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Great Captains

NAPOLEON

A HISTORY OF THE ART OF WAR, FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION TO THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, WITH A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE WARS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

WITH 202 CHARTS, MAPS, PLANS OF BATTLES AND TACTICAL MANŒUVRES, PORTRAITS, CUTS OF UNIFORMS, ARMS, AND WEAPONS

BY

THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE

BREVET LIEUTENANT-COLONEL UNITED STATES ARMY, RETIRED LIST; AUTHOR OF "THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE," "A BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR," "PATROCLUS AND PENELOPE. A CHAT IN THE SADDLE," "GREAT CAPTAINS," "ALEXANDER," "HANNIBAL," "CÆSAR," ETC., ETC.

IN FOUR VOLUMES

VOLUME I

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REMOTE STORAGE

To

THE AMERICAN SOLDIER

WHO, NOT BRED TO ARMS, BUT NURTURED BY INDEPENDENCE, HAS ACHIEVED THE PROUDEST RANK AMONG THE VETERANS OF HISTORY

These Volumes

ARE DEDICATED

575954

"*Faites la guerre offensive comme Alexandre, Annibal, César, Gustave Adolphe, Turenne, le prince Eugène et Frédéric ; lisez, relisez l'histoire de leur quatre-vingt-huit campagnes ; modélez-vous sur eux, — c'est le seul moyen de devenir grand capitaine et de surprendre le sécret de l'art ; votre génie, ainsi éclairé, vous fera rejeter des maximes opposées à celles de ces grands hommes.*" — NAPOLEON.

"*La tactique, les évolutions, la science de l'officier de génie, de l'officier d'artillerie peuvent s'apprendre dans les traités ; — mais la connaissance de la grande tactique ne s'acquiert que par l'expérience et par l'étude de l'histoire des campagnes de tous les grands capitaines.*" — NAPOLEON.

PREFACE.

THE laurels worn by Gustavus Adolphus fell upon the brow of Frederick the Only; and the narrative of that great captain's campaigns, as a part of this History of the Art of War, was completed several years ago. But the publication by the Great German General Staff of the early volumes of its extensive treatise on the Prussian king has interrupted the chronological sequence of this history. The abundant fresh matter and the new point of view in the splendid monument thus erected to the German national hero have made it expedient for the author to await its completion, so that he may embody in his own work many of the new facts developed by the profound research that has for years been made in the inaccessible German archives, and may recast much of what he has already finished. It has meanwhile been deemed wise to begin the publication of the Napoleonic wars, although these should properly follow the campaigns of Frederick. It is hoped that there will be no unreasonable delay in the issue of the remaining volumes.

The basis of all our information about the campaigns of Napoleon exists primarily in the letters, orders and bulletins issued from the headquarters of the armies in campaign. These, checked off by the official reports of the campaigns and battles by his opponents, and compared with other accounts from more personal sources, furnish the material from which to construct an accurate and consecutive narrative. The "Correspondence of Napoleon I.," as far as obtaina-

ble, was published by Napoleon III. in thirty-two volumes. Some letters and orders could at the moment not be procured; a few were for other reasons omitted; but the bulk of all Napoleon's correspondence is spread before the public in the twenty-two thousand official documents printed therein. The volumes also contain Napoleon's Memoirs and other matter dictated at St. Helena. While the latter possess marked interest, they are, like all comments in after days, less reliable than the orders issued and the letters written at the moment of action. These have a positive value. Chiefly upon this Correspondence the author has relied for his details, although the story of this great captain has been so often told that its bald facts may be gleaned from many sources.

The reader will remember that this work deals with only the military life of Napoleon. The political events of this era, or indeed his personality, although replete with interest, can be touched on only so far as they illustrate the art of war, or elucidate campaigns.

The bibliography of Napoleon is numbered by thousands of works, from Thiers' brilliant history of this period in thirty-one volumes to the simple brochure occasionally issued today. Most of these works contain comparatively little that can be used, although the author has made himself familiar with most of them. Some have a personal charm or a political value, but viewed from the standpoint of the art to which Napoleon contributed so much, the majority possess scant interest. Much reliance has naturally been placed on the criticisms of the well-known military historians, beginning with Jomini. It is difficult to say anything about the great warrior that may not already have been recorded. The Memoirs of some of the marshals — Victor, Marmont, St. Cyr and others — the histories and critiques of Scharnhorst,

Clausewitz, Rüstow, Lindenau, Bülow, Martens, Kausler, Woerl, de Ligne, Venturini, Massenbach and many more, are full of matter. Of later books, one of the most valuable is Wartenburg's. To this work, and to that of Prince Gallitzin, which extends up to 1801, the author is greatly indebted. Wartenburg closely follows the Correspondence, and in pursuing the same path, the author has made much use of the intelligent suggestiveness of this distinguished officer. To C. von B. K., Berndt, Odon and various French text-book writers for the present generation of soldiers, thanks are also due. A preface in which acknowledgment were made by name to all the Napoleonic students who have contributed to the author's knowledge would exceed all limits; but he owes much to one and all his predecessors in this study.

It has been thought that quotations from Napoleon's utterances at the moment of action would be interesting to even the general reader, and such quotations have been largely indulged in. Most of them are *verbatim;* a few only recite the general statement or opinion. Those not otherwise credited are from the St. Helena Memoirs. An occasional difference in dates may be due to the use of the Republican Calendar.

The same care in visiting the battlefields in person that was given to former campaigns has with few exceptions been exercised in writing these.

The portraits of the marshals and generals celebrated at that time, as well as those of the great captain himself, will be found interesting. It has been thought better to spread upon the pages many of these, even when of scant artistic value, than to put in a few only on account of their merit as pictures. It will be noted that most of the portraits are those of middle-aged or old men, whereas many of Napoleon's lieutenants were young; but they were too busy during their

fighting years to give sittings for painters. In many cases portraits of even celebrated men seem not to be in existence. Many of the portraits are mere sketches from old engravings, which cannot be reproduced.

The cuts of uniforms and arms help to illustrate the subject treated, even when they lack the highest grade of execution. Nearly all are copied from pictures of the period, among others those of Van der Meulen, Vernet, Charlet, Lami, Bellangé and those in the Versailles Museum.

The maps and charts will be found sufficient. From the maps has been omitted everything which is not needed for the matter in hand. In the charts of battles there has been no attempt to enter into great detail, the general position of the lines alone being indicated, so that the battle in its larger features can be readily understood; for it is not the fighting of the separate divisions so much as the general plan of the leader which interests us. In the charts, the blocks or lines of troops merely indicate general position, and not numbers or specific place.

More space has been given to the strategic operations of Napoleon than to the grand-tactics of his battles. Wonderful as the latter were, the strategic marches were yet more so. They are not in most histories so amply treated, whereas the key-note of Napoleon's successes was that his strategy so led up to battle that victory became decisive; and to the military student the strategic manœuvres are of perhaps greater interest. This has, in fact, sometimes induced the author to give the day's routes of the various corps; but as the legends at the head of each chapter enable the general reader to skip what he cares not to read, it is hoped the prolixity will not be out of place. Much matter has also been put in small type. This matter is, as a rule, not essential to the narrative, but possesses its own interest.

This history of Napoleon is written largely from the French standpoint, although due weight has been given to the authorities of every nation. It is not possible to describe Napoleon's brilliant lessons in the art of war from the point of view of any one of his opponents. Moreover, less space has been devoted to those campaigns in which our British cousins figured than might be natural in volumes written for English-speaking people; but in the case of the Peninsular War, where so great a character as Wellington figured, and where he so often held the initiative, much has been stated from the English standpoint. The Peninsular War has, however, been so thoroughly covered by Napier, and is being again covered with so much amplitude and skill by Professor Oman, that the author has deemed it more desirable to treat these campaigns as a minor part of the great Napoleonic scheme — as indeed they were — than to seek to compete with these brilliant and laborious historians in describing the events in Spain and Portugal.

More than all are thanks owing to my collaborator for the past twenty-three years, my wife, whose patient intelligence has so often saved me from serious blunders, and whose skillful pencil has lent interest to over twenty volumes.

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NAPOLEON

teers;" and the following year a number of free corps, departmental companies and legions of light troops were raised; but it was readily seen that these raw levies could not cope with the standing armies of Austria, Prussia and the other European states which were sure to combine against France, — at least in regular warfare.

Soldier of Legion du Midi.

As soon as France was declared a republic and war appeared on the horizon, the National Convention began the creation of a new army, and on the ground that 'the fatherland was in peril,' called upon every citizen to rally to her protection. The size of the army was set at four hundred and fifty thousand men, including the National Guard and the gendarmes who had supplanted the old provincial police; and meanwhile there were raised thirty thousand men in Paris, which force, with the volunteers and the relics of the old line troops, was got ready to oppose the Prussian invasion of France in 1792. At the same time all France was roused into producing army supplies, firearms and pikes, ammunition and equipments, fieldpieces and caissons, saltpetre and powder. Astonishing energy, backed by the issue of unlimited paper money (*assignats*) and the ever present threat of the guillotine, enabled the Convention to raise, before the end of 1792, an army of four hundred and forty-six thousand foot, forty-three thousand horse, and twenty-three thousand men of artillery and engineers. This army was by no means of the best; and though it possessed exuberant good-will, yet it melted away so fast that in March, 1793, a further levy of three hundred thousand men was

made, and in July one of twelve hundred thousand men. These enormous numbers could be raised by no method except a general enrollment, which should embrace all men from sixteen to forty-five; and this was the first time in modern history when every citizen was held liable to military duty, and the entire nation was marshaled under arms.

Old Guard Sharpshooter.

The act was that of the people, so-called; and a fanatical patriotism, or else the fear of the Convention and its bloody methods, led all men to seek some military duty in the rage for liberty, or as the only personal safety. In the campaign of 1793 some two hundred thousand men were lost to the ranks by sickness and wounds; yet in 1794 the army was greater than ever before.

Inasmuch, however, as this army lacked everything except men, the Convention appointed a War Committee to work out of the existing conditions a plan for an army really suited to the necessities of the time, and able to cope with regular forces: by the autumn of 1793, owing to its efforts, the French army began to assume a definite shape, and when in August of that year Carnot, then a member of the Convention, was put at the head of military affairs, the strides towards an efficient army were rapid. The old line troops, which constituted a third of the whole body, the National Guards, the volunteers and the popular levies were all consolidated. The national volunteers and the old sharpshooters made up the light infantry. The legions and the free corps contributed to

the light cavalry of the line. Infantry, cavalry, artillery and engineers all received proper and simplified organization. Regiments, or, as they were denominated, "half-brigades," were placed on a more modern footing in make-up, titles of officers and tactical work. A Central General Staff was placed at the head of the army, and the whole was systematically cut up into divisions, each one comprising troops of all arms, and having its own staff and administration, thus being a body well fitted for detail on any specific duty. The entire year of 1794 was occupied in this methodical work, which in 1795 was fairly completed; and there then stood ready an army of five hundred and forty-three thousand foot, with thirteen hundred and fifty-six regimental guns; over ninety thousand horse; two hundred and eight batteries of artillery, with twenty thousand men and twelve hundred and fifty guns; in all a force of over six hundred and fifty thousand well-organized men, not including the technical corps, invalid corps, coast artillerymen and the gendarmes. France had risen in her strength.

Infantryman, 1796.

To complete the good work the Directory, which succeeded the Convention, passed in 1798 the Conscription Act, and this has practically been followed in France until to-day. During the Consulate, 1800 to 1804, Napoleon continued and perfected the work of organization and detail, created new military schools, originated the Consular Guards, a *corps d'élite* of all arms, which later became the Imperial Guard, instituted the Legion of Honor, framed a new body of light infantry

called *voltigeurs*, because they could vault on behind and be carried by a cavalryman, placed the National Guard on a suitable footing for home service, and erected the police force, or gendarmes, into a superior body. France was destined to possess a new army fit to be commanded by its new emperor.

Some notable changes had also taken place in the armaments of the other European nations. Until this period wars had been conducted by the sovereigns with their standing armies, and without any voluntary participation by the people, the part of the latter being confined to furnishing such men and material as might be requisitioned by the rulers to fill gaps, and to paying without remonstrance such taxes as were laid upon them, — a duty not always cheerfully performed.

Hungarian Border Hussar.

This uncertain source of supply made it difficult for the monarchs to provide by mere army chests and state economies for the enormous cost of the wars they waged, and often led to their making a peace on poor conditions for the nation, because of the exhaustion of their resources. To these rulers the French Revolution with its popular power was a revelation, and one not entirely to their taste. The whole burden of the war was borne by the French people, and when their armies conquered fresh territory, as in the Netherlands, the burden was imposed in a similar manner on the population newly added to France. In imitation of the French, Switzerland and the Black Forest region soon began a system of manhood service. And Austria anticipated much from a similar action, voluntarily taken in the Tyrol and the Slavic

provinces, in the way she had always counted for recruits on the ancient Hungarian Insurrection.

At the opening of the French Revolution, Austria had about two hundred and twenty-five thousand infantry and forty-five thousand cavalry troops, from which figures might be deducted some late losses in Turkey and in the recent revolts in the Netherlands. Prussia had one hundred and seventy thousand infantry, and forty thousand cavalry. In addition to these forces were some garrison troops, in Prussia about forty thousand men, in Austria less. To compare these figures with the later enormous levies is instructive.

Austrian Light Infantryman.

Infantry. In this arm there had for some years been no great change, except that light foot had proportionately increased. In France, where at first there was a dearth of muskets, the National Guard was armed in part with pikes, and indeed the Vendée troops were originally put in line and won their initial successes with only scythes, flails and pitchforks. Gradually, however, muskets enough were procured. At one time there was some use made of air-guns, as among the Austrian sharpshooters, though this weapon held its place no great time. As regards organization, drill and minor tactics, the infantry of Europe remained much what it had been. The Austrian line regiments had three battalions, the Hungarian four; there were special grenadier battalions, and the light foot was composed mainly of Croats and riflemen. Each battalion had six companies, and numbered in the line regiments nine hundred and twenty-four men, in the

grenadier regiments six hundred and ninety, with the Croats and riflemen, six hundred and sixty men. In 1799 there were sixty regiments of line infantry, two grenadier and eighteen fusilier regiments, each of twenty companies ; seventeen regiments of Croats, two garrison regiments of eighteen companies each, and fifteen rifle battalions of six companies each. The Prussian line regiment, just prior to the French Revolution, had contained one grenadier, two musketeer, and one reserve battalions. The light infantry was made up of fusilier battalions, and there was a regiment of riflemen. Each company contained ten or twenty riflemen drilled to skirmish in open order in its front. The battalion was seven hundred strong, in four companies, the reserve battalion having but three companies. When Frederick William III. came to the throne in 1797, the line regiment had ten musketeer and two grenadier companies, in all about two thousand men ; and the four grenadier companies of each two regiments were taken from it and put into a separate battalion. In England, at the end of the eighteenth century, owing to fear of a French invasion, the available forces were largely increased by the enlistment of fencibles to protect the coast. There were in all one hundred and eleven line regiments, forty regiments of fencibles, one hundred and forty-seven regiments of militia, and some five hundred volunteer corps of various kinds.

In France, when, at the beginning of the Revolution, the National Guard was originated, each first-class battalion had one grenadier, four fusilier, and one rifle companies ; and two field-guns, served by seventeen men, accompanied the body. Outside Paris, Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux, Rouen and Nantes, there were five hundred and forty-seven battalions, comprising four hundred and sixty thousand men. The National Guard of Paris, which Lafayette, fresh from his American training, had well organized and drilled, was the

pattern for the rest. The eighty-three battalions of national volunteers raised in 1791 each numbered five hundred and sixty-four officers and men; and later these grew to two hundred and ten battalions. The riflemen of the old line regiments were detailed as light troops, and to these were added in 1792 six legions of two battalions of eight companies each, a regiment of mounted riflemen, and a corps of artificers. In 1793, after the national volunteers had been consolidated with the line infantry, each regiment (half-brigade) contained one line battalion and two volunteer battalions. The Revolutionary French foot was specially classed as line infantry and light. Of the line there were one hundred and ninety-six, and later two hundred and thirty half-brigades, each consisting of three battalions; and each battalion comprised one grenadier company of sixty-two men, and eight fusilier companies of eighty-six men each. These numbers were increased by supernumeraries when the battalions went on foreign service. Like other foot soldiers, the grenadiers carried muskets, but these companies fought separated from their battalions. They were considered as higher in standing than the average soldier, and under special rules. Grenadiers were not to be used for escorts, they were to remain in a body with their battalion. They were not to be put on picket nor distributed with other troops. The grenadier company was always to be at the head of the column, or ready to march out to sustain the picket, and by its good countenance keep up confidence; but important posts, such as bridges, might be guarded by the grenadiers.

Officer of the Republic. (1793.)

Of light infantry there were thirty half-brigades of similar size, but in these the grenadiers were called carbineers. Each half-brigade, or later each brigade, had a battery of six four-pounder guns. All this made up a force of two hundred and twenty-six half-brigades, numbering over half a million men and thirteen hundred and fifty-six guns. In 1795 the half-brigades were reduced to one hundred and ten, but the grenadier companies were increased to ninety men, the fusilier companies to one hundred and twenty, the battalion, including staff, to one thousand and sixty-seven, the half-brigade to thirty-two hundred men. The light infantry companies were increased in similar fashion, which produced a relative gain in light infantry. In 1800 there were of line infantry one hundred and ten half-brigades; and of light infantry thirty half-brigades. But the regimental guns had been taken from the infantry.

Cavalry. The only general change all over Europe was towards increasing the light cavalry in proportion to the heavy. This arm had cuirassiers and carbineers who were the heavy, and dragoons, hussars, mounted riflemen (*chasseurs à cheval*), so called "light horse" (*chevaux-légers*) and some lancers, all classed as light cavalry. The dragoons were not infrequently put to use as line cavalry, having lost their original character of mounted infantry, which preferably fought on foot. In Austria, in 1789, the regiments of cuirassiers, carbineers, dragoons and light cavalry had six squadrons each; the hussar regiments ten squadrons each. There was one volunteer lancer regiment. Each heavy squadron had one hundred and sixty horses, the light squadron two hundred. In 1799 Austria had twelve cuirassier, fifteen dragoon, twelve hussar, and two lancer regiments of six squadrons each, and one regiment of mounted riflemen of eight squadrons. In Prussia there were

thirteen cuirassier regiments of five squadrons each, twelve dragoon regiments of five and ten squadrons each, and nine hussar regiments of ten squadrons each, the squadron having one hundred and seventy-five horses. In England there were

Austrian Mounted Chasseur.

forty-one regiments of line cavalry, six regiments reserve cavalry, thirty regiments of mounted fencibles, and some two hundred and seventy-five corps of mounted volunteers.

Fewer changes in cavalry organization were made in France. In 1789 there were sixty-two regiments of line cavalry, the heavy and dragoon regiments having three squadrons each, the carbineer, mounted riflemen and hussar regiments four squadrons each. Within four years the cavalry was much increased by adding mounted national volunteers, and creating new regiments of mounted riflemen and others. In 1793 the

organization was changed. The heavy cavalry had neither helmet, cuirass, nor carbine, being armed with only a long straight sword and pistols. There were twenty-nine regiments of heavy cavalry of four squadrons of two companies each, about seven hundred horses to a regiment. The light cavalry, consisting of dragoons, mounted riflemen and hussars, was armed with carbine, pistols and curved sword. There were twenty dragoon regiments of four squadrons each, twenty-three mounted riflemen regiments, and eleven hussar regiments of six squadrons each, the squadron containing two companies. The regiment had fourteen hundred horses. There was thus a total of eighty-three regiments with four hundred squadrons, numbering nearly one hundred thousand horses, two thirds being light cavalry. In consequence of the great losses in war, the heavy regiments were cut down in 1796 to three squadrons, and the light to four squadrons; but three new regiments were raised. In 1803 the entire heavy cavalry was divided into eighteen regiments of four squadrons each, and in 1805 they were made into cuirassiers. There were also the mounted companies of "guides," soldiers originally intended to study the roads and lead the columns, but they later made up the emperor's escort; and the *gendarmerie nationale*, which in 1791 had taken the place of the *maréchausée* or country police, was divided into twenty-eight divisions, in which were sixteen hundred "brigades" of one non-commissioned officer (brigadier) and four gendarmes. The provost-marshal de-

Mounted Guard Grenadier.

partment of the armies was made up of military gendarmes. This excellent body was shortly imitated in every European country.

Artillery. The energetic men of the French Revolution initiated many improvements in this arm. The casting and boring of guns, the cleaning of saltpetre and the preparation of powder, were much improved by the clever French chemists and men of science of that day. The campaigns in the Alps originated mountain artillery which was effective, and portable enough to be really useful. Gribeauval's gun-carriage was simplified, and artillery munition-wagons and all running-gear were perfected. General Eblé invented a grapeshot, and contrived a new species of furnace for heating cannon-balls for the coast artillery. The manufacture of rockets, to throw light as well as to set fire to distant buildings, and other fire-balls, was improved. In technical artillery construction and service many fresh discoveries were made. In Prussia Tempelhof introduced small field mortars, first used to advantage at the siege of Longwy, and later against troops. Guns were cast with conical chambers, as long used by the Swedes, which gave a greater velocity to the projectile. Mortars were also cast with conical chambers, and were proved by the experiments of the Austrian Vega to be more efficient. Count Rumford and others added to the general knowledge about ballistics. On the whole, artillery was increased in proportion to the other

Eblé.

arms, and light and horse artillery in proportion to the rest. Regimental guns were taken from the battalions and collected in batteries. And there being more room for improvement in this arm, it gained in perfection faster than the others.

Bavarian Sharpshooter.

In France, particularly, attention was paid to the artillery as a separate and not a merely auxiliary arm. Even before the Revolution, artillery had received an impetus among the able French scientists and officers, and this advance continued. The arm had consisted, prior to 1789, of seven regiments of foot artillery, with six companies of miners and artificers; but although Austria, Russia and some other nations had introduced Frederick's horse batteries, the French had not done so. When the Convention began its universal levy, the necessity of producing ammunition and guns became imperative; and all France, under four representatives of the people, was divided into eight sections, each supervised by an inspector, who was to oversee the production of saltpetre and powder, and the casting of guns. Most of the copper and iron mills and all the furnaces were utilized for the casting and boring of guns; church-bells were turned into cannon; and the whole of France, under requisition of the central authority, became one vast workshop. Nor was this done carelessly. The strong men of the Revolution were wise as well as energetic. Masters and foremen were trained in Paris under the most cele-

brated chemists and men of science, and sent into the provinces to superintend the work. As a result, in not many months, the production of all material of war grew apace. But too little heed was paid to uniformity of calibre and pattern; and in the early Revolutionary wars there was much trouble in providing proper ammunition for the guns at hand. This, however, got rectified little by little.

Field artillery was then still divided into regimental guns and batteries. The batteries had six, eight and twelve-pounders, with some sixteen-pounders for siege work; and there were six and eight-pounder howitzers. The whole field-artillery arm was divided into regiments and companies. The guns of the foot regiments were mostly four-pounders, and of these there were twelve hundred, which with the battery artillery made a disproportionate number of guns. But the object in this was to back up the courage of the ill-drilled and inexperienced conscript by means of a heavy artillery fire. The creation of a large body of light infantry led up to the production of lighter batteries which might keep pace with the men; and in 1791 there were already two companies of this light artillery, each with two eight-pounder guns and two six-inch howitzers, the men serving which were carried along in wagons of peculiar construction. But during the next year these men were mounted, as being a handier conveyance, and thus the arm grew into horse artillery. Frederick's horse batteries had been a conception of the master-mind rather than a growth. This arm suited the quick-acting French temperament so well that it took on undue proportions. When, in 1793–94, the army was

French General.
(1794.)

reorganized, each half-brigade was given a battery of six guns, that is, the same number of two guns to each battalion was retained. As, however, it was soon discovered that too much artillery retarded the manœuvres of the army without actual corresponding gain, this allowance was cut down to one gun per battalion, or a six-gun battery to each brigade, — a better proportion. The battalions were no longer hampered by each dragging its own gun, the guns being consolidated into one battery, which followed the brigade manœuvres. Thus regimental guns gradually disappeared and batteries came into use, consisting of foot and horse artillery, or according to calibres of heavy and light artillery, the organization being that of regiments and companies, or batteries. Though this distribution changed from time to time, the general trend was towards light artillery rather than heavy ; and the mobility of the French armies markedly increased.

In 1794 the French field artillery comprised eight regiments of foot and eight regiments of horse artillery, twelve companies of artificers and a battalion of pontoniers. The regiment of foot artillery had a staff and twenty companies ; each company was a battery of six guns with eight men per gun, having also supernumeraries for general service; all of which ran the company complement up to ninety-three men. The mounted artillery regiment had a staff and six companies ; each company was a battery of six guns with ten men per gun, a total of sixty men. This made nine hundred and sixty guns and fifteen thousand artillerymen in the foot artillery, two hundred and eighty-eight guns and three thousand artillerymen in the mounted artillery ; a total of twelve hundred and forty-eight guns and eighteen thousand men. In charge of the corps of artillery were two hundred and twenty-eight general, staff and superior officers, including inspectors of field, coast and fortress artillery, arsenal and laboratory commanders and

assistants; and there was a large corps of veteran and coast gunners. The total artillery arm counted over forty thousand men.

Of the heavy batteries, with guns and howitzers of calibres above-named, excepting the six-pounders, six or twelve were united in a *batterie de position*. The four and six-pounders and six-inch howitzers were placed in light batteries made up of four guns and two howitzers. When the French troops were consolidated into divisions, the light artillery got to be called division artillery, and the heavy artillery park or reserve artillery, often *le grand parc*. And inasmuch as the park artillery carried all the reserve ammunition, the division artillery was entirely dependent on it for supplies or for new guns. Such was the 1795 status of the French artillery. A few changes were later made by Bonaparte when First Consul. Gribeauval had long been Inspector-General, but his place was left vacant from his death in 1789 until Bonaparte filled it.

Mameluke in French Service.

The wretched habit had long obtained of having the guns, caissons and wagons hauled by contract. This was altered in 1801 by the organization of eight "train-battalions." The seventh and eighth mounted regiments of artillery were abolished in 1802, and next year seventeen new artillery companies were organized for colonial service, one being mounted. An attempt was made in 1803 to change Gribeauval's simple calibres; but later this was given up.

In Austria the mounted batteries had six guns each, and the foot artillery was distributed among the infantry regi-

ments, two twelve-pounder or six six-pounder guns with each one. An artillery park accompanied the army, out of which the supply could be increased, or a reserve of guns created. Archduke Charles increased the mounted artillery and added some guns to each corps of light troops. In 1799 the Austrian field artillery was divided into three regiments of eighteen companies each.

Dutch Sapper.

The Prussian artillery was partly mounted, partly foot, in batteries and with the foot regiments. Batteries varied greatly in guns and calibres. There were two mortar-batteries of eight ten-pounder mortars each. In 1797 the arm was divided into nine battalions of foot artillery and one battalion of mounted artillery. In the Prussian army operating in France in 1792 there were some thirty thousand foot and eleven thousand horse; and this force had two hundred guns of varied calibre, with the foot regiments and in batteries. This supply was a fair average of all the armies of Europe.

The artillery had its own regulations and tactics. The French artillery was specially speedy in manœuvre. Artillery schools were constantly improving. The Berlin Artillery Academy, organized by Tempelhof, vied with the Chalons-sur-Marne school. But France had more polytechnic schools, to which cadets went from Chalons; and here they studied two years, and then went for practical work to the "regimental schools" at La Fère, Bésançon, Grenoble, Metz, Strasburg, Douay, Auxonne and Toulouse, where the several artillery regiments had their headquarters.

Engineer Troops, and such men as pontoniers, miners, sappers and artificers, had heretofore been a part of the artillery arm, but in France, early in the Revolutionary War, they were all collected in a special corps of engineers.

Part of the equipment of every army was a pontoon-train. In Austria and Prussia there were three pontonier companies. In France in 1793–94 there were two battalions of six hundred men each; this was reduced next year to one battalion of eight companies of seventy-four men each, and in 1799 a second similar battalion was formed. These pontonier companies were constantly practiced in their work, and proved very useful in the Low Countries, Italy and Switzerland, where bridges had constantly to be thrown, not only constructed of boats and pontoons, but made of any material which happened to be at hand. In addition to pontoniers, there existed in France bodies of expert swimmers for use in this work, to lead sudden attacks across streams, and to protect the throwing of bridges.

French Sapper.

Of miners there were in Austria four companies, in Prussia four, in France a number varying in the several years from four to nine, which at last was fixed at six companies.

Of artificers there were in France up to 1793 nine companies, from then on twelve companies, each with four officers and eighty-three men.

The *sappers* were created in 1792; in 1793 there were twelve battalions of eight companies each, the company two

hundred men strong, making the battalion sixteen hundred men, and, all told, nineteen thousand two hundred men. In 1793 the sappers and miners, as above stated, were put into the engineer corps, and later the artificers. In 1797 the twelve battalions were cut down to four, and in 1799 a fifth was made, with weaker companies for all. Austria had but three sapper companies.

During the Revolution the French engineer corps at first fell into decay, because many trained officers had left the country; but the arm was later fully revived. Engineer geographers (what we call topographical engineers), road-builders and others of like profession were collected, and the graduates of the polytechnic schools little by little built up the service. In 1794 there were four hundred officers, from generals down, in the corps; later, some additions were made. This corps rose to great prominence in the Revolutionary wars, and attained a high grade of skill and utility under the Empire.

Cornet of Voltigeurs.

did not soon succeed, it was reinforced or relieved by the second line. Should this make no better progress, and the cavalry not have beaten the opposing horse, the victory was rightfully claimed by the enemy, who had stood on the defensive. Concentric attacks were common, in front and on the flanks and rear of the enemy's army; but unless these attacks could be timed so as smartly to work together, the result was apt to be failure. The army acting on the defensive fought in place after much the same fashion, relying on its artillery and infantry fire; and the second line and cavalry assisted the first line. The retiring of the first line was wont to have an ill effect on the second. Hence, unless the first line of the army on the defensive could stand off the enemy's first line and cavalry to good effect, this army would be apt, for fear of defeat, to break off the battle and retire to a fresh field, an operation in those days of slow manœuvres much more easy of accomplishment than it is to-day, as the opponent was rarely ready to follow.

Russian Chevalier Guard.

Frederick had given to his battles the true flavor of his own burning genius; but as a rule, in disposition for battle and in its conduct, there had since been little homogeneity or concentration. The troops were far too much spread and out of hand. They often lay in small isolated bodies, each exposed to be separately beaten. The whole mass was wont to be put into action at once, so that no reserve was left to reëstablish a waning action, or renew an attack which had

failed, but which, delivered afresh, might succeed. Battles were never fully fought out, and one party or the other retired from a field half won or lost. Reserves powerful enough to give a new turn to a battle were unknown. The French troops were the first which, partly by the accident of exceptional conditions, opposed to this system the open order combined with the column of attack. The success of this

Bavarian Dragoon.

new idea quite supplanted the old Prussian lineal tactics ; and it forms the most important of the tactical changes of this remarkable period.

Thrice at least in our history we Americans have taught the world some valuable lessons in war. At Concord and Lexington we proved the superiority of good marksmen in open order, each one taking advantage of the accidents of the ground, over seasoned regulars who fought elbow to elbow.

In 1812 we gave numerous lessons in naval warfare to the English. In the Civil War, among other things, we showed what was to be the future rôle of cavalry which moved in the saddle and fought on foot; what successive thin lines of attack could accomplish; we first armored ships and effectively used them in war, and we first made many of the inventions in arms which have been the basis of modern rapid fire. This list could be enlarged.

There had been firing in open, or skirmishing, order known as early as the first introduction of firearms. But at the beginning of the eighteenth century only the irregular foot, mostly irresponsible though brave men, thus fought. Then Frederick introduced it among his light infantry; but as the advancing fire of the regular Prussian line was what the king relied on to win his battles, this dispersed manner of fighting never grew to great importance in his scheme. In the American Revolutionary War the open order fighting of the sharp-shooting farmers, with little discipline, lent lustre to the system by beating the marshaled lines of British or Hessian regulars, led by excellent officers. What had succeeded in America was imitated in France, many French officers who had served in America being on hand to teach the



Lafayette.

method. Such were Lafayette and Rochambeau. When the armies of the First Coalition crossed the French border, their long lines were met by irregular parties of skirmishers, who took advantage of every hedge and wall and ditch, and advanced upon them with a fire which did much harm, though these *franc-tireurs* suffered little; while in the rear, under cover of the horse, the new levies formed a heavy column of attack in which multitude lent confidence. And when the skirmishers had done their work, this deep column, with true French *élan*, preceded by artillery fire and sustained by cavalry, advanced on the long thin formation of the allies with great effect, and frequently disrupted their weakened line by a charge with the naked weapon. The effect of this novelty in action upon the old-fashioned line of battle was marvelous. Not until the Gaul met the colder-blooded Anglo-Saxon in the Spanish Peninsula did this column rush tactics fail against the line.

Rochambeau.

While it is true that the use of the open order which began in Europe in the French Revolution was a direct product of American experience, and was imitated by the French under conditions similar to those which had prevailed in the New World a decade before, the ployment into a deep column of the reserve was already well known. Folard, early in the eighteenth century, made plans to draw up troops for battle in deep formation, so as to attack with the pike and bayonet. This was in part a copy of the Greek phalanx, or of the "battles" of the Middle Ages; but it was also founded on

as it had no considerable body of cavalry with which to act. But though the French cavalry could not work in masses, it had become excellent for outpost, scouting and minor duties. And it learned to fight in open order like the foot, which until the middle of this century had been done in Europe only by the Turks, Cossacks, Poles and Hungarians; and this method was gradually put into practice by the line cavalry.

There were nine years of uninterrupted war following the opening of the French Revolution; and these years gave the young and able men who furthered the destinies of the new Republic opportunity to introduce and perfect the fresh system of war above spoken of. To this system the French raw levies owed their successes; the alert Gaul eagerly lent himself to forwarding it; and the Revolutionary armies attained so remarkable an elasticity and ability to manœuvre, such speed in marching, and such energy in battle, as to lend them an unquestioned preponderance over their enemies. Moreover, the Convention ruling France, never freed from fear that the troops would rise against its merciless authority, kept the several armies in constant motion from one point on the frontier to another, never leaving them long in any one place, nor affording them idleness in which to conjure up mischief; and as a result the divisions acquired a mobility in marching and manœuvring, a power to overcome difficulties and sustain prolonged exertion, which in a few months gave the raw French soldier the qualities of the veteran. All this gain was of course not made without much opposition to the new system, without many grievous backsets, as well as many splendid victories. There were not wanting able men who discredited the new idea, and would have put the French soldier back into the old line-of-battle rut. And it was only real and brilliant success which at length settled the new tactics as peculiarly adapted to the French genius, and as superior to the

Prussian lineal-tactics. From France the new system slowly spread, forcing its way against the opposition of the old school; but during this entire period there was, in other European countries, a mixing of the old with the new, a struggle of the latter for precedence, which lent the art of war a color far from clear, and helped to confuse the operations of armies.

There was much written discussion in these days of the rival systems. Advocates of the new system theorized about its advantages and wrought out of darkness a definite method; while the lovers of the old clung to their ancient habits. Lindenau's noteworthy "Higher Prussian Tactics," issued in 1790, showed that what was left of Frederick's method, a mere shadow indeed, though then deemed the best in existence, was full of impossibilities and of imperfections. Other writers followed Lindenau, and by pointing out the value of the one and the weakness of the other, prepared the way for the advent of the new system. And this system was perfected much earlier and to better advantage in France than in the other European countries, and lent the French armies a marked advantage.

The Decree of the Convention of March 15, 1792, divided France into sixteen "military divisions" or sections. Each of these divisions controlled several of the so-called "departments," and all the troops, line and National Guard, therein stationed. These military divisions were kept in force for many years. They were in no sense allied to the tactical divisions, into which, as above stated, the army was divided at about the same time. This latter organization, whose administration was distinct, made a great change for the better, so far as responsibility and care of the troops was concerned. In active service the tactical divisions were homogeneous bodies well adapted to every species of duty. Four

or five divisions, placed under one leader, made up an army which was convenient to handle up to a certain size, say forty thousand men. But in large armies it was found that these bodies were too small and numerous, and that they made too many units, for one commanding general to handle. This led to placing several divisions into an army corps, the first instance of which was in Moreau's army in Germany in the 1800 campaign. This army had eleven divisions; and these were consolidated into four corps, viz.: the reserve of three divisions under Moreau; the right wing of three divisions under Lecourbe; the centre of three divisions under St. Cyr, and the left wing of two divisions under Ste. Susanne. This excellent idea shortly spread to the other French armies. The rest of the European nations had, during peace, adopted the regiment as the unit of administration; during war, several regiments were wont to be placed in a so-called division under a general officer, whose staff was an adjutant-general, two assistant adjutant-generals and one engineering officer. The separate armies had larger but similar staffs of higher rank. But the administration was not taken from the regiments.

French Marine.

Administration and Supplies. For the supply departments in France there were war commissaries, and these officials, often to the confusion of all regularity, were quite independent of military control. Before the Revolution there

was a general staff for the whole army, one for the artillery and infantry, and one for the cavalry; these were in 1792 consolidated into a single body. The utility of a general staff had long been recognized by military men, somewhat on the lines of those which are so efficient to-day, though far less detailed in organization; but no such body was actually created until the end of the eighteenth century. In France engineer officers and topographical engineers were appointed by the Convention to do duty quite similar to that of a general staff; but until the period of the Consuls, the idea was not broadened. When Bonaparte became First Consul, he began such work by organizing the "Depôt de la Guerre," and by increasing the corps of geographic engineers. His system of maps and charts became excellent. It was then a novelty, the lack of which, as in Moreau's 1799 campaign, was grievously felt.

The entire direction of military affairs in France was held by the ministry of war, whose chief, the war minister, was responsible to the heads of the State. There was a War Council prior to 1789, which in 1790 was called a War Commission, and was made up of members of the Assembly; and later under the Convention a War Committee. During the early years of the Revolution and under the Convention, there was much disorder and irregularity in military affairs; but under the Directory and Consulate, especially by Bonaparte's efforts, matters were regulated and carried on with method. The work of the engineers and artillery was particularly to be commended.

When the reorganization of the French army was effected in the years 1793 to 1795, a number of changes were made, partly only in nomenclature, the record of which appears slightly confused. Infantry regiments became known as "half-brigades," lieutenant-colonels (our majors) as chiefs of

battalions; colonels as chiefs of squadrons; brigadier-generals as commanders of half-brigades; maréchals des camps (or major-generals) as generals of brigade, lieutenant-generals as generals of division; marshals of France as generals-in-chief. And the staff officers were known as chief of staff, adjutant-general, adjutant-major, etc. Promotions were changed so that a third went by seniority, and two thirds among the generals by selection of the ministry, and among the lesser officers by selection of those of equal rank. Commanders of half-brigades were promoted only by seniority. The generals in chief were selected by the government from the generals of division. In 1801 there was appointed in the cavalry, and in 1804 in all the other regiments, a staff officer with title of Major, to whom was committed, as a species of assistant to the commander of the regiment, the charge of the horses and equipments, instruction and discipline.

Austrian Light Grenadier.

The pay of the troops, up to the time of the Consulate, was very irregularly made, and then only in paper money. This was, in view of the condition of the French finances and the huge levies, by no means to be wondered at; but it gave rise to very great dissatisfaction and unrest, not infrequently to mutinies. Not before the consular period was this corrected. Nor was France an exception. In the German armies it was nearly as bad.

The most important change of this era was in the victual-

ing of the armies. During the first Revolutionary campaigns the troops were fed by the long-used system of magazines, common all over Europe. It was the war commissary who served with each army to whom was committed this task; and this official handled all moneys and issued all supplies. Soon this means proved insufficient, on account of the large levies to be fed, of the rapid movements required of them over all kinds of country, in much of which supplies were hard to get, and particularly because the war commissaries commonly proved to be inefficient, and all too often dishonest. Many of these men grew rich while the troops starved; and yet the military authorities had no control over them. It was much like, and worse than the clashing of the Indian agents and the army officers in the Indian wars of the United States. These war commissaries procured influence in Paris by the usual means known to all ages and in all climes, and were thus protected in their authority and their peculations. The fact that the army commanders could not get their troops fed led them to resort to requisitions on the inhabitants of the countries traversed. Thus in 1792 and 1793 the French armies got victual partly from the magazines, and partly by forced requisitions, the latter being mostly accompanied by disorder and pillage. The next year, 1794, requisitions became the rule. From the moment the troops left their quarters, they began to levy for their food and forage on every peasant and in every village. If not willingly given, the provision was taken by force, both in France and in foreign lands. Thus arose, out of the existing evil conditions, the excellent system of victualing by requisitions, at the inception an irregular and unsystematic plan, accompanied by much plundering and suffering to the country occupied, but later worked into a methodical procedure, chiefly during the Consulate and by the efforts of Bonaparte.

This was not an entirely new means of victualing. In the Thirty Years' War, and indeed before and after, armies had been fed on the country. In fact, the reason for moving into any given territory was often not so much strategic as that it afforded good supplies; and the land traversed was wont to be left a desert. The armies of the seventeenth century moved slowly, and eat out the country before they left it. The French Revolutionary armies requisitioned as they went rapidly along. The object of the one was to find a prosperous country which might be plundered, so as to keep the mercenaries of some potentate from disbanding until some happy manœuvre or accident yielded the advantage sought; that of the other was to enable it to live while carrying out a legitimate operation.

It was only in the French armies, at first, that this system took root, while the other nations continued to rely on magazines; and this accounts for the more rapid marches of the French. But it was by no means a perfect system, and much suffering among the troops and infinitely more still among the country people was the result, as well as marked deterioration of the discipline of the French levies. It was, however, well suited to the offensive character of the French wars; and as good results followed the rapid manœuvring of their armies, the system prospered. Nothing hampers the operations of an army so much as labored victualing; nothing leaves it so free as to live on the country, if this is rich. But in a poor land, or one long occupied, the result is sure to be a crop of the worst outrages and crimes by the men, as well as much deprivation for the troops, coupled to a complete devastation of the territory passed over. Bonaparte's orders on this subject in 1796, and frequently thereafter, show to what this system had grown. The other European armies still clung to their magazines; and it must be acknowledged that these were not

much more successfully managed; for the Prussians in 1792 suffered greatly on account of defective victualing, both in strength and discipline; and the Austrian campaigns in Italy from 1796 to 1800 were vastly hampered by the difficulty of magazine-victualing, in the effort to oppose Bonaparte's more rapid operations, which were fostered by living on the country.

Baggage. In this period, too, the baggage trains began to be limited, and the abolishing of the daily transportation and erection of tents added as much as requisitions to the mobility of the French armies. In lieu of tents the French levies were taught to construct huts or shelters out of boards taken from nearby buildings, branches of trees, poles, straw and other materials, much as our own Continentals had done a dozen years before. Even in permanent quarters this plan was made to work well. All people used to frontier life, or with a knowledge of woodcraft, know how comfortably men can house themselves with even limited material. Our American volunteers became expert at this business in the Civil War. The system among the French cut down the number of wagons to a small fraction of what they had been, and vastly increased the mobility of their columns. It was imitated towards the end of the century by other nations, and helped decrease the enormous trains, but scarcely in the same degree as with the French. For instance, the Prussian train in 1792 carried one hundred and eight tents for each battalion, and forty for each squadron, to transport which there were needed twenty-eight horses and sixteen men for the infantry tents, and sixteen horses and eight men for the cavalry. Each infantry and artillery company had one, and each squadron two wagons for rations; and in addition to these, each battalion was followed by four, and each squadron by two two-horse wagons to carry the tent-poles and blankets

of the men. The officers were allowed wagons, horses and servants, according to rank. The result was that for an infantry regiment which had twenty-two hundred combatants, there were over twenty-four hundred non-combatants and four hundred horses in the train; for a cavalry regiment of five squadrons with nine hundred mounted men, there were nearly eleven hundred men and twelve hundred horses!

Hospital service during this period dragged on, as a rule, in the same old ruts, although many learned books were written on military hygiene, war surgery, etc., and though in some European armies an effort was made to better the practice of the art of healing.

Discipline. As regards discipline and morale, the French armies at the opening of the Revolutionary period were on the lowest possible scale; but by the efforts of the many able men and officers whom the troublous era brought to the front, this condition was changed, so that by the end of the century the evils always attending a time of civil war and anarchy were finally and fully corrected. But the early years were one long record of mutinies against generals suspected of treachery, against officers loosely charged with appropriating the soldiers' pay and rations, and for numerous other causes. In Metz and Nancy these mutinies reached their flood-tide in extensive outbreaks. Politics invaded the ranks, especially in the National Guard and the fresh levies. This mixture of politics and war led naturally, at the first reverse, to a cry of treason

Austrian Royal Infantryman.

by the men against the officers suspected, and to these officers being murdered on the spur of the moment, or to their being speedily brought to the guillotine. Later there was less of this wayward conduct, but real discipline consumed a decade to bring about. Infrequent pay, poor rations and the establishment by the Convention of "public denunciators" and "revolutionary tribunals" in the armies made it easy for discontent to take the form of a legal arraignment of any unpopular general as an "enemy of the country," which was wont to be followed on a half-hearing by the execution of the supposed offender. As a result, the efforts of even such leaders as Hoche, Pichegru, Moreau and others were long unrewarded by any real gain in discipline. Only those who were favorites with the men could accomplish anything. But on the other hand, the sharp, long and energetic wars bred an unflinching spirit and a power of endurance among the French troops which was of the highest type; and this in a way took the place of formal discipline. And while it is true that to the French soldiery — as indeed to nearly all other troops of the day — can be traced untold instances of cruelty, robbery, arson and rapine, yet these same troops withstood hunger, cold, toil and danger in a manner beyond all praise. Gallant and bold, though fierce and unrelenting, the Revolutionary French soldier covered himself with glory. By 1796 these good qualities rose to their greatest height, and from that year on, not only were his deeds more marked, but his general conduct became more soldierly; and the discipline in general responded, as is usual, to the character of the officer in command. But discipline as we understand it to-day, that discipline which tends to lessen the horrors of war by making the soldier respect the rights of others, while in no wise decreasing his fighting qualities, a discipline perhaps more marked in our Civil War than in any other where enormous

forces have been under arms, was never known in the Revolutionary or Napoleonic armies.

A change in military penalties was made during the Revolutionary wars. Corporal punishment, usual for centuries, was abolished. A new penal code prescribed death for the higher crimes and imprisonment for the lesser. It is curious that in this code no mention is made of dueling, though this was common, not only among individuals, but between bodies of men, whole companies indeed; a fact which led to much absurd but lamentable bloodshed. The habit may have been considered as essential to sustain the honor of a corps as well as of an individual; and the term "honor" was then more apt to be misconstrued than now. A system of military orders and decorations was instituted by the Convention. The highest reward that a French citizen could attain was public mention by the government as having well deserved of the country ("bien mérité de la patrie"). It was Napoleon, as First Consul, who again began the ancient tokens of reward by medals, swords of honor, pensions of soldiers, their wives and orphans, paid out of the army and navy appropriations, and the institution in 1802 of the Legion of Honor. Although the Convention had decreed that captured Vendeans and *émigrés* should be shot without trial, it is to be said to its honor that all other prisoners of war were placed under the shelter of the law, and received rations and even a small money payment. The shooting of Vendeans naturally led to retaliation, and such consequent cruelty as lent the war of the Vendée a peculiar atrocity.

Baden Musketeer.

Balloons and Telegraphs. There were two inventions made in this period which added somewhat of interest to military matters, those of balloons and telegraphic signaling. So soon as balloons were conceived by Montgolfier in 1782, the idea of their utility in field operations was mooted. Aerostatic Institutes were started in Paris to prepare air-ships which could be availed of to observe the enemy, and these captive balloons were actually employed in the early Revolutionary wars. Companies of aeronauts were created, and each army was accompanied by two balloons and a proper service. At first the officers who ascended used the naval signals; but they later employed telegraphic instruments, then just discovered. Teams of thirty and forty horses were attached to these captive balloons to move them from place to place; but as all other efforts to make them dirigible were fruitless, they proved to be of questionable utility. At the battle of Fleurus in 1794, the captain of aeronauts, Coutelle by name, remained above the Austrian lines for nine hours, and telegraphed the movements of the enemy to the French army. It was not this, however, that won the battle, but it had its effect in raising the spirits of the French and in annoying the Austrians. A balloon and full equipment accompanied Bonaparte to Egypt; but we do not learn of its having been used, and after this the service declined. Telegraphic or semaphonic signaling had been well known to the ancients. In modern times, the first use in war of the new electric art was at this period. Especially at the siege of Mainz, a Frenchman named Chappé constructed a simple means of military telegraphy; and later a number of men of science improved the system.

Fortification and Field-works. Perhaps in no war were field fortifications and temporary defenses put to use more

than in the French Revolution. On a large scale the system of separate redoubts, mutually supporting each other, took the place of the old fortified lines. This was, it must be remembered, the era of cordon lines of defense; and it was not unusual to find, for the protection of a frontier, or of an army in quarters, or otherwise, a long line of these separate works. On the north, east and south, in the first Revolutionary wars, France was in fact surrounded by a girdle of several lines of such works, as supplementary to the large fortresses; and between these lay a dozen armies stretched out in cordon. These redoubts usually had a sharp profile and excellent obstacles in their front; and though the old form was conserved, the works were now constructed so as better to conform to the lay of the land. And yet, as always happens, even in what were called inaccessible positions, these redoubts were often captured out of hand.

Westphalian Guard Grenadier.

Field fortifications grew apace in these wars. Many engineers and men of science took up the subject, and Fouassac, Jetze and Marquard added much to it. D'Arçon showed how isolated works could support each other, and the terrain be utilized to this end; Hennert in Holland wrote learnedly on permanent fortification. This latter art was also improved. War sat upon all western Europe; there was no time to build new fortresses; but much was done in improving those existing. Mainz was a good sample of such work, the city being transformed into a fortress in 1792–93. Chasseloup and Bousmard drew plans to correct the evil of leaving fortified places open to ricochet

firing, and to the breaching of the main wall at any point. All the means adopted by Vauban, Coehorn and others had not been able to prevent the effectiveness of ricochet firing, except at great expense. Calibres of guns for fortresses were changed. In 1792 it was ordered that a third of such guns should be sixteen-pounders and twenty-four-pounders, a third twelve-pounders and a third smaller. One marked idea in the changes instituted was to make the work suit the existing conditions, not to construct it by hard and fast rules. The details of these improvements, however, belong to the engineer's art and not to this history.

On the other hand, the means of taking fortresses was somewhat improved. The siege-batteries were given more mortars, and guns capable of ricochet firing; and though there are no instances of the capture of large fortresses out of hand, and few by bombardment alone, yet the regular sieges were much shortened in duration, though they remained the same in form. There cannot be said to have been a distinct gain in the art of besieging in this period. As a rule, when a breach was made, a fortress was surrendered with honor, and with free exit of the garrison; or at least, the garrison surrendered as prisoners of war. Acre was one of the most noteworthy sieges of this epoch.

Rations and Pay. As all men who have seen service know, a soldier, during a serious campaign, rations himself as best he may. Messes and other means of feeding the troops may at any moment lose organization and utility, and the hard-worked man eats as, and when, and what he can. But in the French army there was supposed to be a mess for each company, the bulk of the expense of which was borne by the government, and the rest deducted from the soldiers' pay. The men largely lived on soup and bread; meat and

vegetables were issued when procurable, to make a *pot-au-feu;* and issues of wine at night and brandy in the morning were usual. In garrison or on a peace footing the men lived better in the ranks than the average French peasant, — a fact which partly reconciled the raw recruit to his new life. In the field, of course, it was alternate abundance and starvation, more frequently the latter than the former.

Russian Grenadier.

The pay at different periods was that given in the following tables, a considerable part of the dues to the enlisted men being consumed in mess money, and money for shoes and underclothing. For instance, in a decree of March 12, 1806, aiming to "furnish soldiers more abundant nourishment to protect their health," it was ordered "that from the 1st of May there should be furnished an ordinary mess administered by the captains. This mess was to be made up from the five centimes previously ordered plus ten centimes now given to the men present for duty, and from what remains of the pay, — washing, footgear and pocket-money excepted. Out of this amount, companies are to be provided with three ounces of white bread per head for soup, a half pound of meat and necessary vegetables. The captains may manage this matter as seems best to them, according to the existing conditions, but must not divert any of the money to other purposes. The colonel or other commander is to inspect this matter every month. On a war-footing, fifteen centimes is to be taken from the soldier's pay, for which he is to receive four ounces of bread in addition to his ration, half a pound of meat and two ounces of vegetables."

And Bonaparte wrote about the same time to Forfait, Minister of Marine, "Why, Citizen Minister, do they give a pound of beef to the English prisoners, while the ration of the soldier is but half a pound?"

Just prior to the French Revolution the pay of the troops appears to have been as follows, the livre being twenty sous or cents.

INFANTRY.

Colonel — a sinecure	30,000 livres a year.
Lieutenant-colonel	2,000 " "
Captain of Grenadiers	2,000 " "
Captain of Fusiliers	1,500 " "
Lieutenant of Grenadiers	900 " "
Lieutenant of Fusiliers	600 " "
Sub-lieutenant of Grenadiers	600 " "
Sub-lieutenant of Fusiliers	540 " "
Sergeant of Grenadiers	222 " "
Sergeant of Fusiliers	204 " "
Private of Grenadiers	125 " "
Private of Fusiliers	107 " "

CAVALRY.

Mestre de Camp (colonel)	4,700 livres a year.
Lieutenant-colonel	3,600 " "
Major	3,000 " "
Sub-major	1,000 " "
Quartermaster	600 " "
Standard-bearer	480 " "
Treasurer	2,000 " "
Captain	2,000 " "
Lieutenant	900 " "
Sub-lieutenant	600 " "
Maréchal des Logis (Sergeant)	13 sous a day.
Fourrier (Company quartermaster)	12 " "
Brigadier (Corporal)	8 " "
Private	7 sous 9 deniers a day.

In the dragoons and hussars the pay varied somewhat from these rates.

During the French Revolution there were a number of laws passed relating to this subject. The last one, of September 9, 1799, established the total pay of a regiment of infantry at Frs. 529,065.30 a year. Under the Empire the principal acts were dated December 30, 1810, and June 15, 1812.

Under the law of July 20, 1794, the pay was as follows: —

INFANTRY, LINE AND LIGHT.

Chief of Brigade	21	livres	10	sous a day.
Chief of Battalion	15	"	10	" "
Quartermaster Treasurer	6	"	10	" "
Adjutant Major	9	"		"
Adjutant Major's Assistant	2	"	9	" "
Drum Major	1	"	9	" "
Private	about 10 to 13			" "
Captain	9	livres		"
Lieutenant	5	"	10	" "
Sub-lieutenant	4	"	5	" "

These prices varied somewhat in the grenadiers, carbineers and fusiliers; and there were a number of ranks, such as saddler, armorer, tailor, shoemaker, trousers-maker, artist-veterinary, etc., and various musicians.

CAVALRY, LINE AND LIGHT.

Chief of Brigade	22	livres	a day.	
Chief of Squadron	16	"	"	
Quartermaster Treasurer	6	"	10	sous a day.
Non-commissioned Adjutant	2	"	9	" "

In the artillery there were several grades of captains receiving from 6 to 10 livres a day, and the other officers and non-commissioned officers were paid substantially like the

infantry. Successive laws made a number of changes, but none of great moment.

By the law of May 13, 1797, the following rates were established for generals and staff officers: —

General-in-chief	40,000	livres	a year.
General of Division	18,000	"	"
General of Brigade	12,000	"	"
Adjutant-general	7,000	"	"
Chief of Brigade	5,500	"	"
Chief of Squadron or of Battalion	4,000	"	"
Captain	2,300	"	"
Lieutenant	1,450	"	"
Sub-lieutenant	1,100	"	"
Chief Commissary of War	12,000	"	"
Commissary of War	8,000	"	"
Commissary of first class	4,000	"	"
Commissary of second class	3,500	"	"

The pay of the enlisted men varied considerably, but ran between 6 sous a day for privates to 32 sous a day for non-commissioned adjutants. A surgeon not commissioned in a regiment received from 15 to 20 livres a day.

By the law of September 9, 1799, a

General of Division received	12,000	francs	a year.
General of Brigade "	8,000	"	"
Adjutant-general "	6,000	"	"
Aide Brigadier-general "	5,500	"	"
Aide Major "	4,000	"	"
Aide Captain "	2,500	"	"
Aide Lieutenant "	1,450	"	"

The commissaries of war received from 3500 to 8000 francs.

The line was thus paid: —

LINE INFANTRY.

Chief of Brigade	5,000	francs	a year.
Chief of Battalion	3,600	"	"

Quartermaster	1,200	francs	a year.
Adjutant Major	2,000	"	"
Doctor	800 to 2,000	"	"
Drum Major	292	"	"
Captain	1,800 to 2,400	"	"
Lieutenant	1,100 to 1,250	"	"
Sub-lieutenant	1,000	"	"
Sergeant	225 to 300	"	"
Corporal	165	"	"
Private	110	"	"
Drummer	146	"	"

The carbineers were paid slightly more.

LINE CAVALRY.

Chief of Brigade	5,500	francs	a year.
Chief of Squadron	4,000	"	"
Quartermaster	1,400	"	"
Surgeon	2,000	"	"
Artist veterinary	324	"	"
Master saddler	286	"	"
Armorer spur-maker	286	"	"
Master boot-maker	122	"	"
Trousers-maker	122	"	"
Tailor	122	"	"
Adjutant Major	2,300	"	"
Captain	2,500	"	"
Lieutenant	1,450	"	"
Sub-lieutenant	1,150	"	"
Private	122	"	"
Trumpeter	256	"	"

FOOT ARTILLERY.

The foot artillery was paid ten to fifteen per cent. more, and the mounted artillery about twenty per cent. more, than the cavalry.

Artificers and pontoniers were paid about the same as the infantry.

On May 30, 1810, an Imperial decree was issued, tabulating and settling the pay of all the troops, to begin January 1, 1811, mess money being merged into the pay of the troops. The table annexed to this decree is long and intricate, but a few items being of present interest. There was a mess to cover underclothing and foot-gear, to which the soldiers contributed thirty francs a year. The rules for employment of the ration money were made more positive. Under this decree a

Colonel received	400 to 416	francs	a month.
Major	358	"	"
Chief of battalion	300	"	"
Adjutant	166	"	"
Quartermaster Treasurer	(minimum) 100	"	"
Eagle-bearer	104	"	"
Sergeant Major	48	"	"
Wagon-master	50	"	"
Eagle-bearer's assistant	24	"	"
Drum Major	24	"	"
Musicians	16	"	"
Master workmen	9	"	"
Captain	150 to 200	"	"
Lieutenant	91 to 104	"	"
Sub-lieutenant	83	"	"
Sergeant	20 to 25	"	"
Corporal	15	"	"
Drummer	13	"	"
Private	10	"	"

To this were added rations when in the field, the supply being lessened when in quarters. The pay of cavalry was some ten per cent. higher; the pay of the foot artillery averaged twenty per cent. higher; and the mounted artillery averaged between twenty-five and thirty per cent. higher than that of the infantry. The soldiers of the artillery train were paid still higher, and the pontoniers and men of that class

were also better compensated. Artificers generally averaged fifty per cent. more than infantrymen. Officers of the train were paid nearly forty per cent. more than infantry officers. Doctors received monthly from one hundred and sixty-six to two hundred and twenty-five francs, according to the length of service, in time of peace; and in the field about forty per cent. more. For extra distance, in addition to the regular day's march, additional pay was given, from two francs to the colonel down to ten centimes to the soldier.

To resume what has been said, in this period in France a new system of war arose, suited to the changed conditions, in which the people took part as such, and not as mercenaries. At first full of the rough earnestness of the Revolution, this system was completed by the Consuls. Infantry was divided into half-brigades (regiments) and brigades; and light infantry was increased. Cavalry was also increased, especially the light cavalry. Artillery gained much, and horse batteries were created. Engineer troops were formed into separate organizations. Tactically, open order came into use, with better fire and less loss of life as a result, and it was sustained by columns and squares for attack. The French troops surpassed all others in their new system. Administratively, the creation of divisions was the most important step; and staff duties were made more prominent. Vict-

Hungarian Grenadier.

ualing by requisition instead of by magazines grew into use. Tents gave way to huts and other temporary shelter; and the train was markedly cut down. Much increased speed followed the change.

In other European countries little was at first done to alter the old system. When the French showed the superiority of the new system, a few changes were begun. Such were the collection of regimental guns in batteries; the imitation of the French infantry formation; the creation of divisions; the giving up of tents; the increase of artillery, light foot and light horse. But no European army during these wars in any degree reached the mobility of the French. Fortification was theoretically improved; practically no great advance was made.

Sword presented to Massena
by the Directory.
(Rivoli Collection.)

sible writers, had spread abroad doctrines dangerous to the monarchy. Land, of which the peasantry and middle classes held but a small share, was miserably tilled, and the guilds limited trade and industry. Arbitrary government, rank abuses in the administration, *lettres de cachet* by which any one could be imprisoned, *lits de justice* to collect unequal taxes, forced and unpaid labor on roads and other public works (*corvées*), had brought the middle classes into a condition ripe for any, even a violent remedy. The political hearth of France was covered with inflammable matter; to conserve the kingdom, sparks should have been kept away from it. Instead of this, the French monarch applied the match with his own hands. From the standpoint of the French autocracy, a limit should have been set, and the people not permitted to transcend it, laws being meanwhile passed to do them justice. But the well-meaning king took the people into his confidence; and the people, once having gained a standing, found a means to assert their rights.



Necker.

After many efforts to raise money, Louis XVI. finally fell into the financial hands of Necker, who had been director-general of finances from 1777 to 1781, and was again in 1788 and 1789; and during his administration this minister, to cre-

ate a force on which to lean, began to give to the Third Estate some idea of its value in the economy of the nation. There were two parties in France, Neckerites and anti-Neckerites, bitterly opposed to each other; and it was under volcanic conditions that the States General were called together in 1789.

The three orders, Nobles, Clergy, Third Estate, should by ancient custom have voted separately in the States General.

Louis XVI.

As the Third Estate practically furnished a majority of its members, there being three hundred each of Nobles and Clergy, and six hundred of its own members, increased by a number from the other orders, it desired the votes to be counted in one body; but being refused this right, it organized itself into a National Assembly June 17, 1789. To this some nobles and still other strong and free-thinking men joined themselves. When its place of meeting was closed by the king, it met at the *Jeu de Paume*, and bound itself by oath to make France a constitutional monarchy. This act threatened to erect the National Assembly into the real governing power, for, guided by the Gallic temperament, these new-fledged legislators could not, like "town-meeting" Anglo-Saxons, keep within the bounds of law or wisdom. If he desired to conserve his kingdom, the king should have ruthlessly dispersed the National Assembly, and he might then have voluntarily given the peo-

ple such suitable reforms as he was by nature inclined to do. He indeed appeared in the Assembly June 23, and declared it dissolved, but he did not see to it that his will was obeyed, — with the bayonet if necessary. This would have been tyranny, if you like; for the French people was right, the French monarch wrong. But Louis could only succeed against the Assembly by force, and this he did not employ when he might. It was well for France and for the liberties of Continental Europe that he did not do so. Instead of thus asserting himself, he requested the Clergy and Nobles to meet with the Third Estate, which they did, and Mirabeau, chief orator of the Assembly, soon became master instead of Louis. The better classes in vast numbers, headed by the Count of Artois, second brother of the king, Condé and Polignac, foreseeing what might come, abandoned their estates, collected what they could in personal property, and emigrated.

Marie Antoinette.

Having gone so far, the Third Estate was compelled for its own justification and safety to demolish the monarchy stone by stone. It needed only the 14th of July (when, on a rumor that the National Assembly was to be dissolved, the people, or rather a mob of the people, destroyed the Bastille), and the creation of a National Guard under Lafayette, to enable the Assembly to gain control of the entire army. From then on the popular force grew, while the Clergy and Nobles,

by seeking help abroad, denationalized their cause. The representatives of the nobles in the National Assembly surrendered the privileges which this class had for centuries enjoyed — and abused; the guilds were dissolved, and a declaration of the rights of man followed, founded on the strivings for liberty of the English peoples from Magna Charta down.[1]

Louis had retired to Versailles with some troops; but he was not the man to grapple with such a tempestuous situation. He gave way and agreed to the acts of the National Assembly, which had adopted a democratic monarchical constitution. Another revolt occurred in October, and after the excesses of the 5th and 6th, Lafayette brought the king back to Paris with twenty thousand men of the National Guard. Having stripped the throne of every attribute except a naked veto power, the Assembly seized all authority, and Louis dwelt in the Tuileries, rather as a suspect than as the king of France. On the first anniversary of the destruction of the Bastille the Constitution was accepted by the king. France was divided into eighty-three departments, and subdivided into districts containing the forty-four thousand ancient communes, with a tax

[1] From 1789 to 1815 there were six governments: —

1. States General and Constituent Assembly (Creation of a Constitutional Monarchy), May 5, 1789, to September 30, 1791. 2½ years.
2. Legislative Assembly (Limitation of the Monarchy), October 1, 1791, to September 21, 1792. 1 year.
3. National Convention (Abolishment of Monarchy, Reign of Terror, Wars against Coalition), September 21, 1792, to October 25, 1795. 5 years.
4. Directory (Recovery of Influence by Middle Classes. Bonaparte's Rise and Coup d'Etat of 18th Brumaire, Year VIII.), October 26, 1795, to November 9, 1799. 4 years.
5. Consulate (One Man Power), December 25, 1799, to May 20, 1804. 4½ years.
6. Empire (France the most Prominent Power of Europe), May 20, 1804, to June 22, 1815. 11 years.

There were three Coalitions formed against France; the first lasted from 1792 to 1799, the second from 1799 to 1802, the third was in 1805.

suffrage. Juries were created. The hereditary nobility was abolished. The clergy was made elective. Clubs became prominent: the Jacobins, Cordeliers, Feuillants. Paris was reorganized with forty-eight sections. Mirabeau strove to reconcile the Assembly and the king, but he died in April. Had he lived, Liberty might not so violently have purged the body-politic.



Mirabeau.

The *émigrés* had long urged Louis to flight. In 1791 he attempted this, but was arrested at Varennes, June 25, and brought back. He then accepted the revised Constitution and became a prisoner of the people.

From October 1, 1791, the National Assembly called itself the Legislative Assembly. The Jacobins and the Cordeliers — the "Mountain" — succeeded to power. While many strong and able men sat upon its sloping benches, no Cromwell arose in the Assembly who could steer the ship of state through the stormy sea into which France had drifted. A Latin race was now grappling with the problem which the English had solved five generations before.

Meanwhile the several European monarchies, each busied with its own affairs, stood as horrified but silent spectators of the upheaval. Russia had its war with Turkey and the fear of Poland to engross her attention; Austria and Prussia devoted themselves to watching the manœuvres of Russia rather than of France; England was seeking some means to indemnify

Danton.

herself for the loss of the North American colonies. Italy, Spain, Portugal, Sweden and Denmark counted for little in European policy. But when the people of France had deprived the king of practically all power, and the *émigrés* had brought to bear the strong influence they possessed at every European court, the Emperor Leopold and King Frederick William held a meeting at Pillnitz, near Dresden, in August, 1791, at which the Elector of Saxony and the Count of Artois were present. As a consequence of this meeting, in the "Pillnitz Declaration" the Emperor of Germany and the King of Prussia called upon the French people to return to the old order of things and restore the monarchy, on pain of war. This academic threat was so little followed up by the powers involved, that it had no effect in France except to enable the Republican party to persuade the people that the French king had been at the bottom of it. The Legislative Assembly demanded that Louis should declare war against Austria; and when Louis declined to do so, the Assembly, seeing

Robespierre.

Metz and Verdun. The entire line on north and northeast was weak in the centre, but the streams, forests, ravines, hills and other natural obstacles made its defense an easy task for a good army.

The eastern frontier ran from Lauterburg, along the left bank of the Rhine, to the fortress of Hüningen, or Basle, and was strong. On the Rhine lay six fortresses: outlying Landau, Strasburg, Vauban, Schlettstadt, Breisach, Hüningen. The second line had three: Bitsch, Pfalzburg, Belfort. The Vosges Mountains made a third line of great strength. Neutral Switzerland was the bulwark on the right of this section of the frontier. Only one good road led from the central Rhine to Paris: via Strasburg, Nancy, Toul, Bar le Duc, Vitry.

The southeast frontier was divisible into two parts: One part ran from Basle along the Doubs and Jura Mountains to Geneva, protected by Switzerland. The mountain passes were easy of access, but were mostly held by forts. Besançon and Auxonne were in second line. The roads from Switzerland to Paris were bad. The other part ran from Geneva along the Rhone to Belley, thence along the Savoyard Alps via Les Echelles, Mount Genèvre, Monte Viso, and Barcelonette, to and down the Var to the sea. This part was well protected, not only by the natural features, but by Fort Barolles, Briançon and Mount Dauphin. In second line were Grenoble and Toulon. Lyons was the "cross-roads" of this section. Here also ended the highway over Les Echelles from Chambéry. The roads were not of the best, not even the highway along the coast.

The southern frontier was the Mediterranean and the Pyrenees, the western the Atlantic up to Dunkirk.

The Pillnitz Declaration and the action of France having rendered war inevitable, the Legislative Assembly decreed the

putting afoot of two hundred thousand men, of which there were already one hundred and forty thousand men in the Armies of the North, Centre, Rhine and South. The two former armies of between forty and fifty thousand men each, mostly young troops, stood under Rochambeau and Lafayette along the north and northeast frontier; the Army of the Rhine, of equal strength, under Luckner, was watching the Rhine; the Army of the South under Montesquieu was yet forming, and had but twenty-five thousand men, mostly in garrison. The Coalition assembled its forces slowly. The Prussian troops, forty thousand strong, nominally under King Frederick William and the Elector of Hesse, but really commanded by Brunswick, were heading for Coblenz; Austria had but sixty thousand men available, of which half were already in the Netherlands under Sachsen-Teschen, and twenty-five thousand more stood under Hohenlohe on the right bank of the Rhine; but it was intended to double this force. Clerfayt with fifteen thousand men was advancing from the Brabant country to join the allied right wing. It was proposed in France that the armies should attack the Austrians in the Netherlands, and act on the defensive elsewhere. On the other side the allied main armies were to march through Luxemburg and Champagne on Paris, while the Rhine and Netherlands armies were to keep to the defensive. The Coalition harbored small doubt



Luckner.

that their forces could reach the French capital in one short campaign, and dictate terms to the new Republic and its fresh levies. For, ran their argument, most of the good officers had emigrated, and were now in the allied ranks. Little they knew the cataclysmic vigor of the new men who now ruled France.

The French armies, strung along the north and northeast frontier, were faced by the Austrians, each force split into many parts, and extending over a thin line from fortress to fortress, as the cordon system of the day prescribed. This altogether faulty method had gradually crept into use all over Europe, since the days when Frederick gave up war. It was diametrically opposed to the great king's tenets, for "whoso seeks to protect everything will end in protecting nothing," he had said; and during his campaigns he repeatedly disgarnished one position, to the last able-bodied man, in order to fall in force on the enemy in another. He was in fact the first great modern exponent of the value of massing for a single blow.

In accordance with their plan the French, early in the year, crossed into the Netherlands in a number of small columns, in the Lille-Valenciennes-Givet country. Near Jemappes one of the centre columns was thrown back by the Austrians; another fell back before it reached the enemy; the right (Lafayette's) and the left columns, though successful, then deemed it essential also to retire; for the cordon theory demanded that the advancing heads of column should keep on a level, and as the centre had retreated, so must the columns on the right and left. Both the central French columns had much outnumbered the enemy, but discipline was so lax that there had been no attempt at real fighting. One of the commanders, Dillon, was shot by his men for suspected treason; and Rochambeau was later replaced by Luckner. Quiet

reigned until June. Then Luckner advanced and took Courtray; but he there arrested his operation, on the ground that the Belgians did not rise to aid him. Dillon (brother of the one killed) took command in July near Maubeuge, but accomplished nothing; whereupon Dumouriez was given control. The operations on the northern border had only gone to prove the utter worthlessness of the cordon system, with its numerous strong places and isolated columns operating between or against them, and the still greater lack of value of the French levies, as they then stood.

In Champagne, meanwhile, more important events had occurred. The Army of the Rhine, now under Biron near Weissenburg, did nothing until July. The Army of the North, under Lafayette, was near Sedan, Luckner lay under the guns of Metz, Kellermann (Senior) was near Lauterburg; all told, one hundred thousand men. Brunswick was fast approaching the Rhine with sixty-five thousand men, and with these the Netherlands forces, twenty-five thousand men under Teschen, were preparing to coöperate by a diversion. The allies proposed to thrust themselves in between the French armies and move straight on Paris, on a line from Coblenz via Longwy and Verdun, where the French frontier was to be ruptured; thence to Chalons and down the valley of the Marne. The *émigrés* had assured the allies that the people would spontaneously rise in favor of Louis, and the Coalition



Kellermann (Senior).

Quaregnon flanks the hills on the west. On this highland the Austrians had built fourteen redoubts and manned them with fifty-four guns; and here Clerfayt, Teschen and Beaulieu, with about twenty-five thousand men, proposed to arrest the French advance. Dumouriez had the divisions of the Duke of Chartres (Louis Philippe), Miranda, Ferrand, Beurnonville, Dampierre and Harville, and with these, forty-five thousand strong, he started from Valenciennes and Maubeuge, while a column from Condé was ordered forward to observe Tournay. On November 6, 1792, he came in presence of the Austrians, and speedily moved upon them, holding in hand a good reserve.

Louis Philippe.

Ferrand attacked Quaregnon with his foot; Dumouriez in the centre and Beurnonville on the right opened on the Austrian redoubts with artillery. Harville with a flying right wing was intended to debouch from Siply, take Bertaimont, turn Mons by the right and cut the Austrians off from retreat on Brussels. But he went at his task in a slothful manner, also opening with his guns alone, instead of advancing with his foot. All along the line the Austrian defense was hardy. But French numbers told. At ten o'clock Quaregnon was taken. At twelve Dumouriez advanced his troops in battalion columns under Dampierre and Beurnonville. The wood of Deflenu offered a stout defense, but when Ferrand captured Jemappes and took it in reverse, the Austrians vacated the shelter. On debouching from it, however, the French were thrown into unsteadiness by the heavy fire from the Austrian line and guns, and were on the point of falling back in a panic,

when Chartres rallied them, and at their head gallantly stormed the heights and captured the redoubts. Beurnonville at the same time got possession of Cuesmes, and drove back the enemy's cavalry. At two o'clock the Austrians beat a retreat, which, owing to Harville's failure to accomplish his task, was easy.

Dumouriez would have done better had he attacked the Austrian left, which was the strategic flank, as covering the road to Brussels. But he had not yet risen to the comprehension of this now simple idea. He did, as stated, send Harville's column to attack the allied left, but this officer, it is urged, had orders, according to the cordon system, to keep on the same level with the other columns; and thus hampered, the attack came to naught. The fighting was the first creditable work of the French levies. Elated by what they had done at Valmy, they carried the field-works of the Austrians with praiseworthy courage. The loss was not far from four thousand killed and wounded on each side, and the victory raised the spirits of the French conscripts to a singular degree. The next day the victors occupied Mons. The Austrians retired to Brussels, which a further French advance soon induced them to vacate and retreat behind the Meuse, along which river Dumouriez took up winter quarters. He had overrun all Belgium. The Austrians had lost the land by their absurd adherence to the cordon system. But Dumouriez did not understand how to utilize his vast preponderance of forces so as to destroy the Austrian army.

After this pronounced success, the Convention unwisely declared the country out of danger, a proceeding which was followed by wholesale desertion from the French ranks.

In the southeast, during 1792, Sardinia, allied to Louis XVI. by marriage, raised a force to meet some forty thousand French in the Army of the South, of which latter army part

was ordered to operate against Savoy and part against Nice. The Sardinian regular army consisted of twenty battalions, say ten thousand men of foot, forty squadrons of cavalry, scarcely over five thousand men, and, including fortresses, some four thousand artillery. Its discipline was good. The French invaded both Savoy and Nice, and overran part of each land. It is quite noteworthy that Montesquieu, who commanded the Savoy expedition, concentrated his forces and advanced into that country in one body, thus throwing aside the shackles of the cordon system. This was in a way prescribed by the topography, but still the idea was good. The execution was, however, so faulty that less came of it than might have been expected. An expedition undertaken against Naples, moreover, bore no fruit.

On November 19, 1792, the Convention issued a proclamation offering the assistance of France to any people desirous of throwing off the yoke of its existing government. This was a challenge to all Europe, and its effect was to knit together the not overstrong purpose of the allies.

Light Infantryman. (1791.)

On the whole, the campaign of 1792 proved that France could hold her own against the Coalition. Belgium had been conquered. Mainz, a salient on the Rhine in the enemy's territory, had been taken. Savoy and Nice had in part been added to the French dominions. The allies had set themselves the task of marching on Paris and dictating terms to the new Republic. Had they fallen markedly short of this end, the French would have deemed the campaign won. But not only had their armies been driven back across the French

frontier, but the allies had lost a substantial territory beside. And the main thing gained by the French was self-confidence, and ability to do better work in future. The raw levies of the Republic had met the allied regulars and had beaten them. Up to Valmy, the French recruit or national guardsman was altogether lacking in morale. After Valmy, with his Gallic exuberance, he felt that he could face all Europe. The troops gained, the generals learned, the requisition system worked well, gaps were easily filled in the ranks, and the attitude of the French armies was strengthened out of all proportion to the gain actually made, which was small. What they had won, to be sure, they owed to the allies' slothful method and foolish cordon system, rather than to their own good conduct. A strong allied commander could have marched into Paris and restored the monarchy; but no words can describe the utter weakness of the operations of the Coalition.

Sword worn by Bonaparte in Egypt.

ing fifty thousand cavalry and twenty thousand artillery. But actually not much over two hundred and seventy thousand men were at any one time present under the colors. These were parceled out along the frontier, in the Army of the Rhine, the Army of the Moselle, the Army of the North, the Army of the Alps and the Army of Italy, the Army of the Eastern Pyrenees and the Army of the Western Pyrenees. The Army of the North was ninety thousand strong, the Army of the Rhine half as large; the others were much smaller. Garrisons and reserves considerably swelled the number. Most of this force was raw.

Commissary of Wars.

The allies had three hundred and seventy-five thousand men, well-disciplined and in good heart. The general plan was again to attack the north and northeastern French frontier. On the Rhine were to operate one hundred thousand men in two armies under Brunswick and Wurmser, with Hohenlohe and Beaulieu in support. On the northeastern frontier were eighty thousand allies under Coburg. Piedmont had forty thousand men. Spain put a force of thirty thousand men afoot.

Dumouriez drew up the French plan of campaign. The general idea was to complete the conquest of Belgium and of Nice; and to act along the Rhine and Spanish frontier as occasion demanded. The allies proposed to recover Mainz, and to push the French back across the Meuse.

The allied forces on the Rhine were ill parceled out from the Lahn to Basle, and these were faced by the Army of the

Rhine in Mainz, and the Army of the Moselle behind the Saar. There was so scant a coöperation between the allied armies, that had the French debouched from Mainz across the Rhine and turned against the Prussians, they might have quite upset the allied plans. But the French held to the defensive. On the other hand it was open to the allies to cross the Rhine at Mannheim and cut the Army of the Rhine and the Army of the Moselle asunder, an operation which would have thrown these forces back from the river. As it was, they crossed in the Hundsrück country, turned the left of the Army of the Rhine, and beat part of Custine's forces at Bingen. Custine withdrew the balance of his force to the left bank at Mainz, and the two French armies being now put under his command, he left that city with an ample garrison to its own defense, and retired up river to the Landau region. The allies laid siege to Mainz, and Custine's several operations remained fruitless. In May Custine went to the Army of the North, and Beauharnais (first husband of Josephine) succeeded him. Several attempts were made to relieve Mainz, but the city, though defended valiantly by Kleber, Meunier and Dubayet, fell to the allies in July. Beauharnais ascended the scaffold for thus abandoning Mainz, and was succeeded by Landremont. Being a noble, Custine was easily suspected of not having done all that he might have done to save this city; and accused of

Kleber.

three columns against the villages of Otterbach, Erlenbach and Otterberg. A cross-fire from the French batteries at Erfenbach and Sambach drove the enemy out of the lower land and towards Kaiserslautern. Hoche followed, crossed the Otterbach and took position on the Osterberg, where he established a battery of twenty-nine guns. A cannonade of several hours followed, when a French column of ten thousand men, which had formed under cover in the valley, debouched on Morlautern. The allies received the gallant assault of the French with stanchness, replied by a countercharge and sent a body of cavalry to take the French column in the left flank. This was too much for the young conscripts, who retired back to the cover, where they had formed, and the Prussian pursuit was stopped by the French horse. Each side withdrew to its old location. The French columns sent on Erlenbach and Otterberg likewise failed to make a gain; and on the left bank the allies stood off the French attack. By six o'clock the fire ceased. During the night Brunswick reinforced Morlautern and Erlenbach.

Hoche.

Determined not to score a failure, at daybreak of the 30th Hoche opened his batteries, and shortly sent forward a column of foot in the Erlenbach valley on Buchberg. But Kalkreuth, here stationed, took the French column in flank, drove it back, and even threatened to take in reverse the position at Osterberg. About the same time the French made an unsuc-

cessful attack on Galapfelberg; and on the other bank two assaults on the Galgenberg, and near by it, were driven back by Weimar. At three o'clock the fighting was over. Hoche was forced to retire to Zweibrücken December 3. Brunswick went into winter quarters.

Although Hoche had lost at Kaiserslautern, the Convention recognized the heartiness of the attack, and weary of changes, reinforced the Army of the Moselle. Meanwhile Pichegru with sixty thousand men was pushing Wurmser, and tiring out the allied troops by restless enterprises; and when Hoche moved by his right to join him, the allies, sixty thousand strong, retired to the right bank of the Rhine. Landau, Worms and Frankenthal were relieved. The Army of the Moselle went into winter quarters on the Saar, the Army of the Rhine on the Queich. At this point on the French frontier the allies had once more quite failed to accomplish their end. The Republican forces, despite frequent backsets, had firmly held the French frontier.

In the Netherlands, in 1793, Dumouriez commanded the French, one hundred thousand strong, against allied armies of equal force. The Army of the Netherlands was strung out, cordon fashion, from Antwerp to the Meuse; the allies were parceled out all over the land. The French proposed to conquer Holland, and to give to the people the power held by the Stadholder; the allies to reconquer Belgium. About mid-February Dumouriez invaded Holland with a small part of his force, and in three weeks captured several strong places; but on hearing of the allied inroad into Belgium, he personally returned to the Meuse. The allied leader, Coburg, under whom were serving Archduke Charles, Wurtemberg, Latour and Clerfayt, advanced on the Roer in March, drove away the French troops there lying in cantonments, occupied Aix-la-Chapelle, threw the French back beyond the Meuse, took

after a murderous defense of these villages by the French, during which the two last were taken and retaken again and again, the troops succeeded in tiring out Dumouriez's raw infantry, and aided by the cavalry, which charged in the open between the villages, drove them out of all three places. The Austrian work had been strong, and the battle was theirs. The French cavalry handsomely covered the retreat of the brigades, and the line held itself in front of the Little Geete until next morning, when, on account of the serious defeat of his left by Charles, Dumouriez saw that he must definitely retire. This he did, and took position southeast of Tirlemont.

Heavy Cavalryman. (1795.)

The ill effect of the defeat on the French was such that they deserted wholesale, and made for France. Even the Convention could not guillotine an entire army, and demoralization was rampant. Three days after the battle, Dumouriez had but twenty thousand men. The allies recovered a great part of Flanders; while the French kept but a section, and this by severe measures only. In taking Holland, Dumouriez had lost Belgium.

Whether or not this defeat was the result of treachery on Dumouriez's part is not certain; but treachery was charged, and when the deputies of the Convention came to headquarters to hold him to task, he openly proposed to the army to

march on Paris and restore the monarchy. Met, however, by stern refusal, he fled to the allied camp. The Army of the North was consolidated into the Army of the Ardennes. Coburg was at this moment afforded a fine opportunity for a fatal blow to the Republic by an advance on the capital, but he failed to utilize it. He was indecisive and slow. Neither were the French in any position to assume the offensive, and the allies managed to capture Valenciennes, Condé and le Quesnoy, and besieged Dunkirk during the summer months. They had a quarter of a million men on their line from Lille to Basle, but as usual infinitely divided their forces. The Convention raised fresh levies, and placed Houchard in command of the Flanders armies.

Despite their excellent chances this year, the allies practically accomplished nothing in the Netherlands. Houchard, who received orders to cut the English off from Furnes and drive them into the sea, beat the Dutch at Hondschoote and saved Dunkirk; but as he took no advantage of his victory and had failed to accomplish the task set him, he was recalled and guillotined, "*pour encourager les autres.*" The allies, with a second army out for protection, laid siege to Maubeuge. In place of Houchard, Jourdan was put in command of all the armies along the northern frontier. With forty-five thousand men the new leader advanced on Maubeuge, beat the protect-

Jourdan.

ing army at Wattigny, and relieved the fortress. The allies retired across the Sambre. After some unimportant additional manœuvres in Flanders, both contestants went into winter quarters. The allied work in the Netherlands had practically come to naught. The French had maintained their frontier, though they had lost part of their outside holdings.

In Italy, in 1793, after some changes, Kellermann (Junior) came into command of both the Army of the Alps and the Army of Italy. His operations were not, however, followed by much good fortune. The allies recaptured Savoy, and the French were compelled to vacate Nice. Later, part of Savoy was again taken by Kellermann; but on the other hand Toulon was captured by the English. Yet, weighing the *pros* and *cons*, the allies had made no greater gain on this field than in the north.

Kellermann (Junior).

The execution of Louis had brought Spain into the Coalition. She had a force of ninety thousand foot and fifteen thousand horse, of which thirty thousand men were on the frontier, in Catalonia, Navarre and Aragon. In the Eastern Pyrenees Davout, and later Thureau and Doppet, were held in check in their attempt to invade Catalonia by Ricarod. A number of minor engagements were fought, and much manœuvring done over this difficult terrain, with no decisive result, and the French went into winter quarters near Per-

pignan. In the Western Pyrenees no greater result was obtained; nor indeed in Aragon. The French had not been able to get a foothold in Spain. But they had made secure the Republican frontier.

The important recapture of Toulon from the English, which occurred this year, and in which Bonaparte first played a leading rôle, will be detailed later.

The results of 1793, then, were unimportant for the allies, who in their project of invading France and changing her new government had made no substantial headway. On the whole the French had, even with their raw levies and poor conduct, more than held their own against the regular troops of the allies, which, led by hidebound exponents of the old methods of war, had done themselves scant justice.

The war of the Coalition on the French Republic was largely one of Anglo-Saxon business methods pitted against the furious energy of the Gaul. While England put few British regiments into the field, she was lavish of her money in subsidies to those who could furnish men. Still striving to bring all the European powers into the Coalition, by 1794 she was in good part successful with the smaller ones. Portugal, Naples and Tuscany mobilized. Holland did the same. Genoa wavered. Venice refused French advances and armed. Prussia had been tempted to leave the Coalition, but was persuaded by England to remain in it and furnish

Officer of Light Infantry. (1795).

sixty thousand troops, to be fed and paid by England. Switzerland remained neutral, which was of vast gain to France, and Russia held aloof. England raised her army to sixty thousand men, subsidized forty thousand foreign troops for her own service, and put her navy on a war footing of eighty-five thousand men. The Vendeans were furnished aid, and an expedition was sent against Corsica.

Perhaps no leaders of a great national uprising ever had more difficulties to face than the men who fathered the French Revolution. There were great men in those days, not always men such as peace and plenty breed, but men of the moment, fierce, intractable, ruthless, who sought by any means, fair or foul, just or unjust, to accomplish the one object they had at heart — the liberation of the French from the yoke of centuries of oppression. However much hatred they engendered, however much the world may shudder at the recital of their doings, no one can withhold his meed of admiration for their courage and ability.

The difficulties before them were not only those of foreign interference fostered by the Royalists who were driven out of France, but those of internal struggles, which necessitated the keeping of large armies to suppress civil war, and made the tenure of office by the parties in power one of extreme uncertainty. As there was much civil bloodshed, and as no tyranny was ever worse than that which succeeded the deposal of Louis XVI., so there were many men in power whose guiding motive was merely self-seeking; but amongst these men there was also a leaven of true patriots, and it was eventually the influence of these men which prevailed.

Foremost among the difficulties which the Revolutionary leaders had to face was the war in the Vendée. This struggle has little to do with a history of the art of war, except for its interest as the insurrection of a people. As such, a few words may be devoted to it.

The Vendée began in 1793, and lasted with more or less intensity and after sundry truces and pacifications, until 1799, when it was suppressed, only to break out spasmodically thereafter, especially in 1813, 1814 and 1815. It was a war for the throne and the rights of the Bourbons, and was characterized by extraordinary courage and self-sacrifice on the part of the Vendeans.

The theatre of the *Vendée Militaire* was that which is known to-day as the departments of the Vendée, the Sèvres, the Loire Inférieure, and the Maine et Loire, that is to say, the country lying on the northeast of the Bay of Biscay, sheltered by the peninsula of Finisterre. It contained a population of eight hundred thousand souls, and was topographically divided into Le Bocage, or forest land; Le Marais, or marsh land; and La Plaine, or flat upland. The forest land comprised two thirds of the area, and contained isolated farms and estates closed in, as were also the fields, by ditches, live-hedges and fences, and connected by mere semblances of roads, which during the rainy weather could scarcely be used. Le Marais was near the sea, open and flat, and cut up by many canals, ditches and small shallow ponds, through which, as in many parts of Holland, nearly all communication between town and town, and farm and farm, was kept up by means of flat-bottomed boats. Pedestrians were forced to carry poles by means of which they might vault over the canals and ditches. Open stretches of country could be found only near the mouth of the Loire. There were scarcely any highways which could be used for the operations of an army. Over most of this land troops would have to move by squads, or even in single file.

The Vendeans were a robust people, moderate, laborious, of strong and stubborn character, and fixed though narrow religious views. They were strong partisans of the Bourbons,

ies of Republican troops sent against them, and captured some artillery. Hereupon the Convention declared the insurrectionists to be outlaws, and ordered La Bourdonnaye, who commanded in this district, to form two columns of three thousand men each, to guard the communications with Brittany. At the same time it called out fifteen thousand men under Berruyer, composed of fresh levies. In Angers Berruyer divided his army into four parts, purposing to move on the Vendeans from different directions and push them into the ocean; and, in fact, he did win a victory at Beaupréau against thirty thousand Vendeans; yet Larochejaquelin, leader of the Vendeans, beat one of his advance bodies at Aubiers, collected a number of the insurrectionists, threw part of the Republican troops across the Loire, and shut up others in Bressuire and Fontenay. On May 5 the main Vendean army, twenty thousand strong, under D'Elbée and Cathelineau, surrounded and captured a Republican army, taking six thousand muskets and twelve guns, and the patriots were joined by the experienced Lescure, and many less valuable friends, among them an adventurer who called himself Bishop of Agra. On May 9 this force closed in Parthenay, and on the 13th Chataigneray; but the booty collected induced many of the men to desert. Even patriotism is not always proof to the seduction of loot. On May 16 the

Larochejaquelin.

Vendeans attacking Fontenay were beaten; but Bonchamp and Larochejaquelin came up to their assistance, and the Republican troops on the 24th were defeated with the loss of forty guns and much material, victual and money.

Biron now took charge of the Bleus, but his forces were still undisciplined; they were in fact no better than the forty thousand men that the Vendeans collected in Chatillon and Vihiers. The Vendeans took Doué and Saumur early in June, but were shortly driven back to Tours by Menou, who commanded ten thousand Bleus. Cathelineau was then elected "Generalissimo of the Royal Catholic Army." He determined to move on and capture Nantes as a central base. Bonchamp wanted to move into Brittany and Normandy and on towards Paris; but the Vendeans, in fact, moved down the right bank of the Loire, took Angers and reached Nantes the end of June, being joined by Charette, who had marched by the left bank. Here fifty thousand Vendeans shut in ten thousand Bleus under Canclaux, but the Vendeans could not get possession of the city. Cathelineau was killed. Canclaux was joined by other Republicans; and Westermann, who commanded Biron's cavalry, beat the Vendeans in several engagements, but earned a bad reputation for cruelty to prisoners. On July 5 he was entirely defeated by Bonchamp and Larochejaquelin, whereupon, in retaliation, the Vendeans cut down all the prisoners they took. Another Republican

Cathelineau.

force marching from the Saumur country was defeated, but the southern Vendeans failed in their effort to capture Luçon. D'Elbée succeeded Cathelineau, but there was much disagreement among the Vendeans as to leaders and management.

In five months the Vendeans had created a strong and fairly well-armed force, and their successes over the Bleus had been so considerable as to compel the central power to raise large forces to put them down, and as they phrased it to "destroy the race." The bitterness of the Republicans was equaled by their cruel measures. It was essential to put better troops in the field against the Vendeans; and the garrison of Mainz, which city had lately been surrendered to the Austrians, was sent to the Loire. Here the army was parceled into three divisions, one so called of Brest under Canclaux, six thousand men and twenty guns; one of La Rochelle, ten thousand men and thirty guns, under Rossignol: and one of the Mainz troops, eighteen thousand men and thirty guns. These forces, thirty-five thousand strong, were to operate from Nantes, cut the Vendeans from the sea, push them into the interior and surround them. On September 9 the Republicans broke up from Nantes in two columns, the Brest column against Machecoul, the Mainz column (Kleber commanding van) against Légé. The La Rochelle column also moved on Saumur and Cholet, but the Vendeans managed to beat the latter separately, and to force back Kleber and Canclaux. The Republicans retired to Nantes. Hereupon the Convention joined the Brest and La Rochelle divisions under the name of the Army of the West, and Lechelle was put in command, a poor soldier, who during his short term of office moved into the Vendean country in two concentric columns. On October 15 twenty-three thousand men of the Army of the West, under Beaupuy, Marceau and Kleber, got in the rear of the Vendeans, forty thousand strong, at Cholet.

Here D'Elbée and Bonchamp were defeated October 17, and driven back to Beaupréau with heavy loss. Charette, busy with other operations, had failed to sustain his brother officers. The Vendean army was compelled to cross to the right bank of the Loire, followed by many old men, women and children, to escape the fury of the Republicans.

Marceau.

Larochejaquelin succeeded D'Elbée; Chalbos, Lechelle. The Vendeans strove to enlist Brittany in their cause, and in October took Laval. Here Kleber was defeated by them, despite which, however, he was left in command of his division. The Republicans reorganized, after repeated defeats, in Angers. The Vendeans, though above all they needed union, disagreed as to plans, and finally, in the hope of English aid, moved in force to Granville, on the Normandy sea-coast. But they could capture neither this town nor Avranches.

The Republicans collected a force of levies and peasants behind the Vire, and the troops from Angers and Rennes followed the Vendeans into Normandy. Seeking to move back to the Loire country, the Vendeans won a battle at Dole, but instead of pursuing the enemy, turned to bombard Angers, hoping to cross the Loire on its permanent bridge. This vicinity, however, they soon had to leave on the approach of the Republican army under Marceau, who had now been put

in charge. The Vendeans again strove to reach the left bank of the Loire, but the Republicans headed them off, and they moved back into Maine. On December 8 they were nearly defeated at La Flèche, being saved only by the clever management of Larochejaquelin. Marceau now marched from Angers towards Laval, and obliqued on Le Mans in three columns. The left column, in advance of the others, struck the Vendeans a heavy blow, but was beaten off; and the second column attacked and took the suburbs, December 12. Kleber with the right column came up in the succeeding night, fell on the Vendeans, and drove them back on Laval with the loss of ten thousand men and all their artillery and train. Very many old men, women and children were ruthlessly cut down. A detachment occupied Angers to prevent the Vendeans reaching the other side of the Loire.

Charette.

After this defeat the Vendeans could not hold head to the Republican forces. Marceau followed them up sharply, and the garrisons of Saumur, Angers and Nantes prevented their crossing the river. On December 16 they attempted to steal a passage between Angers and Nantes, but fruitlessly. They were driven back to Sarenay, where on December 22 the body was attacked by the Republicans and cut to pieces. The few who escaped the sabres of Westermann's cavalry went to the guillotine. Only a handful saved their lives. South of the

Loire, Haxo's Republicans had been equally successful; and the year 1793 ended with the almost total destruction of the Vendée and its population. The first six months had been favorable for them, but from September to December their chiefs disagreed, and they worked in detail instead of together, and thus could not meet the better troops and generals the Republicans continued to send against them. Instead of sticking to their proper rôle of a popular uprising, moreover, and fighting in small bands on the defensive, they undertook a regular warfare to which they were not suited. In the beginning of 1794 the Vendée was still further ravaged by the Republicans, and on the other hand the Vendeans revenged themselves by killing all captured Bleus. It became a war of extermination. Larochejaquelin alone held the Vendeans together. Westermann, whom Larochejaquelin had defeated at Vezins, was guillotined; and Larochejaquelin fell in battle.

Westermann.

The further operations in the Vendée are less interesting; but France had to struggle with civil war until Hoche finally pacified the country in 1796, and Bonaparte subdued the Chouans of Brittany in 1800. After this the outbreaks were spasmodic.

There is no end to the stories of heroism, on the part of men and women alike, in this hopeless struggle for faith and king; but these may not be dwelt upon. The war is mentioned solely to show the method of the Vendeans, as well as to draw attention to the serious internal difficulties with which the Republican authorities had to contend while facing all Europe in arms.

northern frontier of France were the troops furnished and subsidized by England. Austria, despite her losses, got into line a quarter of a million men, most of which force went to the Netherlands. The Prussian troops were fed at a large cost by England and Holland, and numbered over fifty thousand men. Holland furnished its usual contingent. The German Empire did the like. The Coalition in one way or other had nearly a million men of all kinds afoot, but as this comprised home and garrison troops, not half of the numbers were actively engaged. The Upper Rhine forces numbered sixty thousand men; sixty-five thousand men stood near Mainz; twenty thousand were in Luxemburg. The main army in the Netherlands had fully one hundred and fifty thousand men for duty. In Italy stood forty thousand, and in the Pyrenees fifty thousand men.

The purpose of the allies was to push hard on the northern and northeastern frontier of France, and perhaps this year to open the long essayed path to Paris. In Italy the troops would stand on the defensive, or assume the offensive only if good chance offered; and the Spaniards were to push through the Eastern Pyrenees and act on the defensive in the Western Pyrenees, so as to draw French forces away from the northern armies. The allies' plan was good, but they forgot to take into account the tremendous momentum of the popular uprising in France.

Line Infantryman. (1795.)

Pichegru, high in favor, commanded the Army of the North, which was strung out from Dunkirk through Lille, Douay and Cambray to Maubeuge, with the Army of the Ardennes sustaining its

right. The fortresses were mostly garrisoned by new levies. Coburg commanded the allies in the Netherlands, and these were also strung out from the ocean to the Rhine, the English under the Duke of York on the right. The French had several fortresses to recapture. They were superior in numbers, but not as good in discipline. Carnot, now French minister of war, drew up the plan of campaign, which, under his pet theory, was to comprise the turning of both allied flanks in the Netherlands. Each opponent was again about to operate on the old cordon system, which had fully taken possession of men's minds, to the exclusion of every sound strategical idea that Gustavus and Frederick had taught the world.

In March, 1794, the allies advanced upon Landrecies with eighty-five thousand men and closed it in. The fortress surrendered April 30, and the French fell back after two rather faint attempts to relieve it. The capture of Landrecies in a way ruptured the centre of the French line, and foreseeing the danger, the Committee of Public Safety ordered Jourdan up with the Army of the Moselle, and Pichegru was otherwise sustained. On April 25 the latter general advanced in two columns on Menin and Courtray. Menin was smartly taken by Moreau. Clerfayt advanced to meet Pichegru, but was beaten at Courtray May 11, and the allied right wing fell back. Ypres was blockaded by the French about the end of April.

At the same time the Army of the Ardennes attempted to cross the Sambre in several columns on a front extending from Charleroi to Maubeuge; but after some heavy fighting, was defeated, with a loss of four thousand men and twelve guns, on May 13. All the battles of this period, however stoutly contested and costly, seem to have remained without result. Nor even when the details which remain to us suffice,

the city was made to capitulate June 25, just as Coburg got ready to take decisive action. The possession of Charleroi gave Jourdan a marked advantage, and added the French besieging forces to the fighting line.

The allies had forty-six thousand men; the French are given as seventy-five thousand, but they were of far inferior quality. Coburg drew up his line on the usual cordon plan in a huge semicircle around the French position, and formed five columns of attack widely separated, each one subdivided into other columns. On the right, Orange was to debouch from Herlaymont; next came Quosdanovich from Frasne; then Kaunitz, who was to operate towards Fleurus to help the Archduke Charles, after taking which, both would advance on Ransart; finally Beaulieu was to debouch through Baulet on Lambusart.

Jourdan's line ran from river to river, through Trazegnies, Gosselies, Heppignies, Fleurus, Lambusart, the divisions standing in order, Kleber, Marlot, Championnet, Lefebvre, Marceau. Considerable forces were out beyond the line in the several villages.

At daybreak of June 26 the allied leader threw all five columns on the French lines. Exhibiting great gallantry, they met with uniform success. Orange had three columns of attack, and speedily drove in Kleber's division as far as Marchiennes, where, learning that Charleroi had surrendered, he paused, and afforded Kleber time to mass his guns on the hills and force the allies back. Quosdanovich pushed in Marlot's advanced parties to Gosselies, and Kaunitz forced Championnet in to Heppignies, where he waited until Charles ousted Lefebvre from Fleurus; but Kaunitz was shortly driven out by Jourdan, who brought up his cavalry for the purpose. Meanwhile Beaulieu had attacked Marceau's division, broken the young troops, and forced the bulk of them across the

Sambre. But, collecting a few brigades, Marceau held fiercely on to Lambusart, where Lefebvre came up to his aid. Here was the bloodiest fighting of the day; and this village became the key-point of the field. Finally the haystacks and thatched roofs of the village caught fire, but the battle raged on in the midst of flames, with surprising tenacity on either hand. Jourdan brought up all the reserve troops he could gather, and the place was held. The day, with more energy, would have proved an allied victory, but Coburg, on the news of the fall of Charleroi being confirmed by Beaulieu, elected to retire, which he did in many columns on Sombref, Quatre-Bras and Nivelles, Roeulx and Mons.

Lefebvre.

The French loss is given as six thousand men. The allies quoted their own losses as sixteen hundred, and the French claimed the allied loss to be thirteen thousand. It is probable that the allied casualties exceeded five thousand. The battle of Fleurus was followed by a fresh advance of Pichegru's army during the summer, by the retreat of the allies behind the Meuse, and the occupation of Belgium and West Flanders by the French. Brussels was entered July 10. The persistency of the Republican leaders had been as admirable as their military methods were lacking.

Clerfayt succeeded Coburg. Jourdan, late in August, marched against the former and pushed him back to the Roer, on which river he defeated the enemy October 2; and after

a number of smaller exchanges the allies retired behind the Rhine into winter quarters. On either side these armies of seventy or eighty thousand men had been ill-handled. Upon Clerfayt's retreat the Duke of York and the English army felt constrained to retire behind the Waal, upon which York went to England, leaving Walmoden in command. The Army of the North followed up the allied retreat. Pichegru crossed the Meuse and the Waal on the ice and, taking Bommel by assault, reached Utrecht January 19, and Amsterdam next day. The whole of Holland was overrun by the end of January, 1795. To show how oddly warfare is at times conducted, the fact may be mentioned that the French hussars rode out into the Helder Strait upon the ice, reached the Dutch fleet, which was frozen in near Texel island, and captured it, — as strange a cavalry exploit as ever occurred. The Army of the North then went into winter quarters. Holland had no recourse but to make a treaty with the French.

There is much in the campaign in Flanders which is of interest; but as it is no part of this history, furnishing as it does no lesson in the art of war, except to exhibit the folly of the cordon system and the status upon which Bonaparte grafted his new method, these otherwise important events must be passed over with only brief mention.

French Grenadier. (1795.)

The result of the Netherlands campaign of 1794, during which the allies had proposed to invade France and push on to Paris — a purpose by no means dulled by three successive failures — had resulted not only in their not entering France, but in their being pushed back behind the Rhine, and being

compelled to abandon Belgium and Holland. Whatever criticism may be passed on the lamentable strategy and tactics of both sides, it is to be said to the credit of the French that, during each of the years 1792, 1793 and 1794, they had placed more men and better generals in the field as time went on. The energy of Pichegru and Jourdan, under the lash to be sure of the Committee of Public Safety and its horrible methods, was much to be commended. Four times they failed after crossing the Sambre; the fifth time they succeeded; and while this success was largely due to the bad system, quarrels and utter lack of energy of the allied generals, yet the French commanders deserve none the less credit for what they accomplished. It is to be noted that here and on the Rhine were a number of Bonaparte's later opponents, Mack, Beaulieu, Wurmser and others, practicing in a subordinate command those errors of the cordon system of which the great soldier was by and by on a larger scale to teach them the worthlessness.

While the Netherlands armies were waging a warfare in detail, which eventuated in favor of the French, the allies concentrated one hundred and fifty thousand men on the Rhine. Facing this array of allies were the Army of the Moselle and the Army of the Rhine. The purpose was to stand on the defensive along this part of the French frontier, and up to May little occurred beyond small-war. In July the French made an advance movement, but without result. Later, under orders from Carnot, another movement forward was made in the Vosges region, and part of the allied army retired across the Rhine at Mannheim. In August Moreau advanced on Trèves and took it; and though its recovery was attempted and the French were a second time beaten at Kaiserslautern, yet the general effect of the French advance in September and October was that the allies retired to their side of the

river. Mainz was then blockaded. Thus on the Rhine, as well as in the Netherlands, the French had held their own, and more. According to the strict rules of the cordon system, when the main army in the Netherlands retired, the Rhine forces had to do the like; and although the French also followed the cordon system in a way, they displayed much greater decision and intelligence in their operations.

In Italy the Army of the Alps and the Army of Italy, respectively of thirty-five and forty thousand men, were faced by not exceeding forty thousand allies all told. The Army of the Alps under Kellermann got possession of the little St. Bernard and Mont Cenis. The Army of Italy under Massena did some good work. A plan drawn up by Bonaparte, who was then serving in the Army of Italy as an artillery officer, was begun; but lacking, as it did, its author's vigor of execution, it failed of the largest result. The pirates were, however, driven out of Oneille; and chiefly by the efforts of Massena, Saorgio was also taken, and the Austrians driven back to Ceva. Seizing the Col di Tenda, the French forced the allies down to the foothills, where they concentrated around Coni. In July an advance was made on this fortress, but the 9th Thermidor and fall of Robespierre arrested the undertaking. The French retained the watershed. The allies in September, attempting to take Savona, were beaten off; and the place being occupied by a French garrison, the coast as far as Savona was covered by the French winter quarters. The allied winter quarters lay in the shelter of the fortresses beyond the mountains. Scherer took command of the Army of Italy, and to Kellermann was given the joint control of both armies.

French Hussar. (1795.)

In the Pyrenees the western Spanish army was intended to remain on the defensive, the eastern one to advance across the French frontier. But the French anticipated the Spanish, and Augereau, the later so distinguished Marshal of the Empire, won some credit for a victory at Seret; after which the Spaniards retired across the border, followed by the French. Constant exchanges took place during the campaign, in which the names of Victor and Sauret also appear with distinction. The campaign ended by the capture of Figueras. In the Western Pyrenees there was also much secondary fighting of no particular interest. On the borders of Aragon a number of expeditions were undertaken, and swords crossed without important effect.

On the whole, then, the result of the campaign of 1794 was naught on the part of the Coalition, and of marked value on the part of France. The allies had accomplished no part of their vast undertaking, while the French Republic, in three years, had pushed forward its frontier on all sides in a manner which Louis XIV., after nearly fifty years of warfare, had been unable to attain. The Committee of Public Safety, and especially Carnot, had conducted the defense of France with an offensive method which, allowing all its faults, had produced great results. The campaign had shown what an active organization like the new Republic could succeed in doing against a lifeless body like the Coalition. The raw levies and new generals of France had proved more than a match for the veterans of the allied armies, led by officers long trained in war.

The fine results of the French operations in 1794 led to a peace with Prussia in April, 1795, by which France remained in possession of some of the conquered Prussian territory on the left bank of the Rhine. Hesse-Cassel made a later peace, and Holland concluded an offensive-defensive alliance with

ing a gap between Laubenheim and the Rhine. General Schaal, in command of the French, had about thirty thousand men in the blockading lines, and the division commanders stood from right to left: Courtot, Gouvion St. Cyr, Mengaud, Rencauld. So soon as Clerfayt reconnoitred this position on October 25, he saw that the gap of over half a mile between Laubenheim and the Rhine opened a good chance of breaking the blockade. He arranged to make stout feints on the French left, and under cover of these, via Weissenau and across the Rhine, to take the French right in reverse. This attack was carefully prepared during the night of October 28–29. Early on the 29th Monbach was smartly attacked, and the French generals drew troops from the right to reinforce the left. Bodenheim, in Courtot's rear, was taken by a column which crossed the Rhine in boats. The Weissenau column advanced without firing a shot, captured the outlying works of Laubenheim with a rush, and pushed in on Courtot's division; while a second column advanced on Hechtsheim, a third on Brenzenheim, and still another column captured Gonzenheim. Courtot retired after a good defense, and St. Cyr was thus taken in flank. The column at Bodenheim was heavily reinforced, and advancing rapidly captured Gaubischofsheim. The French were fairly turned out of their position, much to Clerfayt's credit, and retired from the blockade, with a loss of over four thousand men, and all their guns and material. The allied loss was less than half as much.

Gouvion St. Cyr.

The allies now in their turn kept on in their advance, and in November both French generals fell back behind the Vosges. Mannheim was occupied by the Austrians and later Kaiserslautern, Homburg, and Zweibrucken; at when the Army of the Sambre and Meuse was withdrawn to the Moselle, the Army of the Rhine withdrew behind the Speyerbach. From January until the spring, a truce kept the armies on the Rhine quiet.

In 1795 Austria strengthened her army in Italy, and Sardinia did the like. There were seventy thousand men on paper, fifty thousand under the colors. The Army of Italy stood along the coast from Savona to the Finestre and Tenda passes; the Army of the Alps still held the Alpine passes from the Little St. Bernard to the Argentières. All these forces were in poor condition, numbering barely thirty thousand men for duty. The Austrians proposed to drive the French back to the Var, and occupy the coast; the French to force the Bocchetta pass. Kellermann was given a free hand to advance or retire, as circumstances might dictate.

The Army of the Alps accomplished little but to hold its own. The Austrians advanced in June against the Army of Italy, and forced it back some distance to the line Borghetto-Ormea-Tenda. The English fleet cut off its supplies and reduced the troops to great straits; and reinforcements did not reach the army until August. Kellermann's lack of success resulted in his being left in charge of the Army of the Alps alone, the sole command of the Army of Italy being confided to Scherer.

Late in the year the allies had gone into winter quarters, their left covered by a twofold line of field-works from Rocca Barbena to Loano and from Bardinetto to Finale, and the right extending across the mountains to Ceva. They were well provided with food from Genoa. Fresh from compelling

active enough to prevent the allies from winning much beyond what they had held at the opening of operations. In Italy, the French had gained more than the allies. On the whole the offensive of the Coalition had weakened into defensive, and the French were now in better condition to carry forward their projects. The entire scheme of the Coalition was crumbling.

The first four years of the French Revolution were the beginning of the wars of the new era. Not only did France introduce a new system of war, but the Republic showed itself fully able to defend its frontiers against all Europe; and the years 1794 and 1795 proved France ready to conquer territory outside her old borders. Though there was no special gain in a strategic sense on either side, for both opponents held firmly to the cordon system, yet the French exhibited a great excess of moral force over the allies. However much their methods may be questioned, to the Convention and the Committee of Public Safety must be attributed wonderful intelligence, unanimity and energy in conducting the wars of France. This was complemented by the extraordinary public spirit of the people, partly controlled to be sure by the tyranny of the governing power, but largely due also to the strong innate love of country. Every available man was in arms, every one learned his lesson in the ranks, and the whole population of



Massena.

France became instinct with military fervor. Although the feats of arms attempted by the French troops often turned out to be lamentably weak, yet the constant work along the border from Dunkirk to the Pyrenees, in daily conflict with the enemy, was a good school for officers and men. Many of the ancient and well-educated officers, being nobles, had left France, but the Republic bred up others, and the rule of making success the sole test brought the able men to the front, though it buried from sight many who had failed from no fault of their own.

On the other side there was little unity and less moral force; the operations of the allies had no general method; they were conducted largely by the Vienna Aulic Council, and the men at the head of the armies were hampered by red tape, apt to be at odds, and rarely worked together. As a rule the allied operations lacked energy; the unnecessary dread of being turned or cut off from their base appeared to be a constant motive for retreat. As to their army organization, this had not been changed for fifty years. The armies were loaded down with immense trains and impeded by magazines, and they could not tear themselves loose from the glaring defects of the cordon system and concentrate any respectable force for a single operation. The four years on the part of the allies had been a war of fortresses and field fortifications. The French armies, on the other hand, with small trains, and feeding themselves on the country, were able to accomplish better results, despite their own adherence to the cordon system, which had been less formal; and while these campaigns were on their part defensive, they took the shape of offensive operations.

In these four years the French showed by far the greater ability in war, and the operations of their generals and armies during this period laid a foundation upon which Napoleon

could erect his magnificent schemes. Circumstances were building up for him an army with which to essay his new theory of war, much as Philip and Frederick William had trained armies to be later led to victory by Alexander and Frederick.

In the Vendée, in 1794, Thurreau was in command of the Republicans, who numbered forty thousand men, more or less raw. The Vendeans had half as many and were still in disagreement as to plans, and could consequently make no progress. In June the Committee of Public Safety withdrew the bulk of the forces from the Vendée, which encouraged the revolutionists. The year 1794 had no occurrences of value. In 1795 Canclaux took command of the Republican army, and on the 5th of February Charette made a treaty of peace with him, and his lead was followed by Stofflet. The rest thus given lasted no great time. The *émigrés* started the Vendeans afresh, and the uprising broke out in Poitou. In June the Vendeans were again in full insurrection, and the utmost cruelty was exhibited by both parties. On August 10 an English squadron brought supplies to Charette at St. Gilles, and an English fleet soon followed. The Republicans strengthened the Army of the West by some troops from the Pyrenees. Hoche succeeded Canclaux, and marched on Belleville against Charette. He had fifteen thousand men, and used these cleverly cordon-fashion, pushing Charette farther and farther towards the ocean. At the end of the year the whole coast from Bordeaux to Cherbourg was placed under Hoche, who practically pacified the Vendée.

The year 1793 was the most important one in the Vendée war. In 1794 only isolated attempts made by Thurreau and Hoche against Charette and Stofflet were noteworthy. The fault of the Vendeans had been that instead of carrying on a people's war, they attempted to wage a regular war in masses,

for which they were not suited. On the Republican side, poor generals and poorer troops had kept the war dragging beyond any necessity.

But we must now turn to the young officer, whose future exploits are to be the burden of these volumes, and see what he has been doing to qualify himself for the extraordinary campaign of 1796, which at once raised him to the level of the greatest captains of all time.

Sword of Murad Bey, worn by Bonaparte.

generation. In Ajaccio the Buonapartes were adherents of the patriot Paoli, and indeed Charles, the father of Napoleon, was educated at the University founded by him.

Carlo di Buonaparte was an easy-going man, who relied throughout life rather on what his influence could procure from the efforts of others, than on what he might himself create, in order to care for his constantly increasing family. Napoleon's mother, Letitia Ramolino, was a beautiful woman with much force of character. She, too, came of Florentine ancestry which had emigrated to Corsica, and the young people were married at a very early age. Though she gave evidences of good extraction, Letitia's frugality was bred of Italian economies as well as of the family necessities, and it was largely due to her that on the slender means provided for the family budget, there was anything substantial accomplished towards the proper nurture and education of the children. She lived to be eighty-six, and the extraordinary rise of her great son never dazzled her, as his downfall did not dishearten. It was she who chiefly moulded her son Napoleon.

Letitia di Buonaparte.

Genoa had been succeeded by France as protector of Corsica; and Paoli, who had ejected the Genoese, would gladly

have done the same thing with the French; but his efforts ended in failure, and he and his chief adherents fled to England. Carlo Buonaparte accepted the French amnesty, and when, as a part reward for this conduct, the gift of an appointment to the military school of Brienne was secured by him through the French governor of Corsica, Count Marbœuf, young Napoleon's future was first determined.

In his tenth year, April 23, 1779, after three months' schooling in French at Autun, the future leader of men, a small, thin, strange boy, entered upon his early training in arms. Curiously, the school of Brienne stood at that time under the direction of Benedictine monks. The lad naturally possessed a scant knowledge of French; indeed, at every stage of his life Napoleon was crude as a linguist, though he could use language in a most incisive way; and his comrades, many of whom came from rich if not noble families, looked jeeringly at the poverty-stricken, half-savage islander, who was educated at the royal charge, and treated him after a fashion that often forced him to a quarrel, or else to seek solitude, and taught him to keep his own counsel. He was nicknamed "the Spartan." The lad had a large store of pride in his make-up; he was silent and obstinate; and a letter written in his eleventh year to his father shows that this treatment not only excited his anger, but also stirred up a determination some day to do that which should place him on a par with, if not beyond his companions. Many a boy would have succumbed to the treatment he received; this one rose superior to it, and he is represented in many accounts, despite his low social standing, as having succeeded in impressing himself upon his schoolmates, both in their games and studies, as he later did on all who met him. He was imperious in his way, and irascible; but he was able enough to accomplish some things the other boys could not do. His schoolmate, Bourrienne, tells of his

directing the construction of snow forts in the school-yard in the winter of 1783–84, after a fashion unequaled by any comrade. He learned some things more easily than others, especially the exact sciences, but he was not noted for general excellence in his classes. His memory was, however, of the best, his mind alert, and anything which he willed himself to do he could accomplish. He thought so quickly that he had time to reconsider a question which others had just mastered. His imagination was keen, his mental equipment left nothing to be desired; and he was known for a self-will which often overrode others. But the lesson mainly impressed upon him at Brienne was that some social change was demanded which might give him an even chance with the rest of the world, to stand or fall in the military or political arena. At that time all France was permeated with the revolutionary idea — peasantry, middle classes, clergy and nobles alike; even the Court was not free from discussions on this subject; and we may well believe that the new idea penetrated more or less into every school. The American Revolution had taught a lesson for all to study; and the Gallic temperament was then what it is now, the Gallic mind much narrower.

Napoleone di Buonaparte.
From a sketch by a school-friend at Brienne.

The character and native intelligence of the young Napoleon

continued to grow beyond his scholarship. He was outspoken, if an act or word chanced to gall him. When he was being confirmed, the archbishop seemed astonished at the name of Napoleone, when the future monarch, annoyed, and not diverted by the holiness of the place or the dignity of the churchman, replied, "He is a Corsican Saint, and, moreover, are there not more saints in the Book of Martyrs than there are days in the year?" In 1784 the lad, then but fifteen, wrote a letter to his great-uncle Fesch about his elder brother Joseph's future, which, though full of errors of spelling and diction, clearly shows that in self-poise and in habit of thought he was more than abreast of his years; and the letters written the next year, at the time of his father's death, exhibit exceptional stability and clearness of thought in one so young. He read with avidity Plutarch's Lives and Cæsar's Gallic War; it was a delight to him that a son of Italy should have conquered Gaul, and he was an ardent lover of Paoli. But France was not in his thoughts; all his aspirations were centred in his beloved Corsica and her eventual freedom. His future commission in the French army was in his view but a means to an end. On leaving Brienne, in October, 1784, Monsieur de Keralio, the inspector of the twelve French military schools, thus judged the young man: "Monsieur de Bonaparte (Napoleon), born the 15th of August, 1769, four feet ten inches ten lines tall, has finished his fourth class. He has a



Autograph of "Buonaparte fils cadet gentilhomme à l'école Royale militaire de paris."

good constitution, excellent health and a character submissive, honest and grateful; very regular conduct, has always distinguished himself by his application to mathematics. He knows fairly well his history and geography. He is rather feeble in the lighter studies and Latin. . . . He would be an excellent sailor, and deserves to pass into the school at Paris." This same inspector had said to the monks who wished to keep Napoleon an additional year, so as to perfect him in Latin, "No, I can see in this young man a spark which cannot be too highly cultivated." Domarion, his professor of belles-lettres, said of his rhetoric, "It is granite heated by a volcano," an indefinite but easily understood phrase. His teacher of mathematics was Father Patrault, whose assistant, Pichegru, was later so famous.

Thus equipped, on October 17 Napoleon was transferred as "cadet-gentilhomme" to the military school in Paris, to prepare for an artillery commission, the suggested purpose of going into the navy having been abandoned. His standing among his comrades here, too, was similar to what it had been at Brienne; the school, created by Louis XV., gave the cadets far too much luxury; and there is an essay of the lad's written at this time which suggests as a means of discipline a much simpler life for the future French officer, and leads one to believe that he still harbored the feelings of antagonistic pride with regard to his richer classmates. The reforms suggested in the essay also show that the young Napoleon's mind early began to dwell on creative things.

On September 1, 1785, the gentleman-cadet passed his final examinations with credit, but not high marks. The certificate from the military school is, however, in a way prophetic: "Reserved and laborious, he is more fond of study than of any pleasure; likes to read good authors; very diligent in abstract sciences, little inquiring in others, he knows thor-

oughly mathematics and geography; silent, loves solitude, obstinate, haughty, exceptionally given to egoism, talks little, is energetic in his answers, prompt in action, and severe in meeting opposition; has much self-esteem, is ambitious and striving for all things. This young man is worthy of being favored." He was sent to the La Fère regiment at Valence, where, on about eighteen dollars a month, he had three months' work to qualify himself for his lieutenancy in the service of Louis XVI. His talent was recognized by his superiors, he got a fuller view of what a military life meant, and in due season he received his commission as second lieutenant.

Stationed at Valence, for the first time the young officer found congenial surroundings and society, and, as contemporary letters tell us, showed himself at times frank and amiable. Taking small part in the usually frivolous recreations of his brother subalterns, he was noted rather for scrupulous attention to duty, and for a special aptitude for the artillery arm. He affected the society of the better *bourgeoisie*, and it was here that his earliest love story was told to a young lady named Caroline de Colombier, who seems to have grown fond of the young officer in earnest. His flirtation, however, he said in later life, never went beyond eating cherries with his lady love, at a rendezvous which she gave him one day at sunrise, in her father's orchard. Though he kept steadily at work, as all through life it was his habit to do, Napoleon was peculiarly devoted to military studies only in so far as they applied to mathematics useful in his profession, and history, whose great military heroes aroused in him the ambition, not to conquer the world, but solely to follow in the steps of Paoli, and free his native Corsica. He also began to read Rousseau, whose Swiss blood led him to admire the hardy pride and courage of the islanders.

Though in 1786 Napoleon was promoted to be first lieu-

tenant in the Grenoble regiment, his constant work did not keep him from serious fits of despondency. His father had entered into speculations which ended in financial ruin; and after participation in the putting down of the riot in Lyons, he asked for leave of absence and in September went to Corsica, where the Buonaparte family matters were at their worst. Mixed with these griefs was, however, a joy at revisiting his native land, of which his expressions were youthfully overwrought. With the confidence of ignorance, at the end of 1787 the young subaltern went to Paris, thinking in some fashion to obtain money from the national treasury for his family's services in Corsica. It was not until after an absence of twenty-one months that he rejoined his regiment. Unless we assume that his superiors recognized that the Buonapartes were useful in Corsica, one can scarcely understand his obtaining so long a leave.

Paoli.

Returned to his regiment at Auxonne, from June, 1788, to September, 1789, Lieutenant Bonaparte resumed his work and studies. His books were his only friends, and he used his pen much. In the lowlands of the Saone his health suffered markedly from malaria, as later it did at Toulon from a skin disease (*? sarcoptes scabiei*), which constantly annoyed him until he became emperor, when better living and skillful treatment enabled him to throw it off. But he allowed ill-health to make no difference in his work. In April, 1786, he wrote his first manuscript now extant, on the right of the Corsicans to revolt. If a people elects a prince, he argues, he is bound to do its will; if the prince gets his authority elsewhere,

yet he is bound to make and execute laws for the happiness of the people. So soon as he fails so to act, the people may throw off his yoke. This manuscript was manifestly inspired by Rousseau's "Contrat Social." His next one was on "Suicide," which he justifies, and at times he was assuredly in a mood for it. In 1790 he produced a "History of Corsica;" and the next year he received from the Academy of Lyons a prize for an essay under the title, "What are the Principles and Institutions to be inculcated to Mankind to render them the most happy possible." Later in life this essay was unearthed by Talleyrand and brought to the emperor, who at once threw it in the fire. A less perfect copy was afterwards discovered, and published in 1826. One phrase from the original is worth preserving. "Great men are like meteors, which shine and consume themselves to give light to the earth." A voracious reader and endless in his notes, the young officer made a Summary of English History down to 1688, and came to the conclusion that few kings deserved their thrones. There was an unceasing struggle between his aristocratic feeling and his republican tendencies. Yet every fibre yearned for the freedom of his well-loved Corsica, with which sentiment only his love of kin, and his innate sense of superiority — always a dominant note in his character — conflicted.

The French Revolution was in the throes of its birth. The seed sown by England and America had fallen on soil all too fruitful, soil which was destined to produce a tropical exuberance of good and evil. No doubt all the extravagant happenings of the day were very real to a mind like that of the young lieutenant, and produced their due effect. "Revolutions," said he, "are good for soldiers with intelligence and courage;" and to his ambition, not limited by over-active moral principles, the great upheaval in France seemed to offer a rare chance. But as, at the outset, he personally thought

only of a struggle for freedom by Corsica, he again asked leave, and returned thither in the fall of 1789. He would have been glad to essay afresh the rôle of Paoli. Indeed it was fortunate that what he did and strove to do at this time bred no evil results in his French career. There were larger dramas to enact, and his small but questionable by-play in Corsica was overlooked, or was perhaps deemed to have been useful to the Republic.

In the autumn of 1789, then, we again find Lieutenant Bonaparte on leave in Corsica, where he preached democratic ideas, all tending to the independence of the island, and urged the formation of an insular National Guard. His name appears at the head of a petition to the National Assembly of France for Corsican civil liberty. Much disorder reigned on the island, and on November 5 there was an affray between the royal troops and the populace. Meanwhile Paoli and his adherents were amnestied and allowed to return, in the belief that they would now aid the French régime in Corsica. But while Paoli worked for liberty, he yet was far from being a Republican in the Paris sense ; he was indeed of an autocratic mood ; and Napoleon soon found himself drifting away from his idol. This may have been in part due to the fact that the young author had dedicated his manuscript on Corsica to the great patriot, with a panegyric, and that the latter had declined the praise as being strained, and mislaid the manuscript as having scant value. Yet Paoli seems to have admired Bonaparte to begin with. "This young man," he is said to have observed, "is cut antique-fashion. He is a hero of Plutarch." But his fancy was short-lived. In February, 1791, our subaltern again returned to his regiment. He had prolonged his leave by certificates of sickness ; but his means, unless political, of satisfying his superiors as to his long absences cannot be guessed. On his return journey he found all the

peasants, as well as every enlisted man in the ranks, heartily in favor of the Revolution. Despite his shallow purse, he at this time brought with him his brother Louis, and looked after his education. "I lived like a bear," said he. This meant that black bread was often his only food, in order to save money for books; but this was not the only occasion in life when Napoleon's kindliness of heart came to the surface. He never forgot his family, placing them indeed in positions to which many of them did small credit.

In the summer of 1791 Lieutenant Bonaparte was transferred to another regiment in Valence. Later in the year he went to Paris to see whether the seething of the Revolution would afford him a chance of rising. The extraordinary laxness in army discipline which could afford a subaltern so many absences was but typical of the times. Not only did he visit Paris, but in September he returned to Corsica, to which he was devoting so much fervor. It can scarcely be deemed curious that he failed to see the outcome of the Revolution in France; few people did. In the first trying days of 1861, many later stanch Unionists were of doubting spirit. And to Napoleon at this period Corsica was greater than France. He remained in the island until the succeeding May. It was at this time that the break occurred between him, who was a revolutionist, and Paoli, whose sober tendencies led him away from the wreckers of solid government.

The young man's ambition at this time scarcely reached beyond the epaulets of a general of artillery; and when, on February 6, 1792, the regular course of promotion gave him his commission as captain in the Fourth Regiment of Foot Artillery, he began to see life expanding before him. But the untold ambition of the future does not at this early age seem to have shown much growth.

In the National Guard that had been created in Corsica,

Napoleon had been made major, and aspired to be lieutenant-colonel. His tenure of rank in the French artillery appeared to be a secondary thought. In seeking election to the higher rank, he is said to have resorted to questionable methods, even to sequestrating one of the Commissioners who was working for Paoli's interests — a prototype of future *coups d'état.* But these were the ordinary tricks of the day and place.

By this time the Legislative Assembly was master in Paris; the king was a prisoner, and the First Coalition had been formed against France. Still the young man's thoughts remained centred on Corsica. He did not yet see his future in France. As is wont to be the case in civil wars, he scarcely knew which side to embrace. Whether, indeed, he followed the military preparations of France at this juncture, we have no means of knowing. "As a general," he said later, "I would have sustained the Court; as a lieutenant without fortune, I had to place myself on the side of the people." The island was divided between the French revolutionary methods and the ancient ways of the Corsicans. Loving their church, the populace rose against the French acts of clerical repression; and the National Guard was called in to subdue the riot. Napoleon not only endeavored to seize the citadel of Ajaccio, but he went so far as to strive to seduce the enlisted men of the French troops from their duty to their aristocratic officers. The entire scheme failed, and the young officer awoke to the fact that he had placed himself in opposition to both the native majority of the island and to the government whose commission he held. His enemies accused him of having fermented revolt against the French in Corsica, for the sake of making the island independent; and not only was he obliged to go to Paris to exculpate himself from the charge of desertion in again overstaying his leave, but his attitude towards the French troops had been little short of treason. Just what he had purposed to accomplish cannot be said.

Shortly after he had reached Corsica, in September, 1791, his great-uncle Fesch died, and Napoleon henceforth looked upon himself as the head of the house of Buonaparte. His brother Lucien says that he permitted no contradiction, and ruled in everything. Apparently blind to the fact that he had overstayed his leave, and that his regiment had been put on a war footing, Napoleon's tarrying in Corsica had actually resulted in his being rated, according to the orders of the law-making powers of the day, as a deserter, and being stricken from the rolls of the army. Though he claimed to have been serving the French Revolutionists, it is a wonder that he was able to return to France at all, without suffering disaster from his to say the least extravagant conduct. But the young man was even then ready to beard the lion in his den. With a certificate in his favor from the French authorities on the island, he journeyed in May, 1792, to Paris, and strove to get restored to the service, while struggling along on the slenderest means. The rising of June 20, when the mob invaded the Tuileries and insulted the king and queen, he observed from a room near the palace, and though he himself may have been fresh from an attempt to overturn the French régime in Corsica, yet in viewing the excesses of the populace, his strong feeling for order and authority — for he was always an aristocrat at heart — was expressed in the exclamation, "*Che coglione!*" (What rabble!), and the desire to blow away the revolutionists with his guns. The 10th of August, 1792, when the monarchy fell and the Republic succeeded it, was for him salvation. Officers of talent were in demand for the National Guard, and to replace those who had emigrated; small misdemeanors were cast into the shade by grave events; the past was overlooked, and Napoleon again received his old commission as an artillery captain.

The French patriotic fervor had risen to white heat. The

Prussian invaders met their match in the memorable battle of Valmy; Dumouriez beat the Austrians at Jemappes and won all Belgium; and Custine pushed by way of Mainz to the Lahn. Savoy and Nice were wrested from Piedmont. The Jacobins became unduly excited by so much success, — and Louis XVI. ascended the scaffold.

This act set the rest of Europe against the French Republic; and the tide of victory turned. Striving to conquer Holland, Dumouriez was beaten at Neerwinden and lost Belgium, the Prussians crossed the Rhine, and Condé and Valenciennes were besieged. The Sardinians reëntered Savoy, the Spaniards came close to invading France; the Vendée rising of royalists brought on civil war. To the Committee of Public Safety — Robespierre, Danton, Marat — the situation was confided; the "Mountain," with the aid of the Paris mob, had driven out the Girondists, and these raised the standard of revolt in many towns; but against the superior organization of the Jacobins, and its possession of the central power, they could accomplish nothing. To add to the difficulty under which the Committee staggered, England now headed the Coalition, and furnished the needed funds to carry on the war; and to her business methods the Convention could only oppose its fervid energy and a million men. "From Alps to Pyrenees and from Rhine to Ocean the tricolor fell back." The military situation was desperate, when

Marat.

Carnot was added to the Committee of Public Safety on August 14, 1792; a levy in mass was ordered August 23, under the motto, "Le Peuple Français Debout Devant Les Tyrans;" and "*Aux Armes, Français!*" rang throughout the land.

During this violent period, instead of serving with his regiment in Savoy, Napoleon on a flimsy pretext again managed to return to Corsica, reaching the island in September, 1792. It was not long after the Convention had seized the reins of power in France, September 21, that disagreement followed between it and Paoli, whose influence made him the practical ruler of the island; and when Napoleon, who was a pronounced Republican, as Paoli had always been the head of the aristocracy, took the side of the French, he was made Major and Inspector-General of Artillery of Corsica, October 19.

The French party in the island was declining. The action of Paoli had not resulted, as the rulers in Paris had, from their efforts to conciliate him, hoped it would do, in reconciling the Corsicans to Republican terrorism; and French influence steadily decreased. While, early in January, 1793, Major Bonaparte was working one way and Paoli another (the hero and the hero-worshiper were now far apart), six thousand French volunteers landed at Ajaccio on a filibustering expedition to Sardinia. The coarse brutality of these men, mostly from the slums of the maritime cities of France, raised a riot in Ajaccio, and when the French soldiers caught and in their zealous fury hanged three of the citizens, the excitement grew intense and was hard to be allayed. The Corsicans refused to march to Sardinia in company with the French troops. The Inspector-General suggested a purely Corsican invasion of the Maddalena Islands, lying between Corsica and Sardinia. This was undertaken; but internal jealousies, perhaps fostered by Paoli, brought about failure, and Major Bonaparte, who was almost captured at the time

of the landing and attack, returned to Ajaccio March 3, now a strong anti-Paoli man.

French commissioners were appointed to disband the Corsican National Guard, to investigate this expedition and pass on Paoli's conduct; and these sought to seize the patriot. One of the commissioners, Saliceti, and Major Bonaparte strove in vain to get possession by stratagem of the citadel of Ajaccio, held by the Paoli party; and in trips to and from Bastia at the north of the island, where the French commissioners sat, the young officer had a series of quixotic personal adventures which might well have put an end to his career. An armed attempt was now made on the citadel by the French, but this also failed. Almost to a man the Corsicans became enemies of the French, and the English fleet was asked to coöperate with Paoli and his adherents. During these days Major Bonaparte wrote many lurid pamphlets.

It was quite natural that the Corsicans should take umbrage at the conduct of the Buonaparte family, and the whole tribe found it wise to leave the island early in June, 1793, to land at Marseilles, and wander in Provence on a pittance allowed by the government to Corsican refugees. Napoleon reported to his regiment at Nice. In July the island drifted into the hands of the British.

Thus we see that, instead of serving with his regiments and learning his profession, the greater part of the time of this French company officer, from the date of his leaving school, had been spent in what appears to have been a striving to liberate Corsica, and to turn its population towards republican doctrines. There is not much promise to be extracted from these early years on which to found the hope of a great future for the young man. Perhaps his native ability can, however, be put to no higher test than by the fact that he grew proficient in the artillery arm, when he devoted so little time to

regimental service in his early military years. For no one will deny that, at every age, Napoleon knew his profession as few others did, although he never became, as Carnot says, a truly scientific man. Out of these years only the energy, persistency and, if you like, the gambling instinct, or readiness to take chances, stand out from the other traits of the half-formed character. He was twenty-four years old, and he had so far failed in every undertaking. Even his motive in devoting himself to Corsica is obscure. Whether by nature he was more governed by a love of fame or a love of power can hardly be determined. "One can scarcely say," writes Madame de Remusat, "that he really loved fame, he never hesitated to prefer results." On the other hand: "Fame, always fame, that is what he wished, for France and for himself;" and, "In all his business the present moment disappeared in the future centuries," says Bourrienne. And to Carnot, from Verona, January 28, 1797, with regard to things said against him, Bonaparte wrote: ". . . So far as I am concerned, whatever they may say, they do not reach me. The esteem of a small number of persons like you, that of my comrades and the soldiers, sometimes also the opinion of posterity, and above all the sentiment of my conscience and the prosperity of my country, alone interest me. . . ." While we cannot always give full credence to Bonaparte's own expressions, which were apt to be colored by the demands of the moment, yet there may be a glimmer of truth in this one.

As with all ambitious, hard-working, successful men, so in Napoleon's case, fame and activity were consuming fires. But if he was working for either fame or results, his judgment as to what he might accomplish in Corsica had been lamentably at fault. He had, however, shown two of the essential factors of the great captain, force of intellect and force of character. Would the third factor, opportunity, ever come?

lery. While the batteries were being got together, in August, 1793, Major Bonaparte was intrusted with a mission to Marseilles, to persuade the insurrectionists to withdraw from Avignon, at which point they prevented supply trains from moving to the Army of Italy. Inspired by certain events on this trip, he wrote a paper entitled "The Supper at Beaucaire," in which he placed himself firmly on the side of the "Mountain," then in power, sketched in a masterly manner the political and military situation in the south, and prophesied the success of the Republican arms. The essay was prompted by and was in the form of a conversation between an officer (no doubt himself) and several citizens, in which the former urges all classes to rally to the side of the party in power, as representing France in arms against European despots. Any concession to save the nation and the Republic was its tone. This paper came into the hands of the people's representatives, Saliceti, Gasparin and the younger Robespierre, who had just arrived at Avignon, and of whom the first named already knew the author; and, printed at public cost, it was Bonaparte's first introduction to the powers that be, to whom he soon proved that he could act as well as write. He had now sloughed off his Corsican dreams, and could see his future in France. The tone of the "Souper," unlike his overheated pamphlets up to this day, was as cold and cynical as it was business-like and convincing.

Toulon, the key of southern France, whose harbor was then held by the English and Spaniards, was the burning question of the hour. It was essential to recover control of the place. The Royalists had called in outside aid, and on August 28, 1793, the English fleet, under Admiral Hood, had sailed into the harbor and taken possession of the city for the king of France. This was only the day before the van of the Republican army, under Mouret, appeared in the defile of

Ollioules, on the road from Marseilles and Lyons; and even here it had not been able to hold itself. The work of retaking the defile was begun September 7, and on the wounding of Dommartin, the commandant of artillery, — an accident which left only one captain and some sergeants in charge of the batteries, — Bonaparte, on his arrival September 16, was made second in command, and put in his place by Saliceti, who was on the ground. He went actively to work. About these days Mouret had been succeeded by Carteaux; but the latter had been able to undertake nothing definite against Toulon until reinforcements could come up from the Army of Italy, and material and men could be got from Lyons; but when the division of Lapoype had arrived from the Riviera, a blockade was at once begun, and a regular siege was projected. Carteaux, who quite lacked ability, was shortly replaced by Doppet, an ex-doctor, and he finally by Dugommier, a veteran and an excellent soldier.

Admiral Hood had taken possession of all the works as well as the harbor of Toulon, and had disembarked a motley array of sixteen hundred Royalists, seven thousand Spaniards, five thousand Neapolitan and fifteen hundred Piedmontese troops, to leaven all which two English regiments of twenty-two hundred men under Colonel O'Hara were on hand. This ran the garrison up to seventeen thousand men, a goodly force, but hardly sufficient to man the very extensive outlying works. The city had only a simple bastioned wall, but it was defended by a circuit of excellent forts and redoubts. On the shore, east of the city, lay Fort Malque, and thence, running around the rocky ridge of Mont Faron, which stood like a vast protecting wall to the city, was a succession of works, well placed on east and west of Faron, and ending in the strong Fort Malbosquet on the inner harbor. To protect the harbor there were also a number of forts, chiefly l'Eguillette and Bala-

"Citizen Minister, the plan of attack for the City of Toulon which I presented to the generals and the representatives of the people is, I believe, the only practicable one ; if it had been followed from the beginning with a little more warmth, it is probable that we should be in Toulon. . . . To drive the enemy from the harbor is the preliminary point to a siege in form ; and perhaps this operation alone will give us Toulon." (*Then follow extended details of what it is desirable to do.*) "It is more than a month ago that I told the generals that the artillery on hand at this moment was sufficient to stop the fire of the English redoubt placed on the summit of the promontory of l'Eguillette." (*Then follows the detailed work to be done by each of the eleven batteries he had constructed.*) "If this has not been done, it is because the general persisted in thinking he had not sufficient infantry."

Four long collateral reports are appended, giving every essential detail. In one of them Bonaparte claims that the allied attack on the upland of l'Eguillette to build Fort Mulgrave might by proper measures have been beaten back.

At the council of war it was concluded that the right wing should make a feint on Fort Malbosquet and take it if possible, while its main attack should be on the Eguillette promontory ; that the left wing should make a feint on Cap Brun and its main assault on Mont Faron, which it was to seize and hold ; that Toulon was to be bombarded so soon as proper ground between the Battery of the Convention on Arènes heights and Fort Malbosquet could be seized, meanwhile protecting the former work from a *coup de main.*

No one will deny Bonaparte, beyond all others, the ability to cast aside minor considerations and keep in view the main object to be attained. His sense of perspective was perfect, though perhaps at this day not fully matured. Here at Toulon it is in evidence that most of his superiors seemed to see no other means of capturing the place than a regular siege from the land side — and steps were to this end taken. Bonaparte went into the subject deeper, and (whether he origi-

nated the scheme or not seems immaterial) insisted that if Toulon harbor could be commanded, the allied fleet, no longer able to protect the town, would withdraw the defending garrison; for the latter would have no means of retreat if the fleet had left, and must sooner or later succumb to siege or starvation. He next pointed out the fact that to control the roadstead and prevent the allied ships, for fear of being burned by hot shot, from there riding at anchor, Point l'Eguillette should first be taken; and to accomplish this he drew up in writing a feasible plan, as above quoted. And there appears to be no other scheme in existence by any other hand. The earliest suggestion may not have been Bonaparte's; his detractors claim it was not; but it was his advocacy which determined the matter, as indisputably it was his courage and skill which carried it through. With slight variation the young officer's ideas were adopted.

It is clear that Bonaparte was the busiest man at Toulon; that above all others he exhibited intelligence, courage, power to lead men and to make them willing instruments for his purposes. He embraced this, his first chance, and showed the stuff that was in him. He had not liked his early superiors. While Doppet was in command, Bonaparte had, on November 15, organized a demonstration on the works at Fort Mulgrave, or, as his St. Helena narrative has it, two or three battalions had started an attack. This in the carrying out grew into a hearty engagement. The garrison made a sortie and drove the French back. Bonaparte rallied his men, and, deeming it safer to go on than to discontinue the operation, was heading his column to make a rush which distinctly promised success, when Doppet sounded the recall, — an act which discouraged and angered the young officer and all his men. The latter loudly railed at the "painters and doctors" who were at their head; and Dugommier was heartily welcomed, when, a few days later, he came to take supreme command.

Lapoype now commanded the left division of Dugommier's forces, and Mouret the right one. In the shifting of commands, Duteil became chief of the corps artillery; Bonaparte, to begin with, had had charge of only that of one brigade of Mouret's division. Duteil was old and not over active, and his junior's views, always fresh and original, were frequently accepted by the chief and acted on. No one showed activity in the siege equal to Bonaparte's, and practically he was after a while left in charge of all the artillery business of the right wing, where the important work was being done. But he does not appear to have been technically chief of the corps artillery, or appointed by the government to take charge of all the artillery, as in his St. Helena papers he suggests that he was, though as *locum tenens* he acted as such; and it seems that he had a comparatively free hand.

There is no doubt that Bonaparte's lead, as the best, or certainly the most energetic and suggestive artillery officer present, was commonly followed. As a first step he had erected the Battery of the Convention on the heights of Arènes, at a point which commanded Fort Malbosquet, and in November — the date is in dispute — surprised its garrison by a rapid and annoying fire, which dismounted several guns. To suppress this annoyance O'Hara landed twenty-three hundred men and attempted to capture the battery. His assault was stanch, and his force entered the works and spiked several guns; but Bonaparte marched a battalion through the trenches leading to the battery and took the English in flank. O'Hara, wounded, fell into his hands. On Dugommier's coming up from a direction which threatened to cut the English off, they retired with a loss of nearly five hundred men, and without having silenced the battery. Dundas succeeded O'Hara. The French now moved down more forces and began regular approaches on Fort Mulgrave. In the effort to

reduce this fort, Bonaparte constructed a number of batteries, one of which was within pistol-shot of the enemy; and so dangerous was the manning of it that he could get few volunteers until, relying on the fact that his countrymen do not calmly take a challenge, he aptly dubbed it the "Redoute des Hommes Sans Peur." The soldiers then vied with each other for the duty; and Bonaparte was ever first in their company. Having by December 14 got thirty guns and fifteen mortars in position, the young officer directed a heavier fire against both this Little Gibraltar and l'Eguillette, and after a steady two days' bombardment, the works of the enemy were much broken; and as they do not appear to have been substantially reinforced, an assault was set for December 18. Lapoype was at the same time to assault the Faron forts.

In the night of December 17–18 the storming column of eight thousand men started from La Seine towards Fort Mulgrave, the capture of which meant the evacuation of l'Eguillette. It was hoped to reach the fort unobserved, for the garrison was apt to remain under cover during the bombardment; but at the foot of the hill of La Grasse the French van ran across some pickets, and the resulting fire alarmed the garrison and called it to the walls. Bonaparte's horse was shot under him — according to some authorities this was the third during the siege — and he accompanied the men on foot. The first assault was thrown back; but a small party climbed the heights unobserved, entered by a broken casemate and thus captured a portion of the wall. Followed sharply by more and more men, the gain was maintained, the garrison was overpowered and the fort was taken. Bonaparte received a slight wound in the leg. By five o'clock in the morning the allies had decamped towards Fort Balaquier, where they were picked up by boats from the fleet. At the same time Lapoype seized the hill and redoubts of Faron.

Though an old man, Dugommier had accompanied his troops; but he was much worn out by the fatigue. So soon as the fort had been taken, Bonaparte, who was near by, turned to him with, "Go and rest yourself, general, we have captured Toulon. You will sleep there to-morrow."

Having occupied Fort Mulgrave and l'Eguillette, Bonaparte immediately turned every available gun on the enemy's fleet. Recognizing that the harbor was untenable, Dundas called a council of war; and the effective garrison of Toulon having fallen to twelve thousand men, it was decided to evacuate the place. This was set about at once, and during the day of December 18 the troops were embarked, and the fleet passed out under the French guns. The arsenal and twenty ships of the line and frigates were burned. Next day the Republicans entered the town. To prevent pillage, all the property of the citizens was declared forfeited to the army. This property was soon redeemed by the payment of two million francs by the citizens.

Saliceti and Robespierre recognized that in Bonaparte the Republic had a man of original ideas and abundant energy for its service, and the hero of Toulon profited accordingly. He had seen his opportunity, and had seized it with the sure hand of genius. And it was in this siege that Bonaparte discovered the qualities of Junot, Marmont and Victor, his later so able lieutenants.

It is quite true that Bonaparte's later overshadowing success may have led historians to exaggerate this first feat of arms; but in view of his exhaustive written reports, and of the work he confessedly did at Toulon; in view of the fact that he was rapidly promoted at and after the siege; inasmuch as no documents exist to show that his then superiors disputed his written claim to have suggested as well as carried out the scheme that won Toulon, which, had it been

false, they had abundant chance to do, it may fairly be assumed that to him, largely at least, was due the idea and the work which produced the success there gained, and that he fairly earned his laurels.

The rapidly succeeding events of these whirling years, as good luck would have it, had all worked in favor of Bonaparte. Although he had taken no active part in the stirring campaigns in the Netherlands and on the Rhine during the first four years of the wars of the French Revolution, the frequent gaps made by the *émigrés*, by the attrition of service and by the lack of able men, afforded him promotion. We have seen that he had but recently become chief of battalion (major) in the Fourth Regiment of Artillery; and now for handsome services in the subjection of the Marseilles Federalists (although for ordering the rehabilitation of the ante-revolutionary Fort St. Nicholas, to which the populace objected, he was reprimanded and temporarily placed in arrest), he received promotion to a colonelcy. This was no doubt due in part to the influence of Saliceti and Robespierre, who had gauged his ability at Toulon. The new colonel was set to work to place the Riviera and Provence in a state of good defense; and on February 6, that is as soon as promotion could be secured from the authorities in Paris, he was made general of brigade.

That as a result of his work at Toulon Bonaparte rose from a junior major to brigadier-general cannot, however, be wholly referred to the influence of Robespierre and Saliceti. To be sure, promotions were at that day made rapidly and by favor. Any one whom the Convention believed to be capable or brave might find himself in a dangerously important post at a moment's notice; and many there were whom fame, thus thrust upon them, led to the guillotine. It was otherwise with Bonaparte. From Toulon days on, his promotion was

due to solid work, founded on that exceptional ability which kept him on the upward path to the zenith of his career. That his friends should help him so long as he needed help was but an accident.

In April, 1794, the Army of Italy moved from Nice forward in order to take possession of the passes of the Maritime Alps. Bonaparte had joined this army as general commanding the artillery; and as Commissary of the Convention with the army stood the younger Robespierre, to whose good sense much of its success was due. Bonaparte had drawn up a plan to turn the famous position of Saorgio, which, as already told, was duly adopted; and in the absence of Dumirbion, who was general-in-chief, but sick, Massena, second in command, carried out the plan with entire success. In the St. Helena Memorial Napoleon claims, perhaps with too much breadth, to have "carried the Army of Italy to Savona and the gates of Ceva, which advance freed Genoa, then menaced by the Coalition." But he did play a distinguished part in it. Late in May there was a general consultation as to future plans, and Bonaparte was selected to draw up the scheme, which fairly presents his views on war, as then held.

Wartenburg aptly divides the career of this great captain into three periods. The first comprises the years when he was only one general out of many, and when in what he did he was compelled to pay heed to the ideas and prejudices of others, being hedged and hampered accordingly. In the second period he was in sole command of his army, but had behind him a government which controlled the resources, and from whom he must receive general orders. The third period is that in which all the resources of France were in his sole control and he could act as he saw fit. We are now in the first period, which lasted until Bonaparte received the sole command of the Army of Italy; the second lasted until the Con-

sulate came in on the 18th Brumaire, 1799; the third lasted until 1815.

The plans, then, which Bonaparte drew up for the operations of the Army of Italy before he received its command in chief exhibit less boldness and more sense of limitation than the later ones. There are a number of these monographs: two dated respectively May 21 and June 20, 1794, four dated July 20, 1795, and two dated October 12, 1795, and January 19, 1796. The first-named even from its contents appears to have had a lost predecessor, which was probably the one on the taking of Saorgio. Each plan is worked out at length. The same intellectual conceptions are apparent in all. He begins by saying, "One cannot enter the Piedmont plain except with forces superior to the enemy's; in order to obtain this superiority, one must unite the Armies of the Alps and of Italy. . . . Whatever plan is adopted, this is a preliminary." The desire to outnumber the enemy was his principle all through life, and very different from Frederick's readiness — bred, to be sure, of dire necessity — to fight double or treble his own numbers. "The junction of the two armies can only be made in the valley of the Stura, in order to take advantage of the positions and debouches won by the Army of Italy," he continues; and after indicating that both armies were heading for a point where the Stura enters the plain of Lombardy, and that this plain was their natural meeting-place, Bonaparte goes into detail. The Army of the Alps was to create several columns, the task of some of which would be to attack, of others to protect the attacking columns, and of yet others to make feints to deceive the enemy as to the point of attack. The eventual objective would be the Stura valley. Meanwhile the Army of Italy would watch the gaps leading from the Tinea valley to the Stura, and out towards the right to Mondovi, and form several columns of attack, with similar

tasks; and would eventually force its way to Borgo San Dalmazzo, and coöperate with the Army of the Alps in the Stura valley. The advance of the Army of Italy would, by monopolizing the enemy's attention, have the effect of making the work of the Army of the Alps easy.

In a mountainous country there is more excuse for dividing an army into a number of columns. A mountain pass is practically forced only by the head of column and a few flankers; the rear is useless, if not dangerous; while a second column moving by a parallel pass may possibly take the enemy in reverse, and thus insure his retreat. Bonaparte's usual habit all through life was to work in masses and not in detached bodies; but here he probably had other than purely military problems to face. He was by no means free from interference, and had superiors, whose very marked ideas of their own importance he must respect. The plan shows close study of the topography and a sharp eye for the key-points; but its weakness lies in the fact that, like all work in separate detachments, it depends on the success of each and every column to produce the desired result; and the failure of any one column, from a fact unknown to the commanding general or not under control of the column commander, might upset the entire scheme. The detailed daily operation and the means of subsistence of each column are well worked out in the papers, and each commander is held strictly to its performance — another weakness. The entire plan exhibits wonderful adaptation to what was apparently strong pressure from many seniors.

At Nice, on the 2d Mesidor (June 20), Bonaparte made a change in the plan, also probably brought about by some pressure from several generals, by which the Army of the Alps was to send fewer columns into the Stura valley, and the Army of Italy was also to operate in fewer columns. The

one destined to sustain the Army of the Alps in the Stura valley is lessened; and the columns which are to march on Dalmazzo to close the pass and to secure the whole operation are respectively increased. "This," says he, "is really the corps which is the key of the whole army and the whole system, from Castel Delfino to the Tanaro." In this changed scheme, more freedom is left to the several commanders of columns, and it is by thus much simpler and better.

But neither plan was destined to be put into practice. The upheaval of the 9th Thermidor (July 27, 1794) and the fall of Robespierre menaced Bonaparte with disaster, for the favors he had received from the Robespierres had made him enemies at headquarters. Sent on a secret mission to Genoa, which was threatened by the British from the sea and by the Austrians and the French by land, he had done well; but upon his return in August some unwarranted suspicion caused his arrest and imprisonment in the fort at Antibes.

A strong friendship had existed between the younger Robespierre and Bonaparte, although the former acknowledged that he never quite understood, perhaps never fully trusted the general. Bonaparte had come out flatly for the Jacobins: whether or not he agreed that Terrorism was an evil necessary to purge the body politic, cannot be said; but he was either with the Terrorists or truckling to them, and the latter is unlikely. He saw, as others did, that Terrorism had become a bogy to the French peasant, who feared the soldiers as infidels and as upholding the high-handed and bloody methods of the Convention, and was thus less ready than he might be to aid in furnishing them food and shelter; and that to this extent Terrorism was a failure. But in act and word Bonaparte had been faithful to the ruling party. His plan for the Army of Italy had, however, made him enemies in the Army of the Alps, which had no desire to play a second rôle;

still the general suspicion no doubt came from his intimacy with the Robespierres, and it took form on their downfall, which had just occurred. But Saliceti remained his friend; a war commissary was a power in the army; and, as nothing definite could be alleged against him, he was released August 20, 1794, and restored to duty. The reason given was that better than any other he knew the coast and mountains along the Maritime Alps, and was too able and useful a man to spare.

How everything that Bonaparte had to do with Corsica seemed to go wrong is a noteworthy fact. In the spring of 1795 an expedition had been fitting out by the French to recapture the island from the English, and Bonaparte was put in charge of the artillery. But as matters turned out, the British fleet drove the French convoy back to the coast; and on his return Bonaparte found that he had not only once more lamentably failed, but owing to a reorganization of the arm, had lost as well his berth as Inspector of Coast Artillery. From his activity, slow Scherer had classed him as too ambitious and intriguing. Very much to his disgust he was, in lieu of his artillery command, given a commission as brigadier-general of infantry, and was assigned to the Army of the West, which was facing the Vendée. On the score of ill-health, however, he managed for a while not to report for duty with that force.

With his brother Louis, Marmont and Junot, he traveled to Paris in May, 1795, to protest against what he deemed an injustice. The Deputy Aubry, recently created general, was at the head of the military committee. He had never seen service. He reproached Bonaparte with his youth. "One ages quickly on battlefields, and I have just come from them," replied Bonaparte. In the capital he spent some time, hoping to be on hand for the next political upheaval.

He was alone, the Jacobins having been elbowed to one side; but not being on duty, he had more leisure to devote to his pen, and he prepared his "Mémoire militaire sur l'Armée d'Italie, Paris, premiers jours de Thermidor III.," about July 20, 1795. In this memorial, which he opens by the significant words, "In the present position of Europe, one can turn the Army of Italy to great account, and enable it to deliver blows decisive for peace and of marked effect on the House of Austria," he lays bare the kernel of the 1796 campaign: the advance through the gaps between the Alps and Apennines; the idea that a military severance of their armies would at once result in the political severance of Austria and Piedmont, the former army to rush to the protection of Lombardy, and the latter to that of its own country; then the forcing back of the Austrians on Alessandria, while a threat against Turin would compel a peace from Piedmont.

Only to true genius or to arrant incapacity is ever given the power to see perfection in the plans it draws up. In this memorial Bonaparte argues out, in burning phrases and with entire confidence, the value of his plan, and tells what its immediate results must be. The paper first exhibits the man's exceptional far-sightedness and breadth of view; for he goes on to show how the Army of Italy, after peace forced on Piedmont, may conquer Lombardy, march towards the Tyrol, unite with the Army of the Rhine on the Danube, and dictate terms in the heart of Austria. Even Carnot had never conceived so bold and true a plan.

As a wonderful proof of Bonaparte's genius, it has been pointed out by some authors that he took command of the Army of Italy in 1796, and at once proceeded out of hand upon the marvelous campaign which first illustrated his career. But one must not forget that genius, apart from study and hard work, has never yet accomplished its end.

Bonaparte's success in 1796 was due to years of office study of the country and the situation. While other generals of higher or equal rank were spending their leisure in wondering what was to be done next, or how they could strike a safe blow, or indeed in trivial pleasures, Bonaparte set himself to work out the problem with his maps and charts; he weighed each factor until he found its true value in the whole scheme; he studied the theatre of war until he knew its every hill and river; and he only then felt that he could command success. Like every great captain, his imagination was boundless, and in his brain there revolved at all times problems of what might thereafter be. Whenever he was confronted by a new proposition, he found its answer in the work of many sleepless nights of his restless past. "All great things that one saw him do as emperor," says Bourrienne, "were but the carrying out of projects long ago made, when his future greatness was only a dream, or rather a demand of his own imagination." The man was indeed a dreamer, but his dreams were full of reality, and peopled with facts; and his imagination mainly wandered over those fields upon which he was thereafter actually to play his part.

How much this memorial, how much the recommendations of Saliceti and other friends weighed, we do not know, but, on August 21, 1795, instead of being sent to bury himself in the command of a brigade in the Army of the West, Bonaparte was assigned by the Committee of Public Safety to its geographical bureau (the "Direction of the Movement of the Armies of the Republic"), to work out plans of campaign; and here he speedily gained the confidence of its members, who utilized his suggestions constantly. The leaders of the several armies to whom these suggestions were sent received them, however, with little patience. Kellermann wrote back that the originator belonged in an insane asylum; and Scherer

answered that the man who had made the plan for the Army of Italy had better come and carry it out himself. Curiously prophetic suggestion!

Bonaparte remained no great time in this position. Opinions and men changed rapidly in those weeks. With apparently small desire to give his best days to the service of France, and perhaps with his first symptoms of Oriental fever, he made a request to the Committee of Public Safety to be allowed to go to Turkey to reorganize the Sultan's artillery, — a matter he must have been preparing for some time; and this request was being favorably considered by the sub-committee he was specially serving when, not having reported to his brigade in the Army of the West, he was, under the technical regulations made for the reorganization of the levy in mass, stricken by the Central Committee from the list of active generals. Here was apparently a violent end to the career of a man who had so far succeeded in but one undertaking in life, in a subordinate though prominent position at Toulon. But Providence was reserving him for greater things. His loss of rank was but a step upward. Remaining in Paris he busied himself with many projects, yet often nearly at the end of his resources and without friends. But the 13th Vendémiaire (October 14, 1795) came on, and with it active work.

In 1795, as already stated, treaties had been made with Spain and Prussia, and a more moderate political situation had come in. The *émigrés* had been dispersed by Hoche at Quiberon. Jourdan and Pichegru had but half succeeded on the Rhine. In Italy Scherer had, under the plan claimed by Bonaparte as his own, and ably seconded by Massena, won the battle of Loano, which gave the Army of Italy a position on the Apennines as far as Savona. Matters began to wear their old-time aspect, and France was apparently recovering from the awful disease which had nearly buried the nation.

Paris was then, as now, *toujours gai*. The Reign of Terror had been a nightmare, and the city had awakened to fresh social life. In this Bonaparte mixed little. Politically, in 1795, France was in a struggle between Jacobins and Royalists, in which the latter, in the provinces at least, came close to winning, until Hoche put an end to their hopes in Brittany. France was again threatened, as she has at stated intervals been ever since, with the danger of anarchy from the masses, tyranny from the governing power, or a *coup d'état* by some ambitious schemer. A new constitution was being made, under which tax-paying residents might vote, and a Council of Ancients should have a steadying influence on the Deputies. The Committee of Public Safety was to become a Directory of five members, with more moderate powers. Extreme measures had seen their day.

But the Convention did not willingly cede its enormous powers, and shortly the Sections rose against it. To Barras, who had commanded the Army of the Interior with energy, was given the task to protect the Convention. He already knew Bonaparte. There were thirty thousand National Guards without artillery arrayed against the Convention's five thousand regulars with several batteries. Barras is said to have appointed seven lieutenants, among whom, though he was but one, Bonaparte was the ruling spirit; the entire operation was in his control, and from the first word spoken all followed in his steps. While his senti-

Barras.

ments were always with the people ("he was ever the peasants' General, the peasants' Consul, the peasants' Emperor"), his action was in favor of the ruling party of law and order. In addition to the five thousand line infantry there were fifteen hundred citizens, and when Barras authorized him to get guns from Sablons, he dispatched his subordinate Murat thither to bring them up. The latter was only just in time: the Sections had sent to seize the cannon for their side. With guns well served the Convention had a distinct superiority, unless the Sections should happen to be unusually well led, as it turned out they were not. General Menou had been in charge for the Convention, but he had weakly dallied with the Sections. After Bonaparte took the matter in hand, the day was still spent parleying and awaiting a movement of the Sections. But Bonaparte had for hours been ready, with his guns trained on the Louis XVI. bridge (now Pont de la Concorde), the Pont Royal, the rues de Rohan, du Dauphin, St. Florentin and St. Honoré, and with matches lighted. The members of the Convention were also armed, and the whole great mass of solid buildings making up the Louvre and the Tuileries was held by its troops. About 4 P. M. a few stray shots were fired from adjoining houses, and the Sections advanced on the Convention army by the issues of the rue St. Honoré, and first near the church of St. Roch, where they had their headquarters. Waiting for nothing, and although but a single gun could be trained up the narrow rue du Dauphin, Bonaparte so ably managed his batteries that the troops of the Sections were blown away with a few rounds of grape and canister. A similar attack from across the Seine by the Pont Royal was somewhat later dispersed in like manner. By six o'clock the matter was finished, the Sections had played their cards and lost, with casualties on each side of about two hundred men. The Convention had won by Bona-

lustre is reflected on you. I will lead you into the most fertile plains of the world. Rich provinces, great cities will be in your power; there you shall find honor, fame and riches. Soldiers of Italy, shall courage or constancy fail you? BONAPARTE.

This proclamation showed a keen sense of the strength as well as weakness of the French soldier's character. Bonaparte promised them food, fame, spoils. The Gallic conscript was about to fight for his rations, as the gallant Confederates so often had to do from 1861 to 1865, but with the additional incentive of loot.

France was in a critical situation. In coalition against her were England, Russia, the German Empire, Austria, Naples and the Pope, who had formally joined the allies September 28, 1795; while Prussia and Spain, which had recently made peace at Basle, were still far from reliable as neutrals, though Prussia had reason to hope for an increase of territory. Russia had gone so far as to send ships to the North Sea. Sweden and Denmark, Hanover, Saxony and some other German States were friendly, and Portugal would have been glad to leave the Coalition. Holland had established a republican government, and Beurnonville was there in command of the joint Dutch and French forces. Poland had ceased to exist, and Turkey had no interest in European politics. Switzerland remained neutral. All the French colonies had been alienated or seized by the English; the French fleet had been destroyed; the small foothold of France in India had been lost. On the other hand Belgium had been formally reunited to France, though without the consent of Austria, who viewed the loss of the Netherlands as a grievous blow to her prestige; and the Austrian victories on the Rhine in 1795 gave small hope that Vienna would voluntarily cede this territory. The German armies were expected to make an attempt to cross the Rhine. Finances were at such low ebb that the Directory

resorted to the offensive quite as much to subsist the armies it could not feed upon the enemy's soil, as for strategic gain.

There were three main armies, Jourdan's, Moreau's and Bonaparte's, and two in reserve: Kellermann's Army of the Alps, and one in Provence and on the Var. Jourdan had upwards of seventy thousand men on the lower Rhine, with which to mask Mainz and advance into Franconia with forty-five thousand. Moreau had an equal number in Alsatia, with which to mask Mannheim and advance into Swabia. The two were then to unite, and descend upon Bavaria. The Army of the Alps and the Army of Italy, while near each other, did little work in common, and the former commander of the Army of Italy, Scherer, after the victory of Loano, had sat down to rest upon his laurels in a useless defensive.

Although Clerfayt had done well in 1795, Archduke Charles had superseded him, and with his ninety thousand men was expected to recapture Belgium. On the Upper Rhine, Wurmser with eighty thousand men was to hold head to Moreau ; and Beaulieu, with sixty thousand men in Italy, was ordered to drive the French from the Riviera and follow them into Provence.

In 1796 Italy, divided up into twenty petty principalities, existed only on the map. Sardinia, with Savoy, Nice and Piedmont, Genoa, Lucca, Lombardy, Venice, Modena, Tuscany, comprised the northern part ; the States of the Pope took up the centre ; and Naples covered the southern part of the peninsula, including Sicily. Corsica was French. Victor Amadeus III. of Piedmont, "le portier des Alpes," had married his daughters to the brothers of Louis XVI. ; and his fear of republican doctrines, his family ties and English subsidies, all induced him to cling to the Coalition. And yet, in truth, for in her alliance he had everything to lose and nothing to gain, it was but a feeble fealty that he harbored

From the south it is approachable by easy passes across the Apennines; from the east by fairly good ones over the Julian Alps, and by the passes of the Tagliamento (Pontebba) and of the Piave; on the north and west, however, it can only be entered by the rugged passes of the Adige (Brenner) and of the Brenta; by the Splügen, St. Gothard, the Simplon, and the St. Bernard, Great and Little; by Mont Cenis, Mont Genèvre, Argentière, Tenda. All the latter French and Swiss passes were at that day protected by more or less strong forts; the eastern gaps were not. The debouches from the Riviera to the Po valley were covered by the fortresses of Coni, Ormea, Ceva; and that all these passes ran through valleys into the Padane plains at nearly a right angle lent greater value to these strong places. From the coast, between the Bocchetta and Tenda passes, the roads across the mountains over the Ormea and Cadibona passes were poor.

From Turin down the Po is navigable. It is about as wide as the Danube, but not being deep and having a quiet current, it is in many places easily crossed by troops. The Isonzo protects northern Italy from the east, and the Palmanova aids in its defense; but these rivers can be turned by the pass of Pontebba via Osopo into the valley of the Tagliamento. The Piave protects Venice. The Brenta has many fords. All these rivers are torrential in the mountains. They can all be turned by the upper waters of the Adige, along which run roads from the Tyrol and Bavaria into Italy. From this it follows that the Adige is the strongest barrier of the Po valley on the east, as the line of this river can only be turned by the difficult passes farther to the west. Down to Rivoli the Adige is protected by Monte Baldo, and the position at La Corona, just above Rivoli, practically prevents artillery from moving along the road. Verona commands the Adige at the outlet of the mountains, and still farther down Legnano,

below which the country is too marshy for military operations. The Mincio, from the Lake of Garda to the Po, is watched by the fortresses of Peschiera and Mantua, but between the former and Goito there are many fords. About Mantua lie much marsh land and many lakes. The line of the Mincio can be turned south of the Po, or by the north of the Lake of Garda. The Adda, which flows through the Lake of Como and to the Po above Cremona, has several fords, but Pizzighetone protects its lower course, while Lecco, Trezzo, Cassano and Lodi are strong points above. The Ticino flows through Lago Maggiore, and divides Piedmont from Lombardy. Navigable, with many affluents and uncertain fords, it is a good defensive line, Pavia being its strongest place. Opposite the mouth of the Ticino lies the pass of Stradella, between the Po and a rugged spur of the Apennines; and all roads along the left bank of the Po, practicable for an army, must pass through this defile. We remember that Hannibal saw and seized its advantages.

Mantua was the best fortress in Italy, lying on an island in the Mincio in the midst of marshes and flanked by a citadel and by Fort San Giorgio. Venice, from her position and her forts, was of marked value. Verona had good walls, and on the left bank a strong fort. Legnano was fairly strong. Peschiera was small but important. Pizzighetone had considerable value. Palmanova was a new fortress. Milan possessed a six-bastioned citadel, but was not otherwise strong. Pavia held the Ticino bridge and was strengthened by walls and a citadel. Brescia had like defenses. Bergamo had a citadel and the fortified castle Capella. Crema was strong. Turin boasted good walls and a fine citadel. Alessandria, Tortona, Valencia, Gavi, Ceva, Coni, all strong fortresses, protected Piedmont on the south, while the forts of Bard, Exilles, Fenestrelles, Pignerolo, Castel Delfino, Demonte,

performed like office on the west. Such was the theatre which lay open to the new commander of the Army of Italy.

At this date Bonaparte's appearance had little that was attractive. Short of stature (being scant five feet five, English), spare, and with features so pinched that their real beauty of outline was quite hidden, high broad forehead, thin lips, long yellow hair, not always well kempt, wearing his clothes in a loose and ungainly fashion, ill-groomed to the last degree, there was nothing to suggest his real character, except the big, deep-set, blue-gray eyes, which never failed to fascinate, and his voice, whose words none could fail to heed. Apparently lacking physique, he yet possessed unlimited nervous strength, and he soon proved that he could outwork almost any man in the army. On his first appearance the older generals in the Army of Italy looked with small favor on this twenty-seven years old commander-in-chief; but in a few weeks they were heart and soul his willing lieutenants.

"Headquarters had not left Nice since the beginning of the war. . . . The administrations considered themselves as at a permanent post, and busied themselves more with the comforts of life than the needs of the army." The new leader at once showed the strong hand of authority. He disbanded one battalion for refusing to march for want of shoes and pay, and consolidated the men in groups of five into other commands, "the officers not having shown enough nerve" in the mutiny. He raised money from local bankers to partly pay the troops, and began to gather food and forage with an energy and success not yet seen. Everything was done for the men; everything was demanded of them. "I am compelled to threaten the agents, who have stolen much and who have credit, and I accomplish a good deal by following up my threats with caresses. The army will hereafter eat good bread and have meat," he wrote the Directory. And to Com-

missary Lambert he wrote, April 7, concerning a complaint as to the weight of the rations and forage, and stating that larceny had been proven : —

"The general-in-chief orders you to make an official report on the weight of the bundles of hay which remain and which have been placed under charge of the guard. You will have Citizen Michel arrested until you can find out who bundled the hay, and the storekeeper who received the lettuce. . . . It is important, Citizen Commissary, that not a single rogue shall escape. For a long time the soldiers and the interests of the country have been a prey to cupidity. An example is necessary at all times, particularly on the opening of the campaign."

To Scherer's credit be it said that he received the new commander-in-chief cordially, and gave him all the aid he could. In return Bonaparte suggested him for the post of ambassador. "I have been particularly satisfied with the frankness and integrity of General Scherer. By his loyal conduct, and by his promptness in giving me all the information which can be useful to me, he has acquired a right to my gratitude," he wrote the Directory March 28. And to Carnot: "I have seemed to see in Scherer a man pure and enlightened. He appears to me tired of war, which has broken his health. Could you not employ him as ambassador? He has knowledge of men, and moral breadth."

The Army of Italy, whose soldiers the allies derisively called "heroes in rags," — as indeed they were, for "privations, poverty, misery, are the school of the good soldier," said the emperor at St. Helena, — was perched upon the watershed along the coast of the Gulf of Genoa, over too long a front, from Ormea, at the headwaters of the Tanaro, to Savona. Its communications with France ran along the sea parallel with its front — always a dangerous situation — and were thus liable to be cut at any time. Supplies had to come by the seashore road, as an English flotilla under Nelson and Jervis held the

which were much less pronounced. In the Alps, on Bonaparte's left and with communications running back through Savoy, stood Kellermann's forces, over which Bonaparte had no control. It is plain that by way of Coni, had it so wished, the Army of Italy could have reached out towards the Army of the Alps and worked in unison with it; but there was actually no intimate coöperation. Each commander paid heed to his own front only.

The distribution of troops was as follows: on the left of the army stood Garnier's division of thirty-two hundred men along the Colle di Finestre towards Isola; then came Macquart's division of thirty-seven hundred men along the road from Sospello up to the Colle di Tenda. These two were intended to keep up connection with the Army of the Alps by the Coni road, and to block the way to the Piedmontese, so that the French communications should not be cut by the enemy's advance through the Tenda pass. Serurier's division, seven thousand strong, lay on the road Pieve-Ormea-Garessio as if ready to push on Ceva and Turin, with Augereau's division of eight thousand men stationed behind its right and leaning its own right flank on the sea at Langueglia. There were two divisions in the van, Massena's of nine thousand men, and Laharpe's of eight thousand men; and these held the coast from Augereau's position out to near Voltri. The artillery boasted but sixty guns. All the troops were in cantonments, and far from being in marching order. Of cavalry Bonaparte had not exceeding three thousand men. These he placed under the command of the veteran Steingel, and stationed them in two divisions near Loano, in rear of the foot. In a limited sense both Kellermann's Army of the Alps and the troops on the Var were a reserve to the Army of Italy. But they were not subject to Bonaparte's control. As a fact, Kellermann was none too eager to coöperate with his new associate.

The forces of the allies were equally ill-distributed. After the battle of Loano they had been crowded down from the watershed to the northern foothills of the mountains, and lay covering the approaches to Turin and Milan. Over twenty thousand Piedmontese were contained by Kellermann in the passes of the Alps from Mont Blanc down to the Argentière, so as to be of practically no present use against the Army of Italy; and to this extent Kellermann was doing useful work. But in the immediate problem which Bonaparte was to work out, he was playing only a neutral rôle.

In the valleys of the Tanaro and the Great Bormida, about Ceva and Mondovi, stood Colli, and under him Provera and Latour, with the rest of the Piedmontese, twenty-five thousand effective, covering Turin, with his left on Millesimo; and the Austrians, thirty-five thousand strong under Beaulieu, a veteran of seventy-one, who was, indeed, supposed to be in command of both armies, extended their left out towards the Bocchetta pass, thus covering Milan, and with a flying wing near Genoa. The Austrian centre was at Sassello, with outposts along the ridge of the Apennines; the right was at Dego on the Little Bormida. The main body, which had been in winter quarters on the Po and Adda, was yet assembling in the plains near Alessandria. Beaulieu had good lieutenants: Argenteau, Melas, Wukassovich, Liptay, Sebottendorf. The entire allied line thus extended from the fortress of Coni, which strongly protected its right flank, to the Bocchetta pass and the great city of Genoa. They numbered about sixty thousand men under the colors, and had one hundred and fifty guns. This line was long, and was so placed that, owing to the trend of the watersheds, intercommunication between parts was over difficult ground; if interrupted at any one point, it could be reëstablished only by a considerable circuit. The entire allied force was marshaled cordon fashion: Sebot-

tendorf, opposite Voltri, was supposed, while advancing down the coast, to keep in touch with the English fleet and Genoa; Argenteau was to advance from Acqui towards the coast with his mass at Sassello; Provera, with a brigade at Saliceto and Millesimo, was to keep up contact between the Austrian right and Piedmontese left; and Colli, with the main Piedmontese army, was to hold firm in Ceva.

Bonaparte's orders from the Directory were to separate the allies and force peace on Piedmont, in accordance with his own plans already mentioned, and for which he had been ridiculed by his associate, Kellermann, and his predecessor, Scherer; and though he was resolved to undertake the offensive at an early day, yet there remained a host of things to be done before he could move. Many have portrayed Napoleon as a man always pushing forward, "following his star," without regard to logistics or lines of retreat. The truth is, that no man was ever more scrupulous in his care of victual, clothing and material than he; no man ever knew more certainly what he should do in case of disaster. He was far removed from a Charles XII. Napoleon, to be sure, always made "war nourish war" (excepting the cost of his wars with England, his campaigns were made to pay for themselves); but he none the less calculated everything relating to administration with a nicety of detail which was marvelous; and woe betide that officer who failed him in the department of supplies. It is, however, true that he relied on the country, rather than on magazines, as Frederick had to do. This system he had inherited from the bold recklessness of the early Revolutionary generals. But on the other hand, the valley of the Po, whither he was bound to push his way, was rich, as were not Bohemia and Moravia, where the Prussians campaigned in the seventeenth century. Inasmuch as, in this particular case, what Bonaparte was resolved to do would

demand great speed, so the question of supplies had all the more to be considered and provided for. And the greater part of his early days in command were devoted to this task.

It seems that Bonaparte had for a moment conceived an idea that he might persuade or compel Genoa to give him passage, so that through the Bocchetta pass he might, by a threat to the Austrian left, throw Beaulieu back on or beyond Alessandria, detach Piedmont from the Austrian alliance by advancing between the allies from that direction, and, taking their defenses in reverse, call in the Army of the Alps and move in mass on the Tyrol. In fact, his advance on Voltri was in part owing to this idea, and was in part a threat on Genoa, to persuade her to pay an indemnity for the burning by the English of a French ship in her neutral waters. But on due weighing of the chances, he reverted to the 1794 plan, which he had so carefully worked out in his Memorial and other papers, and which would be much more effective if successful. In general, as already shown, this plan was to break through the enemy's centre across the western Apennines, strategically separate the Austrians from the Piedmontese, force peace on the latter, and then turn upon the Austrians. The point of attack was to be along the Savona-Carcare road; and to carry out this plan he must first concentrate on his right. "To change from the defensive to the offensive formation is one of the most sensitive of operations," said he, as he began this work. A few months later, when his hand had got used to his tools, — or perhaps we should say used to holding the baton, — he found it easier; and thereafter he paid small heed to tactical difficulties, which he always felt he could overcome when met.

Bonaparte's chief of staff was Berthier, then forty-three years old, the man who served him as such throughout his campaigns, except the last. He had been lieutenant-colonel

on the staff of Rochambeau in America, had served in the Vendée and under Kellermann in the Army of the Alps. Berthier was a most useful officer, brave, exact and reliable in every part of the practical business of war, but "of an indecisive character," and without the slightest conception of its intellectual side. Napoleon gave him fame, riches, friendship, and this, said he, Berthier later repaid him by betrayal. At St. Helena he characterized Berthier as a gander whom he had in a way transformed into an eagle. This was scarcely a fair simile, but the emperor was then embittered. Untiring at work in the tent or in the saddle, master of all the details of administration, Berthier was invaluable to the great army leader; but he was not strong in any place except beside his master. On Bonaparte's staff were also Marmont, Murat and Junot, later to rise to fame; and in subordinate positions were serving Lannes, Joubert, Bessières, Suchet and Victor. As lieutenants, each worked up to the top of the ladder.

Berthier.

All the regiments capable of work on the fighting line were now ordered up, and as soon as they could be relieved by garrisons, came on from Nice and Albenga to Savona. These were all places essential to be held to protect the line of communications with France. Bonaparte left his Nice headquarters for the front on April 2, to set the army in motion.

His purpose was to concentrate at Savona, push at once up to Carcare on the Little Bormida, where the road forks towards the capitals of Piedmont and Lombardy, and having seized this fork, he might advance on either road at will.

The allies had also been contemplating active operations. "The minister of France had demanded of the Senate of Genoa a passage through the Bocchetta, and the keys of Gavi, announcing that the French desired to penetrate into Lombardy, and lean their operations on Genoa," narrates Napoleon. Beaulieu had thus conceived fears for the safety of Genoa, and by March 31 had begun to reinforce the troops which lay in front of the French extreme right at Voltri, while Argenteau should debouch from Sassello, via Montenotte, on the French left. "Had General Beaulieu reflected on the topographical conditions, he would not have marched on Voltri to cover Genoa; he would have moved on Acqui and on Cairo; from here he would have debouched . . . in three columns . . . by Montenotte on Savona, . . . by Cadibona, . . . and on Finale. . . . The French army would have quickly fallen back from Voltri and Genoa to defend these three important positions," say the Memoirs. Certain Austrian movements in this region equally demonstrated to Bonaparte that there was no further chance of surprising the allies in their winter quarters, as at one time he had hoped to do. And meanwhile Colli, also alive to a possible advance of the French, had got his troops together into close cantonments about Ceva and Mondovi, and in an extensive camp near the former town. From Albenga, April 6, Bonaparte wrote the Directory: "The Piedmontese army is of the strength of forty thousand men of infantry and five thousand men of cavalry; that of the Austrians is of the strength of thirty-four thousand men of infantry and three thousand of cavalry. I have disposable only forty-five thousand men, all included.

They have held back many troops in the rear and beyond the Rhone. . . . The King of Sardinia has made a requisition of young men over fifteen years of age. He has condemned to be shot those who do not join, and as a matter of fact has had some shot in Turin." The effective for the field would be nearer stated at twenty-five thousand under Colli, and thirty-five thousand under Beaulieu, as against not over thirty-seven thousand French. Even this was a superiority which the enemy might well have utilized; and the French status furnished a problem not easy of solution, especially as the allies had an unlimited supply of artillery, and the French had far less.

Bonaparte also wrote the Directory, April 6: "I have found in Oneille some marbles which are valued at quite a sum. I have ordered them to be estimated, and to be put up at auction in the Genoese Riviera. That might give you a sum of thirty to forty thousand francs." This was the beginning of the habit of seizing works of art as lawful booty, later so pronounced.

It would appear that Beaulieu could have threatened the French to better strategic advantage by an operation in force against their left by way of Ceva, while with a small force retaining his hold on the Bocchetta pass; for this operation might have compelled Bonaparte to retire summarily to the line of the Var; but the manœuvre did not appeal to the Austrian leader, and he chose to push in where Bonaparte was strongest, forgetting that the latter might advance on his own line where he himself was weakest. But Beaulieu, like nearly every other general of that day, had limited views as to what strategy meant. His desire to work against the French right may have come from fear for Genoa; or perchance he had orders from Vienna not to lose touch with that city. Remembering the capacity of the Aulic Council for

blundering interference, one might almost assume this to be true.

Colli had in fact advised Beaulieu to concentrate on his right, across the Apennines between Loano and Savona, and by thus cutting off the French right at Voltri force the Army of Italy back to the Var — an excellent operation. But Beaulieu's conception of the offensive was markedly tame; and in preparing for it he lost sight of the demands of his own defensive. Still it was not left to Bonaparte to open the campaign. His advance on Voltri had roused the Austrian leader from his quiet. On April 9 Beaulieu sent Sebottendorf with the bulk of his seven thousand men forward on Voltri, while Argenteau, who disposed of a column of nine thousand men, pushed forward from Sassello, intending to march on Savona by the Montenotte pass. Beaulieu apparently thought that between Argenteau and Sebottendorf, with a fraction of the force they should have got in line, the French right wing could be cut off and destroyed. Colli, commanding the Piedmontese, while advised of the operation, merely retained his position at Ceva, where Serurier by feints from Garessio held him fast, lest he should open the road to Turin. The Austrian commander may have purposed to pivot on Ceva, and after pushing in the French, form a new line from this fortified place across the mountains to Loano. This on the face of it was practicable; but the result of the operation would have been to separate the centre so far and by so bad a route from the right at Ceva and the left near Genoa, that the French might fall on it in force and destroy it. Whatever Beaulieu may have intended to do, what he actually did fitted into Bonaparte's plans with nicety.

Bonaparte had been purposing to inspect Serurier's force and position, but on hearing the news from Voltri, speeded to Savona, to ascertain how much the Austrian activity there

might mean. On April 10 Sebottendorf's division seriously attacked Cervoni's brigade, which held the extreme right; and though the French made a gallant all-day fight for the position, they were at eventide forced to fall back on the main body, and reached Laharpe next day near Savona. Nor, indeed, was Argenteau idle. At noon on April 11 he met and pushed the French outposts back of Montenotte, until he was checked by the fierce resistance of a French force (whether under Rampon or Fornésy is disputed), in one of three old redoubts on Monte Legino. There are two Montenottes, Superior and Inferior, one almost on the watershed, and one below on the northerly slope. From the Superior ran a road via Monte Legino to the sea. It was this pass Bonaparte had sent a body of thirteen hundred men to hold, and these were the troops Argenteau had struck. Thrice the Austrian forces advanced on the brave Frenchmen's post; thrice they were thrown back with loss. French infantry has often defended positions such as this with admirable constancy.

Serurier.

The meaning of the two attacks could not be misapprehended. No doubt was left in Bonaparte's mind that the Austrians had set out with a determination to drive the French back to Nice. It was for him to counter the blow.

There was nothing to indicate how large a force the allies had put in motion, nor at what point the bulk of it might debouch. But Bonaparte was not slow to recognize the fact that the two operating Austrian columns were separated by a mountain chain, and that he might easily hold one with a small force and fall on the other with enough men to crush it.

At the very outset the enemy had committed the error of moving on him in two concentric columns, an operation which generally endangers them both; and here in effect did so. Bonaparte elected to deliver his main blow on Argenteau, because, should he defeat this general, he would place himself between Colli and Beaulieu, to the assistance of neither of whom could the other come, except by a long detour, and he might thus be able to move upon one or the other of the main armies to marked advantage. To this effect, then, his orders were at once issued on April 11. With Augereau, Massena and Laharpe, Bonaparte purposed to cross the Apennines near the sources of the Little Bormida, while Serurier should descend the mountain slopes towards the plain of the Tanaro. His minor operation was to be a tactical advance against the right flank of Argenteau's column at Montenotte; his major operation was to be a strategic breaking through the centre of the whole allied line.

Augereau.

Augereau, who with his six thousand men had been marching on Savona, was ordered to head on Mallare, and next day on Cairo, where further orders would be given him. This he proceeded to do in good style, forcing back whatever small outlying parties he met. Massena, collecting his nine thousand men, advanced as ordered by way of Altarè. This manœuvre

was intended to project these two divisions around the right flank of Argenteau. Laharpe, with seven thousand men, leaving a small force to act as rearguard on the Voltri road, started at daylight on the 12th to sustain the Montenotte battalions in their gallant stand at Monte Legino ; and on arrival filed into place on each flank of this small force. Information of the manœuvre was sent back to Serurier, with instructions to demonstrate sharply but safely against Colli down the valley of the Tanaro. Personally, Bonaparte accompanied Massena's column.

This plan, rapidly formed and stoutly carried out as a counter-blow to the attack of Sebottendorf already inaugurated, deserved and met with complete success. The Austrians were but ill-prepared for larger operations. Argenteau had apparently got together not exceeding half his force (Beaulieu stated it at one third), and finding himself sharply attacked by Laharpe in front and his right about to be turned by Massena, whose van had pushed over country roads towards Montenotte Inferiore, he was compelled from the outset to fight in retreat. Laharpe followed him up sharply, while Massena strove to reach his right. Bonaparte, from a hill near Carcare, which dominated much of the surrounding country, directed all the manœuvres. Argenteau did his best, but it was a losing game ; and lest he should be cut off from Dego, where lay considerable Austrian forces, he soon beat a disastrous retreat down the mountain roads, with a loss of nearly twenty-five hundred men in killed, wounded and missing. Augereau did not reach the field, as sundry movements of Piedmontese scouting parties up the Great Bormida valley called his attention thither, for fear the French left flank should be threatened ; in fact, before reaching Carcare he retired upstream some distance lest the enemy should get in his rear. Serurier at Garessio contented himself with his rôle of containing the Piedmontese by a feigned attack.

Having found Voltri abandoned, and learning of the combat at Montenotte, Beaulieu now threw up his initiative and strove to reach Dego by such mountain roads as were available. But his progress was necessarily slow, and he could do nothing to arrest the impending disaster.

For the nonce Argenteau was checked, and retired down the Erro valley in the effort to reach Dego by a circuit across the hills. He was followed by a party sent in pursuit by Laharpe. Bonaparte had crushed him by concentrating superior weight at the point of contact. Believing that the Austrian corps was quite neutralized and would not again advance, the young leader now saw that he might at least for a moment turn his attention to Colli. Assembling ten thousand men, the whole of Augereau's division with part of Massena's, he sent them via Millesimo towards Montezemolo on the road to Ceva; and meanwhile Serurier, learning Napoleon's advance, also worked his way down the Tanaro; seeking with his left to envelop the enemy's right, and with his right to reach out towards the French forces heading for Montezemolo. Laharpe, and Massena with what was left of his division, marched across the hills to Dego, to fend the Austrians off from interfering with the attack on Colli, and perhaps to push on to Acqui, which they could now threaten down both the valley of the Little Bormida and that of the Erro.

In order to coöperate with Beaulieu, Colli should not have leaned his right on Millesimo, but on Dego. It was not necessary to stand astride the highway in order to protect Turin. At Dego he would have been covering the road to Milan, but he would have equally protected Turin, because he was lying on the flank of any column moving towards that capital. And at Dego he could not have been so speedily cut apart from his allies.

eighteen guns, fell to the French by evening. Thus in these two days, the French had, as they claimed, won two smart combats, which are usually called the Battle of Millesimo, and inflicted on the enemy a loss of six thousand men, killed, wounded and missing, thirty guns and five flags. The French loss was very much less. Bonaparte gives it at four hundred men; but owing to his intentionally perverse arithmetic, it is never possible to procure acceptable figures of the French casualties. They always have to be estimated.

Beaulieu was now fully cut off from Colli. Nothing but an advance in force sufficient to overwhelm the French could reëstablish his connection with his ally on their original line.

From Dego Bonaparte returned to Carcare, determined to push in without delay on the Piedmontese and bring them to terms. Massena was ordered to gather his regiments and hold Dego; and by 8 A. M. of the 15th, with all the rest of his forces, Bonaparte was on the way back to Montezemolo. The cavalry was ordered up to Carcare, and Bonaparte felt secure as to his right flank.

But Dego was not safe yet. No sooner had Bonaparte turned his back than, owing to careless French outpost service and the absence on foraging of too large a party, an Austrian column of three thousand men, being five battalions from Sassello, under Wukassovich, who was to have reached the place for the fight of the 14th, but had been retarded by bad mountain roads, appeared before the town, and with a sudden dash, by 11 A. M. of the 15th had driven the French out. A rumor had reached Bonaparte that Beaulieu proposed in person to march on Dego, and before hearing from Massena of this new onset, he had already given Laharpe fresh orders to halt at Rochetta. So soon as he heard of the disaster, he hurried to the spot; about 2 P. M. the French again assumed the offensive, and drove out the Austrians with loss of a thousand

men and eighteen guns, and pushed them back on Spigno. Lanusse especially distinguished himself; and here, too, Bonaparte first saw Lannes in action, and noticed his ardor. Dego was left in good hands. This last effort made the right flank safe; and on the left, on this same day, Serurier had marched down the Tanaro valley well towards Ceva, while Augereau, forcing in the Piedmontese, reached Montezemolo and established connection with his brother officer. Colli withdrew to his intrenched camp at Ceva.

In these four days Bonaparte had given the first illustration of the value of his mass-theory as opposed to the cordon system.

When from the heights of Montezemolo the French army contemplated the gigantic, snow-clad chain of the Alps, which they had faced with dread, but which now seemed to be behind them in their march, Bonaparte encouraged them with the remark, "Hannibal crossed the Alps; we have turned them!"

Personally the young commander had been omnipresent, galloping from column to column, cheering and directing every movement. Scarce Alexander could have excelled him in bodily efficiency. In a strategical sense he had worked so rapidly and skillfully as to convince Beaulieu that the French were superior in numbers, and to set that officer to concentrating all his forces at Acqui, not indeed for advance on his opponent, but for the bare protection of Lombardy. The Austrians had lost not far from ten thousand men; and the French blows had succeeded each other with such astonishing rapidity, and on such unexpected places, that the veteran Austrian commander was completely dazed. He had never conceived of such abnormal speed; it appeared to him quite outside the rules of the game of war; and he recognized too late that Colli was cut off from touch with his Austrians. Beaulieu was slow of thought, slower of action; Bonaparte was as rapid in

both. Still on the 15th, himself delaying for neither rest nor food, while Beaulieu was wondering what he could do to meet this half-comprehended peril, Bonaparte made arrangements to take the Piedmontese left in reverse from Dego, while his own left should attack them in front. It began to look as if this new strategist could actually bring the Piedmontese to sue for peace, as he had planned to do. He was taking Scherer at his word.

Of the two armies of the enemy, the Piedmontese was the one to attack first. It was manifestly useless to move against the Austrians. Beaulieu would have retired from the French advance, and have led them away from the main scheme. And Bonaparte was all the more intent on following up his success against Colli, lest the Piedmontese should retire to Turin and there delay him by a siege, for which he was ill-prepared, having neither siege-guns, material, nor equipment. Nor did he forget the difficulty Prince Eugene had labored under in 1706, in his masterly operation up the Po against this capital city. In any event, whatever idea may have tempted Bonaparte to follow up his success against the Austrians instead of Colli he summarily dismissed, and kept in view his main and original plan: first, the separation of the allies; second, the forcing of a Piedmontese peace. Many a general fails by forgetting his first and better intention, and in being led astray by an unimportant gain to do what is not in natural strategic sequence. A sense of proportion, of the relative value of things, is one of the highest qualities in the captain — as in every other workman.

Though there seems to have been no further need of anxiety about the French right flank, yet Bonaparte, on April 16, joined part of the divisions of Laharpe and Massena in still another advance on Sassello. Just why this was done is not indicated by any contemporary evidence. It is probable

that reports came in of further bodies of Austrian troops seeking a junction with Argenteau from Voltri. To lose no time, he seems to have left full orders for his other lieutenants to go on during his absence with the work cut out for them. On the 16th Augereau left Montezemolo, and reaching Ceva, attacked with marked vigor the redoubts in front of the intrenched camp of the Piedmontese near this city. The camp was held in force, and after several hours' hot work Augereau was thrown back. A second and a third assault met with the same fate ; but soon Serurier and Massena came up to his aid, and each moved in from a direction to threaten one of the enemy's flanks. With this additional force the French had by evening ousted the enemy from his camp, and driven him back on the roads leading to Lesegno and Mondovi. Early on the 17th Serurier occupied the town of Ceva and invested the citadel. On the 16th also Laharpe was called back from Dego and left at San Benedetto to observe the Austrians, and Steingel's cavalry, as useless in the mountains as it would now be valuable in the plain, was added to Serurier's column. Headquarters was changed to Saliceto.

This section of country is cut up by watersheds, all running substantially northeast and southwest, and in each valley between these watersheds flows a torrential stream. Behind any one of these rivers was an opportunity for the Piedmontese to make a strong defense ; but Colli seemed to have no such thought. He had too hearty a fear for Turin. As for Bonaparte, having apparently neutralized Beaulieu for good, he could begin in earnest his attack upon Colli. On April 18 Serurier moved towards San Michele, seeking to turn Colli's right flank and cut him off from Mondovi ; Augereau, with part of his division, marched about his left flank via Castellino ; Massena's division, accompanied by Bonaparte, moved up to Ceva. Bonaparte could now more

operations, and then, with his usual extraordinary activity, rode back to Lesegno to hurry forward his troops and material.

On April 22 the French army lay on the line Mondovi-Niella-Castellino. Bonaparte was not certain as to what Colli might do, and his troops had, by their wonderful exertions, earned some hours for rest and for realigning the divisions. But the respite was short. All through his campaigns Napoleon called on his troops for the same exertions that Frederick demanded from his. Exceptional situations must be met by exceptional exertions; and on the 23d he pushed Serurier forward on the road to Fossano beyond the Pesio, to harry Colli's rear, and Massena on that to Cherasco near the Tanaro; Augereau moved to Dogliano, and Laharpe in reserve next day came up to Niella. Colli still had the strongest of his positions on the Stura, with the fortress of Coni on his right and Cherasco on his left; but his sense of resistance had been broken. He had small mind to keep the field. On April 25 Serurier was in Fossano, Massena in Cherasco, and Augereau at Alba. Macquart and Garnier were ordered on Coni to capture the place. Colli retired to Carmagnole. Here he resigned from the Piedmontese, and later entered the Austrian service.

There had been a great deal of pillaging by the long-starved, ill-clad French troops, and the Piedmontese common folk were incensed at this treatment by the men who came in the guise of friends to wreak woe upon them. Bonaparte determined to stop this by summary means, and issued orders to punish every soldier caught in pillage. He always used the resources of the country he traversed to the utmost extent, but at this period he was strenuous to stop excesses by the men, not only for the effect on a perhaps friendly population, but principally because it loosened all the bonds of discipline.

"I will restore order, or cease to command these robbers," said he at this time. Not even as a reward for the great exertions of his men could he tolerate the evil, which had grown beyond all bounds. On the 22d of April he published an order on the subject which deserves attention. It has no uncertain sound. The "morality" referred to applies, of course, only to courage and discipline.

ORDER.

Headquarters, Lesegno, 3 Floréal, Year IV.

The general-in-chief expresses to the army his satisfaction with its bravery, and with the successes it obtains every day over the enemy; but he sees with horror the frightful pillage indulged in by wicked men, who straggle behind their corps until after the battle, so as to devote themselves to excesses most dishonoring to the army and the French name.

Consequently he orders: —

1. The general, chief of staff, to make him within twenty-four hours a report on the moral conduct of the adjutants-general and other officers attached to the staff.

2. The generals of division will send within twenty-four hours to the general-in-chief a note on the morality of the superior officers who have been under their orders since the opening of the campaign.

3. The chief commissary in charge will make the same report on the conduct of the war commissaries.

4. The general-in-chief reserves the right to decide with regard to the superior officers or war commissaries against whom complaints are made.

5. The chiefs of brigade, the chiefs of battalion, will assemble at the quarters of the general of the brigade; they will make a note of the officers of each half-brigade, and of the moral conduct they have shown since the opening of the campaign. The general of brigade will forward this note to the general of division, accompanied by his remarks.

The generals of division are authorized summarily to cashier and even to send in confinement to the castle of Fort Carré, at Antibes, the officers who by their example authorized the horrible pillage which has been going on for several days.

The generals of division are authorized, according to circumstances, to

have summarily shot the officers or soldiers who, by their example, shall excite others to pillage, and thereby destroy discipline, introduce disorder in the army, and compromise its safety and glory.

Every officer or non-commissioned officer who has not followed his flag, and who without a legitimate reason is found absent at the moment of a combat, shall be dismissed, and his name shall be sent to his department, in order that he shall be branded in the opinion of his fellow-citizens as a coward.

Every soldier who shall be convicted of having remained away from his flag (*i. e.*, straggled) twice in succession, shall be published in orders.

Every soldier who shall be convicted of not having been in one combat shall lose his rank of seniority, and shall be carried on the roll at the foot of the company, and if he be a grenadier or carbineer, he shall be stricken from the company roster. A soldier who shall be convicted of being absent twice from a combat shall be degraded at the head of the battalion ; he shall be stripped of his uniform, and he shall be sent beyond the Var to mend the roads as long as the campaign shall last.

The commanders of battalions, or of companies, when they are detached, will make the report to the superior officer commanding the column, who will order the above punishment, and report the same to the general of division.

The generals of division, the generals of brigade and the chiefs of the corps are held responsible for the execution of the present order.

By order of the General-in-Chief.

This order accomplished its end. Bonaparte shortly wrote the Directory: "Everything goes well. Pillaging is less. This first thirst of an army deprived of everything is being quenched. The wretches are excusable. After having groaned three years on the summit of the Alps, they arrive in the promised land, and they want to taste it. I have had three shot, and have put six at work with the pickaxe beyond the Var."

The proclamation which was issued April 26 was aimed to convey a political hint to Piedmont, to encourage the army, and to threaten those who plundered. As thoroughly Napoleonic, it also is quoted entire.

PROCLAMATION TO THE ARMY.

HEADQUARTERS, CHERASCO, 7 Floréal, Year IV.

Soldiers ! In a fortnight you have won six victories, taken twenty-one flags, fifty-five guns, several strong places, and conquered the richest part of Piedmont ; you have taken fifteen thousand prisoners and killed or wounded more than ten thousand men ! You had been fighting for sterile rocks, illustrated by your courage, but useless to the country ; to-day you equal, by your services, the Army of Holland and the Rhine. Deprived of everything, you have supplied everything ; you have gained battles without guns, crossed rivers without bridges, made forced marches without shoes, bivouacked without brandy and often without bread ; republican phalanxes, soldiers of liberty alone were capable of enduring what you have endured ! Thanks be to you, soldiers ! The grateful country will owe you its prosperity ; and if, victors of Toulon, you foretold the immortal campaign of 1796, your present victories foretell a yet finer one.

The two armies which recently attacked you with audacity are fleeing in terror before you ; the perverse men who laughed at your misery, and rejoiced in their thought of the triumph of your enemies, are confounded and trembling.

But, soldiers, you have as yet done nothing, because things remain for you to do. Neither Turin nor Milan are yours : the assassins of Basseville yet tread upon the ashes of those who vanquished the Tarquins.

At the opening of the campaign you were naked of all things ; to-day you are abundantly supplied. The storehouses taken from the enemy are numerous. The siege and light artillery has arrived. Soldiers, the country has the right to expect great things of you : will you justify its expectations ? The greatest obstacles are overcome, no doubt ; but you have yet combats to deliver, towns to take, rivers to pass. Are there any among you whose courage will weaken ? Are there any among you who prefer to return and bear patiently, on the summits of the Alps and the Apennines, the insults of soldiers enthralled ? No ! There is none among the victors of Montenotte, Millesimo, Dego and Mondovi ! All burn to bear to distant parts the glory of the French people, all wish to humiliate the haughty kings who thought to put irons upon us ; all desire to dictate a glorious peace which shall indemnify the fatherland for the immense sacrifices it has made. You all wish, in returning to your vil-

lages, to be able to say with pride : "I was of the conquering Army of Italy."

Friends, I promise you this conquest ; but there is a condition you must swear to fulfill, and that is, to respect the peoples which you deliver ; to repress the horrible pillaging in which indulge some wretches encouraged by our enemies. Without this you would not be the liberators of the peoples, you would be their scourge ; you would not be the honor of the French people, it would disavow you ; your victories, your courage, your successes, the blood of your brothers who have died in battle, all would be lost, even honor and glory. As for me and the generals who have your confidence, we should blush to command an army without discipline, without rein, which knew no law but force. But, invested with the national authority, strong with justice and law, I shall know how to make the small number of men lacking courage and heart respect the laws of humanity and honor which they trample under foot ; I shall not suffer brigands to soil your laurels ; I will carry out with vigor the rules I have published in orders.

Pillagers will be pitilessly shot ; several have already been, and I have had occasion to remark with pleasure the alacrity with which the good soldiers of the army have sought to carry out the orders.

Peoples of Italy, the French army comes to break your bonds ! The French people is the friend of all peoples ! Come confidently to meet it ! Your property, your religion and your customs will be respected. We wage war like generous enemies ; we bear ill-will to none except the tyrants who enslave you ! BONAPARTE.

That all the calculations of the new commander of the Army of Italy were accurate was clearly proved on the 23d, while the columns were crossing the Pesio, by the arrival of a dispatch from Turin praying for a truce. It has been said that the truce was first suggested by Bonaparte, and that Turin promptly replied. But so limited by the Directory was the army leader that he had no power even to agree to an armistice, and did so only on the surrender of some fortresses. On the 28th the truce was signed at Cherasco, after an interview with Generals Latour and Beauregard, to whom had been given power to treat. At the meeting Bonaparte bore himself in a

courteous, but cold and haughty manner. For the first time he had led an army; for the first time he had conducted negotiations of the highest importance; and in both, the wonderful character which dominated all who met him, in the cabinet or the field, came at once to the fore. He told the procrastinating envoys that the army had orders to advance at 2 P. M., and that, while he might lose battles, he would not be taxed with losing minutes. Quite browbeaten, the envoys signed the truce. The French leader was glad thus to put a glorious term to this his first campaign, especially as it neutralized one of the armies he had to meet, and enabled him to turn in force against the other. It was a welcome crowning of a series of victories, glorious and fruitful, but which yet left the French in far from a secure situation; and Bonaparte was fortunate in being able to impose on the enemy the surrender of two out of three fortresses, — Coni, Alessandria and Tortona, — and to insist that negotiations for a permanent peace should at once be begun. And the terms he informed the Directory they could prescribe, as he possessed the certain means of enforcing them. "The King of Sardinia will be obliged to make a peace such as you wish to dictate to him," he wrote to Paris, "because, independently of the country comprised between Coni, Cherasco, Alba and Alessandria, we have the town and the fortress of Coni, and the towns and the fortresses of Tortona and Alessandria. . . . You can dictate, as masters, peace to the King of Sardinia." So soon as the armistice was signed, Coni and Tortona were delivered over to the French. This armistice served the Directory as the basis of the Treaty of Paris, which was executed in that capital, May 15. Alessandria and Tortona were to remain in French hands during the war, Susa, La Brunette and Exiles were to be razed, and Piedmont agreed to keep open the routes over the Mont Cenis and Argentière for French uses.

paring his Memorial on the Army of Italy. Neither Alexander nor Hannibal had set to work with a firmer hand than the young French general who was destined to follow in their footsteps. The strategic situation of the army had been a false one. Strung out along the Maritime Alps, with an English fleet in his rear, and confronted by two powerful armies; with his line of communications running out from his left flank and in prolongation of his front; liable to be cut off from Nice and Marseilles by a strong column of Piedmontese with which any enterprising commander might debouch from the Colle di Tenda, the Army of Italy could hardly have been in more parlous case. Out of this danger, in two weeks' time, Napoleon had wrought a marvelous situation: he had beaten one of his enemies, practically equal in force to his own army, and had thrown him back into Lombardy; he had forced the other to sue for peace, and to surrender two of his fortresses; and he had opened a free line of retreat in rear of his centre, and had swept for himself a clean front from Saluzzo to Savona. Though outnumbered by the enemy, wherever he had struck him he had put more men into fighting contact. He had developed his paper theory of action by masses in actual manœuvres on the field, and he had again and again demonstrated the exceptional marching power of the French soldier. As Jomini's rules put it, in "The Fundamental Principles of War," "Bonaparte had by strategic calculation led the mass of his forces against the decisive points of the theatre of war, usually the communications of the enemy, and this without endangering his own; and he had so manœuvred that he had hurled the mass of his force against divided portions of the enemy." In 1794 Bonaparte said: "To conduct war is like besieging a fortress; you must unite your fire against one point. When a breach is made, the balance is broken, all other work is useless, and the fortress

is taken. . . . You must not divide your attacks, but unite them." And on first meeting Moreau in 1799, when that able soldier asserted that it was always the greater force that beat the lesser, Bonaparte agreed with him; but, said he, "with the lesser force you can, by rapidity and skill, hurl the greater force on the enemy, and by successive attacks on different points by your mass, always retain the advantage of numbers."

To be thus superior in numbers at the point of fighting contact is the basis of Napoleon's conduct of war; but it requires a Napoleonic *coup d'œil*, speed and decision to carry it out. Frederick enunciated the same idea and acted on it; and both Alexander and Hannibal, because always outnumbered, were compelled to act on the theory. During our own Civil War, partly owing to their interior lines, often to better management, the Confederates as a rule had as many men at the point of contact, tactically if not strategically, as the numerically superior Federals. Especially was this true in Virginia. What is needed is an eye to see the key of the field, and moral courage to disregard everything else, and to push in straight and hard upon the one essential point, affording your opponent no leisure to take advantage of any opening you may thus give him. When Bonaparte had concluded the entire campaign of 1796–97, and was dictating terms to Austria on her own territory, he said, "Many good generals exist in Europe, but they see too many things at once; I see but one thing, and that is the masses; I seek to destroy them, sure that the minor matters will fall of themselves." Here, then, he closed his eyes to Beaulieu at Genoa and to Colli watching the Tenda pass, merely leaving a suitable force under a good commander to contain each of them; and from April 11 to 15 he destroyed the allied centre by the superior mass he hurled upon it; whereupon both the Piedmontese

and the Austrians yielded up Genoa and Ceva. Napoleon always made keen political guesses subserve his strategy; he knew that Savoy hoped for accessions of territory from the Milanese; and he was wise in divining that the Piedmontese and Austrians would not long hold together when once strategically severed, but that the former would think first of the safety of their own country. This they did, though from a military standpoint their real safety lay in a junction with the Austrians and the delivery of one great battle, in which their total numbers would have told.

Again, as soon as Beaulieu was neutralized, acting on the same theory, Bonaparte pushed his mass in on Colli, merely containing the Austrians with a small force. From the 17th to the 23d was all the time he needed to force the Piedmontese to sue for peace. He even drew from the force left to watch the Austrians, so soon as he saw that Beaulieu was so stunned as to be apt to keep quiet, and that the immediate theatre of operation was getting distant from him. This was one of those risks which tells, but which only the active, able leader dares assume. He concentrated to fight, and in time for action, just as he was wont to separate to feed the army. Add to all this his scrupulous care in the matter of supplies, his protection of his base, his untiring labor and his disciplinary measures, and we have a picture which no other modern captain has given us at the opening of his career.

In his dispatches home, Bonaparte greatly exaggerated matters in his own favor; but this is the common prerogative of the campaigning leader. "The combined armies were eighty-five thousand strong," he wrote April 29; and May 1, "I have beat them with thirty-five thousand men all told. . . . Beaulieu flees so fast that we cannot catch him; . . . he told the King of Sardinia that he would not unshoe himself until he reached Lyon; but he is not on the road thither."

Yet while his attitude towards the Directory was strong and self-confident, he never failed in showing good-will in word as well as deed. "Be sure that we shall do everything that is feasible," he wrote.

No sooner had Bonaparte accomplished this first success than he began to urge the Directory at home to add at least a part of the Army of the Alps to his own, and to send him reinforcements to complete the great work. His tone in addressing the Directory was that of a successful man, who proposed to make himself necessary. Instead of sitting down on his laurels, he at once looked forward to fresh ones. "While waiting" for the truce to be ratified, "I march to-morrow against Beaulieu," he wrote the Directory April 28; "I shall force him back across the Po; I shall immediately follow him over; I shall take possession of all Lombardy; and before a month, I hope to be on the mountains of the Tyrol, to find the Army of the Rhine, and with it to carry the war into Bavaria. This project is worthy of you, of the army, and of the destinies of France." "If you continue to give me your confidence, and you approve these projects, I am sure of the result: Italy is yours." "I have justified your confidence." "I shall constantly seek to give you proofs of zeal." These phrases from his letters speak the man's purpose as well as his independence.

Among other failings Beaulieu was wanting in enterprise. He might at an early day have struck Bonaparte's rear by an advance on Laharpe at San Benedetto, and thus have seriously hampered the French operations; and in fact, by April 26 he rather feebly set out to do this thing, but it was then too late; and shortly hearing of the truce, he gave up any idea of a counter-blow.

Having failed in an attempt to get possession of Alessandria and Tortona, and thus to retain a foothold on the right

bank of the Po, Beaulieu retired before the advancing French, and on May 1 crossed the Po at Valencia, where, breaking the bridge, he took up a position at Valeggio, and along the Ogogno near Lomello, with van out at the Sesia, and detached parties along the Po down to the mouth of the Ticino. He thought he might hold the line of the Po, especially with his excess of cavalry. This was, however, a task which as a general proposition was impossible of accomplishment, unless for the temporary purpose of giving battle on favorable terms whenever the French should cross the river. Colli, now one of his lieutenants, was stationed at Buffalora, to hold the road to Milan against an attack from the west; and a force was placed at Sommo to protect the left. To defend Milan, which was his first duty, Pavia on the Ticino would have been a better town to hold in force; but Beaulieu did not suppose the French would undertake to march across neutral Parma, to which the territory here on the south bank of the Po belonged. Bonaparte had cleverly inserted in the negotiations with the Piedmontese an article giving the army permission to cross the Po near Valencia, without having the remotest intention of so doing; and into this crude trap the enemy fell. Beaulieu imagined that Bonaparte would attack him in front, and the latter did all he could to encourage the error, making a marked show of forcing a passage at Cambio. On May 2, when the Austrian commander retired behind the Ogogno, Massena was near Castellaccio, Laharpe at Rivalta, Augereau in the rear; and the army headquarters was at Bosco, while Serurier was still a full day's march behind, at Alba. All this, so far as he knew of it, had a distinct appearance to Beaulieu of a French passage near by his front. The Austrian general would have defended the Po to better advantage against a manœuvring army by a position astride the river connected by several good bridges near Stradella.

This would have compelled the Army of Italy to cross above, and have left Beaulieu both the Ticino and the Po as defensive barriers.

Beaulieu's having crossed the Po at Valencia gave Bonaparte just the chance he desired and had hoped for; he had no idea of forcing a river almost as formidable as the Rhine in the face of a numerous army not yet defeated in one body in battle, nor of successively forcing several other streams, when, by a speedy and well-calculated manœuvre, he might turn them all. He could now without danger move down the Po on the right bank, take possession of a large territory which could be made tributary to the French army; cross at any one of several places farther below, and take Beaulieu and his army completely in reverse. This, too, by rapidity and skill he might manage secretly, and have his crossing of the great river unopposed. He feared the enemy's horse more than any other thing. "If I have any chances to run in Lombardy, it is on the score of the enemy's cavalry," he wrote the Directory April 29; and "The Austrians are redoubtable only for their cavalry, of which they have six thousand," he later said.

From headquarters, now moved to Tortona, Bonaparte on May 3 ordered an *élite* corps, made up of four grenadier and two carbineer battalions and fifteen hundred cavalry, to be ready May 5; and these as a van he proposed should seize on the crossing-point he aimed at; but meanwhile he kept up an active semblance of preparation to force the river near Valencia, by pushing his divisions to the neighborhood of Sale and Castelnuovo, by taking possession of all the boats he could gather, and by writing to the governor of Alessandria that a division would surely cross at that point — which misinformation soon reached the Austrian commander, and was credited in full. All communication with the left bank was then cut off, and Beaulieu, completely in the dark, strove to

Massena near Sale, and their presence kept the enemy from fathoming the French commander's design. With respect to this situation, Bonaparte wrote the Directory, May 6, " If my movement on Placentia leads Beaulieu to vacate the Lumellina, I will quietly cross at Valencia. If Beaulieu remains twenty-four hours in ignorance of our march on Placentia, and I can find boats or material for rafts in that town, I will cross in the night."

Kilmaine.

In order to keep in touch with both his wings, Bonaparte retained his headquarters in Tortona, but was personally much at the front, while Berthier conducted the formal business. In this he had the further object to keep Beaulieu as long as possible subject to the delusion of a crossing near Valencia; for as, in order to succeed fully, he must steal the passage at Placentia, it was essential that Beaulieu should send no large body of troops thither. Throughout life Napoleon was fertile in this species of stratagem, and judged with great astuteness what would or what would not deceive the enemy.

It took all day of May 6 to determine how the conditions were shaping themselves, and the crossing had in effect to be done by daylight, and not by night as Bonaparte had intended. Late on the 6th, from Tortona, he ordered Massena to Voghera, Augereau to Castel San Giovanni, Dallemagne, with Laharpe in support, to Borgo San Antonio, near Placentia, prescribing early morning hours for each division to start. He himself came on to Castel San Giovanni, reconnoitred the neighborhood and collected some boats. By 4 A. M. of May

7 Dallemagne started, reached Placentia by 9 A. M., and found on the farther side of the Po but a single squadron of Austrian horse. The column *d'élite* had marched from Tortona to Placentia, forty-four miles, in thirty-six hours. Upon the absence in force of the enemy being reported to headquarters, all the French divisions, which so far had been cautiously advanced for fear that the calculations might by some untoward accident be upset, were ordered by forced marches forward to Placentia. It was now certain that the passage could be effectuated here; and the town being on the right bank, the difficulties were much diminished. Lannes, "as brave as he is intelligent," then commanding a brigade under Dallemagne, was the first to cross with the van, and to put foot ashore; and by 2 P. M. Dallemagne had got over the rest of his detachment. Had the army been equipped with a pontoon bridge, Bonaparte could have dealt Beaulieu a fatal blow; as he was compelled to rely on boats and rafts alone, the passage was slow and laborious. Some flat-boats had been captured on the river above Placentia, carrying five hundred wounded Austrians and a large quantity of medical stores. There was also a big ferry-boat at Placentia, which could make a trip every half hour, with a considerable number of men and horses, across the river, which here is rapid and some quarter of a mile wide. The bridge did not get finished until the 9th. Laharpe's division

Lannes.

was the first to follow Dallemagne. Bonaparte could truthfully write to Carnot: "Beaulieu is disconcerted, he calculates rather ill, he falls constantly into the snares one lays for him. Perhaps he will wish to deliver battle, for the man has the audacity of madness and not of genius."

Cremona has been pointed out by many military critics as the better place to cross in order to cut off Beaulieu. But as Placentia was nearer and on the right bank, it was chosen rather than Cremona, though it is true that by crossing at the latter place the French would have got beyond the Adda. Moreover, time was of the essence in this manœuvre.

As a matter of fact, expeditious and secret though the manœuvre had been, Beaulieu had received abundant notice of the proposed crossing at Placentia to enable him, with the French army's accidental delays, to concentrate forces which could offer serious resistance to the operation. But he was all strung out in the effort to hold the Ticino with his right and extend to the lower Adda with his left, so as to protect Milan. He had no sense of perspective. He could not see that if the French crossed below him, Milan would still be compromised. Wise enough in his effort to hold the Adda, he was mistaken in his desire not to leave the Ticino. But Beaulieu naturally judged that an advance would now be made by the Army of the Alps in support of the Army of Italy. This indeed Bonaparte had been asking for, and it would have been good policy for the Directory to order it.

On hearing of the French appearance at various points down the river, Beaulieu, on May 4, ordered Liptay with five thousand men to march towards Pizzighetone to dispute any crossing the enemy might attempt, and especially to cover the Austrian communications with that city and Mantua. Sebottendorf marched to Pavia, and Beaulieu followed. Colli was left in Buffalora to fend off the expected attack by Kellermann.

Bonaparte utilized the enforced delay at Placentia in compelling the Duke of Parma to sign an armistice, to pay two million francs, and deliver up ten of his best museum pictures as purchase money for his neutrality; and to furnish, moreover, large supplies, and many horses for the artillery and cavalry. It was here Bonaparte systematically began that habit of collecting works of art from captured cities which has so wonderfully enriched the French capital. The Duke of Modena had fled to Venice, but his territory was none the less mulcted in ten millions of francs and twenty *chefs-d'œuvre*. Both these rulers had rather haughtily refused Bonaparte's recent overtures, and were treated with corresponding harshness.

Late on this same 7th of May the French advance on the north bank struck the head of the enemy's column, which the Austrian commander had ordered downstream, and which had been all too leisurely coming on. Liptay's van had reached Guardamiglia, and from here he managed to throw the French van back towards the river. But by May 8 Bonaparte, who had now got across enough men, pushed forward Lannes, who struck Liptay at Fombio, where the Austrians had collected twenty guns and intrenched. Dallemagne's grenadiers attacked on the right; Lanusse headed a column on the high-road; and Lannes fell to on the left. After a lively combat, Liptay was hustled back on Pizzighetone with loss of twenty-five hundred prisoners, some guns and three flags. "The success of the combat of Fombio is in great part due to the courage of the Chief of Brigade Lannes," reported Bonaparte. By night Laharpe had got to Codogno, and Dallemagne advanced towards Pizzighetone. About 10 P. M. a fresh Austrian detachment, sent by Beaulieu from Belgiogoso, and coming from Casalpusterlengo, fell on Laharpe's outposts in the dark and came close to pushing them in. As ill fortune would

from the timbers of the bridge upon islands in midstream up and down river, and then, finding they could wade to the farther bank, had formed as skirmishers, and, under cover of the bank, had taken the Austrians in reverse by a lively fire. The first Austrian line having been broken, the grenadiers pushed in without a moment's delay; Massena crossed and deployed on their right and left; and at the point of the bayonet the French fell upon the second line; the Austrian position was carried, and in addition to the fourteen guns, thirty munition-carts were taken. After uselessly putting in his cavalry, Sebottendorf retired with the loss of two thousand men. The French loss is not given. It was probably more. The combat had been only an affair of the rearguard, but a brilliant one. The French advanced to Tormo Palasio and camped, the cavalry, which arrived too late to take part in the battle, protecting their front.



Beaulieu.

As Beaulieu had already anticipated the French on the road to Brescia and Mantua, any gain there might have been made in the fight at the bridge of Lodi was forfeited.

In the Army of Italy there had grown up a habit among the old grenadiers to hold daily a little council of their own, to discuss events, and to promote from time to time their young leaders. It was on Bonaparte's return to camp after the battle of Lodi, when he rode around among the regiments, that the old grenadiers saluted him as "P'tit Caporal!"

It appears that the storming of the bridge of Lodi was what first gave Bonaparte the idea that he was cut out for great things. Though a handsome affair, it was one which has been many times equaled by other troops; but the young general's vast imagination had been set at work; and later, at St. Helena, the emperor said: "Vendémiaire and Montenotte had not warranted me in considering myself an exceptional man. Only after Lodi did the idea come to me that henceforth I should be a decisive player on the political boards; then arose the first sparks of high ambition." This seems to exhibit a somewhat curious limitation of judgment; for while Lodi was a bold, it was not a great feat of arms.

Bonaparte had imagined that Beaulieu in force stood beyond the river to defend the position of Lodi; and even on the evening of the fight he clung to the idea that he had beaten the whole Austrian army. His resolve under these circumstances to carry the bridge was an act of excessive hardihood, if not rashness, to be gauged by history as many other rash assaults have been, — as Gustavus' assault on the Alte Veste, or Sherman's on Kenesaw, have been alternately praised or blamed. Good fortune seconded the courage of his grenadiers. As the obstacle could have been readily turned; and as, had the entire Austrian force actually been present, the assault would almost to a certainty have failed, it can scarcely be called an act of wisdom. But if Bonaparte merely desired to give a lesson in daring to his opponents, he certainly gave it in good style. Moreover, it must be remembered that time was essential to him, and like Gneisenau he could say: "Strategy is the science of how to use time and space. I am less miserly of this than that. We may recover space, lost time never again."

Bonaparte, "in his nightly rounds" after the battle of Lodi, "met a bivouac of prisoners, where was a talkative old

Hungarian officer, of whom he asked how their affairs were going. The old captain could not help admitting that they went very ill: 'But,' he added, 'there is no longer means of understanding anything about it; we have to do with a young general, who is sometimes before us, sometimes on our rear, then again on our flanks; we never know how we ought to place ourselves. This way of making war is insupportable, and violates every usage!'" He did not know who his interrogator was.

For a month the French troops had known no rest, night or day. They needed a respite. But it was short. On May 11 Bonaparte remained near Lodi, sending a detachment across to Crema, and one to Milan. His first idea was to "follow up Beaulieu, and to draw some use from his stupor, so as to again beat him." When he learned that the Austrians had moved on Pizzighetone, he started thither at early morning of the 12th; Massena and Dallemagne marched on the left bank of the Adda; Menard was to attack on the right bank; Serurier, yet at Placentia, to move up and support him, if pressed. Augereau was ordered during the 12th to march on Pizzighetone by way of Crema. But the prey had escaped. Beaulieu had concentrated his forces during that day at Cremona and retired thence across the Oglio. He was more rapid in retreat than in advance. Pizzighetone, attacked by Massena, with Menard and Serurier on the other side, had no chance, but surrendered after half an hour's bombardment. "This last affair, by yielding the whole course of the Adda to the Republicans, assures them the Milanese, conquered by the winning of the battle of Lodi," says the Relation of May 14.

Bonaparte was now convinced that Beaulieu proposed to retire behind the Mincio to Mantua, and that neither could he be caught, nor was any danger to be apprehended from

him. Only the semblance of a pursuit by Augereau was undertaken. It seemed and was wiser to complete the conquest of what had already been overrun. Sending Massena to Milan, and Augereau to Pavia, while Serurier remained at Cremona and Placentia, Menard at Codogno and Pizzighe-

Bonaparte.
(Engraved at Milan, 1796.)

tone, and detachments held the Adda, Bonaparte prepared to make secure his footing in Lombardy by military occupation, for he could conclude no treaty with the Austrians as he had with the Piedmontese.

In seventeen days the Army of Italy, under its new commander, had conquered all Lombardy. Bonaparte made a triumphal entry into Milan May 15. The National Guard, formed on either side of the streets with the colors of Lombardy, and under command of the Duke of Serbelloni, received the conqueror. His coming was hailed by many as the advent

of Italian liberty. A triumph in Paris would scarcely have shown greater elation on the part of the populace, he tells us. But there were many regrettable French excesses.

Bonaparte was instant in his demands for more and good material and men. "Since the death of Steingel I have no superior officer of cavalry who will fight. Send me some who have fire, and who do not know how to make learned retreats." Lambert was chief commissary of the army, and while Bonaparte could give him orders as to where to send rations, he could not control his methods. On April 28 he asks for an able commissary. "I have only pigmies, who make me die of hunger in the midst of abundance." With the commissary department beyond military control, and a commissioner of the Directory to interfere with manœuvres, the French successes were to be wondered at. But Bonaparte was lucky in having Saliceti as chief commissioner. At this time Bonaparte wrote to a commissary of the Directory who was mixing too far in the operations of the army: "The requisition you have made on General Vaubois is contrary to the instructions given me by the government. I desire that you shall restrict yourself from now on within the bounds of the functions prescribed to you by the Executive Directory, without which, I shall be obliged to forbid in army orders the filling of your requisitions. We exist all of us only by the law. Whoso desires to command and usurp functions which it does not accord him is not a Republican."

While at Lodi, in answer to his repeated suggestions that Kellermann's idle forces be placed under his command, Bonaparte, to whom there was some opposition from jealousy of his brilliant successes, received from the Directory the absurd proposition to consolidate the Army of Italy and the Army of the Alps, placing Kellermann in command of half of the joint forces on the Mincio, while he himself, with twenty-

five thousand men, to be known as the Army of the South, should march on Rome and Naples. Too intelligent to be compromised by impossible conditions at a moment when the French had to encounter all the forces of Austria, Bonaparte resigned his command; but while awaiting the action of the Directory, he made preparations to push Beaulieu still farther back towards the Tyrol. His answer to the Directory, dated May 14, contained the following: —

"I think it very impolitic to divide the Army of Italy in two; it is equally contrary to the interests of the Republic to put over it two different generals. The expedition on Leghorn, Rome and Naples is a small affair. . . .

"For that (the main operation) is needed not only a single general, but also that nothing should disturb him in his march and his operations. I have made the campaign without consulting any one; I should have done nothing good had I been obliged to reconcile my views with another's. I have obtained some advantages over very superior forces, and this while lacking everything, because, persuaded that your confidence was reposed in me, my march was as prompt as my thought.

"If you impose on me impediments of all kinds; if I am to refer all my steps to the commissioners of the government; if they have the right to change my movements, to take from me or send me troops, expect nothing more that is good. If you weaken your means by dividing your forces, if you break in Italy the unity of the military thought, I tell you with sorrow, you will have lost the finest occasion of imposing laws on Italy.

. . . "It is indispensable that you should have a general who possesses your confidence entirely. If it were not I, I should not complain, but I should make efforts to redouble my zeal to merit your esteem in the post you confided to me. Every one has his method of conducting war. General Kellermann has more experience, and will conduct it better than I; we two together will conduct it very ill.

. . . "It requires much courage to write this letter . . . but I owe you the expression of all my sentiments." . . .

The above letter to the Directory was sent to Carnot, to deliver or not, as he saw fit. In his letter, a confidential one, to Carnot, Bonaparte said, "Kellermann will command the

army as well as I; for no one is more convinced than I that the victories are due to the courage and audacity of the army; but I believe that to join Kellermann and me in Italy would be to lose all. I cannot serve willingly with a man who believes himself the first general in Europe, and besides, I believe that one poor general is better than two good ones. War is like government, it is a matter of tact. . . . Whether I make war here or elsewhere is indifferent to me . . . but I have it much at heart not to lose in eight days two months of fatigue, pains and dangers."

Let us remember our motto, that the great captain is the product of exceptional intellect, exceptional force of character and exceptional opportunity. Given the two first, without the last factor, no general can do his best. History shows us many splendid commanders, like Turenne and Marlborough, who have been so hampered by the authorities behind them as to have accomplished far less than they might have done with full power to act. Bonaparte believed that opportunity would come to him if he waited. He was conscious of the brain and the moral force which impelled him; and he was wise to refuse to conduct an army on terms so unsuited to what he had already accomplished. "Every commander-in-chief," he once said upon this subject, "who undertakes to carry out a plan which he holds to be bad and ruinous, is at fault; he should make representations, insist on changes, and in the end rather demand to be relieved, than be the cause of disaster to his people." From whatever motive, such was now his action.

Infantryman on the March. (1796.)

What Bonaparte had done had more than settled him in

command. From the moment of his arrival in the Army of Italy he had, in his own manner, secured implicit obedience to all his orders, and had shown the army who was master — of troops and situation alike. He had demonstrated to the rank and file, and to every officer, high and low, that he had not only the commission of the Directory, but possessed the inborn right to supreme command. In his case, in order to command, it was not necessary to know how to obey. This lesson Bonaparte had never fully learned.

In a certain sense it is the lieutenants of a commanding general who win his battles. Without good ones no captain can succeed. But the great captain makes good lieutenants: that he can make them is one proof of his power. In the Army of Italy, when Bonaparte took command, there were excellent lieutenants, young, ambitious, enterprising, and yet well trained. There was Massena, the miserly, reckless, but high-strung and unsurpassed leader of men; "he was never discouraged; . . . if vanquished, he began over again as if he had been victor." There was Augereau, the severe disciplinarian, whom still his soldiers loved; the excellent battle commander, intrepid and yet careful; the talkative, quick-witted, sound. There were Serurier, the veteran in service, severe and hard-working; Laharpe, the simple-minded but able; Steingel, the tireless pattern of a cavalryman. They were all older in years and war than Bonaparte, and they looked askance at him — but not for long. Not once during the entire campaign, in which Bonaparte made the severest demands on his lieutenants, was there ever a sign of anything but quick obedience — a great tribute to a commanding general of twenty-seven.

The amount of hard work which Bonaparte did is well measured by the numberless political papers he wrote, the orders he issued, and the amount of ground these all covered. The

perusal of a volume of his Correspondence is as interesting as it is instructive. The orders for the march were coupled with instructions to the commissaries for bread, to be delivered to the troops at various places; and the mayors of towns and officials of provinces were often held personally responsible to see the bread baked and delivered. Entire populations of a district were set to work to repair bridges broken by the enemy. Officers and diplomatic agents were sent ahead of the army to study the country, ascertain the sentiment of the people, and to foster good feeling. The train of the army was carefully inspected, officers were forbidden to have carriages or carts, or more horses than regulations allowed; private horses seized were ordered to be turned in to the provost; women were forbidden and ordered out of camp. In no department was the leader's eye or the proper order wanting. Moreover, he was keen in his appreciation of every fact, and saw its significance when others did not. Detail was plain to him without his losing sight of the whole.

Another thing is worth noting in Bonaparte's reports. All the officers who distinguished themselves were cordially mentioned and unstintingly praised, and in all he did the chief, while not underrating himself, ascribed his successes to the courage and willing help of his officers and men. "Since the beginning of the campaign," he wrote the Directory, May 6, "General Berthier has always passed the day beside me in the combats, and the night at his desk. It is impossible to join more activity, good-will, courage and knowledge. By just title, I have passed on to him one half of the flattering and honorable things that you express in your letters."

The action of the Directory was altered May 21. Bonaparte retained command of the undivided Army of Italy.

In less than a month the new leader had turned the line of the Alps, won a number of sharp combats and three well-con-

tested engagements, — Montenotte, Millesimo, Lodi, — made twelve thousand prisoners, taken a number of fortresses and two capitals, detached Piedmont from the Coalition, opened the route into Italy through Savoy, and overrun Lombardy. "I believe," says Jomini, "that if Napoleon had commanded the most excellent troops, he would not have accomplished more, even as Frederick, in the reversed case, would not have accomplished less."



Bonaparte's Sword of
Institute of France.

Convinced that in these uprisings half-way measures were suicidal, Bonaparte at once ordered Berthier to send to Milan three battalions, two regiments of cavalry and four guns, and he himself hurried thither to put down the revolt with a strong hand. This he did in Milan, holding a summary court there on May 25, and meting out quick military justice to those found guilty; and thence went straight to Pavia, where eight thousand armed peasants had broken in and captured the French garrison. His demand for admittance being refused, Bonaparte, on the 26th, forced an entrance into the city, cut down a number of the rebels in the streets, had the French commandant who surrendered the place shot by drumhead court-martial, and some of the municipal officers sentenced to death. The latter penalty was, however, commuted; and two hundred hostages were sent to Paris to insure future good behavior. Bonaparte was on the point of setting fire to the town, but he refrained from his purpose, and in lieu of this punishment gave it over to the troops for several hours' pillage. This cruelty — brutality if you will — has been much commented on; and indeed, within little more than a century it seems scarcely possible. Yet the lives sacrificed at Pavia saved multitudes that by any other treatment would have been elsewhere lost; an example was needed if the French were to hold Lombardy, which they had fairly conquered, and Bonaparte delayed not, neither shrank from extreme measures in giving it. The speedy vengeance was distinctly effective. Further risings there were none.

Discipline improved as the men were better fed. They had been on his arrival "without bread, without discipline, without subordination," and "the soldier without bread is driven to an excess of fury which makes one blush at being a man," he said. The leader now strove to seek excuses for the past. "Discipline reëstablishes itself every day, but we

have frequently to shoot pillagers." "From the moment that we can arrest our movements, we will clothe the army afresh. It is yet in a frightful condition, but the soldier is growing fat. He eats only Gonesse bread, good meat and in plenty, and has good wine." All through the Italian campaign occasional orders against pillaging had to be issued, and instructions were given summarily to shoot men caught in the act, at the head of their battalions. A number were thus executed. But on the other hand, he had on June 14 to write to Lambert, chief commissary with the Army of Italy, about similar difficulties he could not personally control: "From all sides, Citizen Ordonnator, arrive complaints to the general-in-chief about the vexations which the miserable inhabitants of the conquered country are made to suffer, from the requisition that the transport contractor exercises to procure horses and cattle. . . . The desolation is such among the poorest in the Mantuan country that they are getting ready to emigrate with all their beasts. Verify this . . . and stop the cupidity of the agents. . . . BONAPARTE."

Meanwhile the French army had been advancing, under orders, towards the Mincio, where, according to the plan of the Directory, it was to await reinforcements from the Rhine, that were to come to it through the Tyrol. But wait Bonaparte could not. It was not in his nature to sit down and idle, especially as certain additional forces had come up from the rear, so that, not counting the troops left in Lombardy, he had some twenty-seven thousand men. Moreover, the reinforcements from the Rhine had been contingent on success there; and instead of success there had been failure. On May 25 the divisions had crossed the Oglio, and Kilmaine reached Brescia, Massena Casaglio, Augereau Baitella, Serurier Quinzanello, and in these several places they remained May 26. Next day Bonaparte rejoined the army at Soncino,

and on the 28th pushed on to the Chiese, with van out beyond the river to Lonato. This movement, the collection of boats at Desenzano, and the advance of a half-brigade to Salo were intended to give the impression that Bonaparte was manœuvring towards the Tyrol, to turn the Austrian right, join the Army of the Rhine by the roads west and north of the Lake of Garda, or at least to reach Beaulieu's line of communications far to the rear, and there to cut off his expected reinforcements. Serurier, by way of Ghedi, reached Mezzano, on the Chiese, May 29, and at the same time Augereau crossed and advanced to Desenzano, and Massena to Montechiaro, while Kilmaine moved forward towards Castiglione. At 2 A. M. of the 30th — there were no delays in Bonaparte's programme — the entire force broke up to cross the Mincio at Borghetto, Kilmaine in the van with Bonaparte in his company, and the other divisions echeloned a few miles in the rear.

It had been the plan of the Austrian commander-in-chief to defend the line of the Mincio. He now had nearly eleven thousand men in Mantua, twelve battalions near Roverbella, and the balance in various detachments, small and large, along the lake and the river. His ideas of defense were, however, scarcely abreast of Bonaparte's ideas of attack. Instead of remaining in one body, so placed on the left bank as to move rapidly on any threatened point, and of carefully scouting the right bank, towards which the French were pressing, — a proceeding which might have inspired even Bonaparte with some respect, — Beaulieu was frightened at the French diversion towards Salo and Lonato, and so completely thrown off his balance by the feeling of uncertainty as to what was to happen, that he again shifted his forces, and now placed Liptay at Peschiera, Hohenzollern at Valleggio with Sebottendorf below, and Colli at Goito, meanwhile keeping a big

force in Mantua. Thus, not counting this latter fortress, Beaulieu had strung two thirds of his men along a stretch of fifteen miles from Peschiera to Goito; while Bonaparte, in one solid body, was ready to break through his line at any point he chose. A mere advance would do it, without serious fighting.

Beaulieu's conception of defending the Mincio was all wrong. Indeed, had he stood with all his forces at Gavardo, he would have prevented Bonaparte from moving beyond Brescia, lest the Austrians should fall upon the flank of the Army of Italy. Had he stood with the bulk of his forces near Mantua, Bonaparte could not have gone beyond the Mincio, for fear the French communications should be cut. Nothing can be worse than the cordon system of defending a river which Beaulieu adopted.

"The art of strategy," says Jomini, "consists in leading upon the decisive points of a line of operations the greatest mass possible of your forces." Bonaparte had done just this, and at 7 A. M. on May 30 Kilmaine with the van appeared in front of Borghetto, which was on the right bank, and having pushed in the enemy's small body lying on guard there, was ready to force the river. An arch in the bridge had been burnt by the retreating Austrians, and while the repairs were going on to enable the heavy foot and guns to cross, a few enterprising grenadiers waded the river at a ford about four feet deep, holding aloft their pieces, and by their very audacity seized the farther bank. By noon Kilmaine had driven the few Austrian companies away from the left bank and beyond Valleggio. Beaulieu, with Hohenzollern, took up a position on the heights between Villafranca and Valleggio, but held it only a short while, and then fell back to Castelnuovo, where he joined Liptay. The passage accomplished, Bonaparte at once determined to move against the

Proud words, but true, and uttered by the man who had earned the right to use them. He also added, "I will not cite you the men who have distinguished themselves by traits of bravery. I should have to name all the grenadiers and carbineers of the vanguard. They play and laugh with death. . . . Nothing equals their intrepidity, unless it be the gayety with which they make the hardest forced marches, — they sing alternately *la patrie et l'amour.*"

As Frederick had some narrow personal escapes during the Silesian wars, so here Bonaparte almost fell into the hands of the Austrians. A reconnoitring party of Sebottendorf's, marching along the Mincio to rejoin the main army, ran across the French headquarters at Valleggio, and quite took by surprise its all too feeble guard. The commanding general was occupying a palace, where he was indulging in the luxury of a bath, and it was only by a summary flight through some gardens in the rear — actually, as Mother Goose hath it, "one shoe off and one shoe on" — that Bonaparte managed to escape, and to reach Massena's column. This narrow chance was the origin of the formation of the "Guides," a body *d'élite*, each man in which had seen ten years' service, to do duty near the commanding officer's person. Its leader was Bessières, "an officer of reserve, full of vigor, but prudent and circumspect."

Bonaparte had done on the Mincio substantially what he had done on the Po. By his march through Brescia, and the pushing of a detachment up to Salo, he had created the impression in Beaulieu's mind that he might march to the Tyrol on the west of the Lake of Garda, just as his diversion at Valencia had kept Beaulieu from guessing that he would move down to Placentia to cross; and fearing for his communications, Beaulieu had left several passages of the river practically naked, and had reached out his right to save him-

self from an imaginary threat. Napoleon has said that he knew of but three things to do in war: "march twelve leagues a day, fight, and then quietly go into cantonments." It goes without saying that the leagues must be in the right direction, and that the fighting shall be for a proper object and in proper force, for "the secret in war does not lie in the legs, it resides entirely in the brain that sets the legs in motion. An army may make forced marches all through the campaign; it will yet be lost if the direction of these marches is faulty." Bonaparte's manœuvres on the Po enabled him to take Beaulieu in reverse, and had he been able to cross the river rapidly, he might have forced battle on the Austrians to their great disadvantage. Here the Lake of Garda protected the strategic flank of the Austrians, and enabled them to preserve their line of retreat, as well as compelled Bonaparte to force his passage opposite their centre, or at least in their front. Happily, this was not made difficult for him. So soon as he had crossed, he essayed an advance against the enemy's communications by his march on Peschiera and Castelnuovo; and Beaulieu by his retreat confessed his weakness and gave up the whole campaign.

Augereau effectively followed up the retiring enemy for a day, and Massena marched on Verona, and then turned on Dolce, out of which he drove the Austrian rearguard. Here the column stopped: it was idle to pursue farther; there were other things more important to be done to secure what the French had so quickly won. Bonaparte turned towards Mantua.

Trent, on the upper Adige, was the Austrian depot and place of assembly, their secondary base, as it were, from which was to start their line of operations, whose objective now was Mantua, a fortress essential to their holding northern Italy, and one that, if they would not confess to failure, they must

relieve. And there was no question that they would soon undertake to do so. Mantua lies in a bend of the Mincio, and has about it a network of marshes and lakes, fed by the slow flowing river. There entered the fortress at this time two bridges and three causeways, the ends of the roads from Legnano, Verona, Brescia, Cremona and Borgoforte. The plain north of Mantua is not far from thirty miles wide, from the city to the foothills of the Alps; and to this plain there were from Trent down but three roads fit for artillery. The shortest was by the way of Roveredo and Dolce to Verona along the left bank of the Adige, with an occasional crossing to another road which ran down on the right bank. The longest way was through the Brenta valley to Vicenza, where the highway from Carinthia came in. The third lay through the Val Bona along the Chiese to Brescia. The Dolce and Brenta roads were not connected, except at the upper part by a few mountain paths. At the head of the Lake of Garda was a road from Roveredo to the Val Bona; but this could easily be closed at Rocca d' Anfo. The highway along the right bank of the Adige was at places useless for artillery, and was commanded by the defile of La Corona, and by Monte Magnone and Monte Baldo, a pile of hills which dominate the country like a huge square fortress. South of these latter heights lies a large natural amphitheatre, from the middle of which rises the plateau of Rivoli, around which, in a plain, flows the Tasso stream. The plateau is of itself a species of natural bastion over a mile in length. The Adige and the Brenta are both torrential rivers. The former on reaching the plain is some four hundred feet wide, and its main bridges at that time were protected by Chiusa, Verona and Legnano.

From the topographical conditions described, it appears that, starting from the mountain base of Trent, the Austrians would be compelled to march to the plain in one dangerously

long column, or in several columns far apart; and the parts of the one long column would have to be as much separated by distance as the several columns would have to be by natural obstacles. On the other hand, the French divisions at Legnano, Verona, Rivoli, La Corona and Salo could easily concentrate on the open ground south of Garda. This was much in Bonaparte's favor. Still, should a superior Austrian army carefully debouch from the mountains, deploy and march in mass on Mantua, striking the French forces whenever met, it might by intelligent and energetic initiative overwhelm them. Wonderful as had been his gain so far, the French leader's task was far from completed.

As is not uncommon with success, Bonaparte's recent achievements had brought serious difficulties in their wake. The Austrian column was by its retreat nearing the large reinforcements which had been sent to it from the Rhine; while Bonaparte was growing weaker the farther he moved away from his base, and could not look for equal accessions to his army. The Italian princes were, to be sure, neutral; but feigned friendliness was not the best of guaranties. Rome and Naples in the south might do the French a mischief. Already annoyed at the French forced requisitions of bread, Venice had grown fairly wroth at Bonaparte's unwarranted invasion of her territory at Peschiera, though indeed she had laid herself open to this treatment by giving free passage through that fortress to the Austrians. An English division of ten thousand men, now in Corsica, might land at Livorno and incite opposition to the French arms. All these items, each small in itself, would make a great sum of strength when added to the efforts of the Austrian army already in the field. Bonaparte had but forty-five thousand men, part in garrison; the Austrians had thirty thousand impregnably posted on the Adige, and as many more said to be coming along as rein-

forcements. It has been suggested by some military critics that Bonaparte should have at once masked Mantua and followed up Beaulieu. But this is an extravagant view. Such a course would change what had so far been remarkable enterprise and courage into what would have been foolhardiness unworthy of even a Charles XII. And with all his boldness and enterprise, Bonaparte possessed a well-developed bump of caution.

Three things were most prominently essential. First, Bonaparte must watch the avenues by which the enemy might approach, to learn the fact at once and use means to check their oncoming. Second, he must take Mantua, as a part of his base for a further advance from the line of the Mincio. Third, he must make terms with the Italian states to the south of him, lest at some inopportune moment they fall upon his rear. This last indeed was the idea of the Directory, with which, as we have seen, Bonaparte only in part agreed. The Directory saw, like "many good generals in Europe," altogether "too many things at once." Bonaparte kept his eye on one thing, the Austrian army, certain that so long as this was beaten or neutralized, he need not fear the others. Still, operations against the Austrian army depended on careful arrangements in his rear, and these he at once began to make. Although Bonaparte did not believe in an eccentric movement by a large force on Rome and Naples, he did propose to anticipate trouble from thence ; and being moreover constrained to meet the views of his superiors, he redistributed his army.

Massena was given charge of Verona and its important bridges, as well as the country up the Adige, with orders to watch for and fend off any Austrian advance ; and a small force of his was to be stationed west of the Lake of Garda at Salo, and an equal force at Monte Baldo, on the east of the lake. Serurier and Augereau were sent to Mantua to shut in

the fortress, if this could be done. Vaubois' division was coming on from the Army of the Alps, and this with Dallemagne's three grenadier battalions, twelve thousand five hundred in all, remained free in Bonaparte's own hand for use as occasion demanded. A part of Augereau's force was dispatched to Legnano. The garrisons in Lombardy numbered nine thousand men. Inasmuch as in forty-eight hours the French divisions could assemble on either bank of the Mincio, the Army of Italy may be said to have been firmly established on that river; and all northern Italy was in its possession, save only the citadel of Milan and the fortress of Mantua. The works at Peschiera were ordered to be put in good condition with as great dispatch as possible; and after inspecting Verona, Bonaparte established his headquarters in Roverbella, a central point from whence he could watch the north, as well as carry on the siege of Mantua.

Situated with a semicircular lagoon on the north and marshes on the south, Mantua was exceptionally strong. The citadel on the north side of the Mincio was practically inexpugnable; but the south and the west of the fortress were possible of approach. Augereau, on the right bank, seized the two causeway roads leading into the city on the west and south sides of the lagoon near the fortress; and Serurier, on the left bank, seized the two on the east side, and occupied the suburb of San Giorgio. Dallemagne, who was at first stationed at headquarters, later replaced Augereau.

The latter on June 12 was sent to Bologna, crossing the Po at Borgoforte, to further the enterprises ordered by the Directory, and which Bonaparte found it essential to inaugurate against Tuscany and Rome. These south Italian matters did not, however, long remain of military significance. By a lucky accident, such as all through life often subserved Napoleon's vigor and genius, Ferdinand of Naples treated for peace

and withdrew his contingent from Beaulieu. And as, judging it wise to draw the temper of the divine pontiff, Bonaparte directed Augereau to march on Bologna, it was an agreeable surprise when this city received the French willingly, while a detachment captured Livorno with a large supply of English stores; whereupon His Holiness made haste to sue for peace, and signing an armistice, paid twelve and a half million francs indemnity, gave up a hundred of his best pictures, busts, vases and statues, selected by the French Commissioners from the Vatican collection, and five hundred manuscripts from its library, to enrich the galleries of Paris, and yielded up Ferrara, Ancona and Castel Urbino. The guns of these towns, added to those sent on from the Piedmont fortresses, made up an ample siege equipment at Mantua. The Grand Duke of Tuscany, who had broken neutrality, was also mulcted. In addition to the above good fortune, the citadel of Milan surrendered June 29, and the material there employed could also be sent on to be used in the siege of Mantua.

When Bonaparte visited Tuscany, where his family had originated, he was received by an Abbé Buonaparte, who treated him and his staff with great distinction. The general bade the Abbé ask some favor, and after much pressing, the churchman desired that the victorious general should procure from the Pope the canonization of a certain Father Bonaventure Buonaparte, who had generations before been a Capuchin monk of Bologna. The general laughed heartily at his distant cousin's choice, but the latter persisted, saying that he desired to have in the family a great man on earth and a saint in heaven. Later, indeed, on his death, he left his considerable property to Napoleon, who created with it a charitable institution in Tuscany.

The siege was pressed vigorously from July 5 on. But news was constantly running in concerning heavy Austrian

reinforcements on the way, and the force which Bonaparte figured out as the one he would shortly be called on to face summed up some sixty thousand men. So, at least, he announced to the Directory in asking for further accessions to his own force of forty-two thousand. This was perhaps an excessive estimate, but not far wrong if it included the garrison of Mantua, and far too low if any of the Italian states should join the Austrians. The Mantua garrison, which Bonaparte gauged at eight thousand men, was really thirteen thousand strong.

It was indeed important that Mantua should be taken at as early a day as possible, for Fieldmarshal Count Wurmser had been appointed to succeed Beaulieu, with instructions to relieve the fortress at all hazards; and this officer had left the Rhine with twenty-five thousand old and tried troops. He had served Austria fifty years, in the Seven Years' War and against the Turks; he had gallantly forced the Weissemburg lines in 1793, had beaten Pichegru at Heidelberg in 1795, and had invaded the Palatinate. A fine old cavalry officer he was; and yet he lacked much of being an army leader.

Until the new Austrian army got so close to the outlet of the mountains on the upper Adige as to be an immediate danger, Bonaparte would not give over the siege of Mantua, which seemed to be approaching its end. Massena at Verona and Rivoli had fifteen thousand men; Augereau's troops on the right at Legnano comprised six to eight thousand more; while on the left, west of the lake, stood Sauret at Salo with five thousand men, under Massena's orders. Despinoy's division of five thousand men had just arrived from Milan, and was set to watching the Adige from Verona to Ronco; Serurier, with eight thousand men, was operating against Mantua; while Kilmaine, with three thousand reserve cavalry, occupied Valese, subject to Bonaparte's quick call. As reserve there

was a brigade at Peschiera, one at Verona, and one in camp between the Lake of Garda and the Adige. The numbers in the several divisions are stated with so much diversity in the various reports that now, as always in Napoleon's campaigns, it is impossible to arrive at accuracy. The effective given is, however, near enough the truth. The French leader watched operations from Verona and Roverbella alternately with eager eyes.

The siege of Mantua had been heartily pushed. As in the early weeks, however, the French were far from being well equipped for the operation, an attempt was made early in July to capture the fortress by surprise; but it failed, for as Bonaparte then said, "all undertakings of this kind depend absolutely on luck, on a dog or a goose." Upon the return of Augereau from the south, the first parallels were opened in the night of July 18–19, and completed the succeeding night. An attack was made on the outworks of the place July 19, but this also failed, and Bonaparte then resorted to a steady bombardment until the end of the month. But Mantua, with its three hundred and sixteen guns and ample garrison, though indeed out of the thirteen thousand men there were four thousand sick, fended off every attempt the French could make to break down her defense. The several towns captured during the preceding campaign had furnished one hundred and forty heavy guns, which were gradually put in place; and having given his personal attention to the inauguration of this work, Bonaparte returned to the front to watch the oncoming of the Austrian reinforced army.

He did not have to wait long. Wurmser, whose forces, nearly fifty thousand strong, had assembled at Trent by the end of July, made no great haste, but he came in touch with the French outlying forces on the 29th, and pushed in with energy. Acting in part on the controlling cordon idea, and

in part as prescribed by the theatre of operations, he divided his army into halves, one to go around each bank of the Lake of Garda; and each of the halves was subdivided into two or more columns.

The part marching on the west bank under Quosdanovich, about eighteen thousand strong, had three columns: one to march on Brescia, one on Salo, one on Gavardo. It had orders to capture these places, and if the French should retire to the right bank of the Po, as Wurmser fondly imagined they might, to march on Placentia, and cut their line of communications. The part marching on the east side of the lake was divided into two columns, one on either bank of the Adige. These various columns were organized for the purpose of compelling the French to divide their forces. This they indeed accomplished, but Wurmser did not appreciate the difference between divided forces having interior lines, and divided forces operating eccentrically. He was to learn it now. The several Austrian columns all duly advanced on their respective errands, in high heart and excellently equipped.

During the Silesian wars and during the Bonapartist wars, the Austrians have so often fought the losing part that one might almost believe something to be lacking in the make-up of the Austrian army. But when you examine into the details associated with their frequent defeats, you arrive at a very high estimate of the fine qualities of the Austrian soldier, of the devotion and intelligence of the Austrian officer, and frequently of the skill of the Austrian army leader. There was always plenty of fight in an Austrian army, and its good countenance under conditions fit to dull the keenest martial edge commands the admiration of the student of those campaigns which have, on the other hand, illustrated the irresistible genius of a Frederick and a Napoleon. Moreover,

the Austrian army was always subject to that extraordinarily hide-bound body, the Aulic Council; and on many a day when Austrian courage rose to culminating fervor could it accomplish no result, because the patriarchs in Vienna had given it a task absolutely impossible of accomplishment. No praise can be too high for the gallant white-coats.

At Salo the head of one of Quosdanovich's columns struck and threw back the small detachment of Sauret's forces that held the place, pushed on to Gavardo, and sent a body to take and garrison Brescia. Sauret concentrated to the rear at Desenzano. The column on the right bank of the Adige, under the commanding general in person, and numbering twenty-four thousand men, turned the position of Massena's outlying force at La Corona, in advance of Rivoli, in the early dawn of the 29th; and this French force was also compelled to fall back on Castelnuovo with loss of sixteen hundred men. The Austrians occupied Rivoli. On the left bank of the Adige, the column under Davidovich was expected to seize Verona, at which place a rendezvous was given to all the forces, as there could be no doubt, thought the Austrians, that Bonaparte must fall back at once to the right bank of the Po. At the same time a flying column of five thousand men had been sent into the Brenta valley to mislead the French commander, as at first it did.

Bonaparte, who was in Montechiaro on the 29th, at once ordered the concentration of Massena, Despinoy and the reserve cavalry under Kilmaine at Castelnuovo, and instructed Augereau to collect his forces, cross the Adige to the left bank, march via Villanova to Montebello, and attack the enemy on the 30th; for he looked on the Brenta detachment as one of the main bodies of the enemy. Further intelligence shortly came in about the columns in the Adige valley, and Sauret likewise reported his unequal engagement with the

enemy; whereupon Augereau, before he had gone too far, was withdrawn to Roverbella and Villafranca. News of the loss of Brescia came in on the afternoon of the 30th.

For once in his life Napoleon was not seized on the instant by the fighting fever. For a few hours he greatly feared that this sudden Austrian onslaught would compel his retreat from the Mincio. The baggage and trains in the rear of the Army of Italy were started back towards Milan, and the citadel there was ordered to be put into a state of perfect defense. On this same July 29 Bonaparte wrote to Serurier: "Part of the division of General Massena has been obliged to fall back. I am going to-night to Castelnuovo with several half-brigades. Perhaps we will reëstablish the business, but it meanwhile compels me to take serious precautions for retreat." Then giving him orders what to do, he added, "All that I tell you is only measure of precaution, for we have yet brave and numerous soldiers who have not been in action." The siege lines at Mantua were not yet ordered to be evacuated, but Bonaparte wrote even next day to Augereau to abandon his position on the Adige. "The moments are precious. I confide the execution of these measures to your wisdom and to your prudence. Following is the unfortunate position of the army: the enemy has pierced our lines at three points; he is master of La Corona and of Rivoli, important posts. Massena and Joubert have been obliged to cede to force. Sauret has abandoned Salo and has made his retreat on Desenzano. The enemy has seized Brescia and the bridge at San Marco. You see that our communications are cut with Milan and Verona. Await new orders at Roverbella. I shall go there in person."

All this sounds unlike the vibrating tones of the orders issued months ago; but it must be remembered that this was Bonaparte's first sample of the difficulties of the defensive. He had commanded an army in one series of offensive oper-

ations, when the briskness of the work carried him and everything before it. Now, for the moment, when struck at several points, though he had been carefully watching the enemy's manœuvres, he seemed not immediately to collect himself. He had no precedents to follow: he had to create them. But the arrested combativeness was but temporary. Within a day and night he was himself again.

To some of his lieutenants, who saw the matter only from their own partial standpoint, the situation appeared less threatening. With reference to the Brenta column, Massena wrote from Pieverono, July 29: "I expect to see the number of troops which yesterday reached Vicenza diminish. You will see, Citizen General, that after all it will turn out only a reconnoissance." And Sahaguet wrote from Milan, July 31: "Up till now nothing indicates, despite the usual exaggerations, that the enemy's force which marched to Brescia is worth notice." This by no means indicates that Bonaparte's judgment on the general situation was not the more intelligent one. For any but a fighting leader, it would have been a sound conclusion. And any one of the division commanders who had served through the late campaign would have weakened under the situation, and have at once elected to leave the conduct of the entire defense to his present chief, so strongly had he already impressed himself upon them all. This had been shown when Bonaparte was absent from the front at the time of the revolts in Milan and Pavia: a feeling of uncertainty had reigned as the army approached the enemy, and Berthier from Crema, May 25, wrote him: "The army longs with impatience for you." The whole incident is interesting as a study of Napoleon's character; but as his action, shortly undertaken, was colored by all his own peculiar genius, his first idea has no other value. According to Jomini, Bonaparte assembled a council of war, in which Kilmaine and the

educated soldiers voted for retreat; Augereau, in a fine fervor not usual with him, demanded to fight his division, as he gallantly did a few days later; others followed suit.

The entire incident reminds one of the equally curious mental attitude of Frederick at Mollwitz. After freely exposing himself in the thick of the fight, he was persuaded by Schwerin to leave the field, though the battle was then not absolutely lost, as the sequel proved. To such weakness the king never again yielded. Neither did Napoleon.

So soon as the affair developed, the conviction seized Bonaparte that here lay another chance to operate against the separated halves of the Austrian army; and this soon fully possessed him. "The enemy, in descending from the Tyrol by way of Brescia and the Adige, put me in the middle; if my army was too feeble to make head to the two divisions of the enemy, it could beat each one of them separately," says the report to the Directory of August 6. With a view, then, to fall first on the column descending on the west bank, because it was nearer to and threatened his communications, he galloped to Desenzano and ordered Sauret, whom Despinoy should follow, to march July 31 on Salo, and attack the Austrians afresh. In his march on Salo, Quosdanovich had cut off Guyeux, of Sauret's division; but this officer retired to a walled inclosure on the lake, "shut himself up in a great house in Salo," says the report, and desperately held himself; and three Austrian battalions were left to watch him. Part of Sauret's orders was to rescue his lieutenant. From Desenzano Bonaparte galloped over to Castelnuovo, to which point Massena had been forced to fall back, and instructed this general to evacuate Verona and to take position at Peschiera, into which he was to throw a sufficient garrison, and on the right bank, facing the Mincio, and to guard the bridge at Valeggio with a strong detachment. Augereau and Kilmaine had got

back to Roverbella and Castellaro, where they were to stand for the moment to protect the siege operations at Mantua; but as it was evident that these could be no longer maintained, for every man who could carry a musket must march against the approaching Austrians, they soon ceased to be of value there. Though the work was nearing its end, Serurier was ordered to raise the siege, get the artillery away if possible, and march part of his division to the support of Augereau. If not able to save the material, he was to spike the guns, burn the carriages and caissons, destroy the emplacements, bury the projectiles, and throw the powder into the river. As a matter of fact, Serurier had little transportation, and was obliged to destroy the siege equipment, which he did in the night of July 31–August 1. Some of the guns were left intact to the enemy. In justifying this abandonment, Bonaparte said that "to save guns is a matter of honor to an officer of artillery; to accomplish results, with or without loss of guns, is the affair of the commanding general." Late at night, Bonaparte, who scarcely left the saddle, reached Roverbella, and hurried Augereau, Kilmaine and that part of Serurier's division which had come up, by way of Goito and Guidizzolo, towards Montechiaro; while Serurier's siege troops on the right bank of the Mincio were headed to the bridge over the Oglio at Marcaria, to secure the line of retreat by the Cremona-Pizzighetone-Pavia road, should the army have to forfeit the line back to Milan; and a few hours later Massena was ordered to move to Lonato, whither Despinoy would also follow, and Kilmaine with the reserve cavalry. The commander-in-chief had quite regained his equipoise; if he was to deal a blow, he meant that it should be a massed one; and thus retiring his whole force behind the Mincio, he prepared to crush Quosdanovich. Having without resistance occupied Brescia, this Austrian general had advanced July 30

on Montechiaro, and sent Ocskay to Lonato. On July 31 he ran across the French advance parties.

Bonaparte was omnipresent, and always found himself at the point most threatened. He proposed to have his plan executed in his own fashion; and during these few restless days he rode to a standstill five horses, and these of the best to be had, on his never ceasing gallops from place to place.

On the 31st, also, Sauret moved forward to Salo, and turning the left flank of the Austrian line, seized the place and released Guyeux from his peculiar position; "General Guyeux and the troops under his orders remained forty-eight hours without bread, constantly fighting against the enemy," reported Bonaparte; having done which, as the Austrian body near by was reinforced to a point far superior to his own, and threatened to cut him off, Sauret again retired to Desenzano. Meanwhile Despinoy and Massena's head of column, advancing from Peschiera, threw the Austrian detachment under Ocskay out of Lonato. Quosdanovich now recognized that he had a superior force in his front; and beginning after the Salo surprise to fear for his line of retreat, — for the good road along the lake bank to Salo afforded the French an opportunity of throwing forward a large body, — he started back to Gavardo late at night, leaving only a small force at Montechiaro. During the same night Augereau and his division were making a forced march towards Brescia, which they reached August 1, driving the enemy out of Montechiaro on the way; and the possession of this city at once gave back to the French their direct line of communications to Milan, recovered the large stores of bread-stuffs and material there lying, which the Austrians had left in too much haste to destroy, and rendered the Pizzighetone-Pavia line that Bonaparte had seized at Marcaria superfluous. Sauret was again ordered forward to Salo in support of the general programme, but he did not

HAVING reached Valeggio the last day of July, and learning that Mantua was freed of the French, Wurmser determined to cross the Mincio, and fall on the rear of the army which was now manifestly opposing the oncoming of his lieutenant, Quosdanovich, of whose general whereabouts he knew, but from whom he received no news as to details. But the Austrian commander was much too deliberate; he felt that he must first visit the fortress he had relieved; and this he did, entering Mantua in state with two foot and one horse divisions; he seemed not to know that time is of the very essence of manœuvres leading up to battle, and on August 1 he only sent a van forward to Goito, and a small party over at Borghetto to hold the crossing, while the bulk of this Austrian wing assembled at Roverbella. Next day, August 2, Liptay made a formal passage at Goito and moved on Castiglione, but advancing beyond this place, his van was met by some of Augereau's troops from Montechiaro, and hustled back. Bayalich, with more energy, crossed below Peschiera, and marching on Lonato, smartly attacked and drove out Massena, who retired to Ponte San Marco. Bonaparte had in person reached Brescia late on August 1, and while Liptay was crossing at Goito, Brescia now being out of danger, he established Augereau's division in Montechiaro, and ordered Guyeux, who commanded wounded Sauret's division, backed by Despinoy, to definitely push Quosdanovich out of Gavardo and Salo to

Wurmser.

the north. Massena received instructions to hold Ponte San Marco as a general central reserve, and Augereau to base on Montechiaro, in any advance he might make against Wurmser.

A detachment of Augereau's division, acting as rearguard, had retired fighting before Wurmser's advance across the Mincio, as far back as Castiglione; and here Bonaparte ordered its commanding officer, Valette, to maintain his ground. The task was a hard one, with less than two thousand men to "defend this important position and thus always keep the division of General Wurmser distant from" the forces under Bonaparte; but allowing himself again to be, as his chief declared, unnecessarily driven in by the much superior Austrian head of column under Liptay, Bonaparte at once cashiered him in the presence of his men. Liptay occupied Castiglione, but Wurmser did not reach Goito until August 2, nor cross until next day.

On August 3 came the real clash of arms, the French having to fight to both front and rear. Bonaparte describes his position as a long line, with Guyeux on the left to attack Salo, Massena in the centre to attack Lonato, and Augereau on the right to attack Castiglione. This, in a sense, it may have been considered. Counting in Massena, Bonaparte could face Wurmser with twenty-five thousand men. He was now backing on the Chiese, as the Austrians were on the Mincio. Exact details of the operations of the day are difficult to exhume from the letters, reports, or contemporary accounts and histories, as the movements of the minor bodies are carelessly referred to, and the hours or even days of their manœuvres are mostly slurred or omitted. Even Bonaparte's report to the Directory is blind reading. But the general work of each day is plain, and studied with the map, gives a reasonably clear idea of how oddly large bodies of both French and

Ocskay's division, and so thoroughly puzzled by the report of a few men who escaped from the disaster as to the numbers of the French, that he determined on retreat, and at once issued orders accordingly. With plenty of physical, he lacked that moral courage which bids defiance to disaster.

Though perhaps at times prejudiced for or against his lieutenants, Bonaparte was not slow to spread the praises of his favorites. In his report to the Directory of August 6 he says: "I ordered my aide-de-camp, Chief of Brigade Junot, to place himself at the head of my company of guides and to follow the enemy, to catch him by his speed at Desenzano, and to oblige him to retire on Salo. Arrived at Desenzano, he encountered Colonel Bender with a part of his regiment of lancers, which he charged; but Junot, not wanting to amuse himself by charging the rear of the column, made a detour by the right, took the regiment in front, and had wounded the colonel, whom he wished to take prisoner, when he was himself surrounded, and after having killed six men with his own hand, he was overturned, tumbled into a ditch, and wounded with six sabre cuts, none of which, they lead me to hope, will be mortal."

The battle of Lonato was thus a series of isolated marches and combats. The main reserve body under Massena, in fighting towards the east, had recaptured Lonato. The body under Guyeux, Despinoy and Dallemagne had started as a whole towards the north, but had been cut in two, and then, after operating on the Austrian flank, had been forced to withdraw. Ocskay had marched south, past Guyeux's right, on Lonato, and on retiring after his defeat, had been caught between Massena and Guyeux, and captured. Augereau was holding head to Liptay by superb fighting near Castiglione. This to-and-fro almost hap-hazard battle-manœuvring had, however, resulted in cutting Quosdanovich from his chief, and

in throwing him back up the lake — which was the end aimed at.

While all this was going on at and north of Lonato, Augereau, in order to hold back Wurmser, had been equally busy. He had started early on the 3d from Montechiaro towards Castiglione, to contain the main Austrian column under Wurmser. Liptay had also received orders from Wurmser to advance on Montechiaro, and no sooner out of Castiglione than, as stated, he ran against the much superior forces of Augereau. Hoping to be sustained, Liptay fell back to a position on the right and left of Castiglione, and here accepted the French attack that Augereau delayed not to deliver. Beyrand fell on Liptay's left; Verdier and the grenadiers attacked the castle at the south of the town, while Pelletier indulged in a feint against his right. Robert had made a long circuit in the early hours of the day around Liptay's left, and lay in ambush in his rear; and Augereau kept a reserve well in hand behind his line. Liptay held his position with distinct tenacity despite the French superior forces, and yielded no ground to the repeated attacks until Robert broke out of ambush and fell upon him unawares. He then retired in good order to the heights behind Castiglione, where he threw back several further assaults by Augereau. He had done himself vast credit in resisting the masterful onsets of the French general. Late in the day Wurmser's column began to reach the ground. These reinforcements might have enabled the Austrians to push Augereau back, but they contented themselves with holding their ground, and at night retired to the heights behind Castiglione and near Solferino, where during the 4th Wurmser collected twenty thousand men. Augereau had done his work bravely and skillfully. But the report exaggerates in saying that "all the day he delivered and sustained fierce combats against forces double

his own." The Austrian loss at Lonato is stated as three thousand men killed and wounded, four thousand prisoners and twenty guns; at Castiglione on the 3d, four thousand killed, wounded and missing. The French casualties were less, as they lost no prisoners on that day, though during the campaign Bonaparte acknowledges thirteen hundred captured. Towards evening the leader came up and inspected the work of "intrepid Augereau," as he calls him in the Report, gave instructions for the morrow, and returned to his headquarters, then at Lonato, to supervise the whole scheme of action.

When, according to orders, on August 4 Despinoy, reinforced by three thousand men from the Army of the Alps, and Guyeux, reinforced by a brigade of Massena's, again sallied out respectively from Brescia and Salo, determined to drive Quosdanovich out of Gavardo, as they had the day before failed to do, they found to their surprise that the Austrians were in full retreat up river on Riva. All they could do was to fall on the Austrian rear, which they did with effect. Quosdanovich had made up his mind that he could not effect a junction with his chief by this route, and had concluded to march around the north of the lake to the Adige. A small party had been left behind. This rearguard got cut off by the French advance under Guyeux. Part of it, however, made its way to the main column. The other part essayed to cut its way through to Wurmser south of the lake. Quosdanovich's retreat was a lucky termination to what might have been a situation beyond even Bonaparte's resourcefulness; but it was well earned by the French leader's energy and defiance of danger.

While Massena on the 4th was marching towards Castiglione and the expected battle there, Bonaparte had returned to headquarters at Lonato, which he deemed to be sufficiently protected with a guard of twelve hundred men. But that part

of Quosdanovich's rearguard which had marched south had lost its way in seeking to join Wurmser, and suddenly appearing at Lonato, boldly summoned the headquarters guard to surrender. Only by a feat of audacity, and at marked personal risk, could Bonaparte face the matter out; but he succeeded in bluffing the Austrian officer in command, and after some show of resistance the party of two thousand men (four thousand he calls it), with four guns, gave in and surrendered.

Bonaparte's narration of this affair is interesting: —

"I myself went to Lonato to look at the troops that I was to draw from thence; but what was my surprise on entering the place to receive a parliamentary who summoned the commandant to surrender, because, said he, you are surrounded on all sides! In effect, the different cavalry videttes announced to me that several columns were in touch with our grand guard, and that already the road from Brescia to Lonato was intercepted at the bridge of San Marco. I then felt that it could only be the débris of the division that had been cut off, which, after having wandered around and assembled, was striving to make a passage for itself. The circumstance was rather embarrassing. I had at Lonato only about twelve hundred men. I had the parliamentary come before me, and caused his eyes to be unbandaged. I told him that if his general had the presumption to capture the general-in-chief of the Army of Italy, he had only to come forward to do it; that he ought to know that I was at Lonato, because all the world knew that my army was there; that all the general officers and superior officers of his division should be held responsible for the personal insult he had been guilty of. I declared to him that if, in eight minutes, his division had not laid down its arms, I would not pardon a single one. The parliamentary appeared much astonished to find me there, and an instant afterwards the whole column laid down its arms."

This occurrence, and what he learned by cross-examining the officers captured, proved to Bonaparte that he had definitely got rid of Quosdanovich, and that he was now safe to turn with his entire force on the main Austrian army. Guyeux and Despinoy were ordered to follow up Quosdanovich,

and this a part of their force did until he reached Lake Idro and the Rocca d' Anfo defile.

Wurmser meanwhile had been making some changes in his position behind Castiglione, but had done little either in the way of concentration, or to help Quosdanovich in his efforts to come on to his assistance. He had detached one force on a useless errand down the Po, and another equally useless one to blockade Peschiera on the east bank of the Mincio. Bonaparte, on the contrary, prepared during the 4th to put in his last man against the Austrian main army, and in reality, on the field itself, secured the preponderance of numbers. Wurmser had, however, drawn up his line with care, leaning the right on Solferino and the left on Medolano, and here he cheerfully awaited the French onset. Serurier had fallen ill, but his division, under General Fiorella, by 8 A. M. on August 5 arrived from Marcaria; on the disappearance of Quosdanovich, Guyeux and Despinoy, so far as not engaged in his pursuit, were ordered down by rapid marches, and Massena was placed on the left of Augereau, who still continued to face Wurmser. The French line thus ran: Massena on the left, Augereau in the centre, Fiorella on the right, Despinoy and Guyeux coming up in reserve. Bonaparte was massing his forces according to what Jomini enunciates as this great captain's general rule, as it had been Frederick's: "When you want to deliver battle, assemble all your forces; neglect none of them; a battalion sometimes decides a day." And moreover the blow was to be aimed in such a way as to compromise Wurmser, should he defeat him. For the Austrian retreat across the river must be at or near Valeggio, and his left was his strategic flank.

Before daylight of August 5 Bonaparte was at Castiglione, marshaling his troops for the battle which was to decide the fate of Italy. Each army leaned on the hills which lie south

of Garda and up to the Mincio, the French left and the Austrian right being strongly posted there; and Wurmser had well intrenched his left at Medolano. His twenty battalions and ten squadrons were deployed in two lines, and he had made ready to fight a defensive battle. Moreover, his tactics played into Bonaparte's hands. He essayed to extend his right so as to turn the French left, and at the same time to enable him to reach out towards Quosdanovich, of whose retreat beyond Lake Idro, to be sure, he did not know, but on whom he had no right to believe he could any longer rely. Augereau, in two lines, stood on the right of the road to Valeggio, with Kilmaine and the reserve cavalry echeloned in his right and rear. Massena in one line, with a second line of columns in support, stood on the left of the road. Fiorella came up at Birbisi, and was ordered under cover of the accentuations of the ground, via Guidizzolo on Cavriana, to turn the Austrian left, and roll the enemy up and away from the bridges at Borghetto. "One must not deliver battle," says Jomini, "only to win it; one should aim at the destruction of the enemy's organized body."

In the prosecution of his plan, and to allow Fiorella ample time to gain Wurmser's left, Bonaparte made several simple demonstrations during the early part of the day on Wurmser's front. In fact, he made a slight feint of a retrograde movement with the whole army to tempt Wurmser forward from his position, so that Serurier's division might get in his rear. Wurmser replied by extending his right to outflank Massena, but without the careful preparation of the French commander. Bonaparte slowly extended his own right; and as soon as Fiorella had reached his position in advance of Guidizzolo, this whole French wing was ordered forward on the Austrian left flank. Augereau assaulted the centre at the tower of Solferino, Massena contained the right. Wurmser's left

ing order is interesting: "Headquarters, Castiglione, 19 Thermidor, Year IV. (August 6). The municipality of Castiglione will immediately cause to be buried the dead who are found in its territory; the horses will be likewise buried. For this operation all the inhabitants are requisitioned. The municipality of Castiglione will notify all the neighboring communes which have any dead on their territory to cause them immediately to be buried. The municipal officers are personally responsible for the execution of the present order, and if, this evening by ten o'clock, there remains a single corpse which has not been buried, they shall be punished by martial law."

By many authors, all the combats from July 29 to August 5 are included in the title, Battle of Castiglione.

To prevent Wurmser from holding the Mincio, Augereau, early on the 6th, was ordered to demonstrate for a crossing at Valeggio, while Massena, to turn the Austrian right, moved by way of Peschiera, the garrison of which had managed to hold out against Wurmser. He reached Peschiera by 9 A. M., Augereau meanwhile cannonading Wurmser to attract his attention. Massena crossed the Mincio, and threw back the Austrian force he there met, which was intrenched along the heights on the southeast of the fortress. Bonaparte, deeming this now the place to give the *coup de grâce*, shortly sustained him with Fiorella and Augereau. But Wurmser had already issued orders to retire up the Adige valley towards the Tyrol, and could not be caught. The road by way of Bussolengo having been closed by the French, the Austrians moved through Verona, sending the cavalry along the Brenta valley, where it could better forage.

Serurier's division reached Verona at ten o'clock in the evening. The official report says: "The rearguard of the enemy was still in Verona; the gates were shut and the drawbridges

up. The Proveditor of the Republic of Venice, summoned to open them, declared that he could not do it short of two hours. I ordered at once that the gates should be opened by cannon-balls, which General Dommartin executed in less than quarter of an hour. . . . At Castelnuovo, on Venetian territory, a volunteer was assassinated. I had the house where this was done burned, and on its ashes I put up a sign, 'Here a Frenchman was assassinated.'"

In due time Quosdanovich and Wurmser again assembled at Trent their beaten forces. All they had accomplished for their heavy losses was to leave seven fresh battalions in Mantua. The French had lost some five thousand men, and at Mantua had abandoned one hundred and eighty-seven guns.

The French pursuit was neither active nor long continued. The troops were absolutely exhausted, and Bonaparte gave them their well-earned rest. Massena went into the old positions he had held in July, Sauret did the same, Augereau took post at Verona, Fiorella led his troops back to Mantua and resumed the siege. The loss of the siege material was heavily felt, and only a slow blockade could be resorted to.

One marked effect of these victories was the signing of a new treaty, offensive and defensive, between France and Spain.

Works of art were not the only things which were collected in the French campaigns. From Brescia, August 13, 1796, Bonaparte wrote: "The jewelry and diamonds, Citizen Directors, that the army has sent to Genoa, which since then were on the way to Paris, and which have been started back to Genoa, ought to be worth at least two or three millions; yet there has been offered for them only four hundred thousand francs. I believe that it is the interest of the Republic that these precious objects should be transported to Paris. The great

number of strangers who are in this capital will make the sale of these objects more fruitful. Moreover, I understand that the Flaschat Company is to take them for four hundred thousand francs; that would be a ruinous transaction for the Republic."

During this "Campaign of Five Days" Napoleon reported to the Directory: "You would believe, that when we arrive in the bivouac our soldiers would at least go to sleep. Not at all. Each one makes up his reckoning, or his plan of operations for the morrow, and many of the latter are very true. The other day I was watching a half-brigade file before me. A chasseur approached my horse. 'General,' said he, 'you ought to do this.' 'Wretch,' said I, 'wilt thou hold thy tongue!' He disappeared instantly, and I sought him in vain. What he had said to me was just what I had ordered to be done." This will appear natural enough to all old soldiers. During our Civil War the veterans were often able to prognosticate what the conditions demanded.

Whenever an army pushes rapidly into the enemy's country, it by and by reaches a point where its initial force has been exhausted, when it must stop and either act on the defensive, or else create a strong secondary base for a fresh advance. Bonaparte had long before pointed out to the Directory the Adige as the limit of possible operations from Piedmont as the only base. The Alps, between him and the Austrian Tyrol, were too serious an obstacle to overcome with what force was left him; and the Mincio, flanked by Peschiera and Mantua, was the proper secondary base. Both the mountains as a natural obstacle and Mantua in the enemy's hands as an artificial obstacle were factors altogether too much in his opponent's favor, and Bonaparte's offensive campaign had to come to a legitimate strategical pause. To pave the way for further offensive work, he reëstablished as far

as possible the siege of Mantua, and placed an observation army to watch the Alps.

It has been said that on reaching the Mincio Bonaparte should at once have used his entire force to insure the early capture of Mantua. But suppose, as was probable, that Mantua had made a long defense. This would have left him at the mercy of the oncoming reinforced Austrian army, which he knew to be much larger than his own, and which, unopposed, would have first cut him off from Milan by way of Peschiera or Brescia, and then have turned on his isolated army at Mantua. In what a trap, then, with communications cut and with only forty thousand men, would the French commander have been! He would have had to face an army of relief of fifty thousand men, plus the thirteen thousand men in Mantua; he himself would have been besieged in his own siege-lines, and if he had broken out from them, he would have even then had to undertake just what he now chose to undertake of his own free will — a renewed offensive against the oncoming Austrian army. It is not frequent in history that armies have been able to cut their way out of a besieged fortress. Besiegers have now and then driven away relief armies and still held on to the siege of a fortress, but rarely, and under exceptional conditions as to communications, force and character of ground. Bonaparte with his food cut off would have been in ill case. Whether he remained before Mantua or not, he must eventually choose either to retire to Piedmont, or to fight for his holding on the Mincio; and it was unquestionably his wiser policy to undertake the offensive at first, rather than be forced into a series of defensive battles.

Having come to this conclusion, Bonaparte would have been more than unwise to throw away his theory of masses, leave a substantial part of his forces before Mantua, and fight an

enemy already superior with a still more diminished body. His main task was to hold the Mincio and thus hold Lombardy; to take Mantua was, to be sure, the immediate task, but it was a subsidiary one. He showed his grasp of the whole problem and a strong sense of perspective by selecting the course he did, by throwing up the operation against Mantua as of secondary importance, and by directing his whole mass with the utmost rapidity on the enemy; and especially was this so because Wurmser had divided his forces. "The strength of an army, like that of a body in motion in mechanics, is expressed by the mass multiplied by the velocity." This the French general proved true along the Mincio.

When Frederick had shut in Prague in 1757, he had before him much the same problem. Daun was approaching with a large army. Had Frederick decided as Bonaparte did; had he thrown up the siege of Prague, or left only a few regiments there as an observation party to contain the enemy or delay him; had he concentrated his whole force and marched rapidly against Daun, is there any reason to doubt that he would have crushed him — as, indeed, with his thirty-four thousand men to Daun's fifty-three thousand, he came near to doing, — and then have returned and marched with flying colors into Prague? But Frederick, in his estimate of masses, had been taught a careless lesson by his extraordinary victories with inferior numbers. On this occasion "he saw too many things at once," and forgot his own rule, "Whoever seeks to conserve everything will lose everything;" and as a result he lost Kolin, lost Prague, and lost the campaign of 1757.

Wurmser had been thrown back into the mountains, but this was by no means to be the last of the energetic old soldier, who, moreover, had received stringent orders from Vienna to advance once more against the enemy. Bonaparte anti-

cipated a further movement, and finding that the late operations had somewhat disorganized not only the troops, but the supply department, and that some time should be devoted to this end, he set vigorously to work on reorganization. It would have been a thrust in the air to follow the Austrians into the Tyrol until he had some knowledge of the advance into Germany of the Army of the Rhine. Instead of blindly pushing on, irrespective of difficulties, and relying solely on his destiny, as he is often carelessly represented to have done, we see him devoting his days and weeks to the smallest details of the commissariat and ordnance, while neglecting no factor in the broad strategic scheme. Again, if he was to advance with the Mincio as a secondary base, he must have fresh accessions of troops, for the rule of numbers was the constant basis of his calculations; and for these reinforcements he never ceased to press in his dispatches to the Directory. Yet, despite all difficulties, Bonaparte knew that the safest way of countering the blow he felt sure Wurmser would again deliver was himself at the proper moment to assume the offensive.

The equipment of the army at this time was lacking. Bonaparte wrote to the chief commissary from Brescia, August 18, "In four or five days, Citizen Ordinator, a new campaign will be opened by the invincible Army of Italy. The barriers of the Tyrol will be forced, and the theatre of war will extend to Germany. The army is partly naked, and the nights are very cold. The mountains demand that the soldiers should have shoes, and many are with naked feet. . . . Gather all your means, and let me know on what we can count. . . . Have we got capes? Finally, what can I announce to the division generals?"

Some changes were now made in the troops, stations and commands; and at the end of August the army lay as fol-

lows: Sahuguet's division of eight thousand men blockaded Mantua, now held by seventeen thousand men, of whom a quarter were sick; Augereau's nine thousand men stood at Verona; Massena with thirteen thousand men occupied Rivoli and vicinity; and Vaubois with eleven thousand men lay at Storo on the Chiese, near the head of the Lake of Garda.

The following letter of August 14 to the Directory is of interest: —

HEADQUARTERS, BRESCIA, 27 Thermidor, Year IV.

I think it is useful, Citizen Directors, to give you my opinion as to the generals employed in this army; you will see that there are very few who can serve me.

Berthier: Talents, activity, courage, character. He deserves everything.

Augereau: Much character, courage, firmness, activity, has the habit of war, is loved by the soldier, lucky in his operations.

Massena: Active, indefatigable, has audacity, *coup d'œil* and promptness in decision.

Serurier: Fights like a soldier; will not accept responsibility; firm, has not confidence enough in his soldiers; is a sick man.

Despinoy: Soft, without activity, without audacity; has not the feeling for war, is not liked by the men, does not fight at their head; moreover, he is haughty; has brains and sound political views; good to command in the interior.

Sauret: Good, very good soldier, not clever enough to be a general; little lucky.

Abatucci: Not good to command fifty men.

Garnier, Meunier, Casabianca: Incapable; not good to command a battalion in a war as active and as serious as this one.

Macquart: brave man; no talents; lively.

Gaultier: Good for an office; has never made war.

Vaubois and Sahuguet: . . . I shall learn to gauge them. So far they have acquitted themselves very well of what I have confided to them; but the example of General Despinoy, who was very good in Milan and very bad at the head of his division, obliges me to judge men by their actions. BONAPARTE.

The war commissaries frequently gave much trouble. On August 26, 1796, Bonaparte wrote the Directory about a commissary named Salva, who had fled from the army in a panic fright. "Nothing equals this cowardice except the bravery of the soldiers. Many of the commissaries of war have not been more courageous. Such, Citizen Directors, is the inconvenience of the law, which directs that the commissaries of war shall be only civil agents, while they need more courage and military usage than the officers themselves. The courage they need has to be entirely moral. It is never the fruit of anything but the custom of danger."

On the last day of August Bonaparte wrote Moreau that he was ready to coöperate with him, and should, two days thence, move on Trent, now Wurmser's headquarters. Despite initial success, however, the Army of the Rhine and the Army of the Sambre and Meuse, respectively under Moreau and Jourdan, were not destined to coöperate with the Army of Italy; and shortly after the time when Bonaparte stood ready to reach out towards these associates, join, and with them march on Vienna, both (as will be later detailed) were to be compromised by the able strategy of young Archduke Charles, and to beat a retreat to the Rhine; while Bonaparte on the Mincio was to be left to rely on his own unaided efforts for whatever success France was to obtain in the general campaign of 1796.

When, at the end of August, Moreau in his initial success had crossed the Lech, the authorities in Vienna, fearing the capture of Innsbruck and the invasion of the Tyrol, drew up a new plan to drive back Bonaparte, or at least to forestall his advance up the Adige. Accordingly Wurmser began his preparations for a fresh advance from Trent, this time to attack the line of the Mincio from the east. After being reinforced, he had some forty-five thousand men, and these he

was to divide into two parts, of which one was to close the Tyrol to Bonaparte by holding the Adige valley at its upper waters, while with the other he would himself march down the Brenta valley on Bassano, whence he would turn to Verona or Legnano, and make his way to Mantua. He had small doubt that he should thus take Bonaparte unawares, and succeed in raising the siege of the great fortress, with the numerous troops in which, added to his own, he would be able to inflict a severe blow on the French.

To Davidovich he gave command of twenty thousand men, of which six thousand were at Roveredo, seven thousand behind them at Trent, and the rest at various good defensive posts in the mountains in the rear, observing the entrances from the valley of the Po ; and with twenty-five thousand the chief started out on his offensive thrust. His three divisions were under Mezaros, Sebottendorf and Quosdanovich, and he had a fine large body of reserve cavalry. On August 31 sixteen thousand men had got to Bassano, four thousand were in Pergine, and six thousand still in Trent. In a week he purposed to have them all in Bassano.

Wurmser was beset by a notion that a demonstration down the Brenta valley against Bonaparte's flank would drive him back beyond the Mincio. It never appeared to enter his calculations that the French commander could meanwhile do some fairly intelligent manœuvring on his own account. It is curious that any general of experience should thus continue to divide his forces ; but such was the habit of the day, and the requirement of the universal cordon system. His late campaign had taught him nothing. He calculated that, should Bonaparte turn on his column near Verona or Legnano, Davidovich would debouch on his rear ; while he himself would do the same should the French march up the Adige. If, as was probable, Bonaparte retired behind the Mincio,

the Austrians would have gained that much territory, and he would pursue the enemy and recover Lombardy. Should Bonaparte, however, defend the Oglio or the Adda, the Austrians, having relieved Mantua, would cross the Po and march on Tortona. Wurmser failed to consider that, if he was to fight Bonaparte, his division of forces would be fatal. In war you are constantly called on to divide your forces; but it behooves you to see to it that you can assemble them more rapidly than the enemy — in other words, that you control the interior lines.

Although Bonaparte was ready to move at the same moment as his opponent, neither had as yet guessed the other's intentions. On September 1 orders issued from the Verona headquarters were to the effect that Massena should start next day up the road which ran on the right bank of the Adige towards Ala, while Augereau, keeping touch with him, was to follow in his right rear on the road along the left bank, so as to sustain his associate at need. Both started about noon, leaving Kilmaine with three thousand men in Verona, from which place he was to patrol down the river to Legnano. Vaubois had already been ordered to start on the same day up the Chiese and around the head of the Lake of Garda to Riva and Mori. This gave Bonaparte somewhat under thirty thousand men for his marching army.

Sahuguet, with his eight thousand men at Mantua, was merely notified of the forward movement and warned to be on the alert. That a small detachment of the enemy had been in Bassano, Bonaparte already knew; but he believed the bulk of the Austrians to be still in Trent, and had no idea of Wurmser's intended operation through the Brenta valley on Mantua. But, like Frederick, Bonaparte always provided for even remote probabilities. "Should the enemy, however, commit such a piece of stupidity," said he, referring to just

this manœuvre, Kilmaine was to retire behind the Mincio, and Sahuguet to give up the siege of Mantua, and withdraw behind the Oglio. But Peschiera was to be garrisoned and held at all hazards, to keep open the line of retreat of the main army.

The above movements were made September 2 and 3, and a few Austrian outposts were driven out of Ala and vicinity. The joint concentration was to be made the next day by all three divisions near Mori, before reaching the immediate presence of the enemy, and the march on Roveredo was to follow.

Every great captain has recognized the value of the offensive, — of the initiative. He cannot bring himself to accept the enemy's directions, to act in accordance with the enemy's plan. He prefers to prescribe the plan himself. To Napoleon the offensive implied concentrated masses hurled at the right spot; and from the start he acted on the idea of concentration. Division of forces, concentric columns, he will none of. To command success, concentric columns require a clever and exceptionally pushing leader at the head of each one; no one man can direct several such; any minor interruption of one of them may be fatal to all. Yet despite their disadvantages, there is something about concentric manœuvres which has always fascinated the average general. To surround an enemy on all sides sounds and looks well; but this can rarely be accomplished in the face of a clever adversary; and the latter nearly always has a superiority of forces at whatever point in the chain he chooses to attack. Napoleon wrote in 1807 to Jerome, "I see that you are on a false military road; I see that you think that two columns which shall seize the enemy between them are an advantage; but this does not occur in war, because the two columns never act in unison, and the enemy can beat one after the other. Of course you

must turn the enemy, *but concentrate first.*" Napoleon sought so to operate that his plans should not fail because the leader of one of his separate columns did not or could not carry out his part of the united plan. So scrupulous was he as to concentrating before he met the enemy that, with regard to the very movement now in progress, he doubted if the columns had not gone too near the enemy before uniting. And we remember how careful he was to concentrate on his right before beginning the campaign in April. In this particular instance, while Bonaparte had organized three columns, Vaubois, Massena and Augereau, they were so to march as to be able to concentrate before they should reach the enemy. The Austrian commander, on the contrary, separated his two columns so that neither would be able to aid the other.

Reuss had been stationed and had intrenched himself at Mori to stop Vaubois' advance; and Wukassovich had been ordered to defend "the inexpugnable defile," as Bonaparte calls it, at San Marco, where the mountains come down near the Adige, against Massena and Augereau; the reserve held the equally strong defile at Caliano. The situation of the Austrian force was good. Would they be stout enough to hold their ground?

On September 3 the leading brigades of Massena's column drove in the enemy's outposts, and next day Massena in force fell on Wukassovich at San Marco, while Vaubois forced the Sarca, stormed the Austrian works at Mori, and then advancing on Roveredo, threatened to turn the Austrian right flank. Wukassovich had placed the bulk of his forces in this position. Bonaparte made use of the common tactics of mountain warfare. By heavy artillery fire on the front battalion, followed up by a smart infantry attack, he succeeded in unsettling the Austrian troops in the rear, that could take no part in the struggle. At the same time strong parties of riflemen

retreat on Trent. "The Citizen Bessières, captain of my company of guides, saw two guns on the point of escape; he rushed forward with five or six guides, and despite the efforts of the enemy, stopped these pieces," reported Bonaparte to the Directory. Thus was the road to the Tyrol opened by the brilliant fighting of the French advance. Davidovich cannot be said to have acted with as much discretion or vigor as his opponent.

Bessières.

Had he recognized the meaning of this occurrence, it would have much disturbed Wurmser, whose columns were systematically pursuing their march down the Brenta valley, the rear having already reached Borgo. But though, during the same afternoon, he heard of the Roveredo combat at his headquarters, which was still at Trent, Wurmser not only made no change of plan, but himself set out to join the field force at Bassano, leaving Davidovich behind with orders to defend Trent to the last man. He held fast to the impression, now that Bonaparte had adventured so far up the Adige, that the moment was all the more auspicious to seize the lower Adige, while his lieutenant should hold the key to the Tyrol, and thus catch the French, as it were, in a trap. He forgot that his method would necessitate a battle, that in this battle he would be outnumbered, and that this was just the scheme, slightly varied, in which he had failed before. That Trent, which had excellent means of defense, could be held seemed

certain; but the irresistible flood of French brigades speedily swamped the Austrian resistance, and his task immediately proving impossible, Davidovich retired behind the Avisio, and Massena entered the famous City of Councils on the morning of September 5, followed by Vaubois at noon, with Augereau still coming up.

When he found that he could not hold head to the French, Davidovich had made a fatal error in not leaving the defense of the Tyrol to his lieutenant, Laudon, and a small force, to which could have been added much Tyrolese militia, and marching down the Brenta valley to join his chief. This would have given Wurmser considerably over thirty thousand men with which to oppose the twenty thousand of Massena and Augereau. But Davidovich, like all the Austrian generals, was hampered by his orders from Vienna, which were to the effect that the passage through the Tyrol was to be held in force and kept closed to the French at all hazards. He had no independence of action.

By the possession of Trent the French were established on the rear of Wurmser's column. Bonaparte, though still knowing nothing about the operation of Moreau, saw that here was a better game to play than to adventure into the Tyrol in an attempt to join the Army of the Rhine, even had he believed it to be approaching. Moreover, he was clearly holden, first of all, to protect his own rear, and not to expose the troops he had left behind. But Wurmser's manœuvre itself Bonaparte did not at first correctly interpret. He believed that his own forward movement had been at the root of the Austrian's eccentric march, and he prepared at once to do two things to meet the conditions: dispose of Davidovich, so as to have his own rear protected, and then follow Wurmser, fall on his rear wherever he should reach him, and force him to a battle. He had no idea that Wurmser was aiming to relieve Mantua, but

imagined that he was seeking to cut the French communications, while Davidovich should fend the French off from the Tyrol by holding on to Trent. This scheme Bonaparte proposed to render nugatory.

Davidovich recognized the gravity of the situation, and essayed to defend the bridge over the Avisio River at Lavis. Vaubois strove in vain to seize it. Bonaparte found his presence essential. Riding to Lavis, Vaubois was again pushed forward, and by evening, under the chief's eye, the French had driven Davidovich out of Lavis and up the Adige on Salurn and Neumarkt. Meanwhile Massena was hurried towards the Brenta valley to Pergine, which he reached late on the 6th; and Augereau, by a short cut, on the same day moved over the mountains to Levico, to follow up Wurmser's manœuvre, whatever it might portend. On the 6th Wurmser was at Bassano, with a rearguard of three battalions at Primolano.

Bonaparte was now sure of victory. He again had before him an enemy divided in two parts, between which he had thrust himself; and he had beaten the right wing and turned the flank of the left. The march in pursuit was continued on the 6th, Vaubois' division being left behind at Lavis to protect the rear of the marching column from the direction of the Tyrol; but all the grenadiers accompanied the commanding general. Augereau and headquarters got to Borgo and pushed out a van to Ospedaletto; Massena marched to Levico, out of which place Augereau's van had previously driven the last of the Austrian rear. Next day another Austrian detachment of three battalions was pushed out of Primolano, where they were holding the Brenta defile, which here, too, was defended by a castle. The attack was made with a line of skirmishers and the light infantry, followed by a close column under cover of the artillery fire; and a regiment of French

dragoons having got in the rear of the position and seized the defile, the party laid down their arms. "The ardor of the soldier," says Bonaparte, "is equal to that of the generals and the officers. There are, however, traits of courage which merit to be gathered by the historians, and that I will let you know at my first leisure."

On the same day the headquarters reached Cismone. On the 8th, in a start at 2 A. M., Massena was put across the Brenta to the right bank, along which ran a fairly good road, while the main column advanced to Bassano, and during the forenoon struck the enemy, who had drawn up on the heights in front of the town, with a van of six battalions holding the long defile at Solagno, and Campo Lungo, on the other bank, being also held in force.

Bassano is on the left bank of the Brenta, connected with the right bank by a bridge. Quosdanovich lay before the town with his left on the river. Sebottendorf was drawn up on the farther bank to protect the bridge.

Wurmser had been of a mind to march by way of Vicenza and Verona to Mantua, and a third of his force under Mezaros was already at Montebello. He was utterly taken aback by the sudden appearance of the French in force. He had expected that Bonaparte would head for Innsbruck, and that his own march on Verona would call him back down the Adige roads. He could scarcely have got himself in a worse dilemma; and now, instead of listening to his discretion, leaving a rearguard of good troops under a plucky officer to delay Bonaparte's pursuit, and striving to rejoin his other division at Montebello by a forced march, he hearkened to his courage and stood to fight a superior enemy, sending a hurried dispatch to Mezaros to come back to help in the approaching battle — for which operation there was no more time. The defile between rocks and river at Solagno was taken by

assuming this to be the main attack, drew forces from his centre and hurried them through Tenea to hold it back. These troops deployed between Vigol and Castelletto, and held head to Bon, who had drawn up in face of them. Massena remained at Due Castelli until he heard the firing on the left, which was his signal to advance on San Giorgio; and this he did in two columns, by way of Villanova and La Sprona, so as to cut the Austrian connection between La Favorita and San Giorgio. At the same time that Sahuguet advanced on La Favorita, Massena fell on the weakened Austrian line with vigor, Victor in battalion column forcing the right half of the centre back into San Giorgio at the point of the bayonet. The fire in its rear alarmed the Austrian right, which fell back on Rodena heights, followed by Bon, who cut off several companies and took them prisoners. While Victor was following on the heels of the defeated Austrians, and forcing his way into San Giorgio, Pijon, sustained by Kilmaine, was striving to cut off this fort from La Favorita; but Sahuguet failed to help them by a stanch attack on the latter place, only advancing a short distance, when he paused. Had he pressed in as hard as Massena and Bon, Wurmser might have been captured in a body. His weak conduct enabled the enemy to hold himself for a time in front of the citadel, and then by the left to retire through it into Mantua, the French following hard upon. The battle had cost each side twenty-five hundred men, and the Austrians had lost eleven guns.

This day's result prevented Wurmser from again debouching on the left bank of the Mincio, and the various sorties he attempted in October were easily driven back.

The news now ran in that Jourdan had been forced back to the Rhine, and that this had enabled Archduke Charles to turn in force on Moreau. It was well that the commander of

the Army of Italy had not striven to join his associates through the Tyrol.

Bonaparte had not compelled a surrender of Wurmser's army, but he had followed the Austrians up closely and forced them to enter the fortress, which he now again shut in with Kilmaine's, late Serurier's, division of nine thousand men. Kilmaine made good use of his position, erecting works on the left bank. On the right bank there was only a blockade, but Wurmser was gradually narrowed down to a small territory in which to forage. Vaubois was still at Trent with ten thousand men; Massena was dispatched to Bassano and Treviso with nine thousand men, and Augereau with an equal number to Verona. For a reserve Macquart was ordered to Villafranca with three thousand men, and Bonaparte returned to Milan. By October 1 these stations were occupied, and despite the severe campaign just passed, reinforcements enough had come in to level the divisions up to the numbers specified. Wurmser was now in Mantua with twenty-eight thousand men, about twenty thousand being duty fit. Davidovich was in the Tyrol with fourteen thousand men. Three thousand stood in Voralberg. On the Isonzo was a goodly force guarding the passes to Carinthia.

On October 1 Bonaparte wrote to the Directory that he had less than nineteen thousand men in the army of observation, and nine thousand in the army of siege, and that the enemy would have fifty thousand in six weeks. This was his usual method of procuring reinforcements. He insisted that he must have over fifty thousand men all told, and specified troops that might be sent him. He needed twenty thousand muskets, for those he had captured were Austrian, much too heavy, "and our soldiers cannot use them. . . . If the conservation of Italy is dear to you, Citizen Directors, send me all this aid."

He also addressed the following letter, October 2 : —

QUARTERS GENERAL, MILAN, 11 Vendémiaire, Year V.

TO HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF GERMANY.

Your Majesty, Europe desires peace. This disastrous war has lasted too long. I have the honor to notify Your Majesty, that if you do not send plenipotentiaries to Paris to open negotiations of peace, the Executive Directory has ordered me to fill up the port of Trieste, and to destroy all the establishments of Your Majesty on the Adriatic. Until now I have been restrained in the execution of this plan by the hope of not increasing the number of innocent victims of this war. I trust that Your Majesty may be moved by the distress which menaces your subjects, and may restore to the world repose and tranquillity.

I am, with respect, Your Majesty's etc., etc.

BONAPARTE.

From any one else this would have been mere *brutum fulmen*. In a sense it was no more from him.

The success of this campaign had depended on the French capacity to march, which had proved exceptional. In 1805 the French soldier used to say, "The emperor has discovered a new way to make war : he uses our legs and not our bayonets." He had already begun to use their legs and their bayonets, too. From the afternoon of September 5 to the early morning of the 8th, sixty hours, the French had marched over fifty miles down the Brenta valley to Bassano, with two combats at Levico and Primolano. Having beaten Wurmser at Bassano, Massena reached Vicenza on the 9th, thus fighting a battle and marching twenty-one miles in thirty-six hours ; and in the succeeding twenty-four hours, Massena marched another twenty-one miles to the Adige, which his men at once began to cross. From the morning of the 8th, in eighty-four hours, Augereau fought a battle and marched sixty miles. In sum, from the 5th to the 11th of September, or six days, Bonaparte's army had marched, Massena over one hundred and Augereau one hundred and ten miles, and

fought two combats and one battle. The pursuit of Wurmser had been brilliant.

To say pursue is easy; actually to pursue is the rarest thing in war. Out of a dozen battles won by bravery and intelligence, barely one has the results which proper pursuit would yield it. Men who have won a victory feel that this is all they should be called on to perform, and yet, if the enemy has strength to flee, the victor has surely strength to follow. But it has always required a great man to compel this to be done.

In one sense the army in Mantua afforded a prospect of many trophies and much glory when the place should be taken; but now that the French armies had been driven out of Germany, there was a probability of a fresh Austrian reinforcement for the forces on the Adige, and these would again attempt the rescue of their penned-up comrades. In case another army had to be met by Bonaparte, twenty thousand men issuing from this fortress in his rear might well turn the scale. Moreover, the French army had been much used up, in its late campaign, and the feverish marshes of Mantua were far from favorable for its reëstablishment. The campaign had been glorious, but there was much yet to anticipate.



Pistol of Massena.
(Rivoli Collection.)

was near Saarbrück. The Army of the Sambre and Meuse under Jourdan, equally strong, had its centre and right along the left bank of the Rhine from Cologne to St. Wendel in the Nahe country; and its left wing, under Kleber, of twenty-two thousand men, lay in a fortified camp at Düsseldorf.

There are numerous crossings of the Rhine, of which the principal ones are Hüningen, Breisach, Strasburg, Selz near Rastadt, Lauterburg, Germersheim near Philipsburg, Speyer, Mannheim, Worms, Mainz. At many other places the river can be spanned by pontoon-bridges. The only fortified bridge held by the French was the one at Düsseldorf; the Austrians had one at Mainz, and one at Mannheim.

The first Austrian plan was to push on Trèves, and having thus secured a foothold on the Moselle, to file up and down the left bank of the Rhine, taking each French army in reverse. But when Wurmser was withdrawn with his veteran divisions to meet the Italian danger, the archduke was instructed by the Vienna Council to act on the defensive. The forces facing each other were of about equal strength; but the allies had much more and better cavalry. The French planned to push the Army of the Sambre and Meuse, pivoting on its right on the Hundsrück mountains, forward via Düsseldorf, to attract the allied attention, so that the Army of the Rhine and Moselle could the easier cross the river to operate against the allied left wing. The advance by Jourdan would at the same time threaten the Austrian communications, and tend, it was believed, to induce Charles to withdraw all the Austrian troops to the right bank. But as Jourdan, counting out garrisons and detachments, had only forty thousand men for the field, his advance became something of a problem, and moreover the question of food and equipment worked much delay, for French finances were at a low ebb. The general idea of the campaign, though on a larger scale than hereto-

fore, was in Carnot's usual style: to advance a force against each flank of the enemy. This method lay at the root of the French failure in this campaign. Great as Carnot was as an organizer, his strategic views were far from sound. But at that day no one's military views were sound — except Bonaparte's. Carnot was truly a great man, even if not a perfect strategist. He had been brought up as an officer of engineers. Napoleon said of him that "he had no experience of war, his ideas were false on every part of the military art; . . . he has published works on the attack and defense of places, and on the principles of fortification, which can be acknowledged only by a man who has no practice in war." Yet Carnot honestly earned his title as "Organizer of Victory" during the wars of the Revolution.

At the end of 1795 there had been a truce made between the opposing armies along the Rhine, and this truce lasted until May 31, 1796, when Austria chose to end it. Still, as the detaching of Wurmser to Italy had arrested the proposed Austrian offensive, the French were enabled to take the initiative. Kleber, twenty thousand strong, was ordered to drive Wurtemberg behind the Lahn, whereupon Jourdan would cross the Rhine. This Kleber accomplished early in June; the Army of the Sambre and Meuse was put over June 10 at Neuwied, and masking Ehrenbreitstein with a considerable force, took possession of the Lahn right bank. Endangered by this operation, the allied troops near Kaiserslautern had to be withdrawn to the right bank at Mannheim; and they were followed to the river by a part of Moreau's force. Twelve thousand Austrians occupied the Mannheim bridge-head, while the rest reinforced the two allied armies. Latour took command of what was left of Wurmser's troops, and Archduke Charles was made generalissimo, while Wurtemberg was succeeded by Wartensleben. This initial French manœuvre had,

as it was expected, swept the left bank of the Rhine clear of the enemy, and would now enable Jourdan and Moreau to carry the war into Germany.

The Austrians on the Lahn were spread along a distance of fifty miles. Jourdan had an opportunity to break through this cordon, but being too deliberate, he gave Charles time to come to the aid of his overmatched divisions. The archduke too might have operated to advantage against the French right flank, and cut Jourdan off from the Rhine. But he deemed it wiser to attack the left and beat it in detail; and in fact he did defeat the French left under Lefebvre at Wetzlar, and crossed the Lahn at Leun, June 16. Jourdan, whose immediate duty was limited by the Directory to engaging the enemy's attention, which he had done, retired to Neuwied and recrossed to the left bank of the Rhine. Charles followed awhile, and then retraced his steps, so as to be near Latour, now seriously threatened by Moreau.

The latter had been meanwhile demonstrating with his left near the Mannheim bridge-head to lead Charles to expect operations at that point, and secretly preparing means of crossing the Rhine at Strasburg. The long cordon of the allies from Hüningen to Philipsburg made this easy. In the night of June 23–24 Desaix seized Kehl by a *coup de main.* Moreau put over his divisions June 26 and 27, and advanced against the Austrians, who could at the moment concentrate but eighteen thousand men to oppose the thirty thousand he had got across. Laborde remained on the left bank between Breisach and Hüningen. The French general speedily drove the allies towards the Murg, and took up a defensive position with Desaix and St. Cyr, until he could secure his right in the Black Forest. Cut off from the Austrian right and centre, the left wing under Condé and Fröhlich retired up the Rhine and Kinzig; the Swabian troops fell back into the mountains

at Freudenstadt, and the Saxons joined Sztarray, who retired in the same direction. By this advance Moreau had drawn the pressure from Jourdan, but the specific duty prescribed him was to carry the war away from the Rhine, and as a first step he purposed to push the archduke across the mountains to the valley of the Neckar. Ferino followed Condé and Fröhlich, and occupied the Freiburg country; St. Cyr pushed the Swabians out of the Freudenstadt country, and a detachment got as far as the Neckar. Latour and Sztarray sought to defend the Murg, but Desaix attacked them at Rastadt and drove them back to the Alb, where they joined the archduke. These interesting manœuvres can be afforded no great space.

Desaix.

Charles came rapidly up in the early days of July, with twenty thousand men, leaving his main force of forty thousand men under Wartensleben along the Main to face Jourdan. As the rôle of Wartensleben was only to delay Jourdan's advance, Charles, as he himself acknowledges, would have been wiser to leave but twenty thousand men on the Lahn, and to march up river with sufficient force to defeat Moreau and drive him back across the Rhine. Wartensleben could have accomplished all he did do with half his force, used with energy. Charles made preparations to attack Moreau July 10. But the alert French commander anticipated him July 9 at Malsch. His plan was to contain the Austrian right

Archduke Charles.

Jourdan followed to the Sulzbach-Amberg country, and then took up a position on the hither bank of the Naab, between Naaburg and Schwandorf. The Austrians lay where they could not easily be attacked, and Jourdan held his position, sending Bernadotte to Neumarkt to observe the archduke's army.

Charles now matured his plan. It was worthy of a great soldier. Leaving Latour on the Lech to contain Moreau, he determined to join Wartensleben with twenty-five thousand men, mostly his veterans, fall on Jourdan with force enough to crush his army and, driving it back to the Rhine, again turn on Moreau, who, for every mile he advanced beyond the Lech, would be the worse compromised. Scarce one of Bonaparte's operations is superior to this; and Charles proceeded at once to put it into execution. His general idea, similar to Bonaparte's, had been to operate on the enemy's centre, and keep in touch with Wartensleben. Carnot's plan of turning both allied flanks played into his hands. His lieutenant's retreat had prevented the execution of his truly fine conception until now; and still he had to be cautious lest, by turning Jourdan's right, he should open to him a road to the Danube to join Moreau by the rear of the Austrian army. Yet Charles did not believe Jourdan to be capable of so bold a manœuvre; nor, indeed, did Jourdan know where Moreau was.

Sending word to Wartensleben to refuse battle, with twenty-five thousand men Charles crossed to the left bank of the Danube at Ratisbon, and on August 22 reached the vicinity of his lieutenant's army. Sharply attacking Bernadotte at Neumarkt, he sent the French corps spinning back through Altdorf to the Pegnitz, and then masking him with Hotze's division, he turned on Jourdan, who, with Wartensleben in his front and Charles on his right, at once retired to Amberg, where on the 24th the Austrians dealt a heavy blow to his rearguard, in which two French battalions were destroyed to the last man. Charles had effectively cut the two Republican armies apart. Jourdan had expected Moreau at least to hold the archduke in his own front, if he himself could not come over to his assistance; or, failing to keep him south of the Danube, to follow him up so as to equalize the

bodies. But Jourdan now had to fight his battles alone and against superior forces. Wartensleben pushed on the heels of Jourdan's main army, while Charles advanced from Neumarkt; and Jourdan fell back to Sulzbach August 24. Hotze marched on and entered Nürnberg. Only by most rapid marching around the head of Charles' column could Bernadotte rejoin his chief behind the Wiesent, August 28.

Though his army was spread over too much territory in a number of columns from Hochstädt north, the archduke came close to cutting off Jourdan's retreat. He was in his way doing as distinguished work as Bonaparte in Italy. In the Memoirs Napoleon taxes him with slowness; and measuring his operations by Bonaparte's rapidity in Italy, he was indeed so. But no one at that day knew what speed meant; and much of what the emperor says savors of hypercriticism. His columns were expertly placed, though being too much on the cordon system Jourdan broke through the net, and seeking to make his way to Würzburg, he actually did reach Schweinfurt, and crossed to the right bank of the Main. His army, no longer upborne by success, had shrunk to forty thousand men, hungry and footsore. Bad discipline was rampant, which Jourdan ascribed to the requisition system, and the consequent inevitable marauding, despite which the French soldiers had been ill-fed for weeks, and were in bad health and heart. It takes but little success or failure to affect the morale of troops. Jourdan had heard a rumor that Moreau had beaten Latour on the Lech, and his present idea was to await the enemy in the great bend of the Main in which Würzburg is situated, and there deliver a general battle, so as if possible to resume Carnot's strategic scheme of a double advance on the Austrian flanks. He marched thither via Schweinfurt.

Charles now saw his chance. He could assemble a supe-

rior force, and via Kitzingen could reach Würzburg before the Army of the Rhine and Meuse could do so, thus shunting the French off the main and good post-road to the Rhine, and back into the hill country, where it was difficult to march or subsist an army. To this task he at once addressed himself, and we now see both commanders, intent on battle, heading for the one point which would lend either a marked advantage. An Austrian detachment was sent by way of Bamberg and Hasfurt to observe Jourdan's manœuvres, while Lichtenstein crossed the Main at Kitzingen, and pushing on Würzburg, captured and garrisoned it September 1, shut in the citadel on the left bank, and took possession of the Galgenberg in front of the city. Sztarray, in his rear, reached Reperndorf, and deploying in its front, slowly moved forward; and the main Austrian army got on to Schwarzach early September 2, ready to cross on a bridge there to be thrown.

Hearing of the archduke's march on September 1, Jourdan left Lefebvre with ten thousand men to hold Schweinfurt, which was essential to him in case of disaster, and hurried on the reserve cavalry to Würzburg, followed successively by the divisions of Simon, Championnet and Grenier, thirty thousand effective. The cavalry reached Würzburg at noon on the 2d, and seized the Steinberg. Simon shortly came up, and pushing the Austrians across the brooks, took position between Estenfeld and Lengfeld; while Championnet, who arrived an hour later, after a hard fight drove a division of Lichtenstein out of the Körnach and Sperl meadows, lying between the two brooks. The Austrians fell back to Euerfeld, where they barely held themselves. The French had begun well; and this easy success led Jourdan to believe that Charles had sent most of his forces to meet Moreau, and that here was an auspicious moment for battle; but as a fact,

About 3 P. M. the fight recommenced. As the Austrian cuirassier squadron came up, Lichtenstein headed it also on the French left wing. The French reserve of horse made a handsome bid to keep the Sperl woods; but it was driven out, and ranged itself behind the line of foot, while the Austrians again forced Championnet out of the Estenfeld woods. Kray overwhelmed Grenier at Heiligenthal, and his cavalry completed the rout of Championnet. The French had no reserve to call upon, while fresh Austrian troops were still coming up. Jourdan recognized that he had lost the battle, and retired on Arnstein, where at night he reassembled his divisions, Championnet with the cavalry having covered Simon's retreat by a brilliant fight on Kornach heights.

Kray.

Charles organized four columns to follow up the French; but the formal method of their marshaling and the poor ground prevented a vigorous pursuit. Yet Simon's rear was badly cut up. If the Austrian loss of about fifteen hundred men out of over forty-four thousand, and the French loss of two thousand out of thirty thousand men, is accurately stated, neither the casualties nor the fighting can be said to have been heavy; but Charles had won the innings. The French lost seven guns.

Thus pushed off his main line of retreat, Jourdan was compelled to retire through the Spessart mountains, which he did

in two columns towards Giessen on the Lahn. It was of the highest importance that he should reach the Mainz country, and there hold head to the Austrian advance, but he was unable to do so. He actually reached the Lahn September 9, where Marceau joined him, and with other incoming detachments, he got together over fifty thousand men. With these he held the line of the river, but covering too much front. And while Moreau was advancing to the Isar, Charles continued his march along the highway, and took Hanau and Frankfort September 8; whence moving forward, he crossed the Lahn and attacked the French at Altenkirchen September 16, with some success. The French line fell back, and with greater speed Charles could have compromised Jourdan, and cut him off from the Rhine. But he was over-cautious. In his turn Jourdan neglected near Hof a chance of retrieving the campaign. He fell back behind the Sieg, resigned his command, and was succeeded by Beurnonville, who shortly withdrew behind the Rhine at Bonn, Lefebvre occupying Düsseldorf. Charles followed; but satisfied that the Army of the Sambre and Meuse would undertake no more active work this season, he headed a detachment up the Rhine to get in Moreau's rear. This body captured Kehl, but shortly again lost the fortress. Napoleon points out that Charles would have accomplished more, so soon as the French had crossed the Rhine, by moving with forty thousand men on Ulm, and calling in Latour to join him via Ratisbon and the left bank of the Danube. Moreau would then have truly been in evil case. Charles left too many men on the Lower Rhine.

After the battle of Neresheim, it had looked as if the issue of the campaign lay in the hands of Moreau, and indeed, had the commander of the Army of the Rhine and Moselle marched up to join his associate, instead of following Latour, the archduke's brilliant plan would have been shattered; for

the Austrian army, caught between two French armies vastly outnumbering it, could not have successfully manœuvred. How much of this failure was due to Moreau, and how much to the orders of Carnot and the Directory, there seems to be no record to disclose. In retiring August 12 to the right bank of the Danube, Charles had guessed aright that Moreau would follow him, and as the Austrians destroyed all the bridges, the French were compelled to seek crossings well up the stream. On August 20 Moreau concentrated on the Lech, and here Ferino joined him. With his sixty thousand men he proposed to take Augsburg. Latour's thirty-five thousand men were too much spread out to be effective; and when Moreau advanced on him August 24, he was compelled to fall back after a lively fight at Friedeberg, in which he lost fifteen hundred men and seventeen guns, and to take up the Isar line for defense, occupying the river from Munich down to Landshut.

Charles' manœuvre, like all such operations, practically opened the road to Vienna to Moreau. But, though the archduke's instructions to Latour were to resist the French onset to the utmost, he could well afford the risk, aware that he himself had Bohemia in his rear as a base, and that after defeating Jourdan he could turn to the left and cut Moreau's sole line of retreat. His entire plan was of the highest value.

As he gained these advantages, Moreau grew more cautious, and followed too slowly to impress his operation on Charles, who was just beginning to push hard on Jourdan. St. Cyr seized the Isar crossing at Freisingen on September 3, and Latour assembled at Landshut, where reinforcements sent him by Charles were met. It is clear that the best military policy had demanded that Moreau should weeks before have marched to a junction with Jourdan. But though St. Cyr testifies that Moreau knew Jourdan to be hard pressed, yet this was at a date when a junction could no longer be

effected. Moreover, Moreau was negotiating with Bavaria for peace, and cared not to leave the Isar; and his orders no doubt also limited his action. Finally he did what might have earlier turned the scales: Desaix was ordered across the Danube and towards Nürnberg, September 10, to interfere with Charles' communications. As the archduke paid no heed to this threat, Moreau put his centre over the river at Neuburg. This was an extra-hazardous manœuvre, which placed the French army in a critical position astride a great river, rather than interfered with Charles' operations. Moreau's left was at Eichstadt; the centre at Ingolstadt; the right at Geisenfeld. The object to be attained is not apparent. Had Charles not been intent on better game, or had Latour been more enterprising, Moreau might have found himself in evil case. As it was, after four or five days he recognized the weakness of his situation, and reassembled on the right bank.

But Charles' brilliant operation was now bearing fruit. Jourdan was painfully making his way towards the Rhine, and Moreau, on learning of his associate's defeat, was forced to recognize that Carnot's plan of two lines of operation, one against each of the allied flanks, had failed. The whole history of war is full of such failures, but it needed a Charles to take advantage of the error, and a Bonaparte to evolve a new maxim out of the failures. It was manifest that Moreau could no longer remain in Bavaria, with Charles so near the Rhine and the French line of retreat; it required small intelligence to guess that so soon as Charles had forced Jourdan across the Rhine, he would turn towards the Neckar country, to cut the communications of the Army of the Rhine and Moselle; and he determined to retire to Ulm, where he could defend the line of the Iller, and by holding the great fortress, operate on either bank of the Danube at will. Indeed, retreat was imperative, for as couriers between the two

French armies, except by a long detour, had during the entire campaign been irregular, and were of late quite interrupted, and as Moreau knew not how far Charles had forced back Jourdan, it was quite within the possibilities that the Austrian generalissimo might cross the Danube and cut him off from France. Indeed, a rumor that part of the Mannheim garrison had marched up river and attacked the Kehl bridge added to his disquietude.

Moreau, accordingly, with his sixty thousand men, retired from the Isar in three columns, with the artillery and train in the advance, Latour following him up step by step. On September 21 he reached the Iller, about the time when the Army of the Sambre and Meuse was seeking refuge beyond the Rhine; and Desaix crossed the Danube and took up a position behind the Blau. Yet even here Moreau did not deem himself secure from an allied column which might advance up the Rhine right bank, or indeed up the Neckar valley; and in the last days of September he again retired, this time towards the Upper Rhine. But he deployed his forces over so large an area in the Biberach and Federsee region that he retained but twenty-six thousand men under his own eye. The splendid successes of the Austrian archduke now encouraged Latour and his lieutenants to a marked degee, and they followed up and harassed Moreau with energy and skill. Nauendorf threatened the French left by crossing over into the Neckar valley to Tübingen; Latour kept on his heels; a third corps was getting between him and Lake Constance, and Petrasch was advancing up the Rhine from Charles' forces, and would soon seize the Black Forest debouches. The unexpected retreat and the want of regular issues of rations had caused as much deterioration in the French ranks in this army as in Jourdan's. Superb as is the gallantry of the Gallic soldier, — and there is no denying him a brilliant record in

history, — yet he weakens under failure faster than the Anglo-Saxon. The three-o'clock-in-the-morning courage, the cold persistence in fighting against fate, is peculiarly the birthright of the latter. The French army was quite out of heart, and Moreau was soon fain to acknowledge that he could not expect to hold himself on the right bank of the Rhine. He must fray his path by way of the rugged ravines of the Black Forest, through what is called the Höllenthal, Hell Valley, to Freiburg; and in order to accomplish this retreat without losing his train, he deemed it essential to neutralize Latour's army by a battle, just as Charles had done at Neresheim, so that it could not pursue him with too much vigor. In two weeks Moreau's handsome achievement had been turned into dire disaster by the archduke's masterly operation against Jourdan.

The country near the Federsee is hilly, wooded and full of ravines. The position which, on his arrival, Latour had taken up on the hills along the Biss, with that stream in his rear, was a bad one, and his several corps were much too isolated. So indeed were Moreau's. Desaix with sixteen thousand men was north of the Federsee from Alschausen to Wittenweiler; St. Cyr with ten thousand men was on the south of the lake from Buchau to Schussenried; and Ferino was at Ravensburg between the Waldsee and the Lake of Constance, more than a day's march away, where he could scarcely be of use in the proposed battle. Moreau planned that on October 2 Desaix should attack the Austrian right under Kospeth at Stafflangen; that St. Cyr should advance against Latour at Steinhausen in the centre; and to Ferino were sent orders to march on Winterstetten, and turn the enemy's left under Condé and Mercantin.

This plan was only partially carried out; Ferino did not receive his orders in season. Desaix drove the enemy's right

weight of the old cordon system, and of his own false scheme of concentrating the bulk of the operating forces at the ends of his own cordon, so as to turn the flanks of the enemy's cordon. How mistaken this theory was, it needed only Bonaparte in Italy in this same year to demonstrate. Yet it was much in favor of the French arms that to Carnot was given the sole power, while the Austrian arms were subject to the whims of the Vienna Council, whose pedantic methods often came close to wrecking what would have been excellent operations, if let alone.

Carnot's general plan was to have Moreau and Jourdan advance, each on either bank of the Danube, and join hands with Bonaparte at the gates of Vienna. The plan was magnificent, but like all concentric operations, it possessed the distinct element of failure. The Austrian general plan was to gain a strong foothold on the left bank of the middle or lower Rhine, and thence reconquer the Netherlands. With the forces Austria placed on the Rhine ployed into one body, a determined and able leader might have marched on Paris; but when Bonaparte reached the Mincio, the wiseacres in Vienna withdrew Wurmser and the best of the veterans from the Rhine, and assumed a defensive rôle where they had purposed to deliver their heartiest blow. It was merely by a piece of good luck that the field operations were placed under one man — and he the Archduke Charles.

The scheme of Carnot was perhaps superior to that of the Austrians; but its details were less well managed. The principal operations were confided to Moreau, whether because his army lay on the straight road to Vienna, or from the idea that he was more able than Jourdan, cannot be said. Jourdan's entire army was to begin by making a mere demonstration to aid Moreau's. The two were later to operate, each limited to his own line; and yet they were supposed to be in

coöperation. This is not, however, the sort of coöperation which produces results. The falsity of this gigantic plan stands out in marked contrast to Bonaparte's success in Italy, in his beautifully simple manœuvres against the centre of the Austro-Sardinian armies. Had Carnot placed both Rhine armies in one body to operate down the Danube, what might not, in connection with the Army of Italy, have been the result? The same reasoning applies to the two Austrian armies. Would not Archduke Charles have been better equipped, if both these armies had at the outset been in one body, which could push in between Jourdan and Moreau and destroy each singly? This was in fact what Charles eventually, but only in part did, and it was this which brought to so brilliant an end this memorable campaign.

Why Charles retired so constantly at the opening of the campaign, when he had practically the same opportunity as in the latter half, unless he was controlled by the Vienna Council, has been often asked. The answer is that the garrisons left on the Rhine, and the defection of allied contingents, reduced him to an inferiority; and being inexperienced, he needed to prove his weapons. He himself says that his object was, so soon as he should reach the Danube, to dispute the advance of the enemy foot by foot, without risking a general engagement; to draw in his left wing, which had been cut off; to rejoin Wartensleben farther to the rear; and to seek a chance of falling with superior forces on one or the other French army. And from the moment he decided to operate against Jourdan, while holding Moreau in check with Latour, he showed marked capacity for war. The inevitable happened. Moreau was compelled to retire when his associate was forced back, and both were glad to seek refuge behind the Rhine. Even gauging Moreau's retreat at its highest value, and it was boldly and skillfully conducted, yet he was

from whatever source. Despite all Bonaparte's victories, his situation continued dangerous. He had lost twenty thousand men by battle and disease, and had not over thirty-six thousand men left. And yet he must have reinforcements. Repeatedly he warned the Directory, "Troops, or Italy goes lost." And while France did naught to sustain her one successful general, Austria put fresh hosts into the field.

On October 1, 1796, Bonaparte wrote to the Directory: —

"In January the emperor will have a powerful army in the Tyrol and in Friuli. . . . Nothing equals the activity that there is in the empire to recruit the Italian army. Here is the force of our army: Vaubois with eight thousand men covers Trent; Massena with fifty-five hundred men and Augereau with fifty-four hundred men are on the march to the Brenta; Sahuguet and Dallemagne with forty-five hundred men are before Mantua. In Lombardy, at Coni, at Alessandria, at Tortona, at Ceva, at Cherasco, are four thousand. Sick, fourteen thousand; wounded, four thousand. Thus I have eighteen thousand nine hundred men in the army of observation, nine thousand men in the army of siege. I leave it to you to judge, if I receive no help, whether it is possible that I can this winter resist the emperor, who will have fifty thousand men here in six weeks. . . . Reflect that you should have here in Italy, to be able to sustain yourselves during the winter, thirty-five thousand men of infantry in the army of observation, and eighteen thousand men of infantry in the army of siege, to make face to the emperor."

During the two months which the French forces spent in the fever-stricken lowlands about Mantua, Bonaparte was kept busy in working daylight out of the conflicting shadows of Italian politics. His desire was, while respecting and taking advantage of the aristocratic and ecclesiastical sentiments of both classes and masses, to make republics out of the principalities of northern Italy, the population of which had taken kindly to the republican ideas, and was wavering between love of their religion and hatred of domestic oppression. After much negotiation and canvassing, Bologna and Ferrara

were actually erected into a Transpadane Republic; Modena and Reggio into a Cispadane, the former town having been occupied by French troops.

But there were many awkward questions staring Bonaparte in the face. Venice might at any time declare for Austria, and she could put twenty thousand men into the field. The Pope had broken the terms of his armistice, and had made overtures to Vienna. Naples had delayed signing the treaty with France, whose terms had been agreed to. By the death of the king of Sardinia, the attitude of Piedmont again became questionable; and without this base as a positive factor, the French forces on the Mincio were absolutely in the air. Some of Bonaparte's fears, however, came to an early end by the final execution by the Directory of a very liberal treaty with Naples on October 10; and this treaty likewise settled the Roman question, for the Pope was apt to attempt nothing, unless sure of the countenance of Naples.

As Bonaparte had long desired to create for the Republic in Italy a strong place upon which he could rely, he renewed certain of his demands on Genoa, and these eventually resulted in that city paying a tribute, excluding the English fleet, and the great port being transformed into a French armed place. About the same time the English occupied Porto Ferajo, and Corsica having become troublesome, they left that island, which was thereupon promptly seized by a French expedition, October 21.

There was sufficient reason why Bonaparte, whose troops were still before Mantua, and in the Brenta and Adige valleys watching the enemy, had not initiated active operations. In addition to the political work, which always consumed much of his time, for Bonaparte was as apt to rely on what he could accomplish by statesmanship as by war, his army demanded much time; for it had suffered severely from epi-

demic fevers, which had depleted the ranks and filled the hospitals, and reinforcements came in all too slowly. Yet he must keep it in good fighting trim, which was no easy task with its then half-civil, half-military organization. In a long dispatch to the Directory, dated October 12, 1796, Bonaparte made formal complaint by name against many of the civil employees of the army as being villains of the first water. "Since I am in Milan, Citizen Directors, I occupy myself with making war against rogues. I have had several tried and punished. I myself denounce others to you. In making an open war against them, it is clear that I arouse against myself a thousand voices, which will seek to pervert the (public) opinion. I understand that, if 'two months ago I wanted to be Duke of Milan, to-day I would like to be King of Italy.' But as long as my force and your confidence last, I shall make a pitiless war against the rogues and the Austrians." He then goes on to state that the evidence proves that the contractors and commissaries pocketed a large part of the money furnished them, that they delivered poor goods, that they demanded fifteen and twenty per cent. rebate on government orders, that they corrupted the military storekeepers and forged vouchers. "They steal in a manner so ridiculous and so impudent that if I had a month of leisure, there would not be one of them who might not be shot." A number of these men are identified by name in this dispatch; and among them, to their credit, a number of honest men are also mentioned. This trouble was ever recurring. In writing Berthier January 1, 1797, about three citizens who had stolen and made false vouchers, Bonaparte wrote: "I demand in consequence that these three employees shall be condemned to death. They should not be considered as common thieves, but as men who every day diminish the means of the army, and cause the best concerted operations to fail, or at least

only allow their success after the spilling of much French blood."

While Bonaparte waged war on plunderers of the army supplies, he consistently upheld the arts and sciences. On October 25 he wrote: "It seems, Citizens Directors, by your letter of the 14 Vendémiaire, that the *savants* and the artists have complained of not having what they need. It would be very ungrateful on our part not to give them all that is necessary, for they serve the Republic with as much zeal as success, and I beg you to believe that on my side I appreciate more than anybody the real service which arts and sciences render to the state, and that I shall always be anxious to second with all my zeal your intentions on this subject."

Turning from the civil to the military side of his duties, on October 16 Bonaparte wrote to Wurmser, stating the fact that Mantua was beyond being saved, offering to let him personally see what the existing conditions were, and suggesting that he had better yield up the fortress. This diplomatic attempt had, however, no result. On October 25 he wrote the Directory: "Wurmser is in the last extremity, he has no wine, meat or forage. He is eating his horses, and has fifteen thousand sick. He found means of getting the proposition I made him to Vienna." For all that, the fortress continued to hold out. Wurmser had pluck, if not ability.

Meanwhile the defeat of Jourdan enabled the Voralberg troops to march to the Adige, and Davidovich, who had been put in command with orders to take Trent, received accessions which ran his army up to nearly twenty thousand men; and the army of Quosdanovich, which after the defeat of Bassano had retired to Gorice on the Isonzo, was also increased to thirty thousand, partly Croats, recently organized into regiments, partly men from the Rhine armies to act as a leaven and partly recruits from the interior.

Bonaparte's political operations were interrupted by the arrival at the end of October of a fresh Austrian army under Alvinzi, who, like his predecessor, was charged with the relief of Mantua, which Austria was determined to keep at any price. The force which had been assembling in the Friuli under Alvinzi had concentrated October 22 at Pordenone, reached Conegliano October 30, and crossed the Piave on November 2, on the way to Bassano, while Davidovich with eighteen thousand men recaptured Trent. Each of these two columns proposed to push its advance, Davidovich down the Adige, Alvinzi towards Verona, until they could join hands at the latter city; and meanwhile Wurmser would debouch in force from Mantua. This intention, which shortly became manifest, prevented Bonaparte from advancing on Alvinzi on the Brenta or the Piave, lest he should, by his absence, enable Davidovich to beat Vaubois, march down and join Wurmser at Mantua, and establish a large body on the French communications. Nor could he well advance to Roveredo, lest he open to Alvinzi the road to Mantua, with the same results. And should he remain massed at Verona, the two Austrian commanders might join hands by the Brenta valley. The one thing in his favor was that the two armies were again to operate on concentric lines, so that either could be attacked separately, so long as the other kept quiet, or could be neutralized. The late defeat of Wurmser seemed not to have taught the Austrians any military wisdom. But the superior numbers of the enemy were most disquieting.

Of Alvinzi's movement towards the Brenta valley Bonaparte had received news by October 25, and he proposed, as a first step, to have Vaubois push the Tyrolese troops back on Neumarkt, so that he could draw from his division a goodly detachment to reinforce the main body; and he sent Berthier thither to see the work done as directed. Should a

heavy force move on Bassano, Massena, who was on the Brenta, was ordered to withdraw to Vicenza, and when the enemy had got tired out by his long marches over bad roads, Bonaparte's time of attack would have come. The French general's calculations were, however, as we shall see, much upset by Vaubois' inability even to hold his own.

On October 29 Massena made a reconnoissance towards the Piave, and ascertaining the presence of Austrians on the farther side, concentrated at Bassano the troops with which he had been protecting the Brenta valley and watched for the enemy. That Alvinzi had crossed the Piave November 2 was soon reported to Bonaparte at headquarters in Verona; and next day the Austrian army was in the Treviso-Asolo region. Upon the approach of Quosdanovich with the right wing to Bassano on November 4, Massena vacated the town early in the morning, and withdrew towards Vicenza; while Augereau, under previous orders, approached Montebello, and Bonaparte came thither to take command. On the 15th Massena and Augereau concentrated at Vicenza. Provera and the left wing marched to the Brenta in front of Citadella.

While this was going on opposite the Austrian lower Adige army, Vaubois advanced on the upper Adige army under Davidovich according to orders; and though attacking with vigor on November 2, at early dawn, the position of the Austrians near San Michele above the Avisio, was unable to carry the place; and his right having been turned, he retired by evening to Lavis. Next day Davidovich, who had twice the force of Vaubois, led the attack on the French right at Segonzano, and fearing to be turned, Vaubois withdrew his left to Trent. On the 4th Davidovich, encouraged by success, pushed sharply in on Trent, and by nightfall Vaubois was fain to leave this town also, and take up the next available position, in the defile of Caliano. Again Davidovich

advanced, and on the 5th attacked the defile, sending at the same time a turning force of Tyrolese riflemen under Laudon, by way of Mori and Torbole on the other side of the river, to reach the French rear. He was playing the same rôle, in the opposite direction, that Bonaparte had played two months before.

On November 5, 1796, Joubert, in whom Bonaparte had recognized the true quality of the soldier, was ordered to turn over his command of Legnano to another officer, and to report to Vaubois to help him in his campaign. It was here that Joubert learned the Adige country, as a preparation to his future brilliant services there.

Why Alvinzi did not essay to join Davidovich by the Brenta, or at least organize a line of couriers between the armies, so as to work in some sort in concert with his lieutenant, or at all events with knowledge of each other's manœuvres, it is hard to comprehend. But a division of forces at that day was not deemed an error. In fact, it is yet the common resort of all incompetent strategists.

In the Brenta valley, on November 6, the armies also clashed. Early in the morning Bonaparte had moved Augereau forward on Alvinzi's right under Quosdanovich at Bassano, and Massena on his left under Liptay and Provera, who stood at Carmagnano and Fontaniva, and had striven all day long by repeated attacks to win the crossings of the Brenta held by the enemy; but though, on the whole, the French were successful, and Alvinzi retired most of his troops across the river, yet the Austrians, by bringing up their reserves, held fast to the crossings, and the day was without gainful result. The loss was fortunately not great. Having in mind the Wurmser campaign, Bonaparte was surprised at the good countenance of the Austrian troops. They appeared to be quite equal to his own in action. He proposed to renew

the attack next day; but bad news from Vaubois held him back. While the commander-in-chief was thus forfeiting the chance he had hoped for, of throwing Alvinzi permanently towards the Piave, and then of marching up the Brenta valley and taking Davidovich in the rear, the latter had attacked La Pietra in force, and had failed by a frontal attack to take the defile. But a turning column had proved more successful, and on learning of its presence, Vaubois was again smitten with the fever of retreat, and wrote his chief that he feared he should probably be forced still farther back by dint of numbers. This forward movement of Davidovich, if carried too far, threatened to take Verona in reverse, and Bonaparte concluded that he must defer his operations against Alvinzi, and turn his attention to the Adige valley. Augereau and Massena were ordered back to Vicenza, which they reached November 7, and after a short respite, withdrew to Verona by the forenoon of the 8th. This rearward movement markedly encouraged Alvinzi and his Austrians.

Davidovich had not a clever soldier in his front. On the 7th he repeated his attack on Vaubois at Caliano, captured the place by 4 P. M., and the French were forced back to the La Corona-Rivoli line. This operation was getting to be so dangerous that Bonaparte himself went up to Rivoli to encourage the troops. Two half-brigades had specially shown lack of endurance in the fight of the 7th; and the commanding general issued an "Allocution to the Division Vaubois."

RIVOLI, 17 Brumaire, Year V.

Soldiers! I am not satisfied with you; you have shown neither discipline, nor constancy, nor bravery; in no position could you be rallied; you abandoned yourselves to a panic terror; you have allowed yourselves to be driven from positions where a handful of brave men should stop an army. Soldiers of the 39th and of the 85th, you are not French soldiers. General, Chief of Staff, cause to be written on the flags: —

"*They are no longer of the Army of Italy!*" BONAPARTE.

This punishment bit deep; the men, with true Gallic fervor, vowed to conquer or die; and when they thereafter kept their word, the stigma was removed. Bonaparte had a way with him which commanded the respect and won the hearts of his soldiers.

In his dispatches to the Directory November 13, the general-in-chief was fain to apologize for some of these troops. Speaking of this fight at La Pietra, "At the beginning of the night a panic terror seized our troops, the rout became general, we abandoned six guns," he reports. And, "General of Division Vaubois is a brave man, fit to sustain a siege in a place," he wrote November 24, "but in no sense fit to command a division in an army as active, and in a kind of war as decisive. I have sent him to command in Leghorn; he might be sent to command in Corsica. I ask of you the grade of division general for the General of Brigade Joubert, a young man of greatest merit." Bonaparte was ever ready to recognize and reward good service.

On the same day, the 7th of November, that had seen Vaubois' defeat, Alvinzi moved within five miles of Vicenza. On the 8th he kept on and reached the city, while Davidovich got as far down the Adige as Roveredo — each with his main body. Matters were coming to a crisis. It began to look as if Alvinzi's eccentric advance was about to succeed against Bonaparte's interior lines.

One thing is worthy of special remark in these days, and that is how little favored by fortune Bonaparte was. Despite work twice as hard as any done by his opponent, despite marches twice as long, despite courage equal to that of any troops, yet Bonaparte and his men frequently fell far short of success. It has generally been said that he was the constant favorite of the fickle goddess; but it should rather be said that when she did smile on him, he quickly seized his

opportunity; and that when she withdrew her favors, he worked all the harder to win back her smiles. In this particular case Bonaparte had set himself a task with marked risk. As has been pointed out, he wanted to reverse the manœuvre he had used against Wurmser, and having thrown Alvinzi back beyond the Brenta, to march up the valley, and fall on the rear of Davidovich. After a fashion, this was laying his own communications open to interruption, for unless he beat Alvinzi so thoroughly as to neutralize him for many days, he could not expect to prevent his again advancing towards the Mincio before the French could crush Davidovich and reach the danger-zone by the long detour up the Brenta and down the Adige.

Now, when Vaubois was beaten, and he himself had failed to beat Alvinzi, — in other words, when Dame Fortune frowned upon him, — Bonaparte saw that he must woo her by some other means; and he changed his plan at once and radically. That he was ready to do so, that he was speedily prepared with another plan, shows that, like Frederick, he was always studying the situation. "A great captain must ask himself daily a number of times: 'If the enemy's army should appear in my front, on my right flank, on my left, what should I do?' If this question puzzles him, he is badly placed, he is not well ordered, he must rectify things." From this study came Bonaparte's readiness, his alertness.

In these quotations from Napoleon's utterances, there is so much which is, idea for idea, the same which we find in Frederick's writings, that one must conclude not only that Napoleon knew these writings, but that they had sunk deep into his mind. He can scarcely have failed to read or ponder what had already become public property, by translation and publication in many places outside of Prussia; and though he nowhere refers to inspiration from Frederick's pages, —

this would not in any case have been the way of this self-sufficient man, — the internal evidence would show that he was indebted to the great king for much of what he knew of war. Frederick's seed fell on fertile soil.

On November 8, then, Bonaparte was at Verona with twenty-one thousand men, and Vaubois at La Corona with eight thousand; and in their front Alvinzi lay with twenty-seven thousand men at Vicenza, and Davidovich with sixteen thousand at Roveredo, — an active field force of twenty-nine thousand French to forty-three thousand Austrians. Next day Alvinzi moved forward to Montebello; but Davidovich, hearing that Vaubois had received reinforcements, remained inactive. On the 10th Alvinzi sent a detachment out to Caldiero, and the following day he marched his main column to Villanova. Bonaparte had meanwhile sent Massena in person to gauge the situation in the Adige valley, and himself closely watched Alvinzi. Should Davidovich advance farther, Bonaparte determined to fall on him and destroy him at any cost; else his line of retreat via Peschiera and across the Mincio might be compromised. But Massena came back with the reassuring news that Davidovich showed no immediate sign of moving; and Bonaparte, instead of sending Massena's division to sustain Vaubois, as he had feared he must, determined to keep him for an attack on Alvinzi. He was to need his every man. The French army, then, had rest on the 9th and 10th; and not until the 11th did Bonaparte hear any definite news of Alvinzi's advance towards Verona.

If we can imagine Alvinzi's advancing rapidly on Verona, which city he could turn by crossing the Adige below, Davidovich continuing to press Vaubois day by day, and Wurmser making a hearty sortie from Mantua with twenty thousand men, it would seem as if this Austrian total of sixty-seven

thousand men, although advancing in a faulty manner, ought to have overwhelmed Bonaparte's total of forty-five thousand men, relieved Mantua, and driven the Army of Italy behind the Mincio. But Alvinzi's slowness was matched by that of both Davidovich and Wurmser.

Before marching out to meet the enemy, Bonaparte, on the 11th of November, issued his usual proclamation: "When the drum of battle shall have beaten, and when we march straight at the enemy, with fixed bayonets and in the dull silence which guarantees victory, Soldiers! be worthy of yourselves. I say to you but two words, they suffice for Frenchmen: 'Italy! Mantua!' The peace of Europe, the happiness of your parents, will be the result of your courage. Let us do once more what we have done so often, and Europe will not contest us the title of the bravest and most powerful nation in the world."

On the afternoon of the 11th, having heard that Alvinzi was marching towards him from Vicenza, Bonaparte determined on an offensive counter. Rapidly assembling some troops, he marched out about three o'clock, struck the Austrian van at San Martino, and by dark, at no great cost, drove it back on Caldiero. The heights of Caldiero come down to, indeed, cross the post-road which runs through Vicenza to Verona; and, covered by vines, walls and gardens, and flanked by river and mountains, make an exceptionally favorable position for troops to defend. During the night of November 11–12 the Austrian van had intrenched itself at this place, and, to forestall the arrival of the main body, Bonaparte attacked it by 8 A. M. of the 12th, Augereau going in along the road, while he threw Massena around the enemy's right flank at Colognola, which appeared to him to be less strongly held. The Austrians had two battalions at Caldiero; three battalions and three squadrons on the Colognola heights; two bat-

Austrians would join hands, and, added to the Mantua garrison, might readily overwhelm him. Verona was within easy reach of three heavy columns, Alvinzi's, Davidovich's, Wurmser's. Man for man, the enemy had so far fought as well as the French; the wonderful work which Frederick's grenadiers used to exhibit against double or treble their numbers is not here apparent; and Bonaparte was right in feeling that he must so manœuvre as to be able to outnumber the Austrians whenever contact came. With troops of equal value, the mass theory was all the more essential.

The chance of retrieving the disaster appeared small. Vaubois and the left wing had been beaten by Davidovich, and had a bare eight thousand men left; Bonaparte and the right wing had been beaten by Alvinzi, and could place in line scarcely above seventeen thousand men; Kilmaine's nine thousand men at Mantua might easily be driven back by a sortie from the fortress, whose garrison was thrice as big. There was no general in the Army of Italy, there are few at any time, who under these conditions would not have retired to the right bank of the Mincio. Not so Bonaparte. His keen eye could still see an outlet to the maze, and so long as there was one left, it was no time to weaken. He had in the past benefited by good fortune, should he not now be able to face the ill? Moreover, the Citizen Bonaparte knew that all his future depended on the success of these few coming months. If he lost the game at this stage, good-by to his growth, political or military. Once shelved by the Directory, in which he had as many enemies as friends, would he have another chance? It was evident that he must hold his own against even the heavy odds he had now to meet. There could be no turning back; win he must. And Fortune favored his courage by casting her cloak of stupor over both Davidovich and Wurmser.

Bonaparte devised a new plan. So long as Alvinzi's force immediately before him was superior to his own in numbers, rather than again to chance an attack on him in front, the French general determined to turn the Austrian left flank and fall on its rear at Villanova, where he might seize the artillery park and train. Such a manœuvre demanded prompt and secret execution, and it also required quite new arrangements that consumed many hours. A body of three thousand men was called from the Mantua besiegers, and under Kilmaine ordered at all hazards to hold Verona, the one thing needful to prevent Alvinzi and Davidovich from joining hands; while Bonaparte proposed on the evening of November 14 to start downstream on his new manœuvre.

The 14th was spent in unusual quiet in Verona. An army is a barometer of success or failure, and the troops were hourly wondering what their chief would do. Yet not a man doubted that the best would be done. As night fell, the divisions were ordered under arms, to form three columns, and to march in silence. Surprise seized on all when, instead of debouching from Verona by the gate opposite the enemy, the head of column filed out of the Milan gate and headed towards the west. Was it a retreat? Were all the battles won at such cost of blood to be forfeited at this late day? "Non, camarade," quoth the old French grenadier. "Tu verras! Le p'tit caporal leur flanquera un bon!" The question was soon answered. Not far from Verona the head of column filed to the left, and the Army of Italy headed rapidly and silently down the Adige towards Ronco. Here Bonaparte had already ordered a bridge to be built, and on the morning of the 15th the French army crossed the Adige, leaving the reserve cavalry under Beaurevoir on the west bank.

Just below Ronco the Alpone flows into the larger river from the northeast, and between the two lies a triangular

Alvinzi up in a *cul-de-sac*, and forcing him to fight to the death; he preferred to beat him and then offer him a bridge of gold, so that he might retire, for a week at least, and enable the French to drive back Davidovich, and again turn on him; and moreover it was important to be as near as possible to his communications with Vaubois, Verona and Mantua. With Massena, Augereau and the reserve cavalry, the French numbered about eighteen thousand men; Alvinzi five or six thousand more.

While Bonaparte was engaged in this turning manœuvre, the Austrian outposts were all but on the glacis of Verona; the main body lay along the post-road or upon the heights to the north of it, with the reserves and train in Villanova; and Alvinzi was preparing one body to move on Verona, and another body at the same time to pass the Adige at Zevio to turn the French flank. It does not appear that Alvinzi had conceived any danger of a flank attack in force by the French; but in view of his own crossing at Zevio, he had taken the precaution to occupy Arcole by two battalions, a squadron and two guns under Colonel Brigido. This was a small force, to be sure, but enough under a determined officer to hold the causeway until reinforcements could reach him, and Brigido proved to be the man. The Austrian commander expected Davidovich to do his share in netting Bonaparte; but the manœuvre was a concentric one, and as is usual with concentric movements, the clever general was not on hand to be trapped; so that Alvinzi woke up to find his opponent turning the tables on him by debouching at an entirely unexpected point. Yet though the Austrian commander found his bearings with uncommon rapidity, it was noon before any number of troops could be got where they could protect the threatened flank. Luckily for Alvinzi, the terrain was in favor of his defense, as a small body could temporarily hold each

end of the causeways, and, owing to the complicated operation, the French were necessarily slow. Provera had some troops on hand to meet Massena when he reached Porcile, and Alvinzi promptly fell back from Verona on San Bonifacio, and extended his left towards San Stefano, throwing Mitrowsky's Croats into Arcole to sustain Brigido. In Bonaparte's report to the Directory, November 19, he states that a regiment of Croats and several Hungarian regiments had been stationed in Arcole.

Like the battle of Cæsar at Alexandria, the fighting was begun along the causeways. Massena took Bionde and pushed on; but despite a vigorous onset, he was arrested at Porcile, and Augereau, though he made several stout attacks on the little stone bridge over the Alpone at Arcole, which was held by Mitrowsky and Brigido, was unable to cross. Watching the operations from Ronco, Bonaparte could see Massena checked, and Augereau, into whose right flank the Austrian sharpshooters stationed along the Alpone were pouring a deadly fire, pause and waver. But Arcole must be had. Even though Bonaparte might manage to advance by way of Porcile on Alvinzi's line of retreat, he could not leave behind such a tactical threat to his own rear of column. It seemed as if his first plan to debouch through Arcole on Villanova was to be wrecked. The enemy's small force was doing famous work. Several French generals had been shot in leading the column and striving to take the bridge; and yet this must be captured. "It was in vain that all the generals, feeling the importance of the moment, threw themselves at the head to oblige our columns to cross the little bridge of Arcole," says the dispatch. "Too much courage was harmful, and nearly all were wounded. Generals Verdier, Bon, Verne and Lannes were put *hors de combat.* Augereau seized a flag, carried it to the end of the bridge: 'Cowards,' he cried to his

troops, 'do you fear death so much?' and he stayed there several minutes, but without any effect. . . . I went there myself; I demanded of the soldiers if they were still the victors of Lodi. My presence produced on the troops a movement which decided me to try the passage again."

The commander-in-chief indeed did gallop from Ronco over the causeway, and recklessly put himself at the head of another storming column against the Arcole bridge. Yet even Bonaparte's personal example in heading his men did not accomplish the desired result; and in fact he came near capture, if he escaped death. As the fresh column charged the bridge, it was met by a counter-charge delivered with true Slavic fury. The French column was forced back, and Bonaparte and a number of the grenadiers at the head were hustled off the causeway, and fell into the marsh, where they sank up to the middle. The Croats rushed on with loud cries, and actually all but passed the place where the commanding general was floundering in the mud, when Belliard, one of Bonaparte's aides, gathering a few men devoted to their chief, with a desperate rush stopped the Croats, who were unaware of the accident, long enough for Bonaparte and his men to climb up on the causeway. The chief then mounted his horse and rode back whence he came. The assault had failed.

All is not glory in war. The commonplace — the ridiculous — is ever and anon mixed with the heroic, as all old soldiers know. The gallantry on both sides was far from inconsistent with the prosaic accident to the commanding general. Nor does this in any sense detract from the performance in history. It did not with the grenadiers. They remembered that Le P'tit Caporal feared not death, and was ready to lend a hand beside them. The rest was forgotten.

Meanwhile Massena had made a fresh attack, which Provera met upon the causeway. As happens often in war, one

of the Austrian rear battalions fired into its own leading battalion and threw it into confusion; the whole column fell back, and in the mêlée Massena reached Porcile. In addition to the two main attacks, a small detachment under Guyeux had been sent by Bonaparte by way of Alvaredo to turn the Arcole force; but though this body late in the afternoon actually drove the Austrians into the town (Napoleon said at St. Helena that they captured it, though this is denied), and created a diversion which a few hours before would have been of marked benefit, yet at 7 P. M., when the result was obtained, the attack was too much isolated to be of value; and as the main body had withdrawn, not only had Guyeux to retire, but the general plan of a surprise on Alvinzi's flank and a march by way of Arcole to Villanova on his rear — and this was the essence — had utterly failed. In ignorance of what Vaubois might be doing, and lest a night march might be necessary to join his lieutenant on the Mincio, Bonaparte thought best to withdraw all the forces and recross the Adige. Alvinzi's van camped at Caldiero; Provera at La Bona, Porcile and Bionde; Mitrowski on the plain from San Bonifacio to San Stefano. The French camped back of Ronco.

The day had been lost, but if Bonaparte had not surprised Alvinzi, he had at all events arrested his manœuvre against Verona, and he had taken some prisoners. To save the situation, however, and enable the main army to turn against Davidovich, Alvinzi must be thrown back on the Brenta. This was now the only chance, and gauging the contending forces equal in effective striking power, the result depended on the situation and the commanders, with the chances decidedly against Bonaparte.

News from Vaubois, showing that Davidovich had not moved on the 15th, ran in during the night. This was cheering information. Bonaparte determined to renew his attack on the

16th; and Augereau and Massena went in again, each as on November 15. On this day Alvinzi had grasped the situation. He reinforced both Porcile and Arcole, and determined to take the initiative, Provera from Bionde and Mitrowsky from Arcole advancing at daybreak along the causeways, in the hope to force their way to Ronco and attack the French on their own ground. But Provera's force, which was in the lead, was met by Massena in front of Zerpa and lustily attacked. The French riflemen along the shore also plied the Austrian column with a demoralizing fire, as Augereau had been served the day before; and shortly the loss of officers became so great that the column dissolved into flight, and was scarcely rallied until it had reached Caldiero. Following up this success, Massena advanced along the causeway towards Porcile, and gave way to Augereau, who sharply threw back Mitrowsky's column at the point of the bayonet, and would have entered Arcole with him, had not an Austrian battalion along the edge of the Alpone again taken him in flank with a murderous fire and forced him back. All day long this fighting went on at intervals and with alternate success, but the French gained little. Bonaparte strove to make an artificial ford at the confluence of the Alpone and Adige by the use of fascines, and sent Vial down river to seek a crossing and join the garrison of Legnano, which had been ordered up river to turn Arcole; but the work at the artificial ford proved too long, and Vial found no crossing. Massena once more got possession of Porcile; but without Arcole it could advantage nothing to the French. Fresh troops succeeded the tired ones, but the fighting had to be in detail, and the Croats continued, in a manner quite beyond praise, to hold the bridge of Arcole. The fighting was sometimes by musketry at a distance, sometimes with the bayonet close at hand, with the intervals between clashes usual in such fighting; but the French could not force their way across the bridge;

and again Bonaparte, for the same reason as yesterday's, felt it wise to recross the river at night. The Davidovich column gave him great uneasiness, and the Austrians were fighting beyond expectation well. The news from Vaubois still indicated that another day could be risked at Arcole; for though Davidovich had taken La Corona and Rivoli on the 16th, Vaubois was holding Bussolengo and Castelnuovo. It was still evident that Alvinzi must be neutralized; and Bonaparte was in a mood to perish with his men rather than retire from the contest, with all that the defeat implied. With his characteristic self-confidence, moreover, he believed that the enemy had lost more men than he had, and was in a condition of morale far less satisfactory; and now that he felt sure that the real superiority was on his side, — for despite their severe handling his men were in good heart, — he determined to move out on the plain, where at first, and so soon after the defeat at Caldiero, he had not been ready to adventure his inferior forces.

On the 17th, then, with a persistency which is truly admirable, Bonaparte for the third time crossed the Adige at Ronco, — though there was nearly a fatal delay by a break in the bridge, brought on by the sinking of a boat, — and on this day sent a half-brigade of Massena's under Robert against Arcole, while Massena with another half-brigade marched on Porcile, and the rest of the division remained in reserve near the bridge. It was arranged for Augereau to move down and cross the Alpone on a trestle-bridge constructed at the mouth of the stream during the night, and not perceived by the enemy, and then turn the Austrian left. Massena's column met the enemy on the causeway as before, and the same to-and-fro fighting, but of a less tenacious character, occurred as on the previous days. Robert made a gallant attempt on the bridge at Arcole, where the Austrians had been reinforced,

but failed; and a Croat column, pursuing his retiring regiments back towards the Ronco bridge, came so close to taking this and obtaining a foothold on the mainland that at the last moment Bonaparte ordered it broken. But anticipating such a possibility, as the French columns were small, he had concealed a half-brigade in a willow copse which extended on the right along the causeway; the Croats were there taken in flank by so sudden and close a salvo, followed by an immediate attack with the bayonet, that, surrounded by the reserves of Massena's division and by some of Augereau's troops, they were completely broken; a large number were killed; and three thousand men were captured. By noon Augereau had crossed the new bridge and smartly attacked Miloradovich, who now commanded the line which defended Arcole, and whose right leaned on the Alpone and left on low land near the confluence; but still the bravery of the enemy held him off, despite their exhaustion from the long defense. A small body of eight hundred men from Legnano had been expected even yesterday to turn this marsh; but they were beyond reason delayed in their advance. Neither would Austrian retire, nor could Frenchman make a further step forward. After three days' fighting over the same ground, it had become, outside interference apart, a question of endurance, not of the men, but of the moral courage of the army commanders. Alvinzi was ready to quit on short notice; Bonaparte might be called off by Davidovich.

On the evening of the 17th Alvinzi had written to his lieutenant that while he might resist another attack, to undertake the offensive was out of the question. He had, in fact, sent his train well to the rear. Why, when Alvinzi saw that he must fight at or near Verona, he had not urged Davidovich to advance on the 16th or 17th as a diversion to aid himself and annoy the French, it is hard to say. But that he did not

do so was Bonaparte's salvation. As a matter of fact, the turning-point had been reached. "The fate of a battle is the happening of an instant, of a thought, . . . the decisive moment arrives, a moral spark flares up, and the smallest reserve carries it out," says Napoleon; and again, "In battle there is a moment when the smallest manœuvre decides and gives the superiority; it is the drop of water which causes the overflow."

It had grown to be evident where the moral spark lay, and it was not in Alvinzi's soul. He had become morally exhausted. The decisive moment arrived, and a mere make-believe attack by a handful of men flashed the spark and carried the French forward to victory. About 3 P. M., when Massena and Augereau were pushed in for the last time, Beaurevoir's head of column came up, and the small garrison from Legnano finally arrived and advanced on the enemy by way of Albaredo, threatening to turn his left flank, there were signs of weaker resistance, and all that seemed needed was one more thrust to disturb the enemy's equipoise. The Austrians had grown benumbed with constant fighting, and were ready to dissolve. Now came the needed flurry. A small group of horsemen (twenty-five guides under an officer nicknamed Hercules, with four trumpeters, say the Memoirs) had been dispatched by Bonaparte on a circuit around the marsh to fall from ambush on the Austrian left and rear with as much noise as they could make, to simulate the arrival of a column of cavalry. This raw device, used at the proper moment, drew the last grain of resistance from the Austrians defending Arcole. About 5 P. M. this handful of horsemen rode in on the enemy's left with loud outcries and strident blare of trumpets, a few Austrian companies gave way, a regiment followed, and the heart-sick, worn-out soldiers under Miloradovich ceased resistance and sullenly fell back. The troops in

Arcole did the like; and the entire Austrian force, which for three days had so pluckily held the bridge against the repeated French attacks, withdrew along the road to Cologna, leaving Arcole to the French. The combined attack along both banks of the Alpone had succeeded, and the battle of Arcole was won. Massena meanwhile, having driven the enemy out of Porcile, left a half-brigade there, and was withdrawn to Arcole to strengthen the main column. There being no good ground for defense along the Alpone flats, Alvinzi retired by way of San Bonifacio and Villanova. The troops which had stood at Verona on the 15th and 16th without undertaking any operation, and had then retired to Caldiero, summarily withdrew. A slight French attack on San Bonifacio was repulsed, and this ended the battle. The troops of both armies, utterly exhausted, slept on their arms.

From the battlefield of Arcole, Bonaparte wrote General Clarke: "Your nephew, Elliot, has been killed on the battlefield. This young man had become familiar with arms. He has several times marched at the head of column. He would have been one day an estimable officer. He died with glory and in the face of the enemy. He did not suffer an instant. Where is the reasonable man who would not envy such a death?"

On November 18 Alvinzi, reduced to fifteen thousand men under the colors, withdrew by way of Montebello to the Brenta valley. Bonaparte wrote, November 19, from Verona:

QUARTERS GENERAL, VERONA, 29 Brumaire, Year V.

TO THE CITIZEN CARNOT.

. . . Never was battlefield disputed like that of Arcole. I scarcely have any generals left; their devotion and their courage are without example. The General of Brigade Lannes came to the battlefield not yet healed of the wound he received at Governolo. He was wounded twice during the first day of the battle; he was, at three in the afternoon, stretched on his bed and suffering, when he learnt that I myself was going to the head of

the column. He jumped from his bed, mounted his horse, and came to join me. As he could not stay afoot, he was obliged to remain on horseback; he received at the head of the bridge of Arcole a wound which stretched him lifeless. I assure you it needed all that to win. . . . Send us succor promptly, for we cannot do again what we have done. You know the character of the Frenchman, a little inconstant. . . . BONAPARTE.

But at Arcole the Frenchman had not been inconstant.

Bonaparte had not defeated Alvinzi; he had lost nearly as many men; but he had forced back the Austrians by superior morale, and could now turn on Davidovich. There was no more fight left in Alvinzi for a number of days.

The Austrian losses at Arcole were sixty-three hundred men, eleven guns and ten munition wagons. The French lost, as quoted, forty-five hundred men; but nearly every French general was wounded, among them Lannes, Verne, Bon and Verdier, Robert and Gardanne.

The pursuit of Alvinzi was intrusted to the cavalry.

With regard to the conduct of the soldiers at Arcole, Bonaparte wrote the Directory, November 19: "I must not conceal from you that I have not found in the soldiers my phalanxes of Lodi, of Millesimo, of Castiglione; fatigue and the absence of the brave men" (who have been lost) "took from them that impetuosity with which I had the right to hope to capture Alvinzi and the larger part of his army." Nor was this all. His complaints against the contractors never ceased. He wrote Garrau, November 19: "The army is without shoes, without money, without clothes, the hospitals lack everything, our wounded are on the floors, and in the most horrible distress; all that comes from want of money, and this at the moment when we have just acquired four millions of francs at Leghorn." The brave little French soldier had to exercise a deal of patience. But victory warmed his heart.

The salvation of the French had hinged on the temporary

lack of enterprise of Davidovich, and this was in a way due to good fortune. This general could scarcely have better played the French game. Satisfied with forcing Vaubois back to Rivoli, he sat down to contemplate his work, regardless of what was happening to his chief. Finally, when it was too late to be of any solid service, and Alvinzi had retired because his lieutenant did not appear, Davidovich undertook to advance on Vaubois at Rivoli. For a week he had amused himself by tapping with a small vanguard at the French earthworks at La Corona ; on the 16th he made a feint at an attack. Early on the 17th, when Bonaparte was for the third time crossing the Adige on his perilous undertaking, — what might not a smart Austrian attack have accomplished two days before? — Davidovich broke up with his corps from Roveredo, and started on his too long delayed manœuvre against the French left flank. He had three columns : a brigade marching via Riva on Rocca d' Anfo, and one on each side of the Adige, that on the left bank being intended as a turning manœuvre. He was two to one of his opponent ; there was no question of his success (though indeed one's mind cannot, during this battle, but recur again and again to the days when the Last of the Kings hurled his little masses at the thrice greater body of Austrians, and beat them), and by 2 P. M., after a fairly stubborn resistance to the Austrian attack on front and flank, Vaubois, having lost twelve hundred men, was in full retreat from Rivoli along the Adige road. The French division paused for a rest not far from Bussolengo, continued its retreat on Castelnuovo during the night, and on the 18th, in the forenoon, withdrew beyond the Mincio at Peschiera. What a chance for Davidovich, had he but pressed Vaubois back on the 15th or 16th ! But the Austrians remained on the battlefield even on the night of the 17th, and next day advanced only to Pastrengo.

Exhausted though the French troops were, victory gave them back good cheer, and with the alacrity all soldiers show towards the man who wins success, they turned their backs on the bloody marshes of Arcole and marched towards the Mincio. No sooner had the news run in that Vaubois had crossed that river than Bonaparte recognized that one more hearty blow would win the day for good. He soon ascertained that Alvinzi would not stand at Villanova; and deeming the cavalry sufficient for the moment, he headed Augereau for Verona on the left bank of the Adige, and Massena on the right bank for Villafranca. He would now punish Davidovich for his temerity. To see a French column reënter Verona on the 18th in triumph by the gate of Venice, when apparently in retreat it had left the city on the 15th by the gate of Milan, puzzled and enthused the population of Verona, and added to the French fervor. On the 19th Davidovich received news of Alvinzi's defeat and withdrawal. He was much taken aback, and not caring to face the divisions which had won at Arcole, he turned in his tracks and retired, November 20, to Rivoli. Bonaparte joined Massena's division to Vaubois', who recrossed the Mincio at Borghetto and advanced to Villafranca, and sent them on the 21st on the track of the Austrians retiring up the Adige, while Augereau was ordered from Verona by the left-bank roads to Dolce, hoping to get up the river faster than they and to cut off their retreat.

The loss by Davidovich of the 16th and 17th had borne ill fruit to the Austrian scheme. When Alvinzi saw that he was not being pursued by any heavy force, he resolved to about face and return to the attack on Verona, so as to disengage Davidovich, if perchance he were in difficulties. He would have been wiser to move up the Brenta to join him at Trent, so as now to operate in one body, as he should have begun by doing; but unaware that Davidovich had retired to

Rivoli, he advanced to Villanova on the 20th, and next day to Caldiero, easily pushing before him the small French detachments on the road. Just at that moment, as, learning of the advance of Massena and Vaubois, Davidovich was retiring from Rivoli, he heard from Alvinzi that the latter proposed to renew the effort to join him, and gave orders to return to the Rivoli position. But no sooner were these orders issued than the difficulties of the situation began to oppress him, and he again countermanded them. Such indecision worked ill on the troops, with the result that when Massena and Vaubois attacked the Austrian position at Rivoli, Davidovich, with but half a fight, fell back; and on learning of Augereau's march on Dolce, he made haste to retire to Ala. Augereau had, however, made excellent speed, and part of his troops had reached Peri. Davidovich had to cut his way through the French advance regiments, which he did in truth, but reached safety beyond Augereau only with an army utterly disorganized, a loss of eighteen hundred men and his pontoon-train.

Between the two Austrian armies there was such poor means of communication that not until the 23d did Alvinzi ascertain the utter rout of Davidovich. Upon hearing this, however, he saw that there was no further chance for him (though had he been energetic, the road was well open to Mantua with its enormous garrison), and on the night of the 24th he started definitely to retire behind the Brenta. Wurmser, hoping to accomplish some good end, made, on the 23d, according to previous arrangement with Alvinzi, who had notified him that he could reach Mantua on that day, a sortie which a week before would have been of distinct value. With eight thousand men he drove back the French blockading troops, and seized San Antonio and La Favorita. But finding no sign of Davidovich or Alvinzi, and as the regiments

detailed to help at Arcole had already returned to the blockading force, the sortie was driven back with ease. Alvinzi's army retired behind the Brenta; the Tyrolese army held itself in Riva and Roveredo. Communication was maintained through the Brenta valley.

The campaign was closed. Bonaparte, by a bold offensive against two concentrically advancing armies, had again maintained his defensive position on the Mincio. There are few short struggles which better illustrate the strength of interior lines coupled to vigorous offense, as well as exhibit the weakness of operations conducted by divided or concentrically operating forces. When you add the numbers of Alvinzi and Davidovich to the big garrison of Mantua, it seems as if worse use could hardly have been made of this superiority.

The Austrians during the campaign had lost twenty thousand men. The French army had also lost heavily, but some reinforcements came in to fill the gaps, and after the divisions had been given their new stations, they reached before the end of the year a respectable figure. Kilmaine, who had fallen sick in the Mantuan marshes, was replaced by Serurier, convalescent, and he continued the blockade with nine thousand men. Massena held Verona with the same effective. Joubert took Vaubois' place at Rivoli with ten thousand men. Augereau was posted with nine thousand men at and near Legnano. A new division under Rey was on the Chiese, watching the left bank of Lake Garda, four thousand men being between Salo and Brescia, while Victor, with two thousand reserves, lay on the Mincio, at Castelnuovo and Goito. In garrison in Lombardy were six thousand men. For the nonce, field operations ceased — on the French side to give time to capture Mantua, and on the Austrian side to repair damages and reorganize for a fresh advance.

The Directory sent Clarke to Vienna to treat for peace,

principles among the various populations neighbor to Venice; while to secure the left of his army against any advance from the Alps, and give it a further *point d'appui*, he directed the seizure of the castle of Bergamo, in northern Lombardy, and there placed a suitable garrison.

It was well that Bonaparte had not relied on coöperation from the Army of the Rhine. The French armies which had so lustily invaded Germany in the spring had been forced back to their bases at Hüningen and Düsseldorf. Archduke Charles was at his task of capturing Kehl, ably defended by Desaix, while Beurnonville on the lower Rhine, though reinforced up to eighty thousand men, sat still for months opposite an Austrian force of twenty-five thousand, when any advance whatever would have relieved the pressure on both Moreau on the upper Rhine and Bonaparte in Italy.

So far, the Directory had sent the Army of Italy few troops except the six thousand men under Rey, and now a descent on Ireland by Hoche threatened to divert all further reinforcements from the Mincio. The Irish expedition came to naught in December, when a tempest dispersed the French squadron, and the vessels were lucky in that, for the most part, they were able to reach home ports. Negotiations were had with England, looking, among other things, to a formal cession by Austria of her title to Belgium, that country being already in French hands; but it was Austria that should first have been treated with, and the successes against Moreau and Jourdan had made Vienna equally difficult to approach or to convince. Catherine of Russia died in November; and it was possible that the great Slavic nation, under her successor, Paul I., might seriously change the trend of European affairs. The result of all these events was that the Directory was embarrassed, and that Bonaparte was denied the reinforcements he needed and, as the one successful captain, had a right to

demand. After much deliberation, however, it was finally determined to keep up the forces of the armies at Strasburg and Düsseldorf by accessions from other sources, and Bonaparte was promised the fine divisions of Bernadotte and Delmas, which were to traverse the Alps in the winter season and join the Army of Italy. This promised to raise its force to seventy-five thousand men. But though his army grew, Bonaparte still had his trials, as his letter to the Executive Directory of January 6, 1797, proves: —

MILAN, 17 Nivose, Year V.

. . . The accountability of the army, in the paymaster's office, is in striking disorder ; nothing can be accounted for, and to the reputation for cheating of the controller is joined the foolishness of the employees. Everything is purchasable. The army consumes five times what is necessary, because the storekeepers make false receipts, and go halves with the war commissaries. The principal actresses of Italy are entertained by the employees of the French army ; luxury, depravity and embezzlement are at their height. . . . The only remedy is a temporary court with the right to shoot any army administrator. . . . Marshal Brunswick had the army intendant hung because he was short of victual, and we, in the middle of Italy, having everything in abundance, and disbursing in a month five times what we need, are often in want. . . . Do not think that I am weak and that I betray the country in this essential part of my functions. I have employees arrested every day, I have their papers examined, I visit their strong boxes; but I am seconded by nobody, and the laws do not allow sufficient authority to the general to impress a salutary terror on this cloud of rogues. Still, the evil is diminishing by means of scoldings, of punishments and of getting angry. Things I hope will be got done with a little more decency.

Then follow observations on various good and bad commissaries, by name.

Nor was discipline by any means perfect, as the following extract from orders of February 4, 1797, at Forli, seems to show: "Art. 1. Every soldier who shall be convicted of having struck or assaulted in any manner any person, or taken

any property of the vanquished people, or who shall have in his haversack pillaged articles, shall be shot at the head of his battalion." In this the leader was sustained by the better element in the army, which did not approve of pillaging. A sub-lieutenant named Rey, as an instance, had despoiled an Austrian officer whom he had made prisoner, and his brother officers met and unanimously demanded his cashiering. But while Bonaparte ordered this done October 5, 1796, he vigorously defended the army against outside accusations. In a letter to the General Proveditor of Venice, dated December 8, answering one from that official, he exculpates the French army from charges of misconduct. "I formally give the lie to whoso shall dare assert that there has been in the states of Venice a single woman violated by French troops. Would not one think, in reading the ridiculous note which has been sent me, that all properties have been lost, that there is not a church left, nor a woman respected in the Veronese and the Brescian?"

When the new year of 1797 was about to open, Field-marshal Alvinzi found himself again at the head of an excellent army of over forty thousand men, and ready for a fourth attempt to relieve beleaguered Mantua. He had not yet learned wisdom enough to advance in one body, but again drew up, or else the Vienna Council did it for him, an elaborate plan which divided his forces into three parts. Provera at Padua had nine thousand men, with which body he was to break up January 7, on the 9th to attack and capture Legnano, and from thence to push on to Mantua. Bayalich at Bassano was also to advance January 7 with his six thousand men, and on the 12th was to attack and capture Verona. In case of success, these two columns were to act with Wurmser in Mantua, and with his army to join the papal contingent and operate on the south of the Po. Alvinzi reserved to him-

self a working column of twenty-eight thousand men, with which he proposed to move from the Tyrol on Rivoli, and after taking this on January 13, to march down and join his lieutenants at Mantua. The plan was exact and carefully worked out; but in effect the two smaller columns were about as good as thrown away. Campaigning armies do not often march like clockwork.

Though reinforcements were on the way, Bonaparte had at this moment but four divisions of eight thousand to ten thousand men each, and one small one: Serurier in front of Mantua; Augereau on the Adige from Verona to Legnano; Massena at Verona; Joubert at Rivoli, with van out at La Corona, a small village with a big nunnery and a valuable strategic defile in the mountains. Looking upon the division under Rey at Salo and Desenzano as a species of reserve, the Austrian advance was thus to be pushed against each French wing, and the centre at Verona.

In accordance with Alvinzi's plan, on the 9th Bayalich reached Villanova; and Provera, after a fight at Bevilacqua on the 8th with some of Augereau's outlying troops, in which the French lost two guns and several hundred prisoners, got the mass of his corps as far as Montagnana. Bonaparte was anxious to make no move until he was sure which column contained the mass of the Austrian army. On the 9th Augereau reported Provera's advance, but deeming no serious attempt probable on Legnano, he left Guyeux at Ronco with part of his division. On the 10th Bonaparte, in Bologna, received dispatches from his several lieutenants, and foreseeing what was to come, he headed the two thousand men he there had under Lannes on Rovigo to Augereau's succor, while he himself joined Serurier at Mantua. On the same day Bayalich's van reached Caldiero; Provera did not move this day or the next; Alvinzi was still up the Adige getting his divi-

sions in prime order for an advance. On January 11 Bayalich reached Verona, and Alvinzi's head of column advanced as far as the upper slopes of Monte Baldo. Though uncertain what the operations of the campaign would develop, yet in the certainty of active work all French troops both on the upper and lower Adige were now kept under arms; but there was no substantial change in any of their positions. Along which of the three lines — Rivoli, Verona, Legnano — would come the main Austrian attack was as yet a matter of conjecture.

Alvinzi had depleted Bayalich of a portion of his troops, which are said to have marched to join the main column by one of the minor valleys between the Brenta and the Adige; and on reaching Verona on January 12, Massena sallied out and easily drove him back, Bayalich retiring to Caldiero. He had accomplished his task of diverting the attention of the French commander. Reinforced by Bayalich's detachment, Alvinzi's van began shortly to move forward into touch with Joubert's forces in the vicinity of La Corona. On the 10th the several columns had assembled at their starting-points. Lusignan was at Brentonico, Liptay at Avio, Köblös at Belluno, Ocskay and Quosdanovich lay between Ala and Roveredo. As contemplated by the plan, Lusignan was to cross Monte Baldo, and by January 12 reach the rear of the French position at La Corona, while Liptay and Köblös were to cooperate in front. The other two columns, with which were to march the train and artillery, headed for Belluno to act in second line. Lusignan was delayed by deep snow, and Liptay and Köblös reached the front of La Corona long before he could reach its rear. The French party here was but three thousand strong. Köblös wanted to attack, as the Austrians were superior in numbers, but Liptay held to the letter of his orders, which were to let the French vacate the position when

Lusignan should have turned it. Only a slight demonstration was made, against which the French held themselves, during the 12th, but at night, under Joubert's orders, they retired from their untenable position, and fell back on the main body at Rivoli. Provera for the moment did nothing.

In order to study the situation from a central standpoint, Bonaparte now came on to Verona. From the first message of Augereau and his own first summary of all that he heard, he was led to believe that the Austrian mass was aiming at Mantua by way of the lower Adige; and to anticipate this, from Roverbella he dispatched orders to Massena to hold himself in readiness on the right bank to march from Verona to Legnano. But arrived in Verona, especially after Bayalich's feeble attack, the chief modified his view, and left Massena in that fortress, in light marching order. He was yet by no means sure of his ground. So soon as Joubert's report of the Austrian advance on La Corona reached him, however, he began to feel as if here might after all be the knot of the problem. It looked opposite Augereau, according to this general's reports, less like a large body than it had a day or two since; he concluded, from his own observation, that he had but a small force in front of Verona; he could see why the enemy at Rivoli might well be the mass; and believing the issue would again be one of working from interior lines against successive oncoming columns of the enemy from the three directions indicated, he held himself in readiness personally to hurry to any threatened point. At the same time he kept his eye keenly fixed on Rivoli. No signs of the enemy were apparent on the Chiese.

Alvinzi's van had revealed some strength in its attack on La Corona; and as Joubert saw that with his one division he could not long retain his hold on a position which was liable to be turned at any moment, he had been justified in

withdrawing his forces from that outlying post, so as to concentrate all the men he had in one body on the Rivoli plateau. The Austrian van, finding no further opposition at La Corona, soon passed the place, and debouching from the hills during the afternoon of the 13th, threatened also to turn the French position at Rivoli. The dispatches of Joubert to Bonaparte were the clear and precise reports of a good soldier, and the French commander-in-chief quickly recognized, from what they told, that Alvinzi had in reality massed his army at Roveredo for an advance down the Adige.

No sooner assured as to where the enemy's mass lay than Bonaparte, true to his constant theory, began to assemble his own mass with which to overwhelm Alvinzi, regardless for the moment of the other two columns, whose feeble efforts so far gave apprehension of no great danger. To Augereau's force was added a small equipment of cavalry, and he was ordered to defend the Adige, but to refrain from a general engagement. Serurier was to keep up the blockade of Mantua, but move what troops he could spare as a reserve up to Villafranca. Orders were issued on the afternoon of the 13th for Victor to march to Villafranca; for Rey to move from Salo to Castelnuovo as a central reserve, whence he was later dispatched to Rivoli; and for Massena to leave one foot and one horse regiment, something over two thousand men, in Verona, and moving up to Rivoli, to go in on Joubert's left. The commander-in-chief himself started out for the front, Joubert having previously been instructed to hold on to the Rivoli plateau at all hazards.

The French brigades tramped cheerfully through the night of January 13–14. Bonaparte reached Joubert about 2 A. M.

Having heretofore fully gauged Alvinzi, and quite familiar with the country, it was not difficult for Bonaparte to guess that not only had the Austrian leader divided his mass into

three strategic parts, but that he would almost certainly subdivide his own part into several tactical columns, which he could not, on the hilly terrain, assemble for battle before he struck the Rivoli plateau. This plateau was the "cross-roads" of the open plain, where the many mountain paths and roads meet, and its possessor could readily debouch in any direction on forces coming from the surrounding hills.

As you stand on the irregular-shaped plateau of Rivoli on a winter day, looking north, you see immediately before you the bold snow-clad height of Monte Baldo, and in the north-west, with a gap between, the less marked Monte Gazo. On your right, at the east foot of the plateau, runs the Adige, which has just emerged from the Tyrolese Alps, and continues its rapid course down to the plains of the Po, with hills and defiles on both hands. A road practicable for all arms meanders along the left bank, a less good one along the right; and east of the village of Rivoli on the farther bank is the defile of Chiusa, between precipice and stream. To the west is the broad expanse of Lake Garda, of which glimpses may be caught, and through the plain which surrounds the plateau, from the north around by the west to the south, runs a swift stream called the Tasso, usually bridged or fordable at a number of places. Parallel to the Adige comes down toward the plateau the long narrow ridge of Monte Magnone, terminating near Incanale in the heights of San Marco.

The rear or south of the Rivoli plateau is closed in by an east and west ridge called Monte Pipolo; and the plateau is accessible from the plain on the north, west and south by a number of roads, while at most points troops can mount the slopes across country from the plain.

It will be remembered that of the two roads down the Adige, the one on the left bank is the better. That on the right bank, when it strikes Monte Baldo, follows the river

some distance, but at Incanale, midway between Dolce and Rivoli, where by a westerly sweep the Adige strikes Monte Magnone, and there is scant place for a road, this turns up over the hills and later debouches through a difficult zigzag defile on the Rivoli plateau. Near this defile, at the foot of the hill, was a cluster of houses around a well-known inn, or Osteria; at the mouth of the defile was a custom-house building, or Dogana. Well up the river several mountain roads branch out from the main one, and run southerly by long circuits around or across Monte Baldo, to tap the upland villages, and thence rejoin the Rivoli cross-roads. These mountain ways are only available for infantry. One of them, on which La Corona is situated, runs between Monte Baldo and Monte Magnone. The Corona heights command the roads on either side of the Adige; and artillery posted at available places could play havoc with a column filing by.

The Rivoli plateau is peculiarly suited to defense.

As it happened, Joubert had, about 10 P. M. of the 13th, begun to leave his Rivoli position, intending to retire to Castelnuovo, lest the Austrians, coming on in great numbers and from several directions, should surround and overwhelm his one division. Luckily, his chief's orders reached him in season for him to turn back and reoccupy a position on the plateau just in front of Rivoli, leaning on Campana and Monte Castello, with van in Zœane. Had the Austrians anticipated him, the battle of Rivoli might not have been a French victory. Bonaparte's message also informed him that his chief was on the way with reinforcements. He prepared for a hard fight to carry out his orders.

It was the topography that constrained Alvinzi either to move down upon Rivoli along several roads, or else to consume more time than in the presence of an active foe was wise, in a march on one or two; and the Austrian army was

actually coming on in six columns. Counting from the Austrian right, the second, third and fourth of these columns, forming the centre, the first two composed of five battalions and the last one of four, respectively under Liptay, Köblös and Ocskay, had come on after the capture of La Corona, and had on the evening of the 13th reached the plain out of which rises the Rivoli plateau; the first and right flank column under Lusignan, also of five battalions, was still skirting the west slope of Monte Baldo. The fifth under Quosdanovich, of nine battalions and twelve squadrons, and the sixth under Wukassovich, of three battalions, were approaching along both banks of the Adige.

The Austrians, during this night, were camped, Liptay and Köblös on a line in front of Caprino and San Giovanni, with Ocskay in front of Gambaron in prolongation of their line; Lusignan at Lumini, away back over the Monte Baldo western slope. Wukassovich had not yet reached Dolce; Quosdanovich was still near Rivalta. And, while this was going on at the theatre of an approaching great battle, to keep the whole strategical situation in view, Bayalich had been driven back to Villanova by Massena's troops left in Verona, and Provera, as a feint, had moved forward to Minerbe, three miles from Legnano, but actually was making dispositions to cross the river at Anghiari.

The falling weather had ceased, and it was fortunately a clear, cold, moonlight night when Bonaparte reached Joubert's headquarters at Rivoli; and knowing the country well, "he ascended the different heights and observed the lines of the enemy's camp-fires;" and could easily recognize the array of Austrian divisions threatening to close in around his lieutenant's position. "The atmosphere was aflame with them." He gauged the enemy at forty-five thousand men, — much too high an estimate of any troops he could possibly see, — and recog-

light, and was to march down river and to seize the Chiusa defile; and if it could get into position, to use its artillery against the French right flank. Columns two, three and four in the centre, some twelve thousand strong, under Liptay, Köblös and Ocskay, were to assault the Rivoli position in front. A column of eight thousand men under Quosdanovich had marched down the right or hither Adige bank, and was to wait behind Incanale for the result of the central attack, and then to assault the height from Osteria. The artillery train and cavalry followed this column, not being able to pass on the mountain roads without undue delay. This arrangement of columns dispersed the Austrian army all too much. As Lusignan's column was separated from all the rest by Monte Baldo and later by the Rivoli plateau, and the three central columns were separated from Quosdanovich by the San Marco hills, and Wukassovich was separated from all the other columns by the Adige, it was manifest that, good fortune apart, they could be handled by the French, one set at a time. Moreover, the Austrian columns were none of them, except those of Quosdanovich and Wukassovich, accompanied by even light artillery, while Napoleon, from the Rivoli plateau, could use his twelve-pounders and field-guns, of which he had a goodly number, to marked advantage. This was much in his favor.

In the expectation that both Massena and Rey would shortly reach the field, Bonaparte had disgarnished both his left flank, thrown back along the heights of Trombolora, and his right, thrown back at the Osteria defile, and by his first advance had massed nearly all the forces which were present so as to receive the three central Austrian columns in the position beyond Zovo and La Presa, and out towards Lubiana, which Joubert had taken up. This action he took because it was evident that theirs was to be the initial attack. Bona-

parte proposed to meet the Austrian advance by a counter, and if he could thus break through the Austrian centre, he would have the wings at his mercy. So far good fortune had accompanied his central operations; and here the conditions also led up to such a manœuvre.

But the Austrian columns were in motion before Bonaparte could advance far; and Joubert alone was not strong enough. Instinct with ardor, Liptay and Köblös pushed in on the left centre of the French advanced line with uncommon speed, taking one of the half-brigades in flank, and driving it and the one on its left, after no long opposition, back in confusion. But though a veteran half-brigade, posted near by, was headed by Berthier and threw itself crotchet-wise against the enemy, stood its ground and saved the guns, the Austrian line, stronger here than the French, broke through, and with the vigor of apparent victory pressed forward as far as Matole. Bonaparte hurried up Massena's leading half-brigade, and put it in to rally the two broken ones. This succeeded, and after a lively contest, lasting some three hours, Massena managed to reëstablish the French line in a half-circle on the plateau, from Rovina through Zovo to Brenzon; and as the body of Massena's and Rey's divisions now began to arrive on the field, the French left was soon beyond danger, firmly established just back of the Trombalora hills. But the forenoon was slipping away.

None the less, although the Austrians had not maintained their initial gain on the French left, they had made a marked impression; and they were at this point superior in numbers. San Marco height was occupied by Ocskay, whose column threatened to get in the rear of the French works at Osteria, and Quosdanovich had come on and got ready to force his way up the defile from Incanale, which the defenders had pains to hold. Lusignan too was arriving at Affi on his way

the French rear? But their gallantry was vain. As they emerged from the deep zigzag cut upon the level, and before they could get a chance to deploy, the French foot, which Bonaparte had gathered, took the head of column on both flanks; the battery established near by swept through their ranks with canister; and Lasalle struck the leading regiment in front with his column of hussars. The effect of the triple blow was immense. Brave as the Austrian onset had been, the head of column, torn almost to shreds, was stopped at the mouth of the defile, and the impetus of the entire column ceased. Thus summarily checked, Quosdanovich was falling back in more or less confusion, when the explosion of an Austrian caisson, accidentally hit by a French shell, shattered a body of the troops crowded in deep masses in the defile, and drove front and rear of column in wild flight down the rocky path. This disaster prevented any further effort. The Austrians fell back to Incanale.

The plateau was freed. But the Austrian centre, which was still in good order, had again to be met, for notwithstanding the recent checks, Alvinzi ordered Liptay, Köblös and Ocskay to assault afresh the Trombalora height. The brave Austrian battalions again pressed forward, and Vial, on the right of the French centre, after a stout fight, gave way and fell back some distance. The position of the French line was, however, a good one; the tactics of the Austrians seemed not to be directed by any one head, and of the two contestants the enemy was the more exhausted. Vial was supported by Joubert's light foot, and an advance of the French line between Matole and San Marco was ordered at the same time; Bonaparte pushed in Lasalle with his small body of dragoons to charge the enemy. Though few in numbers, their timely use produced the marked effect which cavalry alone can do, and horse and foot together, hurled on the

Austrian line, which haply was in part composed of fresh levies, and had neither artillery nor cavalry to sustain it, drove it back with a shock which soon produced disorder; whereupon Joubert and Massena, pivoting on the left flank, made a quarter-wheel to the left, and dashed forward on the enemy. The Austrian line at this point had got disorganized by its own initial success, its power of resistance had been broken, the regiments fell back in complete wreck behind the Tasso, and could not be again assembled until they reached the Pozzone hills. It was 5 P. M.

This manœuvre also resulted in cutting off from the rest of the army the column of Lusignan, which had so confidently started out to encircle the French left flank. Lusignan had got as far as Monte Pipolo, and was actually in line in Bonaparte's rear, astride the Verona road, expecting to catch the French troops in a trap, when Alvinzi should have driven them from the Rivoli plateau. But Bonaparte had faced two half-brigades of Massena's division to the rear to hold Lusignan in check, should he advance. And, already isolated, this column was soon further threatened by Rey with still another half-brigade, who came up from Orza in good season, when, though it strove gamely to cut its way through to Garda, it was utterly worsted and dispersed; and before the next noon, the entire body, wandering about in squads and companies, had been gathered in. A few hundred only got back to Monte Baldo.

Alvinzi had twenty-six thousand men in line at the battle of Rivoli; Bonaparte about four thousand less. The loss in killed and wounded does not appear to be determined; but the Austrians lost more heavily than the French. Especially in prisoners were their casualties serious. Quosdanovich retired in part by way of Rivalta, and in part by Dolce; Wukassovich, unable to assist his comrades, fell back up

river; Liptay, Köblös and Ocskay held the foot of Monte Baldo, where they slept on their arms.

The battle of Rivoli is ill described in his reports by Bonaparte; the less important fights in front of Mantua are very carefully detailed. Time and fatigue explain this.

Just as Bonaparte was preparing, despite the late hour, to finish the day by moving on Osteria and annihilating Quosdanovich, he received word that Provera had crossed the Adige during the night of January 13–14. "Augereau had made bad dispositions." The importance of immediate action at that point, lest Mantua should be relieved out of hand, was plain; and placing Rey under Joubert's orders, he left the pursuit of Alvinzi's army to the latter. Withdrawing Massena from Rivoli, he ordered him to march on Roverbella at daylight of the 15th. Rey was to follow him as soon as Joubert could spare him. This gave Massena, who had gone into battle and fought all day on his arrival from Verona, but a short respite before he was again afoot. But it was just this tremendous activity of mind and body, infused by Bonaparte into his troops, which, like the divine fervor of Frederick, ran down through the officers to every private in the ranks.

From his position at Minerbe, where he had faced Augereau, and having fruitlessly paused, hoping to induce the inhabitants of Legnano to play into his hands, Provera had, as he designed, crossed the Adige at Anghiari on the 14th, unknown to Augereau, though Guyeux with the troops from Ronco offered his flankers some opposition; and leaving twenty-five hundred men in the Anghiari bridge-head, and Hohenzollern to fend off Augereau, he pushed on to Nogara, hoping to reach Mantua without a battle. Augereau, though he had allowed the Austrians to steal a passage, marched to Anghiari, surrounded and captured the enemy's bridge-head

party, broke the bridge, and headed for Cerea. Lannes had reported to Augereau on the 13th, and these two, together with Guyeux, advanced on Provera, each from his own direction. They did not indeed succeed in heading him off, but they did considerably delay his progress; and at Cerea they cut off and captured his rearguard. He had been altogether too slow.

On the day after the battle of Rivoli there was still a further passage of arms between the rival forces there. Disturbed at the cutting off of Lusignan, Alvinzi believed not only that he could help his lieutenant out of the net into which he had fallen, but as he heard that Bonaparte had turned against Provera, he deemed it his duty to make one more essay to save this officer and the campaign, by breaking through Joubert's line and pressing on to Mantua. At the same time Joubert, under the orders left by his chief, was himself advancing to disrupt whatever might be left of the Austrian army. At this moment Quosdanovich had retired on Rivalta; Lusignan had been captured, and Alvinzi's centre was left without support. Joubert gauged the situation with skill. Holding back his own centre, he extended his wings, and by a turning movement on both Austrian flanks, Vial moving along the slopes of Monte Magnone on La Corona, and Vaux along those of Monte Baldo on Ferrara, the enemy was thus taken in a trap. Murat had come up from Salo to Garda across the lake in boats, hoping to fall on the rear of the enemy. Him Vaux joined to his own force, and sent his fresh troops ahead to turn the Austrian flank, whereupon he fell on their front, as did also Vial. The enemy was absolutely at a disadvantage. Under these evil conditions there could be but one result. The Austrian soldiers had been roughly handled the day before; Alvinzi, though a good soldier, was not the man to revive their enthusiasm; they had for days been short of rations, their ammunition was running

low, and they fought feebly. So soon as Joubert felt the weakness of the resistance to his onset, he pushed in with all the more vigor. The result speedily came: the Austrians fell into disorder and retired in confusion, some reaching Rivalta, some rallying on Quosdanovich, some getting caught at La Corona. The enemy left five thousand prisoners in the hands of the French, and this number, added to those taken on the 14th, made a tale of thirteen thousand men. By 9 A. M. the Austrian army had definitely retired, and out of the twenty-six thousand who had so gallantly struck the French on yestermorn, Alvinzi could barely call the roll of ten thousand men.

On this same January 15 Provera, with his ten thousand men, marched on towards Mantua, and by noon arrived at San Giorgio, which was held and intrenched by Miollio and fifteen hundred French. Demanding surrender, he was met with a salvo of artillery; and on turning towards the citadel, he ran into Serurier's troops. He then took up a position near La Favorita Palace, and managed to send a message across the lake in a boat to Wurmser, in which he prayed this officer to join him in an attack on the French on the morning of the 16th. The points of assault were to be La Favorita, on which Provera would fall, and San Antonio, just south of it, which Wurmser was to sally out and assault.

With regard to means by which the Mantua garrison managed to communicate with the outside world, in his dispatch to the Directory of December 28 Bonaparte says: "Mantua is closed in with the greatest care. The 2d of this month General Dumas surprised a spy who was entering the town. It was an Austrian cadet, who had been sent from Trent by Alvinzi. After a good deal of pretense, he confessed that he was the bearer of dispatches, and effectively he threw up twenty-four hours afterwards (*allant à la garde-robe*) a little cylinder, in which was inclosed a letter from the emperor, hereto appended. . . . If this method of having dispatches swallowed was not entirely known, I would give you

the details, so that they might be sent to our generals, because the Austrians often make use of this method. Generally the spies keep it in the body for several days. If their stomach becomes upset, they take care to save the little cylinder, to soak it in elixir, and to swallow it again. This cylinder is soaked in Spanish wax dissolved in vinegar."

But in their attempt to overwhelm the small blockading force at Mantua, the Austrian generals failed to reckon on the wonderful speed of the French troops that had fought at Rivoli. Massena and Victor had arrived at Roverbella by the evening of the 15th, the latter having been picked up *en route* at Villafranca. They had but a short rest on the succeeding night. At Roverbella Bonaparte, ascertaining that his lieutenant still held San Giorgio, ordered Augereau to push in on Provera's rear; Serurier, in command of the blockading corps, was to take post at La Favorita to meet any sally Wurmser might make, which he judged rightly would fall on this spot; and he himself proposed to move down from Roverbella, and with Massena and Victor shut Provera in by an overwhelming circle of troops. Though Augereau had not followed up the Austrian column, he had been busy in arrangements to cut it off from the Adige, having burned the bridge at Anghiari and blocked the roads. He was, however, not so far away but what he could obey his orders in season to join in the attack at La Favorita.

Accordingly when, at 5 A. M. on the morning of the 16th, Provera's onset on La Favorita occurred, he soon ascertained that he had substantially the whole French army closing him in. He none the less began his attack, while Wurmser debouched on San Antonio. Serurier, who occupied both these places, replied with vigor and, aided by reinforcements sent him by Bonaparte, held on firmly. Wurmser was wise enough to discover the impossibility of his task, and to retire within walls; but Provera did not so easily escape. Though attacked

in front by Serurier, on his left by the San Giorgio garrison, and on his right by Massena's and Victor's troops under Bonaparte in person, for a while he held his own ; but when Augereau appeared in his rear, there was nothing left for him to do. He became convinced of the futility of resistance ; and learning of the disaster at Rivoli, by noon, with his nine thousand men left, he concluded to lay down his arms. Bonaparte had tactically used a concentric manœuvre which he always condemned strategically, but his troops were all within supporting distance, and he was present in overwhelming numbers.

The last trick was taken. The Austrians had made a fourth gallant attempt to relieve sore-beset Mantua, but the genius of Bonaparte in nine days had brought all their efforts to naught. Alvinzi had advanced on the Mincio with forty-three thousand men ; he carried back less than twenty-five thousand with which to defend the frontiers of Austria.

In this campaign of Rivoli the French with thirty thousand men made nearly twenty thousand prisoners.

The rapidity of the marches made by the French was astonishing. The same troops which fought east of Verona on the 13th marched fourteen miles during the night to Rivoli, fought all day on the 14th, marched back to Roverbella, thirty-one miles, on the 15th, and on the 16th compelled the surrender of Provera, who believed them beaten on the plain of Rivoli. Few efforts equal this record.

Bonaparte reported to the Directory, January 18 : " All the half-brigades covered themselves with glory, and especially the 32d, 57th and 18th of the line, which General Massena commanded, and which in three days beat the enemy at St. Michel, at Rivoli and at Roverbella. The Roman legions made, they say, twenty-four miles a day ; our brigades made thirty, and fought in the intervals." For gallantry in the

next campaign it was ordered, March 21, 1797, to inscribe on the colors of the 57th, "The terrible 57th half-brigade, which nothing can stop."

Leaving Laudon with eight thousand men to defend the Tyrol, Alvinzi retreated behind the Piave, and at the opening of February the French forces were again in their old places. Joubert pushed the Tyrol army back via Avio, Mori, Caliano and Trent, to behind the Avisio, and took post at Lavis. Augereau's division went to Padua, and later to Castelfranco. Massena followed up the small Austrian force to the Brenta, where he destroyed its rearguard. Alvinzi thought to hold Bassano by intrenching it, but retired on the approach of the French. From Bassano, where his division was posted, Massena kept up communication with Joubert by way of the Brenta. The Tyrolese army kept in touch via Belluno with the Piave, behind which river the Austrians finally withdrew. Alvinzi resigned his command, and was succeeded by Archduke Charles.

Mantua was doomed. The garrison was at the last stage, had eaten its horses, and was dying of pestilence. On February 2, after a seven months' siege, the famous fortress surrendered to the French commander, with the enormous garrison of twenty thousand men, of whom over a third were invalided, as prisoners of war, and multitude of stores, including the guns Bonaparte had been forced to abandon when he first threw over the siege in the Castiglione days, plus three hundred and fifty pieces on the walls and in the arsenal. On the 3d the French made a formal entry. In the absence of Bonaparte in the Romagna, Serurier received the formal surrender. Count Wurmser and his staff, together with a convoy of seven hundred men, were liberated; the prisoners were sent to Trieste to be exchanged.

"I took pains," said Bonaparte, "to show French gen-

sion, each with an equal number, were at Padua and Treviso; Joubert lay in and about Trent with nineteen thousand five hundred men; Victor was on the Adige with six thousand five hundred; there was a cavalry reserve of eleven hundred men, and nine thousand men in garrison. In his St. Helena Memorial, Napoleon understates his army at fifty-three thousand foot, five thousand horse and three thousand artillery, with one hundred and twenty guns.

The Austrian army, over which Archduke Charles was now placed, had barely twenty thousand of the old forces, and reserve battalions of not over fifteen thousand men. These were stationed at great distances apart, to hold the mountain defiles on all the roads to Vienna.

It must have been with pride that Bonaparte sent Augereau to Paris with the Mantua standards; and he paid a marked compliment to his gallant lieutenant, in a letter to the Directory from Tolentino, dated February 18: "General Augereau has left, Citizen Directors, with sixty flags coming from the garrison of Mantua. You will see in this brave general, to whom the Republic owes for marked services, a citizen extremely zealous."

Nor were the others forgotten, for on March 6, 1797, the general-in-chief issued an order giving substantial rewards in the shape of gratuities to many officers, varying from one hundred and fifty francs to a brave trumpeter who was wounded, and two hundred and fifty francs each to the two soldiers who helped him out of the marsh at Arcole, up to twenty thousand francs to Joubert. Most of the items are ten thousand francs each to general officers, among them Rampon, Menard, St. Hilaire, Gardanne, Bessières and others. And to "every one bearing a sword" was given a pension of one hundred francs, to be levied on the Mantuan country.

Joubert had been educated for the bar, but the Revolution

led him into the army. He had risen in the Army of Italy to be general of brigade. Tall, thin, apparently feeble by nature, he yet possessed great endurance. "He was intrepid, vigilant, active." He later was placed in command of the Army of Italy, but fell at Novi. He had the making of a grand soldier.

Alvinzi.

The descent on Ireland under Hoche at the end of 1796 had failed, and the troops detailed for the work were sent to Italy and the Rhine. Hoche took command of seventy thousand men on the Lower Rhine; and the forces on the Upper Rhine, still under Moreau, grew to sixty thousand men. Hoche stood on the left bank from Coblenz and the bridge-head at Neuwied to Düsseldorf; Moreau along the Middle Rhine and back of the Vosges at Zweibrücken. On receipt of the divisions of Bernadotte and Delmas, Bonaparte could number under his standard seventy thousand men between the Mincio and Piave, on the borders of the Tyrol and in northern Italy. On succeeding Alvinzi, Charles was given twenty-five thousand reinforcements. In Germany the Austrians had forty thousand men on the Upper Rhine and down to Mannheim, under Latour; on the Lower Rhine twenty-five thousand men under Werneck on the Lahn; and a similar number in reserve. It was plain that the French military problem could be best solved by a defense along the Rhine, and by giving Bonaparte one hundred thousand men wherewith to complete his work; but some members of the Directory feared to help him to overmuch success, and it was decided to make the main effort in Germany. Moreau and Hoche were respectively to advance into Swabia and Franconia; and it was on the programme that the Army of Italy was merely to sustain them by threatening Carinthia. This proved not to be a wise plan, for the Rhine operations opened so late that Charles might have been enabled to crush Bonaparte by drawing in reinforcements from Germany. But the Aulic Council was ever slow and pedantic: advantage was not taken of the opportunity, and no harm ensued.

Despite their failure in Italy, the Austrians could not consider the year of 1796 entirely wasted. It had begun by the threat of three French armies to invade Austrian territory;

and while of these three the smallest had wrung Lombardy from the Austrian sceptre, yet the two other and larger ones had been thrown back on the Rhine after two handsome imperial victories. Archduke Charles had shown signs of a true talent for arms, much was expected of him in the future, and it was the feeling in Vienna that all the fortunes of war had not been against them. The Aulic Council had, however, gained a hearty respect for the new commander of the Army of Italy, and made no sign of present intention to recover Lombardy. Neither had this august body the least idea that Bonaparte would attempt any further advance. France must surely be satisfied with what he had won. For the moment, at least, a defensive rôle was to be pursued here ; and instead of pressing on to the plain of the Po, the Austrian armies were only so far reinforced that a sufficient body could be left to protect the Tyrol inlets, and a larger corps could be stationed on the Brenta.

In Bonaparte's mind there had been room for nothing but a further offensive advance as soon as he should have received such sufficient reinforcements as the crossing of a mountainous country and a march into the heart of Austria would demand. It was a bold operation, this advance across the Noric and Julic Alps, with the Tyrol army threatening his left flank, or, worse still, his communications, through the Adige valley, and with Venice lying sullenly on his right ; and it needed the qualities of a great captain to undertake it. Until the accessions came in, however, Bonaparte had contented himself with pushing Massena out to Bassano, and Guyeux, commanding the division of Augereau, towards Treviso — which operation was followed by the withdrawal of the Austrian army from the Brenta valley to a new position behind the Piave ; and with ordering Joubert up the Adige, to get in touch with the enemy, who shortly retired to above Lavis. It was in the

pause brought on by the retrograde movement of the Austrians that occurred the operation on Rome, already narrated, and the peace of Tolentino of February 19.

Bonaparte was not satisfied to be long away from the Army of Italy. From Tolentino, February 17, he wrote to Joubert: "In a few days I shall be back with the army, where I feel my presence becomes necessary;" and one of the reasons he gave the Directory for speedy conclusion of peace with the Pope was, "because my presence is indispensable to the army." But this was not all. That Archduke Charles, with his reputation freshly won against Jourdan and Moreau, had been put in command in the place of Alvinzi was a still more potent factor in this desire again to grasp the helm. By March 10 the new Austrian commander was on the Piave, where Lusignan with the Austrian centre of ten thousand men was stationed, with right at Feltre, keeping touch with the Tyrol, while the relics of Alvinzi's army, seventeen thousand strong, held the Tagliamento from Gemona down, as the left wing, and in the Tyrol, as a right wing of the entire line of defense, fourteen thousand regular troops under Kerpen and Laudon, and ten thousand Tyrolese militia stood at Salurn and in the valleys of the Nos and Avisio. There were awaited three divisions from the Rhine, but these were still on the march through Bavaria. Altogether, Archduke Charles had a force variously estimated from thirty-five to forty-five thousand men under the colors, not counting militia. The quality of the force was far from high.

On this same March 10 Napoleon had returned to the Army of Italy and was at Bassano. His divisions were now stationed as follows: in Mantua and Verona were garrisons of fifteen hundred men under Miollio, and two thousand under Belland, respectively; in the Tyrol, along the Adige, Joubert had under his command his own division of ten thousand men,

together with those of Baraguay d'Hilliers, numbering six thousand men, and Delmas, numbering five thousand men; Guyeux's (late Augereau's) division of ten thousand men was in the Citadella-Castelfranco country; Massena lay at Bassano with twelve thousand men; Serurier with nine thousand men at Asolo; and Bernadotte with ten thousand men held Padua. Victor with six thousand men from Ancona and Ferrara, where he had been watching the Pope and Naples, was ordered back to the Adige to protect the base along the Mincio. Lasalle with three thousand men held Lombardy; and Vaubois with twenty-five hundred, Leghorn. There is such vast discrepancy in the authorities as to the effective strength of both contestants that, added to Bonaparte's habit of exaggerating so as to produce a favorable impression, and of understating so as to get reinforcements, no numbers can be quite relied on; but the above figures are not far from accurate. Of this apparently large total a bare half would be able to move against the archduke; for the base on the Mincio could under no circumstances be denuded. But the French were largely veterans, elate with repeated victory and ready for immediate action; whereas the troops under Charles had included many fresh levies before the recent disastrous campaigns, and were dispirited by failure and unreliable.

From the Mincio there were two general lines of advance towards Austria proper: one up the Adige and through the Tyrol, and one through the Venetian states and the Austrian provinces of Illyria and Styria. These lines ran at right angles to one another, the apex being Verona. The first descends to the Danube by way of Salzburg; and from it to the second are five transverse roads, of which, however, only the Puster valley road came within the scope of Bona-

parte's own movement. The others might come into play to enable the enemy to take his line of advance in flank, or to afford the Rhine armies a means of coöperation. The one through the mountains of the Tyrol was easy for the Austrians to defend, and gave small chance for the French to employ large bodies. The one to the east at first crossed the plains of the Po and Adige, skirting the foot-hills of the Alps, following the single great highway or stage-road by way of Vicenza, Treviso and Udine, and thence by a tortuous route through the mountains and many defiles to Villach, Klagenfurth and Bruck, and on to Vienna. In the first part, over the plains, the line had this advantage to the aggressor, that in attempting to successively defend the Piave, the Tagliamento and the Isonzo, the Austrians would be keeping their line of retreat in rear of their right flank, and liable to a turning movement which might throw them away from their base towards the Adriatic. From the Isonzo another post-road ran farther south by way of Gorizia, Prewald and Laybach to Klagenfurt. This was the high-road from Trieste to Vienna. Over the plain flowed numerous streams, all bridged or fordable; through the mountains the streams were torrential; and if bridges had been destroyed, they were difficult to pass. Other and less good roads there were, up all the rivers, and skirting

Bernadotte.

the foothills to the north of the stage-road; but these were practicable for foot and light horse only. After marching up the Adige, and its affluent the Eisach, to the top of the watershed, several valleys, but especially that of the Drave, — the Pusterthal, — led down to the main line of advance to the east, the latter striking it at Villach. As the crow flies, it is a hundred and sixty miles from Verona to Villach, a hundred and ten from Verona to the headwaters of the Eisach, and a hundred from there to Villach; but the constant windings of the mountain roads add largely to these distances.

Charles would have protected the Austrian hereditary states to better advantage if he had occupied the Tyrol in force, and left a smaller army on the Piave. One need not stand astride a road in order to hold it. With a large force ready to debouch down the Adige, there was scant danger of the Army of Italy adventuring itself beyond the Isonzo. But no sooner had Bonaparte discovered the Austrian plan of protecting the Tyrol by one detached army, and the straight road to Vienna by another far removed from the first, than he formulated his own plan of campaign. Upon the forces on the Piave and Tagliamento, say twenty-seven thousand men, he would move with some forty thousand from such a direction that he would interpose between them and the forces in the Tyrol, and thus prevent help coming to them from the latter. Lying as they did, between the Noric Alps and the sea, with their communications back of their right flank, the Austrians were vulnerable; and Bonaparte proceeded to take advantage of this weakness. To accomplish his end Massena was to move via Feltre and Belluno, and thus around the archduke's right, while Bonaparte, with the divisions of Bernadotte, Guyeux and Serurier, would advance along the stage-road via Treviso. Pushing back the lesser forces of the archduke,

he would then move straight towards the defile of Tarvis, at the summit of the Noric Alps, which was the key-obstacle along the Vienna highway. But as the Tyrolese army had still to be reckoned with during this march, Baraguay was sent up the Avisio and across the hills to Primiero to protect Massena's left flank. As to Joubert, on the upper Adige, if he was attacked by forces which he could not overcome, he had general orders to retire slowly down the river, fighting in every good position, as far as Castelnuovo. But as it was probable that Joubert would be able to push the Austrians back, it was understood that when he reached Brixen, Bonaparte might call him to join the main army by the Puster valley down the Drave; whereupon the joint forces would march on Vienna in one body.

The plan at first blush looks much like the division of forces which has been so much condemned in the Austrian manœuvre of 1796. But inasmuch as Bonaparte, with the force he led against the Piave, considerably outnumbered his opponent and had better troops, and as so large a body of the enemy as that on the Tyrol border could not well be left to march down the Adige and cut the French communications, what Bonaparte really did was to leave the care of his communications with Joubert; but instead of his remaining quiet on the Mincio, he gave him an offensive rôle, and one which might render him useful to the main army, should his preliminary advance prove successful enough to neutralize the Tyrol troops and put them beyond danger of coping with Victor, who remained stationary at the base. As a whole the operation was not only conceived in the highest strategic sense, it was one of magnitude and marked difficulty.

Having conceived his plan, Bonaparte was not long in putting it into execution, and on March 10 issued a

PROCLAMATION TO THE SOLDIERS OF THE ARMY OF ITALY.

HEADQUARTERS, BASSANO, 20 Ventose, Year V.

The capture of Mantua has finished a campaign which has given you eternal title to the gratitude of the country.

You have borne off the victory in fourteen pitched battles and in seventy combats; you have made more than a hundred thousand prisoners, taken from the enemy five hundred pieces of field artillery, two thousand of heavy calibre, four pontoon equipages.

The contributions laid upon the countries which you have conquered have fed, clothed, paid the army throughout the campaign; you have, besides, sent thirty millions to the minister of finances, to ease the public treasury.

You have enriched the Museum of Paris with more than three hundred objects, masterpieces of ancient and modern Italy, and which have taken thirty centuries to produce.

You have conquered for the Republic the most beautiful countries of Europe; the Lombardy and Cispadane Republics owe you their liberty; the French colors float for the first time on the shores of the Adriatic, opposite and within twenty-four hours' sail of ancient Macedonia. . . .

But you have not finished all. A great destiny is reserved to you. . . . You will continue to be worthy of it.

. . . The emperor alone remains in our front. Degrading himself from the rank of a great power, this prince has placed himself in the pay of the merchants of London. He has no more will but that of these perfidious islanders.

The Directory has spared no pains to give peace to Europe. It has not been heeded. . . . There is no hope of peace but by seeking it in the heart of the hereditary lands of the House of Austria. There you will find a brave people, bowed down with the war . . . and believing that English gold has corrupted the ministers of the emperor. You will respect their religion and customs, you will respect their properties. It is liberty you will bring to the brave Hungarian nation.

The House of Austria . . . will descend to the rank of secondary powers, where she has already been placed by putting herself in the pay and at the disposition of England.

BONAPARTE.

On March 10 Massena was headed for Feltre on the upper Piave, with instructions to strike Lusignan, cut the Austrian right wing in the Tyrol from its left wing on the plains of Venice, and threaten the right of the archduke's army. So soon as Charles became aware of Bonaparte's offensive manœuvre, he withdrew his troops, which had been lying some ten thousand strong along the Piave, back behind the Livenza, observation parties alone being left on the Piave. The rivers at this season are wont to be full and rapid, and the roads heavy, so that the marching was far from easy. Lusignan being withdrawn up the river on the French approach, Massena on March 11 passed Feltre, and meanwhile Guyeux and Serurier approached the Piave; and next day the cavalry reserve crossed to the north of Montello forest near Vidor, and Guyeux to the south of it at Spesiano, reaching Conegliano. Serurier was not far behind the cavalry reserve. Massena advanced to Belluno; Bernadotte, who was in reserve, reached Castelfranco. The Austrian observation parties all fell back without crossing swords. Baraguay, somewhat belated by the mountain roads, finally reached Primiero. The Austrian line of retreat was along the main road and the parallel country roads towards Udine, and on March 13 the archduke was nearing the Tagliamento, Guyeux having, after a hearty fight, pushed Hohenzollern and the Austrian rearguard out of Sacile, and sent a force to follow it to Pordenone.

Massena on the 13th had not moved from Belluno, but he seized the defile of La Fossa up river, cut out Lusignan's rearguard at Longaro, and threw this Austrian column back to Cadore, a town on the Piave and near the headwaters of the Tagliamento. Lusignan was taken prisoner. "M. de Lusignan covered himself with opprobrium by the conduct he held in Brescia towards our sick. I have ordered that he should be sent to France without right to exchange," Bona-

parte wrote to Paris. Serurier and Bernadotte got respectively to Conegliano and Treviso. Bonaparte began to believe that the Austrians would stand at the Tagliamento and accept battle; but as he was unwilling to deliver one, even though superior in force, until Massena had joined the main column, he now ordered this general to march towards the army by way of Aviano, or if this, owing to the snows or bad roads, was not practicable, to join it at Sacile. From Conegliano, on the evening of March 13, Berthier wrote Massena, "Though the general-in-chief deems the forces which he has at this moment sufficient to determine victory, he would decide to retard his attack by one day, so that the brave Massena division might be of the party." Massena had practically accomplished his task by driving back Lusignan and severing the Austrian centre from the right in the Tyrol; and on receipt of his orders he set out for Serravalle on the 14th, while Serurier marched on Porto Buffole, Guyeux and headquarters assembled at Sacile, and Bernadotte got to Conegliano.

Bonaparte was thus concentrating his divisions so as to mass them for a heavy blow when the time should come, and this he did long before he reached the vicinity of the enemy, who he was convinced would not stand until he got to the Tagliamento. The Austrian rearguard reached the river on the 14th of March, the main body having already crossed and been posted on the line San Daniele-Codroipo-Latisana, with headquarters back in Udine. Anxious to have Massena join, Bonaparte sent him orders to Serravalle to march rapidly via Sacile and Pordenone, and be in Cordemons by the 16th. The bulk of the army advanced little: Guyeux and headquarters to Pordenone, Serurier across the Livenza, and Bernadotte to Sacile. The Austrian rearguard was then withdrawn across the Tagliamento.

From Sacile, on March 15, Bonaparte wrote Joubert two

letters of military instruction, and one for civil conduct in the Tyrol, which contain so much excellent matter that some items in them may well be quoted. They first recite the general scheme. To operate the junction of the Tyrolese and Friuli divisions, the latter (his own force) were to cross the Tagliamento, move up to Osopo, and seize the Pontafel pass, thus opening the way to the Drave valley, while Joubert was throwing the enemy back by way of Brixen, and beyond the mountains on Innsbruck, so as to clear his way for an advance down the same river. But, said Bonaparte, first, the Tyrol divisions may be beaten and forced back to Rivoli, or even to the Mincio. Or, second, the enemy may move by way of Feltre and Primolano into the Brenta valley to cut the French communications — a difficult task. Or, third, the Friuli divisions might be turned by right or left, and the enemy reach the Piave or Brenta before the French could come to the right-about and get there. To meet the first hypothesis, Joubert was given command of all forces in the Mantua country and Lombardy, in fact, of everything between the Adige and the Oglio. In any case Mantua, Peschiera, Legnano and Pizzighetone were to be well provisioned and held by good garrisons; Joubert was to maintain himself between Mantua and the Po, so as to feed himself by that river, and be able to debouch on the enemy's rear, should he advance on Milan. Sahuguet was to concentrate and hold himself in Ferrara. Joubert was to use all means to enable the Friuli divisions to fall back on him, "as I do not doubt," says his chief, "that under all circumstances, you will act in a manner consistent with the spirit of the war we are waging."

The interesting feature about this discussion is the utter calm with which the leader looks at any one of these apparently fatal occurrences. Even if Bonaparte should become completely cut off from Mantua by Joubert's being pushed

back on that fortress, yet Joubert should be able, the instructions assume, to hold himself until Bonaparte had beaten the enemy on the Tagliamento, when he would about face on the force which had ventured on his communications, and in connection with Joubert destroy it. Unlike the soldiers of his day, this young and bold commander-in-chief did not look on a temporary interruption of his communications as a fatal occurrence. Beat the enemy, thought he, and the communications will care for themselves. This is now a broad and constant maxim; but it was new at the time, and his chief's self-confidence must have had a reassuring effect on Joubert, with the heavy responsibility laid upon his untried shoulders. Another point of interest in this letter is the fact that Bonaparte does not undertake to give directions to Joubert how to act under all possible adverse contingencies. This has been for some time recognized as a bad policy in a captain's instructions to a distant lieutenant; and though the rule had not been formulated in his day, Bonaparte evidently saw the wisdom of leaving Joubert to a certain extent untrammeled, and his letter paid no further heed to the other hypotheses. He relied on Joubert's initiative and discretion to do what might at the time be the wisest thing, and recognized the fact that of this Joubert would probably be a better judge than he.

In the second letter Bonaparte orders him to advance on Botzen by the 28th, and then approves all Joubert has done to procure oil and vegetables for the army. "You may be persuaded that I approve in advance all you shall do to ameliorate the lot of the soldiers. While you are on the march, have issued to your forces, as much as may be possible, wine in the evening and brandy in the morning."

The Civil Instruction Bonaparte sent was: First, to confirm all laws and keep in place all magistrates. Second, to confirm the public exercise of religion. Third, to cajole the priests,

distinguished theologians and men of science. Fourth, to speak well of the emperor, but blame his ministers. Fifth, to protect all Tyroleans who have served the emperor. Sixth, to see that moneys heretofore paid to the emperor shall go to the army chest. Seventh, to take no money from the Monts-de-Piété (the government pawnshops), nor from the village treasuries, and to seek to conciliate the people. Eighth, to disarm the population, take hostages from and fine the villages which resist, or which murder soldiers. These were substantially the principles he acted on in any new territory he overran.

Although he never gave them great liberty of action, yet Bonaparte insisted on his lieutenants neglecting nothing, and doing their work themselves. In a circular to division generals, March 14, Berthier says : —

"The general-in-chief gives you the order to betake yourselves every day at four o'clock in the morning to your vanguard (outposts), to be present at the report of the daybreak patrol, and thus to be equal to giving your orders according to circumstances. The officer of engineers and chief of artillery of your division are equally to be on hand at the vanguard to receive your orders. You will also order the generals of brigade to remain in camp, that is they must never have quarters more than two hundred toises (a quarter mile) away.

"The division artillery park is never to be put in a town, but always near and behind the division. The cannoneers and drivers are to bivouac beside their pieces, the horses to be picketed, or attached to the poles of their wagons. The artillery in the vanguard is never to be unhorsed, except to water the horses at the hour to be indicated by the commander of the vanguard." The generals were also ordered to "forbid expressly that any parliamentarian should be received while troops are engaged. This is a ruse the Austrians have put to use more than once, to give time to execute their retreat."

Such simple precautions are all too often neglected in war. On the 16th the French divisions were headed for Valva-

sone, in order to cross the Tagliamento. The archduke's right now stretched from Codroipo to Torrida in a position which had been well intrenched ; and Guyeux, who was ahead, was destined to move on this wing, while Bernadotte, a few hours behind, should manœuvre against the Austrian left wing above Latisena, and Serurier remain as reserve, in a general way heading for Codroipo. Speaking of this division on the march, the chief wrote : "It is assailed by horrible weather ; but wind and rain, on the eve of a battle, have always been for the Army of Italy a presage of fortune." The river was fordable. Bonaparte sent an aide-de-camp and twenty-five guides to reconnoitre up to the intrenchments. Having done this, Guyeux and Bernadotte were ordered forward. The light troops as skirmishers were in front, followed by the grenadiers and flanked by cavalry. Each half-brigade had its right and left battalion ployed into close column, the second battalion between them in line. This was a common formation.

The crossing began about 3 P. M. ; but the Austrian commander, not purposing to stand here to receive battle, and preferring to wait for the twenty-five thousand veterans coming from the Rhine, as a leaven for his very questionable lump of troops, made only such defense as would enable his army to continue its retreat, already begun, on Palmanova. This place the Austrian army reached at night, with its rear-guard echeloned along the highway. In the Memoirs Napoleon describes much more of a battle than the dispatches written at the time and other contemporary reports and documents lead one to believe was fought on this river. Charles had hoped to gain time here, but Bonaparte afforded him no opportunity to do so. Massena had been delayed by the bad mountain roads over which he had to march, and had not yet reached the main army, but Bonaparte now ordered him to

come in rapidly to Spilimbergo. Had the archduke stood for battle, Massena would have been much in demand; as it was, his absence did not prove of consequence. The Austrian army continued its retreat on the 17th towards Gradisca, on the way to Gorizia, and meanwhile Ocskay took over Lusignan's brigade, and making a circuit by the upper Tagliamento, covered the road to Villach at Chiusa Veneta, on the Fella River.

It is to be noticed in this campaign that there are but few roads to determine the strategic manœuvres, the side roads, where any exist, being merely complementary to the single highway. In a country of broad expanses of ground and many roads, minor strategic manœuvres can be indulged in on a larger and more interesting scale than here, where Bonaparte was confined practically to a single line of advance along which to follow up the enemy, and could indulge in manœuvring only partially, as, *e. g.*, to force the enemy to abandon his defense at any given defile or river. While Charles had the poorer army, he had the easier task in defending the approaches to the Austrian capital. Yet the difference in the quality of the troops was marked.

It was not apparent to Bonaparte why the Austrian army had marched on Palmanova, or, indeed, evident whether the mass of it had really taken this southerly direction. He had anticipated that the archduke would retire towards the defile of Tarvis instead, this being — via Udine, Ospedaletto, Tarvis, Villach, Klagenfurt — the shorter and more direct road to Bruck and Vienna; and though he was anxious to follow hard on the enemy's heels, yet it consumed some time to reconnoitre the road in his front and ascertain the facts. These two young generals, respectively twenty-five and twenty-eight years old, had gained a hearty respect each for the other, on the score of the successes each had won in 1796 in Germany and Italy. In all his campaigns Napoleon carefully

weighed the personal equation as the most important factor in his problem, and he had not at first been able to gauge the archduke. Within a few days, however, he had made up his mind that he had not a dangerous opponent in his front, and wrote the Directory, March 25: "Up to this hour Prince Charles has manœuvred worse than Beaulieu and Wurmser; at every step he has made mistakes, and extremely gross ones; these have cost him a great deal, but it would have gone far worse with him had not the repute he has won in a measure deceived me, and had it not prevented my convincing myself of certain errors which I noticed, and which I supposed to be dictated by views that in reality did not exist." The two men were of types markedly different, and the Frenchman was unquestionably the superior as a soldier; but though here unable to do his best, the Austrian held himself through life a worthy prince of men, and won for himself in future years a high military reputation. Bonaparte's slur is scarcely warranted. Just what had induced Charles to give up the direct road as a first purpose, we do not know, as he shortly reverted to it for a part of his forces. It may have been a rumor of Massena's march on Tarvis, which he feared might anticipate his own, and the path there was readily barred. Yet there was time and to spare for a light column to reach the defile and hold it for the Austrians; indeed, this had already been done from Vienna; and the march via Gorizia was an eccentric one.

Some days before, Charles had entertained a purpose of advancing a column down the Fella valley, so as to threaten the French left in its advance on Palmanova, but Massena's smart advance up the same valley had anticipated his plan. The archduke was not now dealing with a general who, like Moreau and Jourdan, would pause after every step; he was facing the most rapid captain of modern days, and that with

a force inferior in numbers and morale. All the factors except terrain were against him.

On his side Bonaparte was beginning to appreciate both the value and the growing insecurity of his position. On March 17 he wrote the Directory: "If the armies of the Rhine cross promptly and enter the lists, the emperor is lost. . . . But if you let me be overwhelmed, I shall have no other resource than to fall back to Italy, and all will be lost." He never ceased to remind the home authorities of the coöperation they had promised him.

On March 25 he wrote to Carnot: "Has the Rhine been passed? It is clear that in four or five days from now, when my movements will be unmasked, and when the enemy will feel the danger in which he finds himself, he will abandon nearly everything on the Rhine to fall upon me. If Moreau does not then march at double speed on the enemy, so as to push him and be able to reach him as soon as possible, I shall be beaten and obliged to return to Italy." In a dispatch to the Directory of April 1 he said: "The army has not yet sustained much loss, and is in the best condition. If I had had twenty thousand men more, I would not have been obliged to wait for the passage of the Rhine, and the army would have entered Vienna almost as if traveling by post: a thing which would have so much astonished this great nation that I would have had nothing to fear from the different assemblages which they are making to-day." On April 5 he wrote to the Directory: "I have not yet news as to whether the Rhine is crossed. I presume, nevertheless, that at this hour Moreau is marching at great speed to prevent the Austrians from all falling on me." And on April 8: "Our armies have not yet passed the Rhine, and we are already within one hundred miles of Vienna. The Army of Italy is then alone exposed to the efforts of one of the first powers of Europe. The Venetians are arming all their peasants, putting all their priests under arms, and are shaking with fury all the springs of their old government to crush Bergamo and Brescia. The Venetian government at this moment has twenty thousand armed men on my rear."

Retiring, then, behind the Isonzo to Gorizia on March 18, Charles took up a position east of the town, and in accord-

ance with orders of the evening previous, Bernadotte started at early dawn of the same day and reached Palmanova, followed by Serurier and later Guyeux; while Massena filed off by way of San Daniele and Osopo to seize Chiusa Veneta (or Venzone) and the entrance of the Pontafel pass, through which flows the Fella River. The Isonzo, down to Gorizia, runs through a deep valley with few and difficult outlets — for an army practically none. At one moment Bonaparte held the idea that the Austrian army might retire up this river, and that, by manœuvring with such speed as to seize the lower and upper ends of the river defile, he could prepare for the archduke another Caudine Forks. Massena in the Tarvis region, and Bonaparte, if he could reach the left flank of the enemy near Gorizia, might accomplish this end. But the enemy kept too much in advance for the French to manœuvre him into the trap. Nor had the archduke harbored any idea of engaging battle until the Rhine troops should have arrived, though Bonaparte did not know it. Thus the French chieftain was disappointed in both his anticipations. Palmanova, evacuated by the Austrians, was occupied March 18, and the French army occupied the right bank of the Torre, which next morning was crossed. On this same day Bonaparte sent orders to Joubert to advance on Brixen.

Bernadotte now led the column, Bonaparte accompanying him, and moved unopposed to near Gradisca; after crossing the Torre, Serurier marched to Villesse; the two divisions then advanced on Gradisca March 19, and surrounding the town, Bernadotte in front and Serurier taking it in reverse by crossing the river at San Pietro after a somewhat prolonged combat, compelled its surrender that evening.

As the Austrian commander expected to find his reinforcements at Villach, he remained of a mind to fall back on these, and continued his retreat on the evening of the 19th. Per-

sonally he hurried to Villach to direct movements to hold the Tarvis defile. His army he now divided into two columns, the larger to march by way of Laybach and Krainzburg on the Tarvis pass, which it would thus approach from the rear; and the lesser, under Bayalich, towards the same point by the roads up the Isonzo River. This last column was followed by the most of the artillery and train. Perhaps the archduke feared to lose his hold on the Caporetto road, or he hoped to expedite his march by sending his army along the two roads; and both columns were indeed heading for the same goal; but in case of delay, which would enable the French to attack his Isonzo column, he laid himself open to disaster. Either this was a safe and shorter route for the whole column, or it should not be selected for part of it.

Massena had made some forced marches and thereby repaired his early delay. He was, moreover, thoroughly at home in mountain warfare. On the 19th he had entered the Pontafel pass, and taken by storm the Casasola bridge, which is one of the strong points in the pass, throwing back the weak Austrian detachment up the Fella. On the 20th the main French column pushed its way up the Isonzo to Gorizia, Serurier on the left bank, Bernadotte on the right, while Guyeux followed an Austrian flanking column on Cormons; but learning that a substantial part of the Austrian army had retired by way of Laybach, Bonaparte altered Bernadotte's direction, March 21, to one towards Czernitza, and this general, forging ahead, soon got into touch with the enemy's rear. This same March 21 Guyeux advanced to Cividale, and Serurier kept on up the river. And meanwhile Massena had, on the 20th, by hard marching, pushed through Pontafel and with his head of column reached Tarvis, and driven the Austrian detachment, which under Ocskay was defending the pass, sharply back to Wurzen. On the 21st, then, Massena

was at and near Tarvis, and Bayalich's column was laboriously making its way up the Isonzo from Caporetto on the same point, reaching Predil. Learning here that the French were already at Tarvis, the Austrians determined to cut their way through, and to help in this, the detachment which Massena threw out of Tarvis was ordered to turn back again from Wurzen and join in the attack.

As a matter of fact, Massena had not yet got forward a force sufficiently large to hold the Tarvis pass, and on March 22 the Austrians under Gontreuil were able by a gallant assault to retake the place, Massena's detachment falling back on the main body at Malborghetto. At Tarvis the Austrians concentrated all near-by forces, and sent a detachment out to Seifnitz to hold head against Massena, and another into the Predil pass to keep open the Flitschler-Klause for Bayalich's column. Meanwhile, after driving an Austrian detachment out of Stupizza, Guyeux had reached Caporetto. Serurier's division (now under Chabot, Serurier being sick) was acting as general reserve. He had at first been ordered to follow on after Bernadotte; but was withdrawn before reaching Czernitza, and held as reserve to the Isonzo column.

At and about Tarvis is a network of defiles, on the summit of the Noric Alps. Running east and west is the Tarvis defile, which Massena had approached up the Fella valley; and running south from Tarvis is the Predil defile at the headwaters of the Isonzo, up through which Bayalich was striving to save the Austrian train. This latter pass was shut at the lower end by the Chiusa di Plötz.

After his van had been driven out of Tarvis, Massena shortly recovered himself, again advanced on Seifnitz and Tarvis, took both places after a stubborn fight, in which Brune especially distinguished himself, and forced his way down to Raibl in the Predil pass; and meanwhile Guyeux had sharply

followed Bayalich. At the south gate of the pass Guyeux found himself suddenly checked by Köblös, but he cleverly turned this officer's position by scaling the heights and capturing the castle which dominated the entrance of the defile, and captured Köblös' brigade almost in entirety. Bayalich and the Austrian train were now shut in between Guyeux, sustained by Serurier, at the southern gate, and Massena, who had got to Raibl in the upper part of the pass. Thus trapped, the Austrians could not even consider resistance, and after a short parley they surrendered four general officers, four thousand men, twenty-five guns and over four hundred wagons. "A great number of men had been killed, wounded or taken in the different combats since the Tagliamento, and others, in great number, natives of Carniola or Croatia, seeing everything lost, had disbanded in the gorges to regain alone their villages." The Austrian total had not been large enough to cope with the force assembled by the French. During this active work at Tarvis, which accomplished in a small way what Bonaparte had hoped to inflict on the whole Austrian army, Bernadotte pushed on as far as Prevald, and on the 25th reached Laybach.

A small part of the expected reinforcements had reached Villach, and on this body the Austrian detachment beaten at Tarvis fell back; the archduke proposed to concentrate his army in Klagenfurt, the apex of the two highways along which the French were advancing. On the French side, Guyeux and Massena advanced March 28 on Villach, which was vacated by the Austrians; and here the army paused until Bonaparte could hear from the Tyrol.

Joubert had during all this time been far from idle. He had opposed to him Kerpen with the larger part of the Austrian forces, while a detachment under Laudon was in the Nos valley to protect western Tyrol. So soon as he heard

from his chief that the main army had reached the Tagliamento, he broke up March 20, and crossed the Avisio, his main body at Lavis, and a turning column at Segonzano. His left thus imperiled, Kerpen retired, — after a lively combat, but scarcely losing two thousand men killed, as the Memoirs report, nor three thousand prisoners, — and was rejoined by Laudon from the Nos valley. The enemy does not appear to have been alert; Joubert surprised them at every turn, and on the 21st threw them back towards Neumarkt with loss of many prisoners, himself moving to Salurn. Thence following them up, on the 22d Joubert reached Botzen, where he ascertained that a column of eight thousand men under Kerpen had retired up the Eisach valley on Brixen, while the Austrian right wing under Laudon, the roads being crowded and the Austrians scarcely guessing the French intention, had marched up the Adige on Meran. Leaving Delmas behind at Botzen to protect his left and to secure the road back to his base, Joubert followed up the column which had moved up the Eisach valley.

Baraguay d'Hilliers had got back from Primiero, and with his five thousand men took post at Botzen, and later followed Joubert. A detachment was sent up the Adige to Terlan, and Joubert moved on Kerpen at Clausen, where the Austrian general had taken up a strong position, his left leaning on the Eisach, and the right on steep hills. Joubert's first attack on the 24th was repulsed; but his light foot scaled the hills, turned Kerpen's right, and a fresh assault proving successful, the Austrians retired through Brixen to Mittenwalde. The French then entered Brixen, where they seized the big magazines amassed by the enemy for the Tyrol campaign. Next day again the Austrians were pushed towards Sterzing. They had left fifteen hundred men at Mühlbach to hold the entrance to the Pusterthal; but these were captured on the

in the Tyrol. In front of him at Villach stood Guyeux and Massena, and Chabot was coming up. From near Laybach Bernadotte had sent the reserve cavalry as a flying corps to Trieste, to glean news, and to collect any stores useful to the army ; and his advance was a threat to the Austrian left. On the 29th Bonaparte advanced on Klagenfurt, and driving in the outlying Austrian detachments, entered the town, the archduke retiring upon St. Veit, where his first Rhine reinforcements reported. But he was still as inferior in numbers as his army was in morale.

Having passed the Drave, the Army of Italy " was in Germany. The language, the manners, the climate, the soil, cultivation, everything, contrasted with Italy. It praised the hospitality of the peasants and their good nature. The abundance of vegetables, the great quantity of wagons and horses were very useful to it, having found in Italy only wagons hauled by oxen, the slow and inconvenient service of which accorded ill with French vivacity."

Bonaparte here issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of Carinthia, Carniola and Istria, in French, German and Italian, which the Memoirs say had a good effect.

On March 31 Bonaparte addressed a letter to Charles, as to a brother soldier, suggesting that nothing could further justify the struggle.

HEADQUARTERS, KLAGENFURT, 11 Germinal, Year V.

TO PRINCE CHARLES, commanding the Austrian Army.

Monsieur le Général-en-Chef : Brave soldiers make war and desire peace. Has not this one lasted six years ? Have we killed enough men and inflicted enough evils on sad humanity ? This implores from every side. Europe, which had taken up arms against the French Republic, has laid them aside. Your nation alone remains, and yet blood is about to flow more than ever. This sixth campaign is ushered in by sinister forebodings ; whatever its result, we shall kill on either side some thousands more of men, and yet we must end by some agreement, for everything has a term, even hateful passions.

The Executive Directory of the French Republic has notified H. M. the Emperor of its desire to end the war which is desolating the two peoples; the intervention of the court of London opposed this. Is there then no hope of an agreement between us, and must we, for the interest or the passions of a nation foreign to the evils of this war, continue to cut each other's throats? You, Monsieur le Général-en-Chef, who by your birth approach so near the throne and are above all the little passions which often animate ministers and governments, are you decided to merit the title of Benefactor of all humanity and of Saviour of Germany? Do not suppose, Monsieur le Général-en-Chef, that I understand by this that it may not be possible for you to save her by force of arms; but in the supposition that the chances of war should become favorable to you, Germany would none the less be ravaged. As to me, Monsieur le Général-en-Chef, if the overture that I have the honor to make to you can save the life of a single man, I shall esteem myself more proud of the civil crown that I shall find myself to have merited, than of the sad glory which can come from military successes. I beg you to believe, Monsieur le Général-en-Chef, in the sentiments of esteem and of distinguished consideration, with which I am, etc. BONAPARTE.

The archduke replied that he had no power to treat, but that he equally desired to end the calamities of the war; and that he would forward the communication to Vienna.

"Assuredly," said he, "while waging war, Monsieur le Général-en-Chef, and in following the vocation of honor and of duty, I desire, as do you, peace for the happiness of the peoples and humanity. As, nevertheless, in the post which is confided to me, it does not belong to me to scrutinize nor to terminate the quarrel of belligerent nations, and as I am not furnished by H. M. the Emperor with power to treat, you will find it natural, Monsieur le Général, that I enter on the subject with you into no negotiation, and that I await superior orders with regard to so important a matter, which is not fundamentally within my province. Whatever may be, however, the future chances of war or the hopes of peace, I beg you to persuade yourself, Monsieur le Général, of my esteem and of my distinguished consideration."

On the same day Bonaparte addressed another dispatch to the archduke, protesting against Austrian sick and wounded

being left at Klagenfurt, while the depots of grain had all been destroyed. "This conduct is contrary to the rights of war," said he. In the dispatch it is suggested that, when invalided soldiers of the enemy are left behind to be cared for by the victor, the grain-stores should not be set afire.

On March 30 Bonaparte remained *in situ* to hear from Joubert and Bernadotte, and to let Chabot get his division up. During the last day of the month the main column advanced on St. Veit, and Bernadotte on Laybach. Both bodies of Austrians fell back. This was again the case next day when Massena advanced on the archduke's position behind the Gurk. Charles, not strong enough to fight a battle, withdrew beyond Freisach, which the French then entered. On the 2d of April Bonaparte reached the Austrian rearguard, and Massena forced the Dirnstein gorge.

"Prince Charles was compelled to bring back from his main body his eight battalions of grenadiers," reported Bonaparte, "the same which took Kehl, and who are at this moment the hope of the Austrian army; but the 2d Light Infantry, which has distingnished itself since its arrival in the army by its courage, stayed not its movement a single moment, threw itself on the right and left flanks, while General Massena, to sweep the gorge, was forming column of the 18th and 32d of the line. The combat was engaged with fury; it was the *élite* of the Austrian army which came to fight against our old soldiers of the Army of Italy. The enemy had a superb position, which he had made fairly bristling with guns; but it only retarded a little the defeat of his rearguard. The enemy's grenadiers were put into complete rout, left the battlefield covered with dead and five or six hundred prisoners."

Massena followed, and dealt the enemy another severe blow at Neumarkt and Hundsmarkt. It was at these three places that the Rhine troops were first put into action. The French reached Neumarkt at night, and from here Bernadotte was ordered forward to the main column by forced marches.

Every day brought the archduke closer to his own capital,

and that the Vienna authorities did not furnish him with more troops can only be explained on the theory that the Aulic Council preferred, if the Austrians were to fight a battle to save the city, to have it come about nearer the walls, where every man could be put in, and where the French would of necessity be weakened by their excessive marches, and markedly endangered by their long communications. To Bonaparte Vienna must have loomed up as a splendid goal; but before he could call it won, the army in his front must be thoroughly beaten. Charles' retreat was daily making the French situation more difficult. Still Bonaparte never forgot that the enemy's army was the true objective, and that all other matters were subsidiary to beating this. A victory cures a multitude of errors and covers a multitude of risks.

With regard to Joubert, Bonaparte was still in doubt. From Freisach, April 3, he wrote him that for the moment the French had not gained enough, nor were they near enough Vienna, to make it certain that the Austrians might not yet resume the offensive in the Tyrol; that in a couple of days things would clear up; and that while he might perhaps order him in to the main body, he need go to no trouble to do more than keep open the road by the Drave valley. Almost immediately after, he was ordered to march to a junction with the army.

The Austrians arrested their backward movement only to ease the troops, continuing the retreat during the night of April 2–3; and the archduke had already instructed the Laybach detachment to move rapidly up to Bruck via Marburg and Gratz. Bonaparte was still illustrating the value of his mass theory. Though by calling in Bernadotte he had now opened the road to his rear, by this same way of Gratz, Laybach, Palmanova, Treviso, yet so long as he seriously threatened the Austrian army by his own massed corps, the enemy

could not wisely take advantage of the opening, unless commanded by a man of equal skill and boldness with the French commander-in-chief, and well equipped with men and material. This is a risk common to almost all strategic manœuvres.

A rumor having come in that the column from the Tyrol army which, under Kerpen, had been cut off by Joubert, was marching to join the archduke by the valleys of the Salza and the Muhr, Bonaparte was anxious not only to pursue the retiring Austrians, but hopeful of intercepting this stray force; and with this additional incentive, on the 3d of April, at early dawn, the tireless advance again began. The report as to Kerpen's column turned out to be an error, but the pursuit of the Austrians was not relaxed. Thus pushed, the archduke retired yet farther, and by the 6th reached Bruck, with rearguard in Leoben. The French army entered Judenburg April 5, and here, to Bonaparte's intense relief, there came to the French headquarters Generals Bellegarde and Meerfeldt as plenipotentiaries from Vienna, prepared to treat for peace. Bonaparte's letter to the archduke had been sent to the capital, with this much-to-be-desired result.

On the 6th Bernadotte had reached Neumarkt, where his advance was checked by Bonaparte. Guyeux had marched forward on Bruck, while Massena had pushed on and taken Leoben the evening of the same day. Serurier was at Gratz, and Joubert, receiving in Brixen his instructions from Bonaparte, had drawn in Delmas, started along the Puster valley on his way down the Drave, and his van was on this day in Lienz. Next day, April 7, a five days' truce was granted, and on April 18 preliminaries of peace were signed at Leoben. These served as a basis for the treaty of Campo Formio.

During the truce, the line of demarcation ran from the sea between Fiume and Trieste, via Littay, Wündisch-Feistritz,

Marburg, Ehrenhausen, Gratz, Bruck, Leoben, Mautern, Rottenmann, Radstadt, St. Michael, Spithal, Lienz.

The French army shortly started on its return march to Venetian territory. In due season the news of the truce of Leoben reached Joubert, and hostilities were suspended. It was time, for Laudon had driven back Baraguay and the French troops, and followed them down the Adige to Roveredo, and had even pushed a detachment along the left bank towards Verona.

It was just four weeks since the last campaign had opened; it was just a year since Bonaparte had moved on Beaulieu from the shore of the Gulf of Genoa, and he now stood within some eighty miles of Vienna. One can point to few operations as brilliant as this rapid march with a quite small force had been, with its contempt of danger and its many victories; but the apparent success was not founded on a truly solid basis. Bonaparte could not safely advance farther. His numbers were distinctly insufficient for a serious campaign against Vienna. A battle with all the forces the enemy could muster at the gates of the capital would be extra-hazardous. Counting in Joubert and Bernadotte, the Army of Italy again numbered nearly fifty thousand men under the colors; but Austrian troops were coming on from Hungary to Vienna, and for every step back the archduke would grow in numerical strength; and the determination to save the chief city of the country would be universal. The two Rhine armies Bonaparte now learned were still on the left bank in cantonments, accomplishing so little good in the general scheme that he was excusable in suspecting that his enemies at home were striving to isolate the Army of Italy, and destroy it and his reputation at one fell stroke. He could not advance alone into the valley of the Danube. The French communications were already threatened by the

regulars and militia under Laudon and Kerpen in the Tyrol, as has just been stated; and the Tyrolese sharpshooter, inflamed by religious hatred of the French, might prove an efficient auxiliary in a winning campaign. Not only had a column advanced down the Brenta and reached Bassano, while another was headed for Verona, but the latter city indeed had risen and murdered the French inhabitants, and driven the garrison of three thousand men under Balland

General Bonaparte.
By d'Angers.

into the citadel, where they were being besieged. Trieste had risen and ousted the French cavalry. Luckily Victor was still on hand, and able to assemble fifteen thousand men to hold Venice within bounds; and joined by Kilmaine and some men from the garrison of the Italian cities, he shortly put down the insurrection in Verona. But in reality, Bonaparte, for all his proud bearing, stood on a volcano.

Under these circumstances, by cunningly taking advantage

of the temporary weakening of the Austrian authorities, and by the exertion of that marvelous power which in any other man we should call bullying, the victorious leader was fortunate to sign preliminaries of peace at Leoben, to which place he had moved headquarters. In the negotiations to this end he exhibited as marked a capacity for diplomacy as he had shown for war, and not only made his situation appear sound, but bore down all opposition to the terms he formulated. "The Austrian plenipotentiaries," say the Memoirs, "had thought to do an agreeable thing in placing for first article that the emperor recognized the French Republic. 'Erase that,' said Napoleon; 'the Republic is like the sun, which shines of its own light; the blind alone see it not!' In effect, this recognition was harmful, because, if one day the French people chose to make a monarchy, the emperor could say that he had acknowledged the Republic."

On April 19 Bonaparte thus sums up the situation to the Directory: —

. . . "Moreover, we must not hide from ourselves that, though our military position is brilliant, we have not dictated the conditions. The court had already evacuated Vienna; Prince Charles and his army were falling back on the army of the Rhine; the people of Hungary . . . were rising in mass, and were already on our flanks; the Rhine had not been crossed. . . . Had they been foolish enough to await me, I should have beaten them; but they would have constantly retired, would have joined the Rhine forces and overwhelmed me. . . . I had determined to levy a contribution in the faubourgs of Vienna, and not take a step beyond. . . . Had I, at the opening of the campaign, insisted on going to Turin, I should have never crossed the Po; had I insisted on going to Rome, I should have lost Milan; had I insisted on marching to Vienna, I might have lost the Republic. The real plan of campaign to destroy the emperor is what I have done. . . . So soon as I saw that negotiations would seriously open, I sent a courier to General Clarke, who, charged more particularly with your instructions in an object so essential, would have acquitted himself better than I; but when after ten days I saw that

he did not arrive, and that the moment began to pass, I had to drop all scruples, and I signed" (the preliminaries). "You have given me full power in all diplomatic operations, and in the position of things, the preliminaries of peace, even with the emperor, had become a military operation." . . .

In the opening of this remarkable campaign from Nice to Leoben, Bonaparte had by his operations enunciated and proved the value of the mass theory. In the operation from the Mincio eastward, he had apparently put aside the mass theory, and had divided his forces. This has led to the expression of opinion by some historians that Bonaparte did not believe in or act on his own maxims, that every campaign must open up a new theory of action, and that after all nothing can ever be done by rule. This is in only a narrow sense true. Napoleon wrote to the king of Spain in September, 1808, "The art of war is an art which has principles which it is never permitted to break;" and at St. Helena he truly said, "All great captains of antiquity, and those who later have most worthily trodden in their footsteps, have only accomplished great results by adhering closely to the rules and the natural principles of the art;" and, "The principles of the art of war are those which have led the great captains whose deeds history tells us of." As a fact, no one adhered more fully to his theory of war than Napoleon; but he knew when to make exceptions, and when to gauge his operations by the character of his opponent. And if we study the situation, we readily see, as has been already explained, that the sending of Joubert up the Adige and down the Drave, while he marched east with the main body, was not a division of forces, but a scrupulous care for his base. Joubert was fending off from it the Tyrol army.

It remains true that few captains have ever utilized so constantly as did Napoleon the rules he had evolved from his

study of history, and from the experience he gained in his own campaigns. But it must be remembered that, as Frederick was the first general who wrote down what he practiced in war, so it was Jomini who first put in print the principles on which Napoleon had acted, and which the great man himself jealously guarded as his own. Military critics are wont to forget that Napoleon's able generalship was the result of his study of the campaigns of the other great soldiers in the past, and of his natural acuteness in evolving the secret of their methods, and in again putting their principles into practice. As his theatre grew in extent, he improved his general strategic scheme; and as he never doubted that in force and intelligence he was quite able to cope with any opponent he met, so occasionally he allowed himself to vary from his maxims according as the conditions varied, because he could foresee that in the particular case in hand his opponent would be unable to take advantage of the variation, and because it was safe and convenient to do so. There were, however, for Napoleon certain constant rules which he never forgot without suffering the consequences, and which a lesser captain would violate at his peril.

What especially strikes the student of the 1796–97 campaign is the wonderful personality of the young commander. In his report to the Directory from Milan, December 7, 1796, General Clarke, then Chief of the Topographical Bureau in the Ministry of War, and later Duc de Feltre, visiting the army to represent the Directory, and to inspect the conduct of the military chiefs and the civil commissaries, says: —

"The general-in-chief has rendered the most important services. Placed by you in the glorious position he occupies, he has shown himself worthy of it. He is the man of the Republic. The fate of Italy has several times depended on his learned combinations. There is nobody here who does not look upon him as a man of genius, and he is effectively

that. He is feared, loved and respected in Italy. All the little means of intrigue fall before his penetration. He has a great ascendant on the individuals who compose the Republican army, because he guesses or conceives at once their thought or their character, and that he directs them with science on the point where they can be most useful. A healthy judgment, enlightened ideas, put him abreast of distinguishing the true from the false. His *coup d'œil* is sure. His resolutions are followed up with energy and vigor. His *sang-froid* in the liveliest affairs is as remarkable as his extreme promptitude in changing his plans, when unforeseen circumstances demand it. His manner of execution is learned and well calculated. Bonaparte can bear himself with success in more than one career. His superior talents and his knowledge give him the means. I believe him attached to the Republic, and without other ambition than that of conserving the glory he has acquired. It would be a mistake to believe him to be a party man. He belongs neither to the Royalists, who calumniate him, nor to the anarchists, whom he loves not. The Constitution is his only guide. And rallying on it and on the Directors who desire it, I believe he will be always useful and never dangerous to his country. Do not think, Citizen Directors, that I am speaking of him from enthusiasm. It is with calm that I write, and no interest guides me except that of making you know the truth. Bonaparte will be put by posterity in the rank of the greatest men."

Clarke.

All contemporary evidence is to this same effect. Nor was Bonaparte lacking in the amenities of life. Harsh and domineering in everything relating to the service, yet his companions testify to his kindly side, and to the marvelous fascination of his society. He had his favorites, — indeed, in a sense, there was far too much favoritism, both in his armies and his government; he kept unworthy relatives, utterly lacking ability, in important posts; and it was often claimed that he recognized moderate services in his dispatches home, and said no word about more important ones rendered by those he did

not like, or by those who had once offended him. But this, a merely human weakness, is to be found in every great man's surroundings, and it was in part due to the wonderful individuality he threw into his creation. His work was truly original. Casting aside the narrowness of the old method, he wrought on his own lines. His leading idea was expressed by Bourrienne: "The art of war consists in having, with a smaller army, more men than the enemy at the point you attack, or at the point where you are attacked." This is a clear definition of the mass theory, and one on which he uniformly acted. But to do this thing, which a few simple words can describe, requires genius.

After Archduke Charles had himself gone to Italy, and reinforcements had been forwarded to the Noric Alps to stay the progress of Bonaparte, there remained on the Upper Rhine a bare forty thousand men under Latour, and on the Lower Rhine twenty-five thousand under Werneck, with some considerable numbers eaten up in garrisons. Facing these forces were respectively Moreau with sixty thousand men, the bulk near Strasburg, and Hoche with seventy thousand men, along the river below Coblenz. Although the Army of Italy sadly needed their coöperation, these armies passed the Rhine only about mid-April, Hoche at Düsseldorf and Neuwied, and Moreau at Kehl. They had been ordered to cross early in March, but there was lack of pontoons and of equipment generally. Vexed at this unnecessary delay, Bonaparte wrote the Directory: "The armies of the Rhine must have no blood in their veins. . . . If one has the good-will to open the campaign, there is nothing to prevent it." He had frequently warned the Directory that if he was not supported, it would be impossible for the Army of Italy to hold itself long; but he yet boldly pushed on, and was rewarded by the glorious triumph of Leoben.

oligarchy, as a punishment for its opposition to the French, was dissolved. Bonaparte established his headquarters near Udine to await the plenipotentiaries who were to treat of peace, and himself went to Milan to complete the organization of the Cisalpine Republic, and to support the new democratic revolution in Genoa. The Genoese oligarchy was transformed into the Ligurian Republic, and the great fortified city came under the control of the French.



Bonaparte.
Sketch by David, 1797.

The negotiations at Udine (Passeriano) went on slowly. Every power seemed to strive to influence what was done. It was hoped in France that another expedition to Ireland, aided by the Dutch and Spanish fleets, might be successful. But the battle of Cape St. Vincent, won by Jervis off Cadiz, placed England absolutely in command of the sea. Her ministers were not unwilling to treat for peace, if Austria was to make it; and indeed negotiations to this end were opened at Lille; but they had no result. English demands were not based on French successes on land. The Directory proved unreasonable, and would accede to no acceptable terms.

The Royalist sentiment, fed by the tyranny of the Directory, had long been growing, and the new elections gave the party strength in the Council. Moreau had dallied with the

Royalists, but Pichegru was the leader of the movement, which no doubt looked forward to a restoration of the Bourbons. Three members of the Directory, Barras, La Révellière-Lepeaux and Rewbel, were Jacobins; Carnot and Barthélemy were Moderates. The Council demanded Moderate ministers, but the three Jacobin Directors put strong Republicans in office; and as each party desired an able general on its side, for a few days Hoche was minister of war. Bonaparte was a stanch Republican, and the leanings of the troops were strongly so. But being with the army in the field, he was in a way removed from politics.

On the national fête of July 14, a great celebration was ordered by the general-in-chief in Milan, salvos were fired for all officers of rank killed in action, new standards were delivered, double rations were issued, and races and games ensued. Bonaparte issued the following order: —

Milan, 26 Messidor, Year V.

To the Army.

Soldiers! To-day is the anniversary of the 14th of July. You see before you the names of our companions in arms dead on the field of honor for the liberty of the country. They have given you the example. You owe yourselves wholly to the Republic; you owe yourselves wholly to the happiness of thirty millions of Frenchmen; you owe yourselves wholly to the glory of that name which has received a fresh lustre by your victories.

Soldiers! I know you to be profoundly affected by the ills which threaten the country; but the country cannot run real dangers. The same men who have made her triumph over Europe in coalition are here. Mountains separate us from France; you would cross them with the rapidity of the eagle, if needed, to maintain the Constitution, defend liberty, protect the government and the Republicans.

Soldiers! The government watches the trust of laws confided to it. The Royalists, from the moment they show themselves, will have lived. Be without disquiet, and let us swear by the *manes* of the heroes who have died beside us for liberty, let us swear on our new flags: Implacable War to the Enemies of the Republic and of the Constitution of the Year III.

Bonaparte.

In the same tone Bonaparte wrote the Directory, July 15, that the emperor was waiting to see the turn things would take in Paris; that the army was indignant at the condition of affairs, and that his proclamation of July 14 had produced the best effect; that personally he could not remain insensible to the attacks of the newspapers, or of the Five Hundred, or of the Clichy Club (of Royalists): "Are there no more Republicans left in France? You can save the Republic with one stroke . . . and conclude peace in twenty-four hours. Arrest the *émigrés;* destroy the influence of foreigners. If you need force, call on the armies. Break up the presses of the journals sold to England, more bloody than ever was Marat. . . . If nothing can be done to put an end to assassinations and to the influence of Louis XVI., I desire to resign." And in a letter to Clarke of July 18, "I confess, however, to you that I much desire to reënter private life; I have paid my score." Was this last quite ingenuous? Resignation when he deemed himself essential was always one of Bonaparte's weapons.

Augereau had gone to Paris with the Mantua flags. No one supposed him to be in league with Bonaparte, whose aide, Lavalette, was there to represent him. On September 4, the 18th Fructidor, by Augereau's aid, the Tuileries, where the Council sat, was surrounded, and Pichegru and Barthélemy were seized. Carnot escaped. A new padded Council upheld the Directory, who selected Merlin and François as new members, much to Augereau's disappointment, as he had hoped for the place. Thus the Jacobins triumphed, without Bonaparte's having personally appeared in the affair.

The change had, however, the effect of preventing so much interference with Bonaparte's control of the peace negotiations. He continued the discussion of terms at Udine, and on a fresh interference with his work by the home authorities,

he actually handed in his resignation on September 25. This act decided the Directory to favor the man they well knew they could not do without, nor, indeed, dared to place in antagonism to their power. The Army of Italy was reinforced, and Bonaparte given such ample power that he determined to sign a peace at Campo Formio.

The St. Helena Memoirs tell the following story of the discussions at Udine. On October 16 Bonaparte recapitulated the conduct of France since the Leoben preliminaries and renewed his ultimatum. Cobentzel, the Austrian plenipotentiary, at whose house the meeting was that day held, argued at length to prove that France was getting too much in the treaty, and would join all Italy to Gaul; "That the emperor was irrevocably resolved to run all the chances of war, even to flee from his capital, if need be, rather than consent to a peace so disadvantageous; that Russia offered him armies; that these were ready to rush to his aid, and that people would see what manner of troops the Russians were; that it was very evident that Napoleon was making his character as plenipotentiary cede to his interests as general; that he did not desire peace. He added that he would leave in the night, and that all the blood that would flow in this new conflict would fall upon the French negotiator. It was then that the latter, with coolness, but highly piqued with this outburst, rose and took from a pier-table a little liqueur-set (*cabaret*) of porcelain of which Count Cobentzel was very fond, as the gift of the Empress Catherine: 'Well, then,' said Napoleon, 'the truce is therefore broken and war is declared! But remember that before the end of this autumn I will break your monarchy as I break this porcelain!' In pronouncing these last words he threw it to earth with vivacity: it covered the floor with its débris. He bowed to the Congress and left. The Austrian plenipotentiaries were astounded. A few minutes

afterwards they knew that in entering his carriage he had dispatched an officer to Archduke Charles to notify him that, the negotiations being broken off, hostilities would be begun again in twenty-four hours. Alarmed, Count Cobentzel sent

Unfinished Portrait of Bonaparte.
By David.

the Marquis of Gallo to Passeriano to carry a signed declaration that he adhered to the ultimatum of France. . . . On the morrow peace was signed."

We must accept this story on the testimony of Napoleon. Many others may have had a foundation far more slender than their present form. But all are like the man, and none lack the interest that anecdotes possess which have grown up about any great character of history.

In the Treaty of Campo Formio, Austria ceded Belgium to France. The Congress of Rastadt was to discuss peace.

Austria received Venice to the Adige, with Istria and Dalmatia, and recognized the Cisalpine Republic. Secret articles provided for an Alps-Rhine frontier for France, with possession of Mainz, the navigation of the Rhine to be open to both France and Germany.

There was good reason for signing the peace. The Army of Italy was in excellent condition, but was so placed that the Austrians would be nearer their sources of supply, and be better able to prepare for the next campaign, than could the French. Many questions in the rear of the French army — Naples, Venice, Sardinia — were in a high degree disquieting, and Bonaparte felt the desirability of rounding up by a useful peace the splendor of his campaign. It cannot be said that he exhibited much regard for the promises which had been made to the recently created Italian republics, from which territory was taken in cold blood in order to compass the desired peace. France retained many fortresses until ratification.

The Peace of Campo Formio was clearly the work of Bonaparte. It was glorious for France and not unfair for the enemy. It should have been solid, for Austria got Venice for Antwerp, and Istria and Dalmatia for Belgium — in her present condition a valuable exchange.

There arose during 1797 certain troubles among the Swiss cantons, which led the Directory, in breach of all international law, to interfere in her internal affairs, under the flimsy pretext of establishing a balance between the democratic and monarchical states. This resulted in the establishment of French control in the Alps in the place of Swiss neutrality, — a grievous mistake on the part of France. It seemed to be the idea of the Directory that to protect the political status of the French Republic, it was essential to surround it with a cordon of small democracies — buffer states, as it were; whereas these

would but give France a more extended line to protect, instead of the Rhine and the Alps, for French control demanded French protection. The neutrality of Switzerland is one of the political and military necessities of the modern status of Europe. In the case of France this is peculiarly valuable. So long as this great natural barrier remains neutral, it protects her two lines of attack and defense, — the Rhine and Piedmont, — each having the Alps on one of its flanks. With Switzerland no longer neutral, the eastern frontier of France demands greater armies and is but half as well protected.

The designs against Switzerland were hidden under the guise of an expedition to Egypt, and this again was kept secret by ostensible preparations near the English Channel. The Swiss invasion was hurried up by the fact, discovered by Bonaparte, that Berne had in her treasury forty million francs in specie; and France needed the money to equip the army and fleet destined for Egypt. As a pretext to take a hand in the internal affairs of Switzerland, Bonaparte made a demand for the passage of a French detachment from Italy to the headwaters of the Rhone, the shortest road from Milan to France; and to this, as was expected, a courteous refusal was the only answer a neutral state could make. This permitted the Directory to begin covert, and later overt, interference with Bernese affairs; and as a result, a body of French soldiers entered Swiss territory in December, 1797. The Swiss raised troops, and Menard took Lausanne. Fostering revolution against the constituted authorities, the French made such exorbitant demands on the Bernese Senate that the only answer could be the raising of an army. This was placed under Erlach. The Directory then demanded that the several cantons of Switzerland should be made into a republic, one and indivisible, and to Brune was given command of the French army. The Bernese Senate lacked energy. Brune

and Schauenburg marched against Erlach early in March, 1798; and by Carnot's ably designed concentric operation from France, Italy and the Rhine (made in anticipation of what actually occurred), coupled with their own really clever work, these generals defeated the Swiss near Berne, March 6; whereupon the French entered the city, and seized on the treasury. Soon Switzerland was overrun by French troops, and the Helvetian Republic, under French protection, was formed by Talleyrand. This invasion of Switzerland made the continuance of European peace impossible.

Revolutionary ideas were growing in southern Italy. Naples was on the eve of an uprising, and the prisons were half full of suspects. Urged on by French partisans, the Roman populace rose to demand a republic. In suppressing this rising, on December 28, 1797, the papal troops charged a mob in front of the French legation, and a French officer was accidentally killed. Of this unintentional violation of diplomatic propriety the Directory at once took advantage. Berthier, with eighteen thousand men, was ordered to Rome; and on February 15, 1798, the Roman Republic was proclaimed from the steps of the Capitol. The Pope left the city for Pisa, and eventually went to France. This interference with papal affairs was a direct blow at Austria. Berthier was succeeded by Massena, and he by Dallemagne. The troops, unpaid and ill-cared for, mutinied, as was not uncommon in these years, and some time elapsed before quiet was restored. All this excessive activity on the part of the Directory was a mistake. It never knew when it had enough. The occupation of Switzerland and Rome tore the treaty of Campo Formio to shreds.

Shortly going to Paris, Bonaparte was received as the hero of the hour. At the opening of 1796 the German emperor had lain on the confines of France with one hundred and

William III., who had ascended the Prussian throne in November, 1797, had character and influence, and in the wish to have Prussia bear her part in the economy of Europe, was apt to create difficulties. Paul I. saw that as a means of self-preservation Russia must soon begin to act in the affairs of the Mediterranean. By holding to her treaty with France, Spain forfeited her commerce, and was restless accordingly. Portugal was so much under English control that France was assembling an army in the Pyrenees to overawe her. Italy stood as on a volcano; the aristocrats were moving in Venice and Genoa; Naples was toying with England; the Cisalpine Republic was robbing the Pope of territory; Piedmont was revolutionary. On the other hand, the Batavian Republic was under the influence of France; and Turkey, though friendly, was too much busied by her own difficulties to be any one's ally. For England there was no choice except to keep up the European conflict, or to surrender her recent colonial acquisitions, and she held herself on a war footing. In France the political situation was nothing less than a maze, and at every step the Directory seemed to be making fresh enemies.

Bonaparte's reception in Paris on his return from his splendid Italian campaigns — really a triumphal entry — was of a nature to turn the head of a less imaginative subject. He was received in the Luxemburg by the Directors with unequaled ceremony. At this reception he was presented to the Directors by Scherer, Secretary of War, and Talleyrand made a fulsome presentation speech. Bonaparte handed in the treaty, saying at the close of his address: "This peace assures the liberty, the prosperity of the Republic. When the happiness of the French people shall be founded on the best organic laws, entire Europe will become free." In his answering speech, Barras, President of the Directors began:

"Citizen General, Nature, miser of its prodigies, gives only from time to time great men to the earth, but she must have been jealous to mark the aurora of liberty by one of these phenomena; and the sublime revolution of the French people, new in the history of nations, had to present a fresh genius in the history of celebrated men. First of all, Citizen General, you have shaken off the yoke of equality, and with the same arm with which you struck to earth the enemies of the Republic, you thrust aside the rivals which antiquity presented to you." He then saluted Bonaparte, giving him what was called the fraternal embrace, and was followed by the other Directors. The Institute of France elected him a member. The municipality of Paris changed the name of the Rue Chante Reine, where Bonaparte lived, to Rue de la Victoire.

There was about as much insincerity as there was honest good-will in all this adulation, for Bonaparte's success had raised envy as well as suspicion in many breasts. Only the populace with real heartiness welcomed the conqueror. But though he was the lion of the day, the sole effect of the flattery was to prove to Bonaparte that France was open as a prize to contend for, and that it was one which he might win as well as any other citizen. He also saw that the time had not yet come for action; that provided he could do work to command attention, he was better away from France than in France; and on this feeling he acted. The Directory was sure sooner or later to crumble of its own weight; and then would come his chance. "The pear was not yet ripe," said he.

The Directors were only too glad to keep him at a distance, lest he should interfere with their control of affairs. They had nominated him to the command of the proposed expedition against England. But Bonaparte held this appoint-

as if the Directory was aiming to be rid of so dangerous a warrior at any price," says Gohier. And as European politics again threatened to become embroiled by Russia's embarking therein, Bonaparte, who preferred that others should be present at the wrecking of the fine structure whose capstone he had laid at Campo Formio, and who was indisputably clever at divining the time when he had best cut loose from an unpromising venture, hurried his preparations to embark upon his Oriental campaign.

From Paris, April 12, the Directory ordered the formation of the army destined for Egypt, and " the Citizen Bonaparte, at the moment General-in-Chief of the Army of England, is named General-in-Chief of the Army of the Orient." In several other orders of the same date the conduct of the Egyptian Beys, and their association with the English, their ill-conduct to the French, and the right of the French to keep open a road to India are insisted on; and the Army of the Orient is ordered to sail for Egypt. The Order of Malta is likewise stated to have acted in a hostile manner against France, and the Army of the Orient is ordered to take possession of the island. These preparations were made, and the orders issued in secret, and the secret was well guarded. The Egyptian forces were long known as the left wing of the Army of England, and up to the last moment Bonaparte signed himself, " General-in-Chief of the Army of England."

The threat of a fresh war with Austria almost led Bonaparte to throw up the command of the Egyptian expedition; but it was now too late. The orders of the Directory were positive, he must either obey them or attack his superiors, and choosing the former alternative, Bonaparte reached Toulon May 9.

Following was the army, mostly from the Rhine or Italy, which Bonaparte collected in Toulon, Genoa, Civita Vecchia,

Marseilles and Ajaccio. In it were fifty-six battalions and twenty squadrons, of which three battalions were left in Malta, and six went to Corfu. By an order of June 22, on board the flagship Orient, it was organized as follows: —

	Bonaparte commanding.	Berthier, Chief of Staff.		
Desaix, van : 21st light half-brigade	under	Belliard.		
61st and 88th line	"	" Friant.		
Reynier, right wing : 9th light	"	" Fugière.		
85th line	"	" "		
Menou, left wing : 22d light	"	" Veaux.		
13th and 69th line	"	" Vial.		
Kleber, centre : 2d light	"	" Damas.		
25th and 75th line	"	" Verdier.		
Bon, reserve : 4th light	"	" Marmont.		
18th and 32d line	"	" Rampon.		
These divisions averaged four thousand five hundred men, making infantry			22,500	men.
Cavalry under Alexandre Dumas, with full equipments, but only three hundred horses, the rest of the men to be mounted in Egypt			4,000	"
Reserve artillery under Dommartin (Songis, 2d)			3,000	"
Non-combatants			1,000	"
			30,500	men.

Some authorities place the force which Bonaparte took to Egypt as high as thirty-nine thousand foot and three thousand horse. But the above figures are reliable. The Memoirs state the total as thirty-two thousand three hundred men. The Inspector General was Dugua; Commandant of Engineers, Caffarelli; Commandant of Pontoniers, Sufalga; and a dromedary corps was later formed, each animal capable of carrying two men, but usually ridden by but one. There were eight companies of artificers, sappers and miners. Plenty of ordnance stores were aboard, including harness for six thousand horses.

Great care was had to prepare for the health of the troops,

and Bonaparte had been heedful to pick out officers whose good conduct had impressed him. In one capacity or another there were with the army, in addition to the above, men whom ability later carried to a high position. Such were Murat, now commanding the dragoons, and eventually reaching the command of all the cavalry; Lannes, at first an aide, Junot, Davout, at first also commanding dragoons, Lanusse, Bessières, Rapp, Belliard, Andréossy, Leclerc and Duroc. Louis Bonaparte and Eugene Beauharnais also formed part of Bonaparte's military family.

Duroc.

The staff was composed of one brigadier-general, three majors, one quartermaster treasurer, four lieutenants, one doctor, two trumpeters, one drum major, one "artist veterinary," one master bootmaker, one master saddler, one master shoemaker, one master tailor, one master armorer, twenty musicians. A distinguished body of men of science accompanied the army, and lent real lustre and no little aid to its work. They carried with them a library, French, Arabic, Turkish and Greek printing-presses and type, workmen, and interpreters in all languages.

This entire force was embarked in four hundred transports, convoyed by thirteen ships of the line, eight frigates, two big pinks, seventy-eight corvettes, brigs, gunboats, etc., all manned by ten thousand sailors and others. The fleet was under Admiral Brueys; but Bonaparte was in supreme command.

"Desaix was the most distinguished officer of the army;

active, enlightened, loving glory for its own sake. He was small in stature, of an exterior little pleasing, but . . . he could command an army like a vanguard." "Kleber was the handsomest man in the army. He was the Nestor, being forty-five years of age. He had served in Germany; . . . but had become major of volunteers in Alsatia, his country, in 1790. . . . His caustic spirit made him enemies. . . . The Directory had a great aversion for him. . . . He loved glory as the path of pleasures, and was a man of spirit, of courage, knew war, and was capable of great things, but only when driven to it by the force of circumstances." "Caffarelli was of such activity that you could not perceive that he was short one leg. . . . He was well off, a brave soldier, faithful friend, good citizen." He was at the head of the body of savants.

From Paris, April 13, 1798, in a report to the Directory, Bonaparte strikes the note of all his future conduct by saying: "In our position we should make a positive war on England, and we can do so" by reorganizing our navy, a task which will not interfere with the land armies, while "the war obliges England to make immense preparations which ruin her finances, destroy the spirit of commerce, and absolutely change the constitution and customs of this people." He evidently did not understand the English character. He then sketches out a plan for reorganizing the French navy, while the English navy would be kept at a distance by the Oriental expedition; and shows how, under such conditions, England might be invaded. This was on the eve of his departure for Egypt.

On May 10, at Toulon, Bonaparte issued an order to his soldiers and sailors: "You have made wars of mountains, of plains, of sieges; it remains for you to make war at sea," said he. "The Roman legions which you have sometimes imitated, but not yet equaled, fought Carthage on this same sea, and on the plains of Zama. Victory abandoned them

The Knights of Malta had deteriorated. The Czar had designs on the island, but the French Knights gave aid and comfort to their countrymen, and the native Maltese revolted. A quarrel was cooked up on the score of water and provisions, as well as general enmity. On June 11 landings were made at seven places, and La Valetta was taken. After some negotiations the helpless Grand Master ceded the island to France. In La Valetta there was found an immense supply of weapons and munitions, twelve hundred guns, and in the harbor two line-ships. The treasury was sacked. The Order of the Knights of Malta was abolished, and the island was reorganized on a French plan. Many orders and instructions relative to Malta were issued. Bonaparte appears to have been very busy, and to have placed the new conquest on a good footing, from both a military and civil standpoint. A garrison of four thousand men under Vaubois was left here. The fleet again put to sea the 19th of June, and escaping the English fleet, skirted Candia and headed for Cape Aze on the African coast. On July 1 it made Alexandria, after a voyage of forty-three days.

On June 22, on board the Orient, Bonaparte issued a

PROCLAMATION.

Soldiers, you are about to undertake a conquest, the effects of which on the civilization and commerce of the world are incalculable. You will strike England the most certain blow, and the one most felt, while waiting until you can give her a death-blow. We will make tiring marches, we will deliver battles, we shall succeed in all our enterprises. Destiny is in our favor. . . . The peoples with whom we are about to live are Mohammedans; . . . work with them as we have with the Jews and Italians; treat with respect their Muftis and Imans, as you did the Rabbis and the Bishops. Have for the ceremonies ordered by the Koran, for the mosques, the same tolerance you have had for the convents, for synagogues, for the religion of Moses and of Christ. The Roman legions protected all religions. You will find here customs different from those

of Europe ; you must become habituated to them ; these people treat their women differently from ourselves, but in every country the man who violates is a monster. Pillage enriches few ; it dishonors us, destroys our resources, and makes enemies of those we need as friends. The first city we shall meet was built by Alexander. We shall find at every step memories which will excite the emulation of the French.

On June 21 an order on the Orient provided that "every person in the army who has pillaged or violated shall be shot; every individual in the army who commits extortion of whatever kind shall be shot; if the members of a division commit disorder, if known, they shall be shot, if not, the division shall pay the loss." Full instructions were given as to the collection of victual, and in the last article the order says that all officers and commissaries are held by the general-in-chief to see to its execution, "his intention being that the fund of the army shall not become the profit of a few individuals, but shall turn to the advantage of all." These orders were, however, far from being always fully carried out. Comprehensive instructions had also been issued from the Orient to cover all probable cases which would occur on landing.

Nelson had divined that the destination of the French fleet was not associated with the much vaunted expedition to England, and had been beating all over the Mediterranean in search of it; he had almost struck it near Crete; and on June 28 he had been in Alexandria, but not finding the French at this port, he had set sail for Syria. This signal favor of fortune Bonaparte utilized by at once disembarking near the town of Marabout, some miles west of Alexandria; and by next morning, July 2, after working through the night, he had four thousand five hundred men on shore, from the divisions of Menou, Bon and Kleber. Waiting for nothing, he set out at daylight, leaving Reynier to supervise the fur-

6th. Until all the material could be got out of the transports, Bonaparte was compelled personally to remain in Alexandria, which he did up to the 9th; but in his orders to Desaix he gave, on July 3, the key to his method for war in Egypt. "The art resides in this, to keep concealed all my extraordinary means, only to employ them, and thereby to create the greater surprise, in case we have to fight great masses." Kleber and Menou had been wounded in the assault on the Rosetta gate; and Bonaparte placed the former with three thousand garrison in command of Alexandria, turning over his division to Dugua, and the latter in charge of Rosetta, Vial succeeding to his command; and on July 5 the army left Alexandria, and Reynier followed along on the road skirting the old canal, which Desaix had already passed over on the march to Damanhur. Vial marched in the rear of Reynier, and Bon, on the evening of the 6th, followed Vial. Dugua had been sent to Rosetta the day before, and here he stationed a small force, and organized a flotilla to follow the army up the Nile. The column was twenty-one thousand strong. Later, on July 7, headquarters moved along the road to Damanhur. For ease to the troops, it was proposed that much of the marching should be done at night. The army was followed by a swarm of Arabs, who massacred any stragglers they could find. This had its good side in keeping the men in the ranks; but one day Bonaparte was himself close to being caught.

At Damanhur an order, interesting to-day, put the following price upon provisions: a goose, twenty-six sous (cents); a chicken, fifteen sous; a pair of pigeons, eighteen sous; mutton, eight sous a pound; beef, six sous a pound; eggs, one liard (a quarter sou) each; rice, two sous a pound; lentils, three liards a pound. The prices are also specified in paras, Egyptian money.

In the St. Helena Memoirs Napoleon gives a long and excellent scientific description of Egypt, as it existed in his day. We have room in this history but for an occasional extract, which is peculiarly applicable to its matter.

Speaking unscientifically, there are in Egypt eight summer months of heat and four winter months of moderate cold. In the Delta region the heat reaches 100° Fahrenheit and the cold rarely strikes the freezing point. As the Atlantic Ocean tempers the climate of Europe and the Pacific that of California, so the vast body of the Libyan and Arabian deserts tempers the climate of Egypt. Rain in Upper Egypt is unknown. In the Delta the rainfall is barely an inch and a half a year. In Alexandria it is about eight inches, and this rain comes from the edge of the winter storms of southern Europe, which a north wind occasionally blows across the sea. The inundation of the Nile occurs from June to October. Crops are then sown, and are harvested from February to June. From early in November and until nearly the first of May, the usual temperature is that of pleasant spring or moderate summer. Early in May begins the Khamsin, a parching wind from the desert which lasts fifty days, as the name indicates. During the inundation the water rises in the neighborhood of forty feet; more will cause devastation, much less brings shortage of crops.

The valley of the Nile has been said to be shaped like a lotus, with a long stem having a single bud, which is the Fayum; the flower is the Delta, the stem the narrow thousand-mile-long valley of the Nile from Cairo up. At Cairo the river divides into two principal branches, which empty respectively at Rosetta and Damietta into the Mediterranean; innumerable minor branches cover the rich lowland of the Delta, and these are connected by the yet more innumerable canals, the product of many centuries of labor and care.

Despite all the hardships, Bonaparte seemed cheerful as never before. Climate had no terrors for him; and in this ancient country his imagination could indefinitely expand. Madame de Rémusat sketches him as feeling himself freed from the shackles of civilization, and able to act out all his dreams. He was to create a religion, to write a new Koran; and he saw himself head of the Orient, employing all the experience of two continents, attacking the English might in India, and subduing half the world. Yet this sketch may be more ideal than exact; for if ever a man could see fact clearly, it was Bonaparte. One must always draw a definite line between his very real and boundless imagination, and his stern appreciation of facts and their value. This was, however, in a sense, one of the happiest periods of his life, the most Utopian.

Bonaparte's next objective was Ramaniyeh on the Nile, and for this place, on July 9, he started from Damanhur, where he had assembled his army, leaving ten thousand men, one third fleet equipment organized as a national guard, under Kleber in Alexandria, and over a thousand in Rosetta under Menou. Dugua and the flotilla were ordered from Rosetta to the same place; and on the 10th the main army reached its goal.



Murad Bey.

Egypt was nominally a part of the Sultan's domain, under a viceroy; actually it was ruled by the Mamelukes, a warlike caste, whose capital city was Cairo. Of the twenty-four Mameluke chiefs, Murad Bey and Ibrahim Bey were the most prominent, and they had been selected by the other Beys to head them. Murad was brave and lucky in

war; Ibrahim was rich, wise and mighty. Murad looked after the military side, Ibrahim the government. But the two were rather at odds. Upon the landing of the French, Murad Bey assembled a large force of cavalry, which had always been the especial arm of the race, to confront the invader. What foot soldiers there were counted for little in civilized warfare. The Mamelukes were joyfully confident of victory and booty. Cairo was illuminated. "They are melons for us to cut open," said the warriors. Murad himself, with five thousand men, had left Cairo on July 6, and had marched to, and with a motley array of Arabs and fellahin had intrenched a position near, Shubra-Khet. From here a reconnoitring force of eight hundred men was sent out, and this body encountered the division of Desaix on July 10. It was the first meeting for generations between civilized and semi-civilized soldiers in Egypt; but European weapons and discipline proved irresistible. Desaix was marching in close column with train in the centre. So soon as he saw the enemy ready to charge, he wheeled towards them: "By platoon on the right and left into line, fire from two ranks!" came the order. Though a few horsemen rode in on the French line and fell on the bayonets, the body of the Mamelukes was quickly broken and driven back on Shubra-Khet, quite demoralized by the rapid French fire of grape and musketry. Unable to understand the defeat, Murad Bey roundly abused the party chiefs, who had shown themselves to be cowards, he said, in not being able to defeat foot soldiers on an open plain. He only knew Oriental foot.

So soon as Dugua reported with Kleber's division, Bonaparte broke up from Ramaniyeh on July 12, and marched along up the left bank of the Nile. Accompanying the column, the flotilla, under Admiral Perée, moved up the river. This was largely composed of Nile sailing vessels (djermas) which,

transformed into gunboats carrying four to six pieces, rendered excellent service throughout the campaign. The French army continued its advance at daylight, July 13, each division marching over the plain in a square containing the baggage

Mameluke.

and the few horsemen, in imitation of the Russian tactics in the wars with the Turks. There were not exceeding five thousand Mamelukes assembled here under Murad Bey, but their splendid mounts and brilliant colors on the open plain afforded the French soldiers a *coup d'œil* never yet had. Bonaparte contented himself with a steady defense, as he was anxious to test the Moslem manner of attack, as yet a novelty to him. The five divisions formed five squares, six men deep, with the artillery in the corners or between battalions. The right square, under Desaix, was leaned on a big village near the desert, the left one, under Vial, was protected by a smaller village near the Nile, both being intrenched and containing some batteries. The other squares stood between these two in checkerwise fashion, the centre withdrawn. Desaix's square was about "a hundred and fifty fathoms front

by twenty-five on the flank," and Vial "made the same dispositions." The entire front was about eighteen hundred fathoms — two miles — long. Every man was armed, the subalterns, non-commissioned officers and cannoneers all carrying muskets.

The two forces remained several hours in position, the French awaiting their fleet, which could not come on until the north wind sprang up, which it usually did about eight in the morning. Meanwhile distant duels were engaged between the warriors and the Alpine marksmen. A few hardy horsemen came up and dared the French to personal combat; but they were received by platoons of carbineers in front of the battalion intervals. Finally, out of sheer impatience, the

Mameluke.

Mameluke host rode down upon the line, proposing to push in between the squares, and to assail the French in the rear, which they imagined to be naked. Their self-confidence was admirable; and to oppose to their rapid charges and ferocious individual bravery Bonaparte had the steadiness of his foot and the projecting line of bayonets. Led by Murad Bey

in person, the glittering array rode in between the squares of Reynier and Dugua; but they were received by a frontal discharge, then by a flank fire, and when they reached the rear, they found this also vomiting musketry and canister. Murad then turned against the villages, to be no better treated; whereupon, torn to shreds by the unequal conflict, he and his warriors galloped away towards their camp.

Bonaparte expected another attack, and delayed his advance for a while; but when this failed to come, the French line advanced towards Shubra-Khet. Meanwhile the French flotilla had arrived, and had exchanged about fifteen hundred shots with the boats of Murad Bey. But being carried too far up river by the north wind, it ran some danger of being surrounded by the Moslem fleet. The advance of the squares, however, disengaged the flotilla, and Murad's forces, ashore and afloat, retired towards Cairo. The heavier armament of the French boats had done some damage. The enemy had lost six hundred men to one hundred of the French. The Memoirs give the loss as three hundred French, mostly in the flotilla, to eight hundred Moslems.

This smart combat, for it was nothing more, interesting, because novel at the time, was dignified as the Battle of Shébreisse, the name the French gave Shubra-Khet.

The army followed on the 15th and succeeding days, and advancing constantly up the west bank of the Rosetta branch of the Delta, between the river and the desert, reached Lel-Uardan on the 19th, where victual was found. This was much needed, for as the villages had all been deserted by the inhabitants, and communication with Alexandria was cut off by the swarms of Arabs in the rear, scant rations had been collected on the way. Next day the French broke up towards Embabeh.

At daylight on the 21st the French army came in sight of

Cairo, having taken eight days to march the eighty miles from Shubra-Khet. The sight of the Pyramids of Gizeh encouraged the troops, and Bonaparte, in an allocution to the army previous to the ensuing battle, used the memorable phrase: "Soldiers! you have come to these countries to snatch them from barbarism, to carry civilization into the Orient, and save these beautiful lands from the yoke of England. From these monuments forty centuries are watching you!"

The Mamelukes had drawn up for a further defense of their capital at Embabeh, a small suburb of Cairo, on the opposite or left bank of the Nile. Soon the French came in view of the enemy on the plain between the stony hills of Gizeh and the river Nile. As the army advanced, the minarets of Cairo, backed by the brown range of the Mokattam hills, were seen on the left, with the ruins of Memphis in their front, and on the right the everlasting Pyramids. In the Gallic mind this wonderful view bred untold enthusiasm, which augured well for the coming conflict. Murad Bey had collected ten thousand Mamelukes on the plain, each served by three or four footmen; and having armed twenty thousand fellahin, had placed them behind earthworks at Embabeh. There had joined him several thousand janissaries and spahis, or soldiers of the Pasha. His right rested on the Embabeh intrenchments, which, though defended by forty guns, were of small value, being simply a wall and ditch. Here stood the fellahin and the janissaries, while the little walled town of Gizeh up river was defended by three thousand Arab auxiliaries. Murad's entire reliance was on his left wing, consisting of his Mamelukes, who had vowed to drive the dogs of Christians from the land.

His wiser colleague, Ibrahim Bey, was on the right bank with a few thousand Mamelukes, spahis, and janissaries, and had foresight enough to collect his wives, slaves and treasures

onset of the Mamelukes was partial, and when the second charge, which was in mass, occurred, it was met by a point-blank volley of musketry and grape which tore it to tatters. Little groups of the bravest Mamelukes continued to circle



Bonaparte in Egypt.

around the French square, charging into every gap, forcing their horses upon the bayonets, striving to leap over the living hedge, or throwing their rearing steeds upon the serried line of steel. Forty of them actually broke into the right flank square and fell at the very feet of Desaix.

Meanwhile the main body opposite Reynier struck the square of this division, and in striving to avoid its fire, came within the zone of Dugua's musketry. Here the Mamelukes lost their head, and as bravely as they charged, so rapidly did they flee, leaving behind them thousands of corpses. Part of the line wheeled towards the Pyramids, another turned towards Embabeh. The sight of the defeat of their comrades demoralized the militia in this town, and Bon and Vial were ordered forward to take it. The squares advanced, the three front ranks, or proper divisions, ployed into column, and under Rampon and Marmont rushed towards the village. The Mamelukes left in Embabeh, and in part those who had fled thither, sallied out and attacked the French column; but this halted and formed square, and drove back the assault. A part of the French column took advantage of a deep ditch, along which they could file, to turn the town, whose defenders were melting away. The fleeing Arabs partly reached the plain, where the French right wing drove them towards the river, and those who remained in Embabeh, after a bare two hundred shots from the guns, were driven into the Nile by the French assaulting parties. As the Egyptians are mostly good swimmers, many were able to save themselves.

No more dramatic battle had been seen since the Crusades. Murad Bey retired with the wreck of his command to Upper Egypt. From Cairo, Ibrahim Bey and the Pasha who represented the Sultan set fire to the flotilla in the Nile, thereby consuming untold riches, and fled towards Belbeys and Salahiyeh, on the caravan road to Syria. Bonaparte claims the loss of the Mamelukes and fellahin at ten thousand men, of which two thousand were Mameluke warriors; his own at forty killed and two hundred and sixty wounded. Numbers of fine horses were captured, and piles of beautiful weapons; many a French soldier picked up a purse of gold, which the Mame-

up to 1812, he labored with equal diligence, though what he did may be but casually referred to.

The better to control the local population, he formed a native Divan, "chosen among the most intelligent and wisest," in which he held the power, but which itself controlled the people. This Divan was composed of twenty-five members, nine from Cairo and one from each of the sixteen provinces, two secretaries, one interpreter, two sheriffs and ten court servants. These men were drawn from the sheiks, the merchants and the men of law, and themselves chose nine members to sit in permanence in Cairo. In each province also was a Divan of nine members nominated by the principal inhabitants and chiefs, and chosen by the general commanding the province. The members of the Divan were well paid. Tallien, ex-member of the legislative body of France, sat in the Divan to represent Bonaparte.

Courts and bureaus were created, so that taxes might be equitably raised. The officers of the bureaus, often Coptic Christians, were handsomely paid, from an administrator at six thousand livres ($1200) down to a book-keeper at two thousand livres. Taxes were raised on imports (on wines and liquors, *e. g.* from France three per cent. and from other places five per cent.), on legal papers, licenses, on tavern-keepers, livery stables, trades and from other sources.

Money was also raised by levying contributions on real estate, the value of which was gauged on the basis of ten times the rental value, and on merchants; and all commerce was made to contribute. Tribunals of commerce were erected in the different cities to adjudge disputes between merchants. A great part of Bonaparte's correspondence in Egypt was devoted to civil organization. In all taxation he strove to make the burden of the occupation fall on the rich and not on the poor. This was his principle throughout life. The bas-

tinado was abolished as a means of getting evidence, but the agas were allowed to continue its infliction as a punishment.

Bonaparte strove to impress the people with the fact that they were to be made independent, and to this end a general assembly of the notables of the fourteen provinces of Egypt was called together.

All Egypt had been disarmed; but in January it was ordered that villages which were certainly loyal might bear arms, each armed person being held to join the local French column in case of attack by Arabs.

Hand in hand with the government of Egypt went the organization of the army. A dromedary regiment was created, consisting of two squadrons, each of four companies, and each company having a captain, a lieutenant and the usual sub-officers. The men were mounted on dromedaries and armed with guns with bayonets and cartridge-boxes, like the infantry, and some of them also carried a fifteen-foot lance. They were dressed in gray with a turban and an Arab mantle; and were of the best material, selected by merit from all the regiments.

Officer of Dromedary Corps.

Every infantry soldier was ordered to carry a stake five feet long, for field fortifications and other uses not easily supplied in a treeless country. It was adjusted behind the left shoulder, in a socket attached

to the belt of the cartridge box. This was suggested by the camp-stakes borne by the Roman legionaries. Every horseman was to carry two small skins, each holding ten pounds of water; and the artillery equipage of each gun was held to

Dromedary Soldier.

be supplied with a hundred pounds of water. Not only non-commissioned officers, but lieutenants and sub-lieutenants in the light infantry, were armed with muskets. Non-combatants in the cavalry were also thus armed.

Janissaries were enlisted, the captain of a company having eighty francs salary. In Cairo ten companies of National Guards were created, consisting of all the civil employees accompanying the army, camp followers and non-combatants. All young Mamelukes over eight years old and under sixteen, and all young slaves of the same age, were incorporated in

the army for fatigue and other duty. Organization and drill were kept up in Cairo, and every Frenchman capable of bearing arms was given weapons suitable to his state. Intrenching tools were made for the guides.

Horses were procured by taxing each of the thirteen provinces from fifty to three hundred horses each. The horses of each arm of the service, artillery, engineers, transportation, cavalry, etc., were branded with a letter or the number of a regiment, so that they could not be illegitimately used. Yet the horses often got changed on the way to depot, and mares were frequently turned in. Bonaparte said, September 24, 1798, in sending a horse to Menou, "It is very difficult to find even passable ones." Presumably Murad Bey had stripped the country. The Arabian is, moreover, small; and the French horses were found better than the native for artillery, on account of their weight.

When servants brought from France struck for higher wages, it was made illegal to hire the servant of an officer, and these were forbidden to ask more than the amount settled when first engaged. The servant who deserted his master could be punished by five years in irons.

Mosques were made into hospitals. Cemeteries for soldiers were erected in Cairo, Gizeh, Alexandria, Rosetta, Damietta, Belbeys. Camels with palanquins, such as carry Arabian women, were among other means used to transport the wounded.

Numerous little establishments for manufacturing powder were found in Egypt, and were improved and used for keeping up the supply, but it was forbidden the people to manufacture powder anywhere, or to sell the powder made by the natives, which was too poor for the army and good only for the Arabs.

Bonaparte did all he could to encourage the troops, as was,

indeed, essential under the unusual trials. But at times there was scant material to announce in orders. On September 10, 1798, from Cairo he instructed Berthier to publish to the army that the dispatches from France gave satisfactory news, that the citadel of Turin had been occupied by the French, that Ireland was in open insurrection, and that the Rastadt negotiations were drawing to a close ; and communicated the thanks of the Directory to the army for the taking of Malta. On September 24, 1798, he announced to the army that a body of Arabs, some ten thousand strong, attacked at midnight the garrison of Damietta. They were boldly met by the garrison, and some reinforcements assailed them in the rear. Four or five hundred French thus beat ten thousand Bedouins, fifteen hundred of whom were killed or drowned.

On September 22, 1798, he issued a

PROCLAMATION TO THE ARMY.

Soldiers, we celebrate the first day of the seventh year of the Republic. Five years ago the independence of the French people was menaced, but you took Toulon, which was a presage of the ruin of our enemies. A year after you beat the Austrians at Dego, and next year you were on the summit of the Alps. Two years ago you fought against Mantua, and you won the celebrated victory of San Giorgio. Last year you were at the sources of the Drave and the Isonzo, on the way back from Germany. Who would have said that you would to-day be on the borders of the Nile, in the centre of the most ancient continent? From the Englishman celebrated in arts and commerce to the horrid and ferocious Bedouin, the eyes of the world are upon you.

It is a curious fact that Bonaparte herein refers to the battle near Mantua, and makes no mention of Castiglione, Arcole or Rivoli.

From time to time Bonaparte reported to the Directory with regard to the army. On October 21, 1798: "We are here in the same position; the army is being clothed, and is

resting, the artillery equipage forming, fortifications are rising, and the country is being organized. . . . I will shortly send you a fine map of Alexandria, of Cairo and of Egypt, that I am having made. Every one works, no one loses his time." A month later he reports that much difficulty is met with in organizing the country on account of the inundations. But on December 17 he wrote that "the army is in the best condition, and there are few sick. . . . We have crops in abundance."

As always, when not on the march, Bonaparte was careful in watching the matter of victualing, and the quality of the rations. On August 26, 1798, it was ordered that "there shall be made in the army only one kind of loaf as a ration: whether for the staff or administration, it shall be the regulation loaf. There shall be made much more carefully bread for the hospitals, but it is forbidden, under whatever pretext, for the administrators and storekeepers to give of the latter bread to the general commanding or any other general, nor to the general storehouse."

The bread ration of twenty-four ounces, made with wheat mixed with a little bran, was often replaced by six ounces of rice, and there was added to the ration six ounces of vegetables. Wine and brandy were furnished. Coffee was added to the rations in September. A ration of meat was given every third day, being half a pound, one quarter mutton and three quarters buffalo meat. The hospital ration was somewhat better. Pay was retained for excess rations: for a ration of bread five sous, a ration of meat three and a half sous, a ration of rice two sous eight deniers, a ration of vegetables four deniers, melted butter or oil one franc four sous a pound, a ration of wood, or half a pound, three deniers. No effort was spared to keep up the quality of the ration. On August 29, 1798, the Arab agent who mixed rye with the

wheat he was ordered to grind was fined one thousand talari; and French officials were frequently reprimanded or punished.

Vial, with a small force, held Damietta, Lannes taking over Menou's division. Other small bodies were sent to Mausma and Suez. To Kleber was given the task of keeping open the communications between the Nile and Alexandria so as to insure those with the capital. The inhabitants of Cairo were disarmed, and extra-heavy contributions were levied on the city; and in the government of Cairo considerable cruelty was shown, for Bonaparte believed that Orientals could be held in subjection only by severity; that equity or generosity was wasted, — an assumption but half true, as the English have proved in many lands.

To make secure his holding of Egypt, that is, of Cairo and the Delta of the Nile, it was essential to drive Ibrahim Pasha across the desert into Syria, as Murad had been driven up the great river. From Cairo up, Egypt is a country ten miles wide on the average, and a thousand miles long. Only this narrow valley is fertilized by the overflow of the Nile; and on either hand well above it lies the rocky, sandy, rolling desert, boundless, waterless, with a rare oasis or a well, which enables caravans at certain places to cross it. It was not a hard task for Desaix to keep Murad in Upper Egypt; but to keep Ibrahim from doing constant harm, he must be followed and driven entirely out of the Delta. On August 2, accordingly, a small party was sent out to El Khanka in pursuit of Ibrahim, at which place it arrived next day. On the 5th, however, Ibrahim attacked this detachment and drove it back on Cairo. Reynier had followed on and, meeting this party on the way, took it up, and with the division reached El Khanka on the 6th. Bonaparte had now completed his preparations to move against Ibrahim; and on the 7th started with Lannes towards El Khanka, leaving to Desaix not only the care of Upper Egypt, but of Cairo as well.

The French soldiery had been kept fairly well in check, despite much grumbling at its unusual climatic sufferings; but at the sight of this new enterprise, which threatened to lead them into deserts to which their lively imagination saw no end, the dissatisfaction became louder and louder, and was on the point of breaking out into open mutiny. But Bonaparte had a peculiar way of keeping his finger on the pulse of his army; and before a single act of disobedience had occurred, by his presence alone, and by his stern and yet reasonable attitude, he suppressed the threatened breach of discipline by a few words, and brought the men back to their duty. And, says Savary, "so great was the confidence which General Bonaparte had in himself, that with this condition of affairs he actually left Cairo."

On the 7th the forces under Bonaparte reached El Khanka; and Dugua followed to El Matariyeh to join the expedition. Two days later the corps was at Belbeys, while Ibrahim had retired to Es Salahiyeh; and on the 10th, the forward movement having carried headquarters to El Karaim and on the 11th to Es Salahiyeh, Bonaparte, who had hurried ahead with all the mounted cavalry he had, some three hundred men, reached the vicinity of Ibrahim's party. But it was of no avail; Ibrahim had started for the Syrian desert, and a rearguard fight accomplished nothing. In cavalry combats the Mamelukes were quite the equals, if not the superiors, of the French, and before the foot could come up, Ibrahim had placed himself beyond reach. Es Salahiyeh being the most available spot for a depot of supplies, lying at a salient towards Syria with the line Cairo-Alexandria as a base, Bonaparte made arrangements to intrench the place, and to use it as a secondary base for the operation he projected against Syria. Detailed orders to this effect were later given to Caffarelli. Leaving Reynier there to complete his plan and to

cover the approaches from Syria, and sending Dugua on the 13th to El Mansura, Bonaparte hurried back to Cairo with the division of Menou.

A grave misfortune now befell the French at the naval battle of Aboukir. Bonaparte had desired the French men-of-war to take refuge in the port of Alexandria; and on July 3 he had ordered Admiral Brueys to enter the Old Port, if there were enough draught; if not, to disembark the artillery and stores, and report whether he could hold himself against a superior squadron in the Bay of Aboukir; and in case neither could be accomplished, to sail for Corfu or Toulon, leaving five specified men-of-war at Alexandria, as well as all transports. Brueys sounded the entrance, and as the ships of eighty and one hundred and twenty guns, which demanded a draught of from twenty-three to twenty-seven feet, could not, he thought, go in, he declined to essay an entrance. He believed, moreover, that a single English ship could blockade the entire port, and confine him to it in uselessness; and as, moreover, in an excess of zeal, the admiral desired to watch the outcome of Bonaparte's enterprise, and thought that by anchoring in the Bay of Aboukir he would in a measure protect Bonaparte's rear, he sailed thither. On the other hand, Bonaparte's idea was that in Corfu or Toulon the French fleet, being safe, would be more useful than where subject to risk — and he was right. After the event, to be sure, on August 19, Bonaparte reported to the Directory that he had written Brueys to lose not an hour in entering Alexandria or making for Corfu; but the assertion is sustained by the earlier correspondence.

In Aboukir Bay, then, on his return from Syria, Nelson found the French fleet anchored. This is a semicircular basin, with the Rosetta cape and the Aboukir cape as headlands; and the Aboukir cape was fortified so as to prevent a landing.

Brueys had seventeen ships stationed in a long line substantially parallel to the shore, with broadsides seaward. He felt sure that no ship could cross the shoals between him and Aboukir, — and indeed it took a Nelson to dare it, — and placed his strongest vessels at the other end of the line.

Nelson.

Nelson and his fleet came up July 31, having long cruised in search of the French; and when, after reconnoitring, he ascertained the anchoring line of their ships, he determined on immediate action; and at eventide of August 1 he sailed down upon the French left, taking Admiral Brueys completely by surprise. Nelson's manœuvre was bold. Defying the danger of the shoals between Aboukir fort and the French left, and favored by the wind, he sailed in and took the French line of ships in reverse, on the side where no preparation had been made to meet an enemy. Many sailors were ashore, and the French fleet was unprepared for anything but an attack from seaward. Nelson's boldness succeeded, as it deserved to do. The leading English ship stuck on a shoal, but four others which followed passed in safety and struck the French vessels in their helpless condition; and meanwhile, with eight ships of the line, Nelson attacked the seaward front. On this front the British suffered severely, and the French admiral at one time even felt sure of victory, ordering his right wing ships to take the English line in reverse. This was not done, however. The Orient was blown up, and darkness brought on a pause. At earliest dawn the fighting began again, and went on till two o'clock in the afternoon. Brueys was mortally wounded. He would

not allow himself to be carried away. "Leave me," said he; "a French admiral should die on his quarter-deck." All told, the battle lasted twenty hours. Four French ships escaped to Malta. The rest of the French fleet (save the two ships of the line and seven frigates which were in Alexandria with the transports) was destroyed. Nelson left five ships of the line before Alexandria, and shortly sailed for Naples.

In a letter to Kleber, September 4, 1798, Bonaparte says: "We cannot dissimulate that in the combat of the 14th it was our leaders who were beaten rather than the squadron, for, with equal numbers, the English were three or four against one. I only see in it a false combination; this gives me a favorable idea of Admiral Nelson, but gives me a not too unfavorable one of our navy; and I remain always convinced that if the English had attacked us on our crossing, we should have beaten them soundly." And from Aboukir, October 7, he wrote to the Directory that he sent to them the soundings of Alexandria harbor, and that the French squadrons would well have been able to enter. "What regrets does this not add to our losses!"

Brueys.

It was at the moment of Bonaparte's return to Cairo that the news of the sea-fight of Aboukir ran in, and at one blow he saw dashed all his hopes of eventual success in his Oriental schemes. No fleet meant no commerce, no security for the new colony, and therefore no colonists, no communication with home except by vessels which might run the gauntlet of

the English fleet. But all who saw Bonaparte at this time testify that in face, words or conduct he showed no sign of even disappointment. The army heard of the disaster with dread; but one and all recognized that their chief reliance now rested solely on the small, spare, stern, self-contained man who had led them in triumph from Nice to Leoben. All over Egypt the news of Aboukir produced a change of sentiment. Bonaparte had already begun to accomplish results; this disaster arrested all improvement. The Mamelukes gained heart of hope; the Sublime Porte turned against France.

Although we learn to know the man and soldier during these trying days, there is perhaps less in the Egyptian campaign than in others which adds to our instruction in the art of war. Yet Napoleon's failures are full of interest. And here, though both the adversary and the climate were different from what he had so far encountered, Bonaparte stuck to his mass theory; and in order to start on his Syrian expedition, he gathered all the force at his command. And again, in dispatching Desaix after Murad Bey to Upper Egypt, and giving him sole control of the land above Cairo, when the French general wrote that he was about to divide his force so as to surround and capture the Mamelukes, Bonaparte sent him word from Cairo, September 4: "You know that in general I do not like combined attacks. Approach Murad Bey from whatever direction you can, but with all your forces. On the battlefield, if he stands, you can take all your measures to do him as much harm as possible." And to Berthier he wrote: "You will give orders to General Desaix to attack Murad Bey wherever he shall find him, but always to keep his forces together. My intention is that he shall not divide his forces with the idea of surrounding the enemy. This kind of manœuvre is too uncertain in a country naturally cut up like the one in which he is situated." As Jomini

in his intrenched camp. He filed off so as to unmask these guns, which then opened upon Desaix's square. Had he thus begun, and followed up the artillery fire by his charge, Desaix would probably have lost the day, or at all events he would have had to change his tactics, for the guns soon made a breach in the French square. To save himself, Desaix was forced to capture the battery, and Murad was not quick enough to take advantage of the critical moment. The brave French column rushed the intrenchments, captured the guns, and turned them on the Mamelukes, who fled towards the desert. The French loss was nearly five hundred men. On each Mameluke killed the men found a purse, often holding as much as five hundred louis, it being the custom of the Mameluke to carry his fortune with him. During the winter Desaix's column made its way with numberless skirmishes, some of them severe, up to the cataracts of the Nile. He established headquarters at Beni Suef, about fifty miles above Cairo, and began to settle the affairs of the country.

As appears above, Bonaparte had long ago made up his mind that to rule Egypt — perhaps to rule any Oriental race — rigor alone would suffice. Right or wrong, on this theory he acted, at the same time making use of all other means of controlling the population. He pretended interest in Mohammedanism even to the verge, it is asserted with questionable authority, of becoming a convert to its teachings; and he made much of those in religious authority. It required an abnormal self-reliance, a determination of the highest order, to carry through his plans in the face of the daily growing difficulties of the situation. The entire population was inimical; "though beaten they were not subdued, and would not be for a long period," he reported; and on every side were growing symptoms of revolt. Repression by the most extreme measures was in order.

To Vial Napoleon wrote from Cairo, September 26 : "Citizen General, you will use the days during which the division of General Dugua can remain at Damietta to disarm the city, to arrest the suspects and send them to Cairo, to disarm the villages and take hostages." To Dugua, October 6 : "I am dissatisfied, Citizen General, that the five villages which have acted so badly have not yet been disarmed." For having assassinated an officer and fifteen men, the village of Alkan was pillaged and burned ; and the summary manner of dealing with the chiefs is well shown in an order of July 30 from Cairo. "Bonaparte, General-in-Chief, having proofs of the treachery of Seid Mohammed El-Koraim, whom he had covered with kindnesses, orders : Article 1. Seid Mohammed El-Koraim shall pay a contribution of three hundred thousand francs. Article 2. In default of his paying the said contribution five days after the publication of this order, he shall be beheaded." The money must have been paid to little advantage, for on September 5, 1798, "it appears that Seid Mohammed El-Koraim, convicted of treason by having kept up correspondence with the Mamelukes after having sworn fidelity to the Republic, and by having served them as spy, was shot in the citadel of Cairo ; his head was carried about the streets, and all his goods were confiscated."

Of stern punishment there was plenty, as witness the following : "Cairo, August 1. The town of Damanhur has acted very badly against a detachment of our troops commanded by General Dumuy. An exemplary vengeance is necessary. . . . General Dumuy will disarm the town, will decapitate five of the principal inhabitants, one being the worst behaved among the men of law, and the four others taken among those who have the most influence over the populace." On August 4 Bonaparte wrote to General Zajonshek : "You have done well, Citizen General, to shoot five men of the villages which had revolted." On November 3 a list was published of fourteen sheiks and others who were condemned to death and to have their goods confiscated. To Reynier, Cairo, October 27, the chief wrote : "Every night we have some thirty heads cut off, and many of these of leaders ; this will, I hope, give them a good lesson ;" and to Lanusse, Cairo, October 27 : "The garrison of Damietta has been attacked, Citizen General, and, as it seems to me, murdered by the villagers of Ramleh. Strive to capture the leaders and decapitate them."

Of such orders the records are full, and they show the condition of the land, and what had to be contended with.

Money too was procured by the ancient Egyptian means of severe cruelty and, until forbidden, the bastinado; and even with this the army chest was frequently empty.

The discipline of the army left much to be desired, though in this respect Bonaparte was never as successful as many of his great predecessors in the art of war. The men plundered right and left, official responsibility was lax, and no woman was safe from violation, despite all orders and punishments. All these breaches of discipline had to an extent existed in 1796; but every man of the Army of Italy was proud to belong to that body, and happy to see the campaign continued. This was in itself a limitation of indiscipline; but here the reverse was the case. To those who had looked on Egypt as the land of promise — and the rank and file had all left home with this delusion — disenchantment came in full measure. Only Gallic light-heartedness carried the men through. In the "Correspondance de l'Armée Française," the utter wretchedness of the Egyptian population, of the villages, of Alexandria, and of Cairo, is fully set forth.

Yet it was sought to enforce discipline by occasional sharp reproofs, and sharper punishments.

On October 14, 1798, "The general-in-chief accepts the resignation of the Citizen Beauvais. The officer who in good health resigns in the middle of a campaign cannot have come here with the intention of acquiring glory and to conduce to the end of general peace. He has been brought here by other motives, and is not worthy of the soldiers whom I command." On December 10, Chief of Brigade Grobert having asked to be sent back to France, "The general-in-chief answers this request, that as the Citizen Grobert won his grade of chief of brigade in Paris, and without hearing a shot fired, his intention is that this officer shall be continually employed at the outposts: you will therefore order him to Salahiyeh." On January 8 it was ordered that "every health officer who without orders leaves the place designated for the hospital in presence of the enemy, or who refuses to carry help to the sick, is to be arrested, brought before the military council, and judged according to the article of the law

relating to soldiers and military men who have fled before the enemy. No Frenchman should fear death, whatever profession he may have chosen. The Citizen Boyer, surgeon of the wounded at Alexandria, who was so cowardly as to refuse aid to the wounded who had been in contact with men sick of a disease supposed to be contagious, is unworthy of the quality of a French citizen. Let him be dressed like a woman, marched about the streets of Alexandria on an ass, with a placard on his back inscribed, *Unworthy of being a French citizen. He fears to die.* After which he is to be put in prison, and sent back to France on the first ship." A corporal and a grenadier were shot for assassinating three women, and the officers and grenadiers of their company were degraded. Two captains were cashiered for gambling with the soldiers : a penalty later modified.

To compensate for these punishments, rewards for good conduct were not infrequent. On January 18 Citizen Devouges, light horseman, was promoted to be second lieutenant for having followed the troops when he had received leave of absence. Soldiers who had been recommended for bravery in Italy received double pay in Egypt. On February 2 silver drumsticks were ordered to be given to drummers, silver trumpets to trumpeters, and gold grenades to soldiers who distinguished themselves. Singular fidelity was shown by many of Bonaparte's associates. In January, 1799, Berthier, being really sick, was sent off on a cruise in which he was to visit Corfu, Malta and sail towards Syria. He was also given permission to go to France; but learning that the army was to march to Syria, he handed back his passport and rejoined the army. Bonaparte recognized this kind of fidelity, not only by honor and rank, but also in a substantial manner — as when, on February 1, certain real estate was given to Lannes, Dommartin, Murat and others.

Yet neither punishment nor reward could forestall or prevent the constant breaches of discipline. The suffering of the army was intense. Unusual exertion in the fearful heat, under which men fell by dozens in their tracks, with rations

often ill-supplied, absence of fuel to cook, unfit clothing, heavy loads and poor camps, produced homesickness among all. Nostalgia was as serious a sickness as dysentery or typhoid. Officers and men alike suffered. Camp disease increased, blindness attacked many; and by the end of the year the plague set in. There were no two minds as to the horror of the situation. The number of suicides by bullets and drowning increased. Only sharp reprimand and punishment kept back resignations, or requests for leave of officers. These latter Bonaparte treated with sharp measures in orders of the day and in personal orders. But he never forgot those officers who here proved faithful. The men who bore with and rose superior to their distress in this campaign found themselves later in the line of rapid and high promotion. Yet the trouble was great, and time rather increased than diminished it. That Bonaparte kept the army in a condition of usefulness and retained its confidence argues distinctly for his strength and ability, for his power over men.

Fortifications were carefully erected wherever they were thought to be essential. On October 20, 1798, on the road from Alexandria to El Ramaniyeh, Caffarelli was ordered to build a good redoubt at every five leagues, capable of holding two hundred men and of being defended by fifty men, and to do so was authorized to use stones and other materials from abandoned mosques. The several places of strategic advantage were made as strong as possible. In December a small force went to Suez with orders to fortify it, and especially to look after the wells and to examine and chart the country. Later Bonaparte made a tour of inspection of the Red Sea shore, and Admiral Ganteaume was ordered over to inspect the place with regard to its naval values.

During the fall and winter of 1798, headquarters was in Cairo. Dugua held El Mansura, and later Damietta. Rey-

nier was in Es Salahiyeh, and Desaix at Beni Suef. Cairo was intrenched, and garrisoned by Lannes and Bon. Some interchanges of troops occurred. Lannes sent his line half-brigade to Kleber in Alexandria, and Bon sent one of his light half-brigades to Menou in Rosetta. Despite discouraging surroundings, Bonaparte stuck to his work. What was not good he made to so appear; all dispatches which should reach the ear of the French people glowed with a roseate hue. As in a measure he did all through life, he was now doubly playing for effect, though indeed he had by no means yet convinced himself that the Egyptian expedition was a failure.

Bonaparte constantly strove to communicate with those whose action might influence the Egyptian situation.

He wrote, August 27, 1798, to the Sheriff of Mecca, telling him that measures had been taken to conserve for the holy mosques of Mecca and Medina the revenues due in Egypt, and offering to provide protection, ammunition and provisions for him On August 31, 1798, he wrote to the Pasha of Damascus, "I have already written you several letters to let you know that we are no enemies to the Mussulmans; and that the only reason that has brought us to Egypt is to punish the Beys, and avenge the outrages they have done to French commerce. I desire that you should remain persuaded of the wish I have to live in good intelligence with you, and to give you all the signs of most perfect friendship. BONAPARTE." On the same date he wrote to the Sultan's Pasha, asking him to return to Cairo. On November 9, in a letter from Cairo to the Grand Vizier, expressing friendship for the Sublime Porte, and reiterating the promise of the French only to punish the Beys of Egypt, "as we have done in Algeria and Tunis," he says: "The French Republic is by inclination as well as by interest friendly to the Sultan, because she is the enemy of his enemies; she positively refused to enter the Coalition which was made by the two emperors against the Sublime Porte. The powers which have already divided Poland between them have the same purpose against Turkey. In the actual conditions, the Sublime Porte ought to look upon the French army as a friend devoted to it, and which is all ready to act against these enemies." In a letter of December 17 to the Directory, Bonaparte states that an Indian who, said he, had come from Tippoo

Sahib, had arrived at Suez with a letter for the commander of the French forces in Egypt, but the letter had got lost. "It seems that our arrival in Egypt has given a great idea of our power to India, and has produced an effect unfavorable to the English. Fighting is going on there." On December 19 it was ordered that everything should be done for the monastery at Mount Sinai, "in order that the tradition of our conquest shall be carried forward to future races, out of respect for Moses and the Jewish nation, and because the monastery is kept by men of education and good order." Their taxes were remitted, and they were to be their own masters, subject to no superior. On January 25 word was sent to the Iman of Muscat, asking him to forward the following letter: "To Tippoo Sahib: You have been instructed of my arrival on the borders of the Red Sea with an innumerable and invincible army, filled with the desire to deliver you from the iron yoke of the English. I hasten to make you understand the desire that I have that you should give me, by way of Muscat or Mecca, news as to the political situation in which you are. I could wish that you might send to Suez some able man in your confidence with whom I could confer. BONAPARTE."

These extracts throw light on the leader's ideas of what might be done in the Orient to favor France and injure England. But the practical failure of all these advances must have lent additional discouragement to a situation as yet promising no return for all the sacrifices made.

At the same time headquarters in Cairo was organized in a manner worthy of a little Paris. In an autograph note of Bonaparte's, probably written at the end of July, relating to things to be ordered from France, there were included comedians, ballet-dancers, marionettes, one hundred French women, the wives of the French employed in Egypt, together with doctors, druggists, surgeons, gardeners, wine-growers and distillers, and a large supply of brandy, wine, soap and oil. No detail seemed too small for the eyes and time of this many-sided man. And although the French army was really banished from the fatherland, for many months elapsed before any news reached it from Europe, the English fleet holding

complete possession of the Mediterranean, yet both officers and men made the best of their lot, and much gayety was indulged in at each one of the permanent posts. All professional soldiers make light of suffering; and the Gaul has a peculiar cheerfulness given him by nature.

No species of amusement was neglected. On August 26, 1798, an order to celebrate the establishment of the Republic provided: —

"Article 3. There will be built in Cairo, in the middle of the Ezeckyeh square, a pyramid with seven faces, each destined to receive the names of the men of the five divisions who have died in the conquest of Egypt. The sixth face shall be for the navy, the seventh shall be for the general staff, the cavalry, the artillery and the engineers." About this pyramid games and other celebrations were to be given. On November 13 a request was sent to Caffarelli to have made a few games of bowls to be sent to the troops at Belbeys, and to Desaix. On December 21 daily music was ordered to be played in the open square, beside the hospitals, "to inspire gayety in the sick, and to retrace to them the most beautiful moments of the past campaigns." On January 30 it was ordered that the feast of Ramzan should be celebrated with all fervor and pomp.

Full support had likewise been given to the men of science who had agreed to accompany the expedition, and their work extended to every department of the army. Having early sloughed off the boorishness of the Terrorists, Bonaparte reverted to his natural disposition to sustain learning. Nor were these worthy savants without their material uses. Cut off from supplies, the leader found them essential in making the most of the resources of Egypt for the benefit of the army. Hand in hand with this work went archæology and astronomy. Bonaparte had once said to the governors of the Ligurian Republic, "True conquests, the only ones which cause no regrets, are those achieved over ignorance." He now proved his assertion good, and an Institute of Sciences was established in Cairo by order of August 22, 1798. With an original mem-

bership of thirty-six individuals headed by Bonaparte, this was the beginning of the renascence of Egypt. It was indeed this body that commenced the work of unearthing the vast treasures of the Egyptian Pharaohs from the detritus of twelve centuries of Mohammedan barbarism. Among other discoveries was the location of the Suez Canal of Sesostris; and Desaix began the excavations of ancient Thebes. While his late Austrian opponents were living at ease, and Nelson was forgetting himself in Naples, Bonaparte was opening the buried riches of Egypt for the future. Like Alexander, he carried learning with him wherever he went. Many things of this nature must be scored to his credit. They offset much that may be said against him.

The members and employees of the commission of science and arts were well paid, from the first class at five hundred francs a month down to the tenth class at fifty francs a month. The medical staff was less well treated. In hospitals, a doctor, who did the work of our hospital stewards, received eighty francs a month, a clerk a hundred to a hundred and fifty, and the higher officers three to four hundred francs a month, plus one to three rations.

News was almost impossible to get, though every effort was made to procure it. On December 11 an envoy was sent to Cyprus and Constantinople on the pretext of asking the release of the Frenchmen arrested in Syria, but really to obtain news. On November 16 a parliamentarian was sent on board the English fleet on a slender pretext, in order to procure news from Europe. On December 9 an embassy was sent to Dernah and Tripoli to seek the good-will of the Beys, and to ask them to send such information from Europe as they might from time to time receive. And on December 12 and 18 orders were given to Marmont to send Arabs to Dernah to get news, "which occasionally comes thither from

Europe, that port not being blockaded by the English." News would be well paid for, it was said. Yet all that ran in were as a rule idle rumors.

There was constant small war with the neighboring tribes and with revolting villages. Murat had proved so efficient in handling cavalry that he was apt to be sent out to suppress these revolts and punish the instigators.

On August 29, 1798, in a letter to Berthier, Napoleon tells him to send Junot to hunt up Bey Torrah, the man who killed a French sergeant. If he could fall upon one of their camps, he is to carry off twenty of their women as hostages. On August 31, 1798, orders were issued to burn down a village near Monsurat, and to levy a contribution on the rich men of the village for their bad conduct to the troops. On November 1 Bonaparte wrote to Berthier : "You will give the order to General Lannes to leave to-morrow at the point of day with four hundred men, and to march to the village of El-Quatah on the Rosetta branch, to punish the inhabitants for having stopped this morning two flat-boats (djermas) charged with artillery. He will strive to arrest the Sheik El-Beled, and failing this, twelve of the principal inhabitants. He will do all that is possible to make them return the bayonets, guns, muskets, etc., they have pillaged." On January 20 Murat was ordered with a small force to fall on an Arabian camp, "to carry off the camels, women, children, old men, and to bring them to Cairo ; to kill all that he could not take, and to do all the harm possible."

The women thus taken were an incumbrance, and on December 8 it was ordered that when women fell into the hands of an expedition against the Arabs, they were to be sent to Damietta, or Alexandria, whichever place was nearest, to be held in prison by the sheiks of the country.

The English victory at Aboukir was followed by a blockade of the port of Alexandria, where the French transports and the few remaining men-of-war lay at anchor. It seems as if the English fleet must have been in the habit of amusing itself by coming close in shore and bombarding Alexandria, or French camps or posts in the vicinity. On September 4, 1798, Bonaparte wrote Kleber instructions on this subject.

"Order, and see it executed, that your cannoneers do not fire when ships are still out of range. It proves that they are afraid. Let the ships advance to half-range, and then let the shell and the red-hot balls commence together, quietly and methodically, and I assure you that they will quickly rue it.

"When the ships snug up to you (*viennent faire les jolis cœurs*), fire at them with half-charges, to draw them on and offer them a bait. Every battery that has only time to fire one or two shells and three or four charges is commanded by a man who does not know his trade, or it is because they have not let the ships come close enough. If they have let the ships get within half-range, they should have time to fire five or six shells and eight or ten balls for each piece, and if the gunners are good and the officers cool, it is certain that with this number of shots some must do great damage and the vessels ought to be lost. Forbid firing with cold balls, unless it be of a few shot mixed in to ease the piece; otherwise the gunners will always fire cold shot. They do not like to fire hot shot. . . . Have the different detachments of artillery exercise every day with hot balls. Most of our gunners, even our officers, have had little chance to fire with hot balls."

Talleyrand.

The closing of the port of Alexandria was not the only ill result of the defeat of Aboukir; for Turkey, irritated at the French invasion of Egypt, had been persuaded to join hands with England, and now agreed to raise armies to drive the French from the land. When Bonaparte left France, it had been agreed with the Directory that Talleyrand, Minister of Foreign Affairs, should go to Constantinople to explain the French attitude in the Egyptian expedition, for the Porte had always been friendly.

This was not done, and the result was disastrous. Bonaparte was threatened with further interference from without. Months before there had been a fair chance for France to play into the hands of the Porte, but Bonaparte now learned that a Turkish army was assembling in Syria under Ahmed Pasha, known as Djezzar ("the Butcher"); and that another, in Rhodes, was being got ready to land in Egypt and relieve Cairo. These armies were to be convoyed by the English fleet, as Turkey was already assisted by English money. So soon as he heard this news, Bonaparte, with his usual expedition, resolved to deal the first blow. It was only against Djezzar that he could direct this, for he had no fleet with which to reach Rhodes; and moreover the Syrian threat was by far the more dangerous. It also came to his knowledge that a large magazine of breadstuffs and material of war was being equipped in Acre (St. Jean d'Acre), in Syria, and from here the enemy had advanced a detachment to Gaza, and thrown out a small party under Abdallah Pasha, Djezzar's lieutenant, as far as El Arish, on the border of the Syrian desert. Guns and artillerists had been landed at Jaffa.

Bonaparte was on the point of starting on this Syrian expedition when, owing largely to the disaster of Aboukir and to the news that the Sultan was sending an army of relief, a revolt broke out in Cairo on October 22, and General Dupuy and three hundred French soldiers were killed. The measures for repression were quick and sharp. So soon as the revolt began, General Bon was ordered to attack the insurgent quarter, bombard the mosques, and put the mortars in such places as would do the most damage. The mosques were to be the centre of attack; all men found with arms in their hands were to be cut down, all houses from which stones were thrown upon the streets were to be set afire; every one found in the mosques was to be exterminated. To prevent

should let his imagination run riot in visions of a wholesale conquest of the Orient, it is difficult to fathom. As an example of what genius and discipline can do, he had Alexander, to be sure, and some other early conquerors of Asia Minor; but the conditions had quite changed. The Macedonian wisely secured his base, the Mediterranean, before projecting his line of operations into the interior, and there was then nothing back of this ocean which could interfere with him, for Rome was no factor outside of Italy; but inasmuch as the rules of strategy never change, and as what was Alexander's must be Bonaparte's base, and as, moreover, the English fleet rode supreme in the Mediterranean, why the French leader should have imagined he could conduct anything except a gigantic raid into Oriental countries will forever remain a puzzle.

To be sure, Bonaparte was as yet ignorant of the recent backward stride of the French power. This was, however, marked, and it meant failure for the Army of the Orient; and yet on November 4, 1798, the Directory had urged Bonaparte either to march towards India and join Tippoo Sahib, or else to march on Constantinople to influence the position of the French in the partition of Turkey supposed to be projected by Austria and Russia. This was blind advice, if you will, founded on utter misconstruction of the existing conditions. Still, it was just this disregard of obstacles which had so far helped the French Revolutionary rulers to win. Knowing practically nothing about the march of European affairs, for nearly a year had elapsed since he had received dispatches, yet Bonaparte kept the possibilities in mind, even if his Oriental dreams were waning.

He wrote the Directory, February 10, 1799: "If during March the report of the Citizen Hamelin is confirmed, that France is in arms against the kings, I will pass into France. I do not permit myself any reflection on the affairs of the

Republic, because for ten months I have received no news. We all have entire confidence in the wisdom and vigor of the determination you shall make." He then goes on to say that he has three objects in moving to Syria: to assure the conquest of Egypt by making a strong place beyond the desert, and therewith to prevent any enemy from combining with an European army which should try to disembark upon the coast; to oblige the Porte to explain himself, and thereby help the French negotiations; to make the coast of Syria friendly, so as to rob the English fleet of its ability to victual and water there. He was to be accompanied by the Mullah of Cairo, who, after the Mufti of Constantinople, was the most revered of the Moslems, by the sheiks of the four principal sects, and by the Prince of Pilgrims.

The thrice fertile Delta of the Nile is separated from the less fruitful land of Syria by the desert of El Jofar. Across this desert run a number of caravan routes, the most northerly of which crosses substantially parallel to the coast, from El Kantarah (on the present Suez Canal), via El Arish and Khan Junas (Khanyun), to Gaza. It is an old traveled route, about one hundred and fifty miles long, with a fair supply of wells at reasonably convenient distances. The sea being closed to the French by the victory of Aboukir, Bonaparte's sole means of reaching Syria was to follow the path for centuries trodden by caravans.

On the 1st of January, 1799, there were about sixty-five hundred men in Upper Egypt, ten thousand in Lower Egypt, and thirteen thousand destined for Syria, a total of nearly thirty thousand men. Of these twenty-two thousand were infantry, three thousand cavalry, over three thousand artillery and engineers, six hundred guides and the rest non-combatants. Generals Desaix, Friant, Belliard, Lasalle, Davout, were in Upper Egypt; Dugua, Lanusse, Marmont, Almeias, were in Lower Egypt; the rest were to go to Syria.

was really the dry bed of the Egyptus, a near-by river. Reynier was sore beset until Kleber's arrival; but in the night of the 14th–15th, after careful reconnoitring, Reynier made a circuit of the position by crossing the ravine, took the force in reverse, and at small loss to himself drove it away with casualties of several hundred men. Bonaparte arrived on the 16th. In conducting the siege, Reynier was ordered to make what we should call scarecrows, with an upright and cross-stick, clothed with an old uniform and hat. "Make twenty-odd manikins, and place them in different corners, to make the enemy believe that they are sentinels or outposts; so that they shall use up their ammunition and get tired of firing on our sentinels, when they commence to find out that they are invulnerable." This simple outworn ruse succeeded. On the 20th, breaches having been made in the walls of the fort, after much correspondence February 17, 18, and 19, the capitulation was thus formulated: —

1st. The fort of El Arish shall be given over to the French troops at four o'clock in the afternoon. 2d. The garrison will betake itself across the desert to Bagdad, unless it wishes to go to Egypt. 3d. At four o'clock a list of the names shall be turned in by the agas, with the promise for them and their troops not to serve in the army of Djezzar Pasha, nor to take the route to Syria. 4th. There shall be accorded a safe-conduct, and a tri-color flag under which the garrison shall file out. 5th. It will leave all the provisions and other effects which are in the fort, as well as all the horses. Fifteen horses shall be left for the chiefs. Other horses shall be honestly given up. BONAPARTE.

This proposition was carried out, the place was then garrisoned and put in a good state of defense by the French, and a number of guns were mounted on the walls.

Owing to the season, the march of about one hundred miles across the desert had so far not been as distressing to the men as they had anticipated, which was a matter of encouragement.

On February 21 Kleber, in the van, started out towards Gaza, Lannes and Bon followed next day, and Reynier brought up the rear on the 25th. Bonaparte left El Arish on the 23d; and on arrival at Khan Junas, he found the several columns astray, and spent a day assembling them at this place. When Kleber's column was found in so discouraged a condition that many of the soldiers had broken their muskets, Bonaparte rallied the men, drew them up in line, and said, as quoted by Bertrand: "It is not by mutiny that you will remedy your ills; at worst it would have been better to stick your heads in the sand and die with honor, rather than give yourselves up to disorder and violate discipline." The men were glad to return to duty with no other punishment.

On February 24 a proclamation was issued to the inhabitants of Gaza: "If I come with my army to Gaza, it is to drive out the troops of Djezzar Pasha, and to punish him for having made an invasion of Egypt." Next day the French army stood before the ancient town, and the vanguard discovered the army of Abdallah Pasha of Damascus joined with the Mamelukes in position in its front. After different evolutions, Murat with his cavalry in two lines, and sustained by Lannes and his light foot, cleverly turned the left of the enemy, who at first seemed ready to sustain the assault, but later beat a retreat. This combat occurred near the hill overlooking Hebron, "whither Samson carried the gates of Gaza." Near the town the French army remained two days.

Gaza received a French garrison, and Caffarelli was given full instructions as to repairing the walls, building hospitals and bakeries, and putting this place and El Arish in a good state of defense; for both towns were essential points in Bonaparte's line of retreat. To this officer he wrote: "You see that circumstances might arise under which El Arish would become the foremost point of our line of operations,

which, as it can hold out a fortnight or a month, may yield incalculable results."

From Gaza, February 26, Bonaparte wrote to Dugua: "We are in water and mud up to our knees. There is here the same cold and the same weather as in Paris at this season. You are very happy in the lovely sun of Cairo. This country is more beautiful than we had expected, and we have found more magazines of war and victual than we could have thought, many European cannon-balls and much powder." And on February 27, to Desaix: "We have passed seventy leagues of desert, which was extremely tiring, — alkali water, often none. We have eaten dogs, asses and camels. For three days there has been a horrible wind here, and it rains torrents. The sky is covered. It is the climate of Paris. The lemon-trees, the forest and olive trees, the inequality of the ground, represents perfectly the landscape of Languedoc."

Breaking up February 28, with Reynier as rearguard, the army left Gaza, and on March 3 reached Jaffa, the biblical Joppa, Reynier following two days later. This port was essential, for Bonaparte hoped, despite the British fleet, to receive here from Alexandria some supplies and heavy guns, and had ordered the vessels to this port. Jaffa, with its forty guns and garrison of four thousand men, was first shut in by Kleber, but it had also to be besieged with the field-guns, and this duty was undertaken by Lannes on the left and Bon on the right of the city, Kleber being pushed out along the coast towards Acre to protect the siege.

On March 7, in a letter to the commandant of Jaffa opening with "God is merciful and compassionate," Bonaparte recited that the army had come to Palestine to punish Djezzar for attacking Egypt; that "Jaffa is surrounded on all sides, batteries will open in two hours, and will strike down the wall and ruin the defenses. The heart of the general-in-chief is touched with the ills that the entire town will suffer in being taken by assault." He offers safeguard to the garrison, protection to the town, and "will retard fire until seven o'clock."

With Moslem fatalism, the offer was refused, and the garrison resisted gallantly; it was late in the day before breaches could be operated in the walls.

"The 22d Light Infantry was in column behind a roll in the ground which served as a place of arms, awaiting the signal for mounting the breach. The general-in-chief was standing on the epaulement of the battery, indicating with his finger to Colonel Lejeune, of that regiment, the manœuvre he was to make, when a musket-ball knocked his hat on the ground, passing within three inches of his head, and laid the colonel, who stood five feet ten inches, stark dead. 'That is the second time since I have made war,' said the general-in-chief that evening, 'that I owe my life to my height of five feet two!'"

Bonaparte reported to the Directory: "On the 16th the garrison made a sortie to take the breaching batteries. Albanese, Kurds, Anatolians and men of all tribes joined in the attack, but they were at once driven back. Duroc particularly distinguished himself. On the 17th I summoned the governor, who cut the head off my messenger. By one o'clock the breach was practicable. Lannes prepared the assault. Adjutant Netherwood, with ten carbiners, was the first to mount the breach, followed by three columns of grenadiers under Rambaud, for whom I ask promotion to brigadier-general. By five o'clock we were masters of the town, which for twenty-four hours was delivered over to pillage and to all the horrors of war, which have never appeared to me to be so hideous."

But this punishment was not all. Some two thousand of the garrison had been killed; other two thousand prisoners were taken, and these, as Bonaparte had no means of feeding them, and his forces were too few to detail a guard to keep them, after two days' deliberation, he ordered taken to

the seashore, and shot. It has been said that the prisoners had been promised quarter by Bonaparte's aides, but it rather appears that this shooting was done by urgent demand of the troops and officers, and grudgingly assented to by Bonaparte. Following was the order of March 9, to Berthier: "You will, Citizen General, call to you the colonel of cannoneers; you will demand the names of twenty principal officers of cannoneers; you will seize these twenty officers and have them conducted to the village where stands a battalion ready to leave for Cairo. There they will be put in the fort until further orders. When they shall have left for the village, you will order the adjutant-general on duty to conduct all the cannoneers and other Turks taken arms in hand in Jaffa to the borders of the sea, and to have them shot, taking such precautions that not one shall escape." Some of these men — the Memoirs say eight or nine hundred of them — were of those captured at El Arish and released on promise not again to serve against the French for one year; and these, at least, by the hard rules of war, had earned their fate. Still, Bonaparte does not seem to have taken the shooting of the Jaffa prisoners much to heart, for he wrote to Marmont, March 9, "The capture of Jaffa was very brilliant, four thousand men of the best troops of Djezzar and the best cannoneers of Constantinople were put to the sword."

From an ethical point of view, the act was no doubt unpardonable; from a military standpoint, it was a necessity. *Salus exercitus summa lex.*

Bonaparte, on March 9, sent out sundry letters to the different provinces. The phraseology was merely a part of the Oriental attitude he was compelled to assume.

To the sheiks of Nablus he wrote, offering peace or war. If they wish peace, let them chase the Mamelukes from among them. If they wish war, "I will bring it to them myself. . . . I am merciful and com-

passionate towards my friends, but terrible as the fire from heaven against my enemies." A proclamation was made to the sheiks and ulemas, and to the inhabitants of the provinces of Gaza, Ramleh and Jaffa. "God is great and merciful. I write you these presents to let you know that I have come to Palestine to drive out the Mamelukes and the army of Djezzar Pasha. . . . Remain quietly in your homes, let those come back who for fear have left. I accord safety and safe-conduct to all. I will give back to each one the property he possessed. . . . It is well that you should know that human efforts are useless against me, for all that I undertake must succeed. . . . The example of Jaffa and Gaza should make you know that if I am terrible for my enemies, I am kind to my friends, and especially gracious and kindly to the poor." A proclamation to the sheiks and commanders of Jerusalem also offered them peace or war. If they wish the first, they are to send to headquarters a deputation. If they want war, Bonaparte will bring it himself. "They are to know that I am terrible as the fire of heaven against my enemies, gracious and merciful towards the people and those who would be my friends."

The plague had broken out in the army. Kleber suggested that the forces be marched to the Nablus (Shechem) uplands, a much more healthful region; and from there Bonaparte might indeed have dominated Syria; but he had no time to waste, and he never could persuade himself to strike other than at the army of the enemy. He could not delay. If the Syrian work was to be done to good effect, it must be done at once. Merely to occupy the land was no part of Bonaparte's scheme. Until every enemy in arms was subdued, Syria could not be accounted his; and Djezzar was an ever present threat. Procrastination was the one thing that would work against the French; and he wisely chose to march on Acre.

Jaffa was also put in a good state of defense, Menou being brought on to take command, and three frigates were ordered from Alexandria to this port. Reynier was left to complete the work, and on March 14 the army advanced towards Acre by the land route to the right of Mount Carmel, instead of

along the shore. Next day the van ran across a body of the enemy, — it was Abdallah, backed by some Nablus foot, —and Lannes' division hastily following it up, after breaking it by a charge, lost a number of men. This enterprise was not patiently received by Bonaparte. "We are not in a position to indulge in feats of courage," said he. On March 17 the army entered the plain of Acre. Of the chieftain in command of the fortress, on February 10 Bonaparte had written to the Directory: "Djezzar Pasha, seventy years old, is a ferocious man who has an unmeasured hatred of the French. He has answered with disdain the friendly overtures I have several times made him." On March 9, in a letter to Djezzar, he recited the French injuries, and that Gaza, Ramleh and Jaffa were in his possession. "I shall march in a few days on Acre. But what reasons have I for taking a few years of life from an old man I do not know? . . . Become my friend again; be the enemy of the Mamelukes and the English, and I will do you as much good as I have done and can do you ill. BONAPARTE." Djezzar paid no heed to this letter. On a former occasion, Bonaparte says, he had decapitated his messenger.

Acre, the old scriptural Accho, was that part of the Holy Land which had been assigned to the tribe of Asher, but had never been conquered by it. Its kings had stood on a par with those of Tyre and Sidon. The city had once fallen before the arms of Sennacherib, and again before those of his grandson. As a city of considerable size, it was known as Ptolemais under the descendants of Alexander. The Arabs conquered it in A. D. 638, the Crusaders in 1104. Saladin wrested it from the latter in 1187, and four years later the Crusaders again took it. It was then held by the Knights of St. John for one hundred years, and was the last Christian stronghold in Palestine. It stands on a peninsula, with an exposed and useless harbor; but Haifa, to the south of it, has

a roadstead of about eight miles by four, which affords fair shelter. Acre was sometimes called the key of Palestine, which, holding as it did the plain of Esdraelon, between Mount Carmel and the main range, and thus fending off access to the Jordan from the sea district, it in a sense was.

Acre had in ancient times been of much military importance; but in 1799 the works had fallen somewhat into decay, though Djezzar had done much to repair the high wall and flanking towers which protected the land side. Not only its harbor was at this time in a bad condition, but even Haifa roadstead was disused. Unaware of the actual conditions, Bonaparte had expected an easy triumph; but the English had already come to the rescue of Acre, and had helped forward Djezzar's plans. To Sir Sidney Smith had been given the command of the eastern Mediterranean, and he had well utilized his opportunities, despite the subsequent acrid criticism of Bonaparte.

Back of the promontory on which the town of Acre is situated is the plain of Acre, some twenty miles north and south by five east and west, and this is a minor part of the great plain of Esdraelon. Several streams cross the plain of Acre, from the mountains to the sea. The plain of Esdraelon is separated from the Jordan valley by the watershed known from south to north as the Mountains of Judæa, which are crowned by Jerusalem, the Hills of Ephraim and the Hills of Galilee. The watershed is a very irregular series of moderate mountains, with intervening plains, and at the north end without a regular backbone; but the range fully separates the plain of the Jordan from the plain of Esdraelon. Another range runs northwest from the southerly end of the plain of Esdraelon, and terminates near the promontory of Haifa in hoary Mount Carmel.

On March 18 a proclamation was issued to the inhabitants

of the Pashalik of Acre, in the same tone as those issued at Jaffa. And on March 20 orders were given Berthier to write to the several villages to have them come in and swear obedience and receive safeguards, promising to repair the injustices committed by Djezzar. A similar message was to be sent to Sur (Tyre). A friendly hand was also reached to the Druses, to whom Bonaparte promised independence and restitution of their old territory. Efforts were made to reconcile the inhabitants to the French advent, and to assemble in some useful way the enemies of Djezzar; and a letter was written to the Mullah of Damascus, proffering friendship, and protection to the usual caravan to Mecca. On March 23, also, a letter appears to have been sent to Sidney Smith proposing the exchange of prisoners.

As the possession of the foothills of the watershed, with their gaps, would shut Acre in on the land side, and prevent access from the trans-Jordan country, the general position taken up by the French was on the easterly slope of the range known as the Turon Hills, at one end of which there stands the Mount of the Mosque, commanding the plain. Nearer Acre, Lannes, with Bon in reserve, was to hold the centre of the trenches, Kleber to the right of the aqueduct, and Reynier, who came up two days after the rest of the army, to the left of it. Field-works and abatis with proper guards were placed at all the approaches to the camp; and the streams were bridged and provided with suitable bridge-heads. "No one, strange to the army, could penetrate into this great camp, where there were fine pasturage, wheat, gardens, orchards, woods, water, mills and everything essential to the siege." A reconnoissance of the defenses was made on the night of the 19th to the 20th, from which Bonaparte had no reason to doubt that he could speedily reduce the place; but, having been wounded, Colonel Sanson, the engineer officer

who made the reconnoissance of the ditch, had failed to discover as much as he might, and reported that the defenses were provided with no counterscarp. Parallels were opened on the 20th. Starting from the gardens, ditches and aqueduct of Ptolemais, these were to operate against the east front, which consisted of two curtains meeting at a right angle, where was situated a strong tower commanding the rest of the works, and enfilading the two lines of wall on east and south fronts. This tower was selected as the special point of attack. On March 23 full orders for placing the batteries in front of Acre, as suggested by the engineer and artillery officers, were issued by Bonaparte.

As a protection to the siege operations, and to hold back Abdallah Pasha, who had large forces coming from Damascus, Haifa was occupied, and the line of the Jordan was observed by four detachments: Junot at Nazareth, Murat at Safed, Lambert in the Carmel region, and Vial on the other flank, with a detachment out on the road to Tyre. Vial later occupied Tyre with a battalion. Murat was accompanied by the Sheik Mustapha, whom the Pasha of Damascus had kept seven years in prison, and Bonaparte restored to his dignities and property. He did not keep them long. The responsibility was placed upon the commanders of these detachments to permit no force to pass the circuit thus formed by the posts, without their knowledge. Bonaparte felt much encouraged by the situation. On March 29 he wrote to Dugua: "The army feels its privations no longer. Abundance reigns in the camp. The villages in the mountains send their crops in with profusion and confidence. They see in us their liberators, and desire to be delivered of their oppressor, who remains shut up in Acre."

The breaching batteries having been so far completed by March 25 that fire could be opened on the tower, a few hours

frigates which had come from Alexandria laden with heavy siege-guns, and put these to use on the walls of Acre (a fact of which Bonaparte did not hear for weeks), but it had opened the way for supplies and material to reach the garrison at will. Bonaparte was thus reduced to continue the siege with light ordnance, and without the power so essential in a siege to cut off the place from the outside world. Thus upheld by European skill in his resistance, Djezzar maintained the defense with confidence, and made a number of stout sallies, but all these were driven back.

Sidney Smith.

Added to the difficulties of the siege, the large army of relief organized by Abdallah Pasha, which had been assembling in the Damascus region, was now afoot; and early in April Bonaparte learned that one part of this army would probably cross the Jordan by Jacob's Bridge, fourteen miles above, and another one at Medjameh or Mekanieh, ten miles below the Sea of Tiberias; and that stores were being accumulated at the town of Tiberias, on the west shore of the lake.

To further ascertain the status of affairs, a stout reconnoitring party was pushed out under the command of Junot; and this officer, on April 9, ran across the enemy at Lubieh, half-way from Nazareth to Tiberias, and after gallantly holding his own for a while by forming a square, was forced back to his station.

"General Junot covered himself with glory at the combat of Nazareth," wrote Bonaparte to Marmont; "with three hundred men of the 2d light infantry he beat four thousand

cavalry; he took five flags and killed or wounded some six hundred men. It was one of the most brilliant affairs of the war." And a week later a prize was offered for a picture of Junot's battle. Such a reward went far to make up for danger and suffering, and acted as a strong incentive for others.

If Bonaparte would keep up the integrity of the siege of Acre, this oncoming army had to be at once met. "The position of the French army was becoming delicate." Out of thirteen thousand men who had entered Syria, two thousand had been killed or wounded, or had fallen sick; two thousand were in garrison at El Arish, Gaza, Jaffa; five thousand were needed in the siege; and this left but four thousand available to meet the oncoming host. On April 9 Kleber, with the light infantry, was ordered to Nazareth to cover the army. Next day Bonaparte wrote to Murat: "As to the intrenchments which should be erected on the hills occupied by your light infantry, you are to make all the men under your orders work in detachments, infantry and mounted men, even servants, if that is necessary. It is a military principle that each detached corps shall intrench itself, and it is one of the first cares one is to have in occupying a position. Do not count on having any laborers for the army. . . . Give the order to your outposts to notify you when they shall see fires in front of them in the mountains, so that you may send them out to reconnoitre. We sleep quietly, persuaded that you will let nothing pass you on the line between the mills of Daud and of Cherdam

Junot.

without our being notified." On April 13 Murat was ordered from Safed to the Bridge of Jacob, and Kleber notified to sustain him if necessary.

Going out on a second reconnoissance towards Lubieh, Kleber, on the 10th, met four thousand men, mostly cavalry, at Kefr Kenna ; and while he drove them off and towards the Jordan, yet he dared not advance, lest single-handed he should happen to meet the entire army of relief. He therefore again retired to Nazareth and Safarieh, where he intrenched.

The main body of the Turkish army of relief had actually passed the Jordan at Medjameh, and was leisurely marching on Bisan, while a smaller part had crossed at Jacob's Bridge, and blockading Safed, had occupied Tiberias. Kleber was ordered to watch the main body and fend it off from Acre ; and to Murat was committed the care of the other detachment, to meet which he marched towards Jacob's Bridge with a thousand horse. The main body of the enemy did not at once advance, but awaited, at the foothills near Esdraelon plain, reinforcements from Samaria and Nablus which would run it up to an effective variously stated at from twelve to thirty thousand men. Bonaparte had written to Kleber from Acre, April 13, expressing a doubt as to whether the bridge south of the Sea of Tiberias had been destroyed. "Mount Tabor is witness to your exploits. If these people hold on a little, and you have a pretty hot fight with them, it will earn you the keys of Damascus. If, in the different movements which may present themselves, you find means of placing yourself between them and the Jordan, you should not be held back by the idea that that would make them march on us. We hold ourselves on our guard. We would be quickly notified of it, and we should go out to meet them ; but it would then be necessary that you should follow in their rear very lively. But I feel that these people are not resolute

enough for this. If it should so happen, they would break themselves all up on the road."

Next day Kleber was notified that, should the enemy march on him, Murat was charged to sustain him, and act under his orders. He was instructed to throw the enemy beyond the Jordan and hold the line of the river. "If the enemy dares to camp near you, the general-in-chief has no doubt that you will make a night attack, which will have the same success as that of El Arish." Thus instructed, Kleber set out to accomplish his task, reporting his intention to headquarters.

A fight under the walls of Acre, where Mussulman fanatics would be encouraged by the presence of their fellow soldiers inside, and the English could head a sortie upon the French rear, was a thing to be avoided; and Bonaparte soon determined to march himself to meet the approaching enemy, who was evidently aiming to cross the mountains and cut off the French retreat to Egypt. Persuaded that he must be rid of this army of relief for good and all, he relied on the ability of a small force to hold the lines at Acre for a brief season, and prepared to sustain the operation of his lieutenant.

In this view he secretly set out at noon April 15 with Bon, by way of Nazareth, to join Kleber, who meanwhile had got in rear of the enemy's army in an attempt to cut its retreat to the Jordan. By an all night march around north of Mount Tabor, Kleber had got between the enemy and the Jordan, hoping to make essay of the night attack suggested by his chief; but "his plan was ill-combined;" he arrived after daylight; the enemy marched around his own right to join the Nablusans; and on the morning of the 16th he found himself in a corner of the plain of Esdraelon, south and under the shadow of Mount Tabor, surrounded and attacked by a superior force, probably overstated by Jomini as twenty thousand cavalry and a good body of foot. Throwing his force "into

The leader's plan was crisp and simple, and every officer was prepared for the manœuvre. So soon as the Mussulmans caught sight of the approaching French, they paused from very surprise, and hastily strove to so amend their line as to meet the threat now coming from every side. This delay enabled Bonaparte to complete his manœuvre. "Vial and Rampon at the head of their troops formed in battalion square," says the report, "marched in different directions, so as to form with Kleber's division the three angles of an equilateral triangle of two thousand toises" (two and a half miles) "on each side. The enemy was in the centre of the triangle." "Arriving within gunshot, the French unmasked themselves," and opened fire with every gun and musket. The first shot was recognized by Kleber's men as the arrival of succor, and the chief was saluted by long and prolonged cheers from the entire division, and a renewal of its fire. The effect was electrical. "Fright," says Bonaparte, "spread in the enemy's ranks. In the twinkling of an eye this cloud of horsemen broke into disorder and fled to the Jordan. The infantry fled to the mountains." Kleber stormed Fuli, and Vial cut off the retreat of the main body into the foothills. Abandoning their camp and magazine, the Moslems divided into two streams, one flowing in wild confusion along the Damascus road, where Murat at Safed and Jacob's Bridge cut them down in heaps; the other moved to the Jordan. Some hid in the foothills until night, and then made their way across at Makanieh. Many were drowned in the Jordan rapids. Booty of all kinds, four hundred camels, munitions of war, horses, weapons, the three-tailed pennant of the Pasha and provisions enough to last the army a year were taken. "Thus," says Bonaparte, in his report to the Directory of May 10, "this army which had announced itself with so much noise; as numerous, said the people of the country, as the stars of

heaven and the sand of the sea, the bizarre assembly of footmen and horsemen of all colors and all countries, repassed the Jordan with the greatest precipitation, after leaving a great number of dead on the field of battle." Having burned down a number of villages to punish the Nablusans for taking up arms against the French, Bonaparte left Kleber to watch the Jordan, and marched back with Bon's foot and Murat's horse to Acre. On the 17th Kleber followed up the enemy, and then returned to Nazareth. The battle of Mount Tabor and that of the Pyramids remind one more of those of Alexander than any other of modern days; and show what discipline can effectuate against courage, strength and numbers, without united action.

The one thing now proper to be done was to pursue the fleeing host, demoralize it to utter inefficiency, and then, following it to Damascus, capture that important capital. But this demanded a force of at least ten thousand men — and where were they? Much against his grain, Bonaparte was forced to give up any idea of such a manœuvre.

At Acre, mining operations had been steadily going on to reach the big tower, and countermining had been equally pushed to destroy these works; but Bonaparte, confident and resourceful, wrote Dugua that by April 25 the town would surely fall. Nine heavy guns finally reached Syria from Alexandria, after running the gauntlet of the British fleet, and, landing at Tanturah, were on the way to Acre. To supply the want of missiles, a price was offered for each one picked up and delivered to headquarters: twenty sous for a ball of thirty-six or thirty-three, fifteen sous for a ball of twelve, ten sous for a ball of eight.

"Two English war vessels got angry with us yesterday, and fired more than two thousand balls at us, which has given us a good supply," wrote Bonaparte, April 8. And a week later:

"Our siege advances. We have pushed the mine-gallery behind the counterscarp under the ditch thirty feet below the surface, and it is within eighteen feet of the rampart on the front of attack. We have two batteries at sixty toises, and four at one hundred toises, to enfilade the flank. For fifteen days we have not fired a single ball. The enemy fires like a madman. We are content humbly to pick up his balls, to pay twenty sous for them, and to pile them up in the park, where there are already nearly four thousand. You see that we have the wherewithal to keep up a fine fire for twenty-four hours, and make a good breach. I am waiting to give the signal for the miners to blow up the counterscarp."

Meanwhile the big mine was completed. On April 23 the troops were notified that next morning the mine would be exploded, and that all the grenadiers of the army, commanded by Legrange, should make the assault under Lannes' orders. Reynier was to hold the trenches, and follow up the assault, if successful. Music was to be at hand, to begin playing so soon as the men reached the breach. It was accordingly fired April 24; but part of the explosion found a vent in the subterranean vaults of the tower, and it did not produce a sufficient breach to warrant an assault, though most of the Turkish guns there were dismounted. On April 25 notice was sent to Egypt "that a great tower, extremely strong in masonry, forming an advanced work at the salient angle, and opposing entrance to the breach, has been mined and blown up. The mine made it uninhabitable for the enemy, and destroyed his entrance and batteries." But to Kleber, two days later, Bonaparte said that the mine had not produced the expected effect. A part of the wall fell, and three of the vaults; and the ditch was covered up with débris. Still further work of the batteries was called for, and by the 30th the first heavy guns were got mounted and opened fire. This was directed not only at the tower breach, but also on the curtain on the east front, and under this, too, a mine was driven to reach its counterscarp. But the enemy was equally

enterprising, and began, from two points, countermining to reach the French works. Efforts to drive him back could not stop his reaching the mines directed at the curtain, which he destroyed, leaving operations against the tower and outworks the only ones available. The death of Phelippeaux by a sunstroke helped little, for he was replaced by Colonel Douglas to good effect.

Bonaparte had stood six weeks in front of the shabby fortress, when on the 7th of May a fleet appeared in front of the place. The landing of the reinforcements thus brought was considerably delayed by a heavy swell, and to anticipate this, Bonaparte directed a sharp fire against a piece of the curtain to the right of the tower, and at nightfall a fresh assault was made. This was at first successful. The French reached the *place d'armes* and the glacis, and made a lodgment in the town. Many guns were spiked, the Turks fell in heaps, the French had reached the garden of Djezzar's Seraglio, and were almost masters of the place, when such of the enemy's troops as had managed to land moved forward upon them, and their fire and that from the houses and barricades and from the Pasha's palace checked them. The leader, Lannes, fell, badly wounded; Rambaud was killed at the head of his grenadiers. The Turks attacked the French right and left from the ditch, and from the tower hand-grenades, hot tar and burning wood were hurled. The assaulting party fell back. Two hundred men were cut off in the town and captured; and these Sidney Smith generously rescued from Turkish massacre and took prisoner. Despite even this failure, Bonaparte wavered not in his belief that the place would speedily fall.

For lack of powder the batteries had been for several days silent; on the 9th they again began their fire, which was now aimed at the curtain, where the French had already got pos-

session of the ditch; and this seemed to promise an easier entrance than the tower, from which there was not good access to the town, new curtains and other defenses having been erected inside the wall. The reinforcements received by Djezzar from Rhodes included a *corps d'élite* trained by Hussein Pasha in the European style, and as yet no serious impression had been made on the Turkish works or morale.

A fresh assault in force upon the curtain-breach was projected for the 10th of May at early dawn, and for this all outlying troops that could be spared were ordered in. On May 8 Kleber was instructed to send in Verdier's brigade, and he himself was given the option of staying with Junot, or of coming in to join in the affair. Next day renewed and detailed orders for the assault were issued. Kleber's division leading, the attack was to be delivered at 3.30 in the morning. Bon was put in command of the party selected. This assault was delivered with true Gallic fury; the ditch was crossed, and the breach was entered; but the defenders again managed to reach the rear of the French column by way of the ditch, the enfilading fire from tower and traverses was deadly, Turkish fatalistic courage had been aroused, Bon fell severely wounded, and the gallant French, though they held themselves where they were able, under heavy fire of the French batteries, to renew the fight at four in the afternoon, were eventually forced to withdraw with heavy casualties. The fanatical Turk and the bulldog Briton had thrown back assault after assault. On the other hand, their own sorties had been equally fruitless. In mere fighting the rival forces had been evenly matched, but the French were losing men and time, and had not the sea by which to fill the gaps. On May 13 a proposition for a truce to bury the dead in the trenches was made by the French.

The Memoirs state the siege of Acre to have lasted sixty-

two days, during which the besiegers exploded five mines, and made twelve assaults, great and little; and the besieged made eighteen sorties, all of which were driven back, in addition to much excellent countermining.

This first real backset in Bonaparte's military career was a sore trial to his fortitude; but it was evident that he could no longer maintain himself before Acre. There were too many defenders in the place, and access to it was too open, to capture it out of hand. Another assault was not immediately to be thought of; ammunition was low; a regular siege required supplies and time; the plague was counting its victims in constantly increasing ratio; summer was upon them; news of fresh Egyptian uprisings came in; the Rhodes force was about to invade the base of French operations; and an English squadron had sailed up the Red Sea to Suez.

But if cheery words and a high head could change awkward facts, Bonaparte at least proposed to march away from his unaccomplished task with flying colors. In the report of May 10 to the Directory he speaks of numberless sorties, and of being master of the principal point of the rampart. He says that the enemy has made a second line of fortifications leaning on Djezzar's castle. "We would have to open trenches in front of every house, and lose more men than I am willing to do. The season, moreover, is too advanced. The object that I proposed has been attained. Egypt calls me back. . . . Having reduced Acre to a heap of stones, I will recross the desert ready to receive the European or Turkish army which will disembark in Egypt." He states his losses as five hundred killed and one thousand wounded.

To Almeras, May 16, Bonaparte wrote: "We have taken the first enceinte of Acre. We have razed the palace of Djezzar and shattered the city with shells. The inhabitants have all fled. Djezzar himself was wounded." And on the same date to Dugua: "I seized two principal

points of the enceinte of Acre. We did not judge it worth while to persist in besieging the two enceintes. It would have cost too much time and too many men." And to the Divan he wrote "that he would bring back many prisoners and flags; that he had razed the palace of Djezzar, the ramparts of Acre, and bombarded the town so that there remained not a stone upon stone."

Bonaparte's irritation at Sidney Smith's interference with his siege operations later took the form of bitter criticisms, which have no great value. In a letter to Fouché of February 2, 1807, he wrote: "I have looked over the History of the Directory by Lacretelle. . . . I remarked on the siege of Acre ridiculous things, such as those on Sidney Smith, who was only a madman who did nothing. He only had two warships with which he cruised, and so maintained the Turks masters of the sea. As regards land, he contributed nothing to the siege." And it is narrated, when Sidney Smith, annoyed at some of Bonaparte's comments in a correspondence between them, sent the French commander a challenge to a duel, Bonaparte accepted it, provided the Englishman would furnish him a Marlborough to fight with.

But give whatever reasons he might, it was manifest that the game was lost. Dire necessity, bad calculation if you will, had wrecked Bonaparte's vast plans for the conquest of the Orient. He had even dreamed, say some doubtful authorities, of heading these same victorious fanatical Mohammedans, whom he would control by religion as well as by his military skill and successes, of marching on Constantinople, of overturning the Turkish government, and of returning by way of Vienna to Paris to rule the world.

How mean and small was his failure beside this dream! And yet no soldier without the imagination to dream such dreams ever reaches the limit of the possible. Some of the great men in the world's history have subordinated military accomplishment to solid statesmanship. In this resided the wonderful capacity of Charles the Great; in a lesser ratio Frederick did the same; and whoso will found kingdoms must put the civil before the military element, though it is

the latter brings the fame. But this course does not usually produce the great captain. Had Napoleon been less a soldier, he might have founded a dynasty in France which would have endured for centuries. But he would never have entered Vienna, Berlin, Madrid, Moscow.

Thus fell Bonaparte's gigantic projects for the conquest of the Orient, in front of what he himself termed a miserable mudhole. One cannot help thinking of Alexander's being arrested by the obstinacy of Tyre, and of the masterful manner in which he overcame his difficulties. Compared with this, one of the world's greatest feats of arms, what a pigmy effort was the siege of Acre! Still, the conditions were quite different, and Bonaparte's inability to win over the Mohammedans to his side or to rely upon the Christians was a marked element in his failure.

The Oriental expedition had failed; but by his dispatches Bonaparte had thrown a glamour over the operation which made his name great in France, and at the same moment the months of his absence had led the Directory onward to certain destruction, and opened a path for his own advancement. Personally, his time had not been wasted.

On the 17th of May, after two months' siege, Bonaparte smothered failure in words of enthusiasm, and announced the return to Egypt in a

PROCLAMATION TO THE ARMY.

Soldiers, you have crossed the desert which separates Africa from Asia with more rapidity than an army of Arabs. The army which was on the march to invade Egypt is destroyed. You have taken its generals, its campaign outfits, its water-bags, its camels. You have seized on all the strong places which defend the wells of the desert. You have dispersed on the field of Mount Tabor that cloud of men which had come from every part of Asia in the hope of pillaging Egypt. The thirty vessels you saw arrive before Acre twelve days ago carried the army which was to

besiege Alexandria ; but, obliged to hurry to Acre, it has finished its destiny. A part of its flags will decorate your entry into Egypt. After having with a handful of men nourished war for three months in the heart of Syria, taken forty pieces of cannon, five flags, six thousand prisoners, having razed the fortifications of Gaza, Jaffa, Haifa, Acre, we are about to return to Egypt. The season of debarcations calls me there. A few days more and you had the hope of taking the Pasha himself in the middle of his palace, but at this season the capture of the castle of Acre is not worth the loss of a few days. The brave men who would have been lost are, moreover, necessary to-day for more essential operations. Soldiers, we have a career of toil and danger to run. Having put the Orient out of condition to essay aught against us this campaign, we may have to repel the efforts of part of the Occident. You will there find a new occasion of glory, and if, in the midst of many combats, each day is marked by the death of a brave man, new brave men must gather and take rank in their turn among the small number who give *élan* in danger and bring victory. BONAPARTE.

Some wounded had already been headed for Tanturah. Supplies which could not be carried off were destroyed, guns were spiked or blown up, or else cast into the sea ; the rest of the wounded and sick (saving some fifty plague-stricken men, to whom a kindly opiate is questionably said to have been given to prevent their receiving the scant mercy of Djezzar, the Butcher) and all non-combatants were sent on ahead the 18th and 19th, and the fire from the batteries was kept up so sharply as really almost to destroy Acre. On the 20th a sortie from the place was repulsed at daylight and another during the afternoon. At nightfall, May 20, the retreat began, Lannes leading, followed by the train, and then Bon. Kleber's division drew up behind the parallels, and the cavalry at the bridge over the Acre brook, which was destroyed. Reynier's division, which held the parallels, fell back later in the greatest quiet, followed at the last by the outposts ; and Kleber's division closed the column of infantry. The cavalry followed two hours later. The Turks kept up a fire on the

empty French trenches all night, though not answered by a single shot. Kleber acted as rearguard. The route was via Tanturah and along the coast, and everything on the road was laid waste so as to make pursuit difficult. On May 17 Junot was ordered to burn the mills on the Jordan, and to sell, give away, or burn all victual near Tiberias, and to burst the guns. On May 21, at Tanturah: "All men and officers able to march were ordered to give up their horses to transport the wounded and drag the guns." "A wounded grenadier feared to soil a fine saddle, all embroidered; he appeared to hesitate. 'Mount,' said the general-in-chief, 'there is nothing too good for a brave man!'" Despite the severe tax on his patience and fortitude which this failure caused, Bonaparte's temper was proof to every trial. But when an equerry asked him on this day what horse he would ride, he struck the man with his whip: "Did I not tell you that *all* should go afoot?" Not until every wounded man had been provided for did he mount a horse.

The return march occasioned extreme distress. Kaisarieh (Cæsarea) was reached May 22 and Jaffa the 24th, and here three days' rest was given to the men. The town walls were blown up, the country devastated, and all war material rendered unserviceable or thrown into the sea. Part of the sick and wounded were shipped by sea to Alexandria. On May 24, at Jaffa, Adjutant-General Boyer was ordered to carry the captured flags, and to display them as trophies in all villages passed, and to exhibit the prisoners in the same manner. "He will write, say, do, everything which shall enable him to enter in triumph," says the order. From Jaffa, on May 27, a dispatch to the Directory makes the defeat appear a glorious success; and Bonaparte states, as a further reason for not going into Acre, that the plague was ravaging the town, and in fine that he had accomplished all that he had set out to do.

On the fourth day the retreat was again begun. Gaza was treated as Jaffa had been. On June 1 the column entered the desert, and reached Katiyeh the 4th. The wounded did better than was expected, the dry atmosphere being favorable. Even few of the cases of amputation were lost on the march. On the 14th Bonaparte entered Cairo in state at the head of three divisions, Kleber having been sent to Damietta, and small garrisons being left in El Arish and in Katiyeh. The campaign had lasted four months. The loss is variously given as from three thousand men upwards. The Memoirs make the number but fifteen hundred. In addition to three narrow escapes, Bonaparte had once been slightly wounded, and had had a horse killed under him. The Memoirs' estimate of ten thousand lost by the enemy is exaggerated.

The distance from Acre to Cairo is over three hundred and fifty miles, not counting the windings in the road, which add fully fifteen per cent. This was marched in twenty-six days, including stops. In view of the fact that the men had started weary and disheartened, that they were encumbered with sick and wounded, that the roads were largely desert sands, that to obtain food and water was a daily struggle, and that the temperature was exhausting to Europeans, this was a noteworthy performance — being sixteen miles each marching day. The troops saluted Cairo with fervor, as if they were reaching home. The population came out to meet the soldiery, and showered upon them costly and beautiful gifts. The return was celebrated by many fêtes.

In a letter of June 28 to the Directory asking for reinforcements of five hundred men each of cavalry and artillery, and five thousand foot, Bonaparte stated his losses in killed and dead of wounds and disease, up to this time, as five thousand three hundred and forty-four men. "If this reinforcement cannot be sent, peace should be made, because an equal num-

ber will soon be lost." He was probably not understating the case, as he desired to produce the proper effect. Many of his wounded might not recover so as to reënter the ranks; but it was probable that he had a total of twenty-five thousand men left; or, taking out ten per cent. for sick-list, an effective of twenty-two thousand five hundred, in June, 1799. In order to increase this force, he seriously considered buying and putting under the colors two or three thousand young negro slaves from the Upper Nile, to be placed a hundred in each battalion; but the project fell through.

Dugua had kept fairly good order in Egypt during Bonaparte's expedition to Syria. Yet despite all Bonaparte's care, as he himself said June 17 to Marmont, "a large quantity of employees, medical men, have embarked for France without permission." It would seem, from some of his orders on his return to Egypt, that all things had not gone to suit him there.

Desaix had chased Murad Bey up to Assuan, near the first cataract, where he arrived February 1; and from here the Mamelukes fled to the desert. On June 23 a report to the Directory mentions a number of the combats of Desaix in Upper Egypt; and states that Kossier, on the Red Sea opposite Thebes, was being put in the best condition possible of defense, so as, with Suez, to shut the entrance of Egypt from that side. Another report to the Directory, in speaking of the seizure of Kossier, refers to the bad condition of the French naval service. "The Republic will never have a navy until all the naval orders are remade. . . . The juries, the councils, the assemblies must be forbidden. On board a ship there should be but one authority, that of the captain, which ought to be as absolute as that of the consuls in the Roman armies."

The raiding of the Mamelukes up and down the Nile val-

ley compelled Desaix also to do much marching to and fro for many weeks. Finally Murad moved down to the Fayum, and from there essayed to reach Cairo ; on Bonaparte's sending Murat against him, he once more receded to the desert; but it was only again to appear at Ghizeh. While Bonaparte was arranging to meet him at this place, news ran in, July 11, of the sighting off the roadstead of Aboukir of a fleet of a hundred sail. This bore the Rhodes army of invasion. Murad Bey shortly left Ghizeh.

Here was a new threat to the French holdings in Egypt ; and to meet this, at least for the moment, although Murad Bey was working in coöperation with the invading armies, a fact which caused additional solicitude, Bonaparte determined for the nonce to abandon Upper Egypt, as he had abandoned Mantua ; and he recalled Desaix to Beni Suef, and thence to the capital, to take command. So soon as the news arrived from Marmont on July 15 that the fleet was ready to land the Turkish army, Bonaparte made preparations to fall with all his forces on the new adversary. Lannes and Rampon (who succeeded Bon, dead of his Syrian wounds) set out at 1 A. M., July 16, for Ramaniyeh, Murat having been ordered to precede them as a van, with the force that had been assembled to head off Murad. This made about six thousand men in the column, which had orders to force the marching. Kleber, to whom had been committed the guarding of the coast from Rosetta, where were his headquarters, to El Arish, was also ordered towards Aboukir by the south of Lake Edku.

In the same bay where a year before Nelson had annihilated the French fleet, the Turkish army, twelve to fifteen thousand strong, under Mustapha Pasha of Rhodes, and escorted by Sidney Smith's fleet, had cast anchor ; and on the 15th of July had landed, a dozen miles from Alexandria, — it is fifteen miles from the city to Aboukir fort, — on the small

peninsula between the ocean and the Lake of El Madieh, or Aboukir. The fort at the point of the cape had been lost by the French officer there in command, who had made a sortie upon the Turks, leaving only thirty-five men in the place; and when compelled to fall back, he found himself cut off, his force was destroyed, and the fort, thus disgarnished, went lost. Marmont was in Alexandria, and to prevent the landing had started out with the garrison of twelve hundred men early the same day; but learning that the landing had already been effected, he returned to Alexandria to await Bonaparte's orders; and the Turks intrenched themselves on the peninsula, landed their stores, and breaking the bridge of boats over which ran the road from Rosetta, sat down to await the expected oncoming of Murad Bey. On the 19th Bonaparte personally reached Ramaniyeh, and for three or four days waited at this town to direct the assembling of his army. We find him here again exemplifying his mass theory. Nearly every general would have been tempted to move Marmont out of Alexandria and Kleber from Rosetta on Aboukir, while the centre marched up through Ramaniyeh. But not so Bonaparte. His plan was to advance his forces from Cairo on Birket Gitas, draw in one of these lieutenants to the main body and hold the other as reserve, according to the place in which he found the enemy ready to accept battle — thus not only assembling his mass before he reached the field, but arranging to put in every man.

The assembly, then, was to be made at Birket-Gitas, between Lake Mareotis and Lake Edku. Hither, or to Esko, he ordered Kleber to be ready to march and join the army; Dugua at Cairo was instructed to send on every available man; Murat was pushed out along the neck of land between the lakes to get into touch with Marmont. Bonaparte hoped that the enemy would attempt to blockade Alexandria, in

to the shore near by, and to make demonstrations to annoy the enemy and attract his attention.

About seven o'clock in the morning, after an easy march towards Aboukir, the French van struck the outposts of the enemy. Some time was spent in forming line, and in an hour's initial cannonade, whereupon Bonaparte gave orders for the attack. Destaing with his three battalions and Lanusse in support moved against the Hill of the Sheiks, Lannes against the Hill of the Wells. Murat with the cavalry advanced in the centre, and rode around to the rear of the two forts through "a fine plain which separated the wings of the enemy." This first operation was crowned with success, both French columns reaching the hills at the first effort.

Murat.

The Turks abandoned the redoubts, and fleeing towards the village in the rear, fell under Murat's sabres and were cut down or driven into the sea. Both columns now obliqued towards each other and advanced on the second line, "which had an intrenched village in its front, a redoubt in the centre and works which ran to the sea, flanked by thirty gunboats." The village was attacked in front and flank, and meanwhile Murat made a circuit and again rode down upon its rear. Reinforcements from the Turkish second line and camp came up, but these after a hard tussle were thrust back, the village was captured, and the Turks were driven into the sea, where,

refusing to surrender, they nearly all perished, "the most horrible spectacle I have ever seen," says Bonaparte's report. The first line and the village were thus taken, and three or four thousand Turks had been annihilated.

Bonaparte's principal object had been attained, that of shutting up the Turkish army in Aboukir peninsula, where, with the heavy guns that Kleber would bring up, they could be destroyed. But the successful issue of the morning's fight lured him on, and orders were again given to attack the second line, whose centre was the redoubt covering Aboukir. This redoubt was hard to take. On the Turkish right a ditch connected it with the sea, and on the left another with the lake, but there was a gap between the lake and ditch, held in force by the Turks with guns, and covered by gunboats from the sea. This gap was widened by some French guns which took position on a jutting point in the beach, from whence they could enfilade the Turkish left. Bonaparte opened a heavy fire upon the redoubt, attacked the right Turkish flank with three battalions under Fuguière, and threw the cavalry against the left flank, where lay the gap. At the same moment Lannes and Destaing stormed the redoubt. Fuguière did not at first succeed. The Turks themselves made a sortie from the redoubt; and for a while there was a fight hand to hand and with cold steel. But the French soldier's bayonet was better than the Moslem's sword and dagger; the Turks were driven back upon their intrenchments, followed by the French, who were, however, checked at this point by a heavy artillery fire, opened as the guns were unmasked. Meanwhile Murat had fruitlessly attacked the Turkish gap between lake and ditch, and Bonaparte had sent him two battalions under Lannes, who was to take the redoubt on its left. Lannes' attack here occurred just as the Turks had driven back Fuguière, and overmuch encouraged by apparent

victory, had rushed out to decapitate the dead ; for each Mussulman bringing in the head of an enemy was to receive a silver aigrette and a substantial reward. Bonaparte sent the defeated French column in again, so as to make a simultaneous attack on both flanks of the redoubt. Murat had finally succeeded in breaking through the gap, and now rode down to close the rear of the redoubt and catch the Turks, who were fleeing before the last French assault. A regular butchery ensued. Murat, wounded by Mustapha Pasha in a personal encounter, cut the latter down and captured him. The camp, the baggage and twenty guns fell into French hands, and the Turks not killed or drowned were made prisoners. Nothing was left of the Turkish army. The Memoirs claim that two thousand were killed and ten thousand drowned. The French loss was at least a thousand killed and wounded, including a number of excellent officers, though on July 27 Bonaparte reported the loss as a hundred killed and four hundred wounded.

The battle had been a massacre pure and simple, of the kind that we read of in ancient history, and that within a few years we have seen in the Soudan — inevitable against undisciplined hordes. But a small remnant of the Turkish army reached Aboukir fort. Bonaparte wrote to Dugua : " It was one of the finest battles I have seen ; not a man of the force which landed has escaped. . . . More than six thousand corpses have been counted, of which half have been buried. Two hundred flags were taken, all the baggage, the tents, forty guns, Mustapha Pasha, first cousin of the Turkish ambassador in Paris, who was commander-in-chief, and all his officers. Murat and Fuguière were wounded." And to the Directors he wrote : " The winning of this battle, which will have so much influence on the glory of the Republic, is principally due to General Murat. I ask for this general the grade of

general of division. His brigade of cavalry did the impossible. The Chief of Brigade Bessières, at the head of the guides, sustained the reputation of his corps." Menou was put in Lannes' place, who was wounded. The prisoners were taken to Cairo.

Kleber did not reach the field until after the battle was won. Enthusiastically throwing his arms about his chief, as he viewed the scene, he cried: "Permit me, General, to embrace you! You are as big as the world!"

During this battle the garrison of Fort Aboukir had remained quiet. It was now shut in, and after seven days' bombardment surrendered, with many killed and wounded. "In the first twenty-four hours after the exit of the Turkish garrison, four hundred prisoners died from having eaten and drunk with too much avidity," says the dispatch.

On the 5th Bonaparte left Alexandria, and on the 10th was again in Cairo. On August 15 Desaix was sent back to Upper Egypt after Murad Bey.

We must not omit to note that in the St. Helena Memoirs Napoleon wrote at length and in a most fascinating manner about both Egypt and Syria, giving much detail for which there is no place here. Like all relations of events long past, in some parts the statements of the Memoirs do not coincide with those of contemporary records, even of his own orders issued at the time. But in this the great soldier erred no more than nearly all men so writing. Everything he says is pertinent and of interest. There is less effort to cover up defeat, as at Acre, than one might imagine him to indulge in; and the entire narrative about the Egyptian and Syrian campaigns possesses transcendent interest.

Bonaparte had already made up his mind to leave Egypt. Since he had discovered that his Oriental dreams were impossible of realization, he again looked to Europe as his field,

and in after years he found it large enough to satisfy any ambition.

At times during the siege of Acre, scraps of information relating to the new Coalition had been got from Phelippeaux in the many *pourparlers* which took place in the trenches. "The general-in-chief thought no more of aught but of the means to cross to France. Syria, Galilee, Palestine, had no further importance. The army must be led back to Egypt, where it was invincible. He could then leave it and throw himself into that ocean of events which presented themselves to his thought," said Napoleon at St. Helena.

After this battle of Aboukir, a parliamentarian was sent to the English fleet to discuss the status of the Turkish wounded; and this officer came back with all the latest news from Europe, and English and Frankfort journals up to June 10. Mustapha Pasha had already told as much. Bonaparte learned of the disasters to the armies of Italy and the Rhine, and the demoralization to which the Directory had been reduced. He had already received a sort of qualified authority to return to France; and Kleber (whom, because of his dislike for him, it has been suggested by some, Bonaparte left in command, with Junot as his second) was as capable of holding Egypt, with five or six thousand reinforcements a year, as he himself was, now that the task was but one of occupation. It was the situation in France which particularly determined Bonaparte to leave at once. The laurels of Aboukir effaced the recollection of the defeat at Acre, and he could return to France victorious.

Marmont.

About the middle of August Marmont sent Bonaparte word that the moment was favorable. Sidney Smith, who had been observing Alexandria, had got out of water and provisions, and the Turkish and British squadrons had sailed for Cyprus. On August 18 Bonaparte left Cairo for Alexandria, giving Menou at Rosetta and Kleber at Damietta rendezvous there. Kleber did not arrive in time to see Bonaparte sail. Menou was put in command of Alexandria.

On August 22 an order was issued to General Kleber to take command of the army, giving him news of what had taken place in Europe, and a cipher in which to correspond with France.

The order asks him to send Junot to France, and tells him that it is the intention of the government that Desaix shall also come back to Europe in November. It tells Kleber that probably he will receive arms and reinforcements, but if, by next May, none have come, and his losses by the plague and the usual attrition of service grow too high, it will be better not to hazard an active campaign, but rather to make peace with Turkey, even if the evacuation of Egypt is the principal condition, though this will be a grief, because Egypt is so important to France. But much will depend on the success of the Republic in Europe. Bonaparte advises Kleber to use persuasion on the Porte, and to keep on its good side. He is to remember that no treaty is good unless ratified. He advises him as to the manner of conducting the government of Egypt, and to keep Alexandria and El Arish in good condition; to rely on Sanson, chief engineer, and Poussielgue, financial agent. "The important place that you are to occupy as chief will put you on a level for showing the talents which nature has given you. . . . I abandon Egypt with the greatest regret. The interest of the mother country, its glory, obedience, the extraordinary events which have just happened, alone decide me to force my way through the enemy's squadrons to reach Europe. I shall be heart and soul with you. Your success will be as dear to me as those in which I myself had a part, and I shall look upon each day of my life as badly used when I do not do something for the army over which I leave you in command. . . . The army I confide to you is all composed of my children. I have had at all times, even in the midst of the greatest griefs, marks of

their attachment. Keep up this sentiment; you should do so on account of the very particular esteem and friendship that I have for you, and for the real attachment I bear to it."

This order, together with long and detailed instructions as to the military and civil government of the land, was left with Menou to deliver to Kleber.

On the same day an order was issued to the army: —

The news from Europe has decided me to leave for France. I leave the command of the army to General Kleber. The army will soon have news from me. I can say no more. It costs me to leave the soldiers to whom I am most attached, but it will only be for the moment, and the general I leave them has the confidence of the government and mine.

BONAPARTE.

Bonaparte went aboard the frigate Muiron early August 23, accompanied by Berthier, Murat and Lannes, all three wounded, Marmont, Duroc, Bessières and Bourrienne; and under Ganteaume, set sail with the Carère and two other men-of-war.

Ganteaume.

A northwest wind obliged the vessels to run along the African coast. It took twenty days to make three hundred miles, but the course was out of the line of English cruisers. Finally an east wind came up. Cape Bon was doubled, and Sardinia was reached. Bonaparte did not know what the state of Corsica might be, but found, on being driven into Ajaccio, that it was still French. Here full news was learned of the reverses in Italy. The northwest wind kept Bonaparte in harbor a week. From

Ajaccio Fréjus was reached October 9, and here Bonaparte was received with open arms. He left at once for Paris, sending ahead, October 10, from Aix, a letter to the Directory: "Citizen Directors, since my departure from France, I have received but one dispatch from you." Then he goes on to state that he destroyed the armies which threatened to invade Egypt from Syria, and those that had disembarked on the coast; but having learned the condition of France, he had determined to return home, though he had but two slow-sailing frigates. "I did not think of calculating dangers. I had to be where my presence would be the most useful. Animated with these sentiments, I would have wrapped my mantle about me and sailed in an open boat, if I had not had frigates. I have left Egypt well organized and under the orders of General Kleber. . . . BONAPARTE."

His passage home was thus fraught with as much fortune as the one from France to Egypt a year and a half before.

Sword of Massena.
(Rivoli Collection.)

some of the old regiments still in France. Such an army, with a sound defensive rôle, would easily have held the right bank of the Rhine in the Schaffhausen country. On the contrary, in Italy the offensive should have been sharply pushed, and in force, before Suwarrov could come up. The Directory was acting on the false theory that by seizing and holding the mountain regions they would control the plains. The converse is true. The Swiss mountains themselves depend on the plains, whence comes their food, not these on Switzerland. No line of operation, as Napoleon points out, should ever run, if it can be avoided, through a mountainous country. There is no victual there, the numerous side-defiles must be held, and this depletes the army; either retreat or advance is hard on the troops; and the best divisions can be beaten by men from the plow, if they know how to shoot. The real spirit of mountain warfare consists in not attacking, but in turning place after place, and obliging the defense to attack or retreat. Moreover a mountain road is fatal for a retreat, and the possibility of falling back must always be a part of the calculation.

Championnet.

Speaking of mountain warfare, the Memoirs say: "It has happened that great armies, when they could do nothing else, have traversed mountainous countries to arrive in fine plains and in beautiful lands. It is this one must necessarily do to arrive in Italy. But to make supernatural efforts to cross inaccessible mountains, and still to find yourself in the midst of precipices, defiles, rocks, without other prospect than for a long time to have the same obstacles to surmount, the same

fatigues to endure; to be disquieted on each new march by knowing that so many bad stretches lie in one's rear; to be each day more in danger of dying of hunger, and all this when one can do otherwise: this is to delight in difficulties and fight against giants; it is to act without good sense, and for that reason against the spirit of the art of war. Your enemy has great cities, beautiful provinces, capitals to protect, — march on these by way of the plains. The art of war is a simple art, and all a matter of execution: nothing is vague, everything is good sense; nothing in it is ideology."

"Switzerland," further say the Memoirs, "is a huge intrenched camp, from which one may easily move into France, into Germany and into Italy. The debouches to enter into the Tyrol are the most difficult." To invade Germany from Switzerland, it is easier to move around the west of the Lake of Constance and reach the Danube than to try to fray a path through the Tyrol. The St. Gothard is the best debouch into Italy. The Splügen is longer and harder. To cover the French frontiers in Switzerland there are four principal lines: the Rhine, the Linth, the Reuss, the Aar. Any one of these is easy of defense.

In order, then, to anticipate the Austrians in Switzerland and the Tyrol, Massena was to cross the Rhine above the Lake of Constance, and after occupying Vorarlberg and Grisons, to advance on the Tyrol. Jourdan was to cross between Kehl and Hüningen, and passing the Black Forest, to reach out his right towards Massena; while Scherer's centre and right would operate against the Austrians at Verona and on the Adige, and his left also reach out towards Massena via the Splügen or Trent, as might best avail. Meanwhile Bernadotte was to blockade Mannheim and Philipsburg, as a diversion to attract the allied attention, and to protect Jourdan's left. Macdonald was to continue his occupation of Naples;

Brune to reduce Belgium. No such magnificent cordon operation had yet been conceived — nor so weak a one.

The Austrians did not expect an early opening of the campaign. Their divisions were much spread, supplies were not yet organized, and their Russian allies were still distant. Their main force had been sent to the Po. Behind the Lech were fifty-five thousand foot and twenty-five thousand horse of good troops, commanded by Archduke Charles; of which fifteen thousand stood under Stzarray at Neumarkt to contain Bernadotte, should he undertake an advance. Hotze and Auffenberg, stationed with twenty-six thousand men in Vorarlberg and Grisons, along the right bank of the Rhine above the Lake of Constance, were also a part of Charles' command. Bellegarde, with eighteen thousand men in the Tyrol, formed the right flying wing of Kray, who with seventy-five thousand men stood between the Tagliamento and Adige, and held Verona and Legnano, some of his divisions being yet in winter quarters. The Russian allies were coming on in two columns: one over fifty thousand strong, under Suwarrov, marching through Moravia towards Italy; the other, under Korsakov, not much less strong, on its way to join the archduke.

Between France and Austria lies a country exhibiting three topographical features: the rich lands of southwestern Germany, through which the Danube furnishes the only obstacle; Switzerland and the Tyrol, poor in victual and difficult for manœuvres; the valley of the Po, rich like that of the Danube. To Archduke Charles, Swabia appeared to be the key-point of the theatre of war; for if held in full force by Austria, the French could not well advance from Italy against Vienna, lest they be taken in flank; while if the French held it, no Austrian army could reach Turin without being equally taken in flank from Swabia through the Alpine passes. It was the

Danube, not the Po, he claimed, on which the Austrian forces should be concentrated. The archduke's theory was, however, weak in this: that should the French win a decisive battle in Swabia, they could at once push on to Vienna down the Po; should the Austrians win one, they could not invade France without crossing the Rhine and the French mountains along its banks. This was a very serious task, and when they should have accomplished it, they would be advancing with these mighty obstacles in their rear. Yet to lay siege to Strasburg and Hüningen, hold the Rhine country in heavy force, and incidentally fight for Lombardy on the Po, seemed to Charles the wiser policy, and the one which would win most.

In opening the campaign, the French committed some grave errors. They paid no heed to the Austrian operations; they assumed the Tyrol to be of excessive strategical value; they distributed their far smaller forces over a greater area than the Austrians; they left large forces to do useless work in lower Italy, and set Bernadotte a quite unnecessary task. Being weaker, if they would not concentrate for one great blow, the French would have done better to assume a distinctly defensive rôle and oblige the Austrians to use up their forces in siege work. In addition to these errors they committed a worse one: they resorted to dishonest measures. While intimating to Austria that it was only a precautionary measure, the Directory ordered Jourdan across the Rhine, with secret instructions to march rapidly on Bregenz on the Lake of Constance, so as to have Vorarlberg and Grisons within his grasp. This Jourdan set out to do; but fearful for his flanks, though speed was the one thing needful in the operation, he paused on the threshold, until Bernadotte and Massena should also cross the Rhine to sustain his right and left. Instead of moving on the prescribed line, moreover, Jourdan likewise chose to advance midway between the Lake of Constance and

Ostrach, still in three columns; and attacking Lefebvre's van, he drove it back on Ostrach, crossed the stream of this name, and forced Jourdan back beyond Stockach, where the Swiss and Swabian post-roads cross. The Austrians occupied the town. Only some distance to the west of the place could the French be reassembled, after a loss of two thousand men. Jourdan took post between Tuttlingen and Singen. As an opening manœuvre, this was well done.

The archduke might to advantage have followed up his victory. He did not, however, do so until the 24th of March, when he advanced with his main force to a position west of Stockach. The little stream of this name flows in a large loop to the west of the town. The archduke's left wing of thirteen battalions and twenty-four squadrons lay along and back of it, from Nenzingen to Wahlwies, the centre in front of it on the Nellenberg plateau, and his right extending to the Liptingen road and leaning on a forest stretch known as the Grauer Wald. He did not know whether Jourdan was in force in his front, or had marched towards Switzerland, or indeed retired to avoid the danger of battle. He determined on a forced reconnoissance, and for this purpose formed two columns, one to be led by himself to march on Aach and Engen, and the other under Meerfeldt to push on Liptingen and beyond to Emmingen ob Eck. A third column under Schwarzenberg on the left was to feel out in its front, but not advance beyond Steisslingen. These columns started before dawn.

Jourdan, meanwhile, despite a disparity which should have made him pause, was proposing to attack the Austrians, lest he should remain permanently cut off from easy coöperation with Massena, and had determined to recapture Stockach, through which he might most easily reëstablish his touch with Switzerland. Napoleon says he had no motive for the battle. But he was risking little. Should he win a battle,

he would regain connection; should he lose one, he could still retire behind the Black Forest and the Rhine. With this view, before daylight of March 25 he ordered the division of Ferino, eighteen thousand strong, via Steisslingen on Wahlwies, and Souham's of six thousand men on Nenzingen, to attack the Austrians in front; and the rest under St. Cyr, sixteen thousand effective, on Liptingen, to turn their right flank. Thus, in the early dawn of March 25, Charles was advancing with half his force on a general reconnoissance, and Jourdan was marching in full force to deliver battle. When, thus early in the day, Charles advanced from Stockach and got beyond Aach with fifteen thousand men, he ran across part of the division of Souham, who threw him back across the river, taking a battalion prisoner; and he soon heard from Meerfeldt, who with twelve thousand men had advanced to Emmingen ob Eck, that he found heavy columns in his path. Charles at once guessed the danger. Leaving Nauendorf in command of his own column, with orders to fall slowly back on Stockach, and sending like orders to Schwarzenberg, Charles hastily made up a column of grenadiers and cuirassiers, and hurried towards Meerfeldt. This general, by 5 A. M., had occupied Emmingen ob Eck, whence he was ejected and forced back to Liptingen. Charles found him already in full retreat, and learned that Souham had got possession of Liptingen and was pushing the Austrian divisions back in disorder, his cavalry riding to marked effect down upon their flanks. Just before the arrival of the archduke, St. Cyr had come up to Souham's aid, and Meerfeldt, after holding himself awhile, was compelled to fall back to the protection of the Grauer Wald. Charles had not brought up enough troops to his lieutenant's aid, and stood in grave danger. The French had made great strides towards victory.

But now Jourdan was guilty of a serious blunder. He

desired to keep a handsome front alignment, — Charles contented himself with sending Stzarray to observe the French, while the main Austrian army went into quarters between the lake and the Danube. Schaffhausen and Stein were taken, and headquarters established in Stockach.

"If, after the battle of Stockach," says Napoleon, forgetful of the limitation of Charles' power, "he had moved to the Lower Rhine, menacing the interior of the Republic, and especially the ancient Austrian provinces, he would have forced Massena to leave Switzerland to form front towards him. He would have acted in conformity with the rules; he would have been rewarded for so doing by success. His manœuvre, when he ordered Hotze to join him, at the battle of Stockach, and having him replaced by Bellegarde, is within the true principles of the art; one recognizes in it the general of 1796."

The cause of the French defeat at this time lay in their division of forces. Against a concentrated army, the Austrians would have found it more difficult to manœuvre. Charles could have done this only by a turning operation which might have afforded Jourdan his opportunity. During the usual lull after Ostrach, Jourdan could well have marched by his right to Switzerland to join Massena, leaving Bernadotte to protect the Rhine. It was useless to retire to Alsatia, which was already sufficiently protected by natural obstacles and the strategical positions of the rival armies. But Jourdan was overmatched by Charles, who was more than the peer of every general he met, until he was placed in front of Bonaparte. In the battle of Stockach, however, Jourdan's plan of attacking Charles' right and throwing him back on the Lake of Constance was excellent. But it was not made in sufficient force. His fault lay in deeming the Austrians beaten too soon, — he lacked *coup d'œil*, — and in sending off St. Cyr, as he had previously dispatched Van-

damme. On the other hand, Charles' right had not been made strong enough; but as he had proposed a change of front pivoting on his left, should he find that Jourdan had moved towards Switzerland, this fact accounts for the weakness. The manner in which he met the initial disaster to Meerfeldt was masterly.

Meanwhile Massena, with his thirty thousand men, had orders to invade Grisons and Vorarlberg before the Austrians under Bellegarde, twenty thousand in proposed strength, were ready. Auffenberg was in Grisons. Hotze had been in Vorarlberg, but having been drawn in by Charles, afforded Massena an opening, and he determined to take the offensive. As is usually necessary in a mountain country, he divided his forces into several columns, some of which were too small, and the united front of all of which was too long. On the other hand, the Austrians had a line of weak posts on the Upper Rhine, with difficult passes in their rear, and the reserve was largely of militia. The campaign was begun by a handsome stroke. Sending Lecourbe by the St. Gothard towards Bellinzona, from whence he advanced on and beat Laudon in the Engadine, Massena crossed the Rhine above and below Coire, and cutting Auffenberg from Hotze, took most of the former's force prisoners, — some six thousand men, with flags and guns. Advancing farther, he imagined that he had made a mistake in not taking Feldkirch, which was necessary to secure his left flank and keep open his connection with Jourdan. Feldkirch was also one of the gates of the Tyrol, via the Inn valley; and through it the Austrians could turn any French force which was too far advanced into the mountains.

With reference to this matter, Napoleon in St. Helena said that Feldkirch was not necessary to Massena. He could have kept touch with the Army of the Danube via Schaff-

movement around the Austrian left flank. The column on the latter errand reached Gallmicht, but Jellachic ably disposed his few men and his artillery. The militia he had assembled contained good marksmen, and the French assault failed. Jellachic made a sortie at the end of the battle, and the French retired with a loss of three thousand men to Nendeln. After all said, Massena had to do his work without Feldkirch, and managed it well.

Oudinot was now sent to join Lecourbe on the right, to aid in checking a column which was to come on from Italy. Lecourbe in the upper Alps did some fairly successful but Napoleon says aimless manœuvring against Laudon and Bellegarde, but was finally driven from the Engadine; and before he had accomplished anything definite, he was ordered to advance no farther, lest manœuvres on the Danube should compromise the Army of Switzerland. For Jourdan being driven back compelled Massena to arrest his advance; and when in mid-May the Austrians under Bellegarde assumed a sharp offensive, it was not many days before they had forced the French army of Switzerland behind the Upper Rhine, with considerable loss in prisoners and guns. Vorarlberg remained in Austrian possession. After Bellegarde's handsome advance on the French in the Tyrol, he was ordered to join Suwarrov in Italy.

When, as above stated, Jourdan's army was joined to Massena's under the common name of the Army of the Danube, the latter saw that, with Charles in Swabia, Hotze and Bellegarde in Switzerland, and Suwarrov and Melas on the Po, all advancing against him, it was rather the defensive than the offensive which the French had best adopt. To try to hold all the Alpine passes made by far too thin a cordon; to concentrate his mountain divisions between the Aar and Reuss rivers, so as to keep substantially on the same front line as

his Rhine left wing, would be an abandonment of nearly all Switzerland. In charge of the Army of the Danube, however, Massena was now reduced to a choice between making a push with his centre down the Danube, as a diversion to help his right (the Swiss forces), and adopting a strict defensive. He chose the latter. The total of his effective was one hundred and fifteen thousand men, spread out from the Engadine to Mainz, and he was wise in placing the left of his Swiss troops behind the Thur.

The French breach of Swiss neutrality was bearing its legitimate fruit. Not to mention its drawing troops from the Rhine and the Po, even the maintenance of an army in these mountains was difficult, especially on the French plan of requisitions. By the defeat of Stockach, moreover, the left flank of the Swiss army had been gravely imperiled at a time when its right wing was far advanced; and it was fortunate that no harm had resulted therefrom. In May Charles joined Hotze and, crossing the Upper Rhine, drove the French down to Zürich, where May 27 and 28 there was a lively battle, as a result of which the French retired behind the Limmat, and the Austrians took a position in their front. Bellegarde having seized the St. Gothard country, Lecourbe was compelled to retire to the Lake of the Four Cantons, with headquarters in Lucerne. Here he kept up a small war. The Helvetian government was transferred to Berne. On June 3 and 4 Charles again attacked Massena at Zürich. The battle was heartily contested, and the casualties were heavy. But the French were forced out of the town, and back to the Reuss.

So far in the entire campaign there had been no French gain made, for the Austrians had been everywhere superior in force. With less than forty thousand men, Jourdan had advanced against Charles' eighty thousand and been defeated; in Switzerland Massena had controlled but thirty thousand to

pit against seventy-five thousand Austrians, and had been checked, — though chiefly as a result of Jourdan's defeat. The Directory had undertaken too big a task; and it was the Austrian slowness alone that saved the French from disaster. On the other hand, considering their strength, the Austrians had accomplished less than they should have done, a fact that was in greatest measure due to the Aulic Council's hebetude.

Thus on the Danube and in the Swiss mountains the French armies had quite failed to carry out Carnot's immense plan. Let us see what had been doing on the Po.

In Italy the French had nearly one hundred and twenty thousand men, of whom Scherer, whom we already know as a general of second-rate capacity, could number on the Po barely forty-five thousand for the field, the rest being in Naples, Rome and in various garrisons. The Austrians on and back of the Adige, including the Russians who were to arrive, had considerably over one hundred thousand effective. Even after the lesson in the military art given to the Directory in 1796 by Bonaparte, this body was unable to see that Naples and Rome could probably be held by small forces coupled to success in the valley of the Po, and would despite large forces certainly be lost by failure there; and they permitted these new republics in southern Italy, together with Piedmont, Tuscany and a detachment to Switzerland, to eat up two thirds of the forces which should have been used to conserve northern Italy. They rectified their error when it was too late. On the other hand, Austria had not only vastly exceeded France in troops raised, but she had likewise prepared her ground by repairing the works of Verona and Legnano, and by filling magazines at various places and building bridge-heads along the line of advance from the Tagliamento. The French could not with common sense adopt an offensive

policy in Italy. But the Directory thought otherwise. Scherer was ordered to assume the offensive along the Adige, though his left flank might be easily threatened from the mountains. The Directory doubted not that the French armies would be able to overrun not only Switzerland and the Tyrol, but all northern Italy. They forgot that Scherer was not a Bonaparte.

The plan of the Austrians in Italy was simple and effective: to push on Brescia and Bergamo, and thus by threatening the right flank of Massena operating in Switzerland, as well as the left flank of Scherer, to push the former away from the Tyrol, and the latter back to the Riviera. It was really an operation against the centre of the Italian-Swiss armies.

The operations in Italy should have begun at the same time; they actually began three weeks later than in Switzerland and Germany. Kray, in command of the Austrians, was slow, and Scherer concentrated on the Mincio. The immediate task assigned him by the Directory was to force a passage of the Adige, so as to bring the Austrians to battle near Verona. He had no choice of action. They imagined that, under their lash, any one could do what had once been done.

Scherer should not have made the many minor detachments he did. The result of a battle on the Adige would control the fate of the Valteline and Tuscany, while nothing these provinces could do would affect such a battle. For the same reason it was that the bulk of the Naples forces should have been brought up to the Adige. Acting in one mass, the Austrians might have been crushed before the Russians came up. Scherer divided his forces fatally. Had he concentrated all but feinting detachments just below Verona, where it was high and dry, he could have crossed and beaten the enemy at San Martino. Manœuvring in the swamps of the lower Adige could be of no value.

than sixty miles! The army was disheartened, and had lost confidence in its chief. In striving to cover everything, Scherer covered nothing. Suwarrov now came up with thirty thousand Russians and assumed command of the whole allied

Suwarrov.

army. There were nearly ninety thousand men in the field in northern Italy against the French. Leaving Kray with twenty thousand men to lay siege to Mantua and Peschiera, as ordered by the Vienna Council, Suwarrov took Brescia and advanced on Bergamo and Cassano with his own army and Melas' thirty thousand men, his right being under Bagration, Rosenberg and Wukassovich, and the left under Ott and Zoph. Melas was in the centre. Two detachments, under Hohenzollern and Kaim, advanced at the same time on Lodi and Pizzighetone. This left Suwarrov over thirty-five thou-

sand men opposite the French centre. Along the Adda, from the 25th to the 28th of April, 1799, in order on one side to hold and on the other to break down the line of the river, there was a series of bloody fights, in which the gallant French conscript of this army was for the first time matched against that wonderful tenacity of the Russian soldier which has checked so many chieftains; and at several points the Russians forced a crossing. After a stubborn fight Bagration put over his division at Lecco April 26, and at San Gervasio next day, though the French made it a costly affair. Scherer, despairing of success, turned over the command to Moreau. He "wanted neither intelligence nor courage; he lacked character; he talked of war with hardihood but vaguely; he was not suited to it," say the Memoirs.

On the 27th Moreau, with Grenier's division, attacked the Russians at Trezzo, in order to reëstablish touch with Serurier's division, which had intrenched at Verderio, and had been cut off by the Russian crossings; but the French were driven back to Cassano with heavy loss. Here Moreau met Melas, who was seeking to force the bridge-head; and, after another severe battle, Melas succeeded in his task and Moreau retired to Milan. Serurier, with four thousand men, was surrounded by the Russians, cut off, and after a stubborn defense, compelled to surrender. In this battle of Cassano the loss was three thousand men each side, plus six thousand prisoners and twenty-seven guns lost by the French, to whom remained less than twenty thousand men to marshal in battle line. The allies were at the same time reinforced by Bellegarde and Haddick.

The Directory now did what should originally have been done. Macdonald was ordered up to the Po to report to Moreau. What might not have been accomplished had he joined the Army of Italy on the Adige!

Italy, by utilizing his advantages with a clear grasp of the problem; and he had seized so many places in the mountains on every side of the French that Moreau was put to it to know how to manœuvre. With part of his forces Suwarrov had gone to Turin, while the rest had been manœuvring on the Po. On hearing of Macdonald's oncoming, however, the allied leader had himself moved down to the vicinity of Alessandria, and with part of his forces blockaded the place.

Macdonald.

The details of the manœuvres between Moreau, Macdonald and Suwarrov are interesting, mainly as exhibits of the old-fashioned style of war, and can barely be mentioned here. Nothing, however, more strongly proves the value of Bonaparte's maxim, to assemble all your divisions before reaching the possible battlefield, than the present operations of Macdonald and Moreau.

Macdonald had been slow in coming up. He left Naples early in May, two weeks later than he need have done, and wasted other two weeks, at the end of the month and early in June, in Florence. So long as the French held the left bank of the Po, Moreau's instructions to Macdonald to join him by way of Bologna, Modena, Parma, Placentia and Tortona were proper. So soon as Moreau had crossed the Ticino in retreat, the only way for Macdonald to join him was by way of Placentia and Bobbio to Genoa, provided he could reach Placentia in time. Speed was of the essence, but Macdonald was slow. If he could not be certain of reaching Placentia before the allies should fall upon him, the one safe way was

to march by Spezzia and the coast to Genoa. This was certainly not a good road, but it was a possible one, and as the French fleet was in the Gulf of Genoa, the artillery could have been transported by coasting-vessels under its protection to Genoa; or in case, indeed, he abandoned it all, there was plenty more to be had in Genoa. The one thing to do was to make junction before battle; but with the old-fashioned idea that it was good strategy to catch the allies between two forces, to wit, his own and Macdonald's, Moreau from the Riviera still planned to march on Tortona and there meet Macdonald, who he assumed would have victoriously forced his way through whatever army the enemy detached against him.

Macdonald had got into communication with Moreau as early as the 18th of May, but this did not mean that he could actually join his colleague. To strengthen Macdonald as much as possible, however, Moreau sent him Victor's division by way of the Taro valley, and himself, with what was left, advanced in two columns, through the valley of the Scrivia and the Bocchetta pass, to lend a hand in the coming conflict. But it was June 18 before Moreau reached Novi and Serravalle, and the lightning had already struck. When on the 20th he got to Tortona, raised the siege and pushed Bellegarde back, he found he had accomplished nothing.

Meanwhile Macdonald was moving slowly along the prescribed road to a hoped-for junction at Tortona. Although the Taro and the coast roads were open, there appears to have been small concert between him and Moreau. On June 12 he had met and beaten Hohenzollern and Klenau at Modena with heavy loss, and the latter had fallen back on Ott, who was advancing towards the Stradella pass. Macdonald kept on his way in a leisurely manner, confident that he was marching to an easy victory in connection with his chief.

ensued a bloody fight on the sandy bed and in the many islands of the Trebia, the loss being merciless, as the artillery on both banks fired grape and canister across the river into the masses of men, mowing down friend and foe alike. Perhaps no more curious battle was ever fought. It was involuntary on both sides. It did not end till past midnight, after three hours' slaughter, by the united efforts of the generals on both sides, who recognized the folly of the fighting, and finally managed to withdraw their divisions.

On the 19th the exhausted regiments did not come together until ten o'clock, when the French left under Dombrowsky strove to cross the Trebia at Rivalta, and Suwarrov detailed Bagration to stop them. This he did; but by his advance there was a gap left in the Russian line on the left of Bagration, taking quick advantage of which, Victor and Rusca crossed, and surrounded and fell with fury on the Russian division of Swykowski. Suwarrov's line came near being disrupted. This division, however, with characteristic Russian coolness, formed square, and holding itself until some reserves arrived, Bagration came back, and Förster sent reinforcements, was able to drive off the French. Dombrowsky had not moved. Meanwhile the French centre and right had made no progress, the Russians under Förster driving back Montrichard, while Ott and Melas arrested, at San Nicolo, Olivier's attempts, however gallant, to cross the river. A French turning manœuvre around the Russian left was fruitless, Watrin, without definite idea of what was required of him, having only marched and countermarched. Suwarrov's efforts to gain a footing on the other bank of the Trebia were equally fruitless. At night the meandering stream still lay between the rival armies. Macdonald had been attacking all along the line; Suwarrov had confined his main attacks to the French left and refused his own left.

The loss had been fearful. Macdonald's casualties were, it is said, four thousand killed, and twelve thousand wounded and missing; five hundred officers and nearly all the generals had been killed or wounded. The Russian loss was six thousand men.

Suwarrov, than whom no more gallant man ever held a baton, determined to fight again on the 20th; but Macdonald retired at daylight to the Nura. He had lost half his army in attempting to join Moreau. Suwarrov sent Ott in pursuit, but the sound of Moreau's guns in the distant rear prevented its being effective. He himself returned to Alessandria. Macdonald had shown courage, but in his management had been wanting. "After the loss of the battle of the Trebia, not a man of the army of Macdonald should have reëntered France, which would have avoided the battle of Novi. Italy was then conquered. But Suwarrov, instead of cutting the French army from Genoa by marching rapidly on the Apennines, abandoned his pursuit at the most important moment, and this army escaped him," say the Memoirs.

As above stated, Moreau had marched on Tortona to join his colleague, and on the 19th he attacked Bellegarde at Cassina Grossa and threw him back behind the Bormida. But the bulk of the allied army lay between him and Macdonald, and the latter had already been beaten, and was glad eventually to retire on Parma and Modena. Had Macdonald held his left in force at the battle of the Trebia, he could in four days have joined Moreau by way of Bobbio. As it was, it was a month before he managed to do so, and this only because Suwarrov did not follow him up. Moreau's theory of taking the enemy between two fires had been shown to be worthless compared with Bonaparte's theory of massing everything in one body before meeting the enemy. Upon Suwarrov's appearance after the battle of the Trebia, Moreau retired

down the Scrivia and through the Bocchetta pass. Suwarrov had succeeded in his effort to keep the two French armies apart, for a time at least, by skillful manœuvring on a sound theory.

The entire campaign had gone wrong. Barely three months old, it had resulted in French disaster. The only French general who had held himself was Massena, and him Archduke Charles, in the two hearty combats of May 27 and June 4, had driven behind Zürich, where, however, he still held the line of the Albis. The effect in Paris was to threaten the existing government. A new Directory was formed, and many of the generals were shifted. Championnet was released from imprisonment, and set to raising an army. Bernadotte was made Minister of War. Joubert, whose fine work in the Adige valley we remember, was sent to command the Army of Italy. Moreau was to receive command of a problematical army on the Rhine.

Joubert.

Luckily for France, Suwarrov, who was the ablest man on the theatre of war, lost much time under orders from Vienna in besieging fortresses held by the French, — the Austrians desired to repossess the land, — and two months passed before hostilities again began. Joubert reached the Army of Italy August 5, with orders to attack, but he requested Moreau to stay by him until the first battle.

In August the French army, made up of the relics of Moreau and Macdonald and some reinforcements from France, still numbered over forty-five thousand men. Championnet at Grenoble had collected thirty thousand men. The two

together might operate with nearly eighty thousand effective. St. Cyr, with the right wing of the Army of Italy, was in the Bocchetta pass and at the upper waters of the Orba and Scrivia; while Perignon, with the left wing, stretched from the upper Tanaro to the Erro. Mantua and Alessandria had gone lost; and as it was thought that Kray and some forces from Switzerland were about to join Suwarrov, and thus make an army of sixty thousand effective, Joubert desired to give battle in anticipation of such a junction. On August 9, accordingly, he began to assemble at Novi, backing up against the Bocchetta pass, and by the 14th had formed a half-circle on the slope of Monte Rotondo. He had marched to his battlefield by two routes, the left wing debouching from the Bormida valley by way of Acqui. It was solely by good fortune that the allies did not fall on Perignon and destroy him.

Monte Rotondo is a moderate hill which extends from Serravalle on the Scrivia to the Lemo, and is largely covered with vineyards and orchards closed in by walls and live hedges. Novi lies nearly at the foot of the slope; and the village of Pozzolo-Formigaro, north of Novi, is somewhat higher on a plateau. The French left leaned on the Riasco brook; Grouchy and Lemoine were marshaled in front of Pasturana, with the cavalry reserves under Richepanse behind this wing; Colli and Laboissière stood on the slopes in the centre on either side of Novi; the right under Watrin leaned on the Scrivia at San Bartolomeo; Dombrosky blockaded Serravalle, whose citadel was held by an allied battalion. The left wing remained under Perignon, the centre and right under St. Cyr. The force in line was some thirty-five thousand men, but without reserves. As a preparation for the battle, Joubert would have done well to capture the fort of Serravalle, so as to lean his right upon it; and this could easily have been done, with the force and time at hand.

had got too far advanced. Much outnumbered, this was thrown back in grave disorder; St. Cyr strove heartily to hold the heights and cover the road of communications with Gavi, but was finally compelled to fall back behind the Fornova brook, and Novi went lost. The French left retired behind Pasturana, and a small force of Bellegarde's took the divisions in flank and hurried them back still farther, with loss of their artillery and many casualties. Grouchy and Perignon were wounded and taken prisoners. Colli's brigade was captured to nearly the last man; Lemoine's division was all but destroyed. The French were driven in at all points, after sixteen hours of desperate fighting; and by 8 P. M. Suwarrov had won the battle.

Infantryman. (1799.)

Though their defense had been superb against overwhelming numbers, the French divisions now fell to pieces. St. Cyr alone kept his troops in any kind of order. The rest dissolved and sought safety by battalions, companies and groups in the ravines in their rear. After their long exertions the allied pursuit was not vigorous, and the French reassembled at the headwaters of the Erro and the Orba. The allies had lost eight thousand men killed and wounded. The French casualties were eleven thousand killed, wounded and prisoners, among them the commanding general and four division generals. Thirty-seven guns and four flags went lost. Moreau was glad to put the Apennines between his army and the enemy.

It had been agreed that, to sustain Joubert's operations against Suwarrov, Championnet, with the fresh army organized in Savoy and the Dauphiné, should debouch from the Alps and create a strong alarm in the Turin country, so as to

necessitate the detailing of a force against him. Joubert did not wait for this assistance, but began his manœuvres a week before Championnet advanced. As it was, the latter with his several columns only reached Susa, Pignerol and Coni September 2, and accomplished no good end. He had not shown great ability.

There was no grand-tactics in the battle of Novi; it was won by sheer hard fighting, and is a fair sample of the determination for which Suwarrov was always noted. Yet at the opening of the battle he had not smartly put in his men. Before long he received orders to move to Switzerland. Italy was definitely lost to the French. What Bonaparte had conquered, Suwarrov had won back.

Meanwhile the Anglo-Russian expedition against Holland had been carried through and failed, partly because the Scandinavian kingdoms and Prussia had refused to take part in it, partly because of its own weight. It had been proposed to land a force of nearly fifty thousand men, under the Duke of York, at Helder on the Zuyder Zee, and the aid of the adherents of the House of Orange was hoped. In neither size of army nor internal assistance was the hope realized. Brune was in command of thirty-five thousand French and Dutch spread all over Holland, plus ten thousand men in Belgium. He should have occupied Helder, as he might have done, so soon as the fleet was sighted, but he did not. The expedition landed at Helder toward the end of August. Still, adverse weather had so much delayed the operation that Brune had time to assemble part of his force. A combat at Groet Keeten was favorable to the allies. The squadron entered the roadstead of Texel; and on August 31 the Dutch fleet, in which a mutiny had occurred, surrendered. This was really all that England aimed to accomplish, for without a navy Holland was completely neutralized, so far as she was con-

far as Lago Maggiore, and Haddick back to Ivrea; and clearing the Simplon and Grimsel, occupied the Furca pass. Jellachic's left and right were also pushed back to the Muttenthal and Uznach. The French thus recovered the upper valleys of the Rhine, Rhone and Reuss. Charles, on the Austrian right, had been held in check by Mortier, Soult and Lorges, while his left wing was thus beaten with a loss of eight thousand killed, wounded and missing, and twenty-one guns. With his centre Massena moved on Zürich, which he attacked August 14; but the city walls proved too strong for him. Charles, on his side, failed to turn the French left and oust Massena from the Albis hills. Meanwhile Korsakov reached Zürich. As Massena outnumbered the Austrians when Bellegarde had been sent to Italy, he should have won more after his victories of August 14–16, says Napoleon. Yet Massena was distinctly the French hero of the European campaign of 1799. The Austrian army now held a line from the watershed between the Linth and Reuss through Coire to the sources of the Rhine. Massena's left wing leaned on Basle and ran along the Rhine and the river Aar, while his right wing leaned on the lake of Geneva, and ran up the Rhone and through the Furca to the Reuss and Aar, with outlying detachments up in the mountain passes. The Limmat was held in force.

Brune.

Part of the general allied plan was to sustain the expedition

to Holland by sharp operations in Switzerland and on the Middle Rhine. Now that the land had been overrun, the Vienna authorities were selfishly anxious to get Suwarrov out of northern Italy, so as to have their own way there, and reap the credit and prizes of the late victories. There was a good deal of jealousy between the allied commanders, and hearty coöperation was lacking. With his Austrians, Charles, who had been with Korsakov in Switzerland, was to go down to Mannheim, cross and march on the Netherlands, while Melas with his Austrians should drive the French back up the Riviera; the Russian fleet was to seize Corfu and move on Ancona, and the English fleet to help Naples rid herself of French domination. At the same time Suwarrov was to bring his own troops to Switzerland, and with the entire Russian army crush Massena and then invade Franche-Comté.

Nor were the French leaders all of a mind. Bernadotte and Massena were at odds, and rather than quarrel with Massena, the one general who held his own, the former was relieved of his post as Minister of War by the Directory. This gave Massena a free hand. Of Suwarrov's purpose he had got notice, and quickly determined to take advantage of the period after Charles had left the Limmat and before Suwarrov had arrived from Italy. All told, he had seventy-five thousand men on the line from Basle to Geneva, of which over half occupied an advanced position along the Limmat from Brugg to Zürich; and with these he might fall on the twenty-six thousand men of Korsakov, who but shortly before had reached the region, while Hotze with fourteen thousand men was still above the lake of Zürich along the Linth. It was a wise step to anticipate Suwarrov, for on the day on which he was to cross the St. Gothard, it had, though unknown to Massena, been arranged that Hotze and Korsakov should also make an attack on the French in their front.

back towards Switzerland, lest Swabia should be endangered; and on October 6 he reached Donaueschingen, but stopped there. On his leaving, Ney, serving under Lecourbe, who had been sent to the Lower Rhine, crossed the river and for a while blockaded Philipsburg. Lecourbe, with a new army half formed, manœuvred, actively but to no great purpose, on the right bank of the Rhine during part of October and November. As Massena kept quiet, there was nothing for him to gain by his operations.

Soult.

During the late fall there were only minor manœuvres in Switzerland. An attack by Massena on October 7, on Korsakov at Schlatt, near Schaffhausen, was driven back; but the French were more fortunate in a fight at Constance some days later. In Italy one by one the fortresses fell to the Austrians. Only Coni was left, and Genoa.

The armies of the Alps and Italy were now joined under Championnet, who took command at Genoa September 10. Under him St. Cyr held the Bocchetta pass on the right, Duhesme Briançon on the left. In the centre Championnet manœuvred to hold Coni. There was much to-and-fro movement. On November 4 the French were defeated with the loss of eight thousand men at Genola, and Coni fell to the Austrians. It was with difficulty that Genoa was kept. Championnet retired early in the year, and Massena took command at Genoa, Febru-

ary 10. Championnet "was brave, full of zeal, active, devoted to his country; he was a good general of division, a mediocre general-in-chief." Melas went into winter quarters, determined to drive the French beyond the Var in the spring.

The French held almost all Switzerland, conquered by Massena's skill. Suwarrov retired to Bavaria. The Austro-Russian quarrel waxed apace. Charles and Suwarrov exchanged some bitter letters, and real coöperation between the two armies ceased.

The French Directory had this year shown valor, but small discretion. It was indeed lucky that Massena rescued Switzerland from the wreck. The errors of the Vienna cabinet, led by Thugut, were scarcely less, and their selfish treatment of their Russian allies was glaring. The Coalition came to an end in October.

Suwarrov was of Swedish descent, born in Finland in 1729. He was thus seventy years old during this memorable campaign in Italy and Switzerland. He had served in the Seven Years' War against the Poles, and from 1773 to 1790 against the Turks. He was the hero of many a brave assault. His work in 1799 in Italy was distinguished, and that in Switzerland, though unfortunate, scarcely less so. It was his last campaign. Massena saw many more.

Of Suwarrov Napoleon says that "he had the soul of a great captain, but not the head. He was endowed with a strong will, great activity, intrepidity proof to all events, but he had neither a genius nor the knowledge requisite for war. When he arrived on the Adige, Kray had broken down the gates of Italy, Mantua and Peschiera were blockaded, and Scherer was behind the Adda, weakened by the loss of two battles and by the garrisons he had thrown into Mantua, Peschiera, Brescia, Bergamo, Ferrara, Fort Urbano and Pizzighetone. He could no longer hold himself, nor was

dangerous except by his junction with the Army of Naples. Suwarrov should, in all his manœuvres, have proposed to himself but one goal: to prevent this junction. It was just this one thing he never thought of. He acted without plan, without reckoning." Yet Suwarrov did this very thing effectively. Napoleon draws up a beautiful plan of campaign which Suwarrov should have followed instead of what he did under the direction of the Aulic Council. While in a way the criticism is sound, the fact remains that Suwarrov did win back northern Italy; and Napoleon rarely appreciated an enemy at his true worth.

From the beginning of the wars of the French Revolution there had been no such enormous forces brought together, and never had France been so outmatched in numbers, nor had such commanders against her as Suwarrov and Archduke Charles. As a result, in thirteen months (from the end of October, 1798, to the end of November, 1799) less than half its programme was carried out. The Coalition had won Italy, Corfu and the Ionian Islands, and held itself on the Rhine; but it had been driven out of Switzerland, Egypt and Syria, and Holland. The members of the Coalition had acted each for its own interest, except Russia. England strove to destroy the Dutch fleet and to enlarge its commerce; Austria to reoccupy northern Italy and hold it for itself; the kings of Sardinia and Naples to recover their thrones; the Porte to reconquer Egypt. There was little real coöperation to the one end of humbling France and restoring the Bourbons. Although future events robbed Bonaparte's conquests in Italy of any utility, yet from a military point of view, what he did in 1796 and 1797 stands out in marked relief from the weak conduct and consequent defeats of the other French generals.

Owing to the unfair treatment of Suwarrov, Paul determined to separate from Austria, and to create a northern coalition.

A defensive treaty was made October 29 with Sweden. Denmark was separated from the French allies. Prussia could not be reached. England strove to reconcile Russia and Austria, and Paul was willing to listen, if Thugut, to whom he ascribed the ill-results of the last campaign, was shelved. The old Thugut-Suwarrov ill-will was revived, and Suwarrov, who had been resting his troops in Bohemia, was called back to Russia with the army.

Sword presented to the First Consul by Officers of the Army of Egypt.
(Prince Victor's Collection.)

END OF VOLUME I.

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